An illustration of the last point is the powers of the Attorney-General. Dicta of the House of Lords in Gouriet v Union of Post Officer Workers that decision of the Attorney-General whether to consent to relator proceedings are not justiciable were not dependent on the categorisation of his powers as part of the prerogative and the dicta were therefore not in terms affected by the decision in CCSU. The refusal to permit review of decisions by the Attorney-General may appear anomalous in the face of the courts’ general readiness to intervene by judicial review in the area of administration of justice, but recent cases have affirmed the non-reviewability of other classes of decision of the Attorney-General, in acknowledgment of his role as guardian of the public interest and the sensitive policy content of his decisions.” [46] Learned SFC urged this Court to hold that the AG’s role as the guardian of public interest in considering whether to grant or otherwise his consent pursuant to section 9(1) of Act 359 should remain outside the court’s jurisdiction. The rationale underpinning the SFC’s submission is that the AG is accountable to Parliament and not to the courts. In support of his contention, learned SFC referred us to p.524 of the Gouriet’s case, where Lord Fraser of Tulleybelton put it as follows: “If the Attorney-General were to commit a serious error of judgment by withholding consent to relator proceedings in a case where he ought to have given it, the remedy must in my opinion lie in the political field by enforcing his responsibility to Parliament and not in the legal field through the courts. That is appropriate because his error would not be an error of law but would be one of political judgment, using the expression of course not in a party sense but in the sense of weighing the relative importance of different aspects of the public interest. Such matters are not appropriate for decision in the courts.” [47] Moreover, it was the learned SFC’s submission that AG is not a public officer or public authority within Order 53 of the Rules of Court 2012. Based on the aforesaid reasons, learned SFC emphasised the continued relevance of the principles established in the Gouriet’s case and submitted that there is no rhyme nor reason for the Court of Appeal to disregard the principles laid down in the Gouriet’s case which conferred immunity from judicial review on the AG. Analysis and Findings [48] It is trite that not all cases brought before courts are reviewable. Before proceeding to hear a case, a court must first examine, inter alia, its justiciability. “Justiciability” concerns the limits upon legal issues over which a court can exercise its judicial authority. Non-justiciability in its administrative law sense signifies that a matter is not capable of or susceptible to, judicial review, as well as non-justiciability in the sense of there being no jurisdiction to entertain an issue or to grant approved relief. [49] The issue of justiciability in an application for leave for judicial review was considered in great detail by Mohamad Ariff Md Yusuf J (as he then was) in Tengku Muhammad Fakhry Petra Ibni Sultan Ismail Petra v Yang Maha Mulia Pemangku Raja Kelantan & Ors [2011] 1 MLJ 28: “Non-justiciable Issues In connection with the unconstitutionality of legislation, we have seen that even where a fundamental right has been invaded by a statute, the individual who is affected thereby may not have a remedy from a Court of Law, because the issue involved is not justiciable. … The most prominent amongst non-justiciable issues are those which are known in the U.S.A. as “political questions”, which means that the subject matter of the question is such that it is not capable of a judicial determination (at p 256). The learned authors of De Smith's Judicial Review (6th Ed) have also appropriately observed in this connection that despite the wholesome development of administrative law, “the fact remains, however, that there are some issues which are inherently unsuited to adjudication” and in this category of case, “the Court acknowledges that the litigation process and the expertise of the Court are unsuited to resolving the question in hand”. (at p. 121). A good definition of “justiciability” can also be found in Chris Finn, “The Concept of ‘Justiciability’ in Administrative Law” in Groves & Lee, Australian Administrative Law (2007): “The term “justiciability” refers to the suitability for, or amenability to, judicial review of a particular administrative decision or class of decisions. The term derives from the common law and reflects a series of self-imposed judicial restraints, themselves founded in a view as to the appropriate constitutional balance between the respective roles of the executive and the judiciary. Thus, a matter may be deemed ‘non-justiciable’ by a Court which feels that its resolution either is beyond the institutional competence of the Court or would involve stepping outside its appropriate constitutional role. (at p.143).” [50] There are certain areas which the court is reluctant to delve into. These include the power of the state to enter into treaties and conduct of foreign policy, the defence of the realm and the control of the armed forces, the prerogative of mercy, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of Ministers. Such powers are governed by broader policy considerations which are more appropriately entrusted to the political branches of government, and which are unsuited to be examined by the courts. One such instance is the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL) (“the GCHQ case”). [51] As we have alluded to earlier, the learned SFC appearing on behalf of the appellant in Civil Appeal No.58 and the respondent in Civil Appeal No.59 placed emphatic reliance on the Gouriet’s case. This case is the seminal decision on relator proceedings. The brief facts of the case are these. On 13.1.1977, the general secretary of the Union of Post Office Workers (“U.P.W”) announced on television that his union’s executive committees had resolved to call on its members not to handle mails transmission between the United Kingdom and South Africa for a week beginning 16.1.1977, as a protest against the apartheid police then in force in South Africa. Such interference with postal communications constituted an offence under section 68 of the Post Office Act 1953 (U.K.), which provides: “If any person solicits or endeavours to procure any other person to commit an offence punishable on indictment under the Act, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour and be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.” [52] The news of this threat by the U.P.W to break the law and bring about the interruption of postal services to South Africa annoyed John Gouriet. On the following day (14.1.1977), he applied to Mr Sam Silkin, QC, the Attorney General (AG) for the latter’s consent to a relator action for an injunction to refrain the U.P.W from calling the strike. Silkin QC had refused to consent and quite undeterred, Gouriet issued a writ in his own name (thus making himself – and not the AG – the plaintiff) against the U.P.W, seeking an injunction against the latter. Because this action would not be heard in time to prevent the imminent strike, Gouriet applied on the same day (14.1.1977) to Stockers J (in chambers) for an interim injunction matching the terms of the final injunction sought in the main substantive action. Stockers J dismissed the application on ground that he had no power to make the order requested. Stockers J was of the view that Gouriet had no locus standi to bring the main action, given the fact that the AG had refused to act as plaintiff in such an action. [53] Mr. Gouriet then appealed to the Court of Appeal ([1977] 2 WLR 310). Before the Court of Appeal, Silkin QC had followed convention by refusing to disclose the reasons for his decision on the ground that he was only accountable to Parliament. He further submitted that the court did not have jurisdiction to grant the interim injunction because only he, the AG, would have had the necessary standing to sue on behalf of the public. [54] One of the main issues before the Court of Appeal was whether a court of law could review or override the effect of a refusal of consent by the AG, even where such refusal might have been based on corrupt motives or bad faith. Pronouncing upon the AG’s discretion in regard to the matter of consent, Lord Denning said at p.328: “It can be reviewed by the courts. If he takes into account matters which he ought not to take into account, or fails to take into account matters which he ought to take into account, then his decision can be overridden by the courts. Not directly, but indirectly. If he misdirects himself in coming to his decision, the court can say “Very well then. If you do not give your consent, or your reasons, we will hear the complaint of this citizen without it.” [55] The proposition that the Gouriet was entitled to maintain an action for injunction in his own right was, on the other hand, rejected by Lawton and Ormrod L.JJ. Both their Lordships also emphatically acknowledged that the AG could not be compelled either to give his consent to a relator action, or to disclose his reasons for refusing such consent. [56] By the time the case reached the House of Lords, Gouriet had abandoned his claim that the AG’s decision was improper or that it could be reviewed by the court. Nevertheless, after ruling that the Court of Appeal had no power to grant him an interim injunction, their Lordships (Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Diplock, Lord Edmund-Daview, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton) emphatically and unanimously rejected Lord Denning’s view that the court had the power to review the AG’s decision and upheld Silkin QC’s contention that he was accountable to the public only through Parliament. [57] With respect, we are unable to agree with the learned SFC that the orthodox common law immunity from judicial review of the AG’s prerogative powers laid down in the Gouriet’s case is still good law in view of the House of Lords decision in the GCHQ’s case. The judgment in the Gouriet’s case is a reflection of past judicial refusal to enquire into the way in which a prerogative power had been exercised. With the progressive development of judicial review, the courts have been more willing to review the exercise of discretionary power, whether derived from statute or a prerogative power. [58] The brief facts of the GCHQ case are these: The respondent had, in exercise of her prerogative powers conferred upon her by the Civil Service Order in Council 1982, changed the terms of service of the intelligence officers at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) by banning them from joining trade unions, citing national security concerns. The union then sought judicial review of the decision on the ground of unfairness. It was the unions’ contention that the courts could review the decision despite it having been made under prerogative powers, something that was previously considered to be not examinable by the courts. They claimed that the Government had not consulted the workers, and therefore there was a ground (procedural unfairness) for judicial review since a legitimate expectation of prior consultation had been established. [59] In an affidavit, the Secretary to the Cabinet claimed that prior consultation could have disrupted and exposed vulnerable areas of GCHQ’s operations. The House of Lords accepted the respondent’s explanation that the requirements of national security outweighed those of fairness. The House of Lords accepted that national security concerns are the purview or the executive, and a question regarding national security is considered to be unjusticiable. However, their Lordships held that the respondent’s decision would have otherwise been vitiated by her failure to consult, and would have been amenable to judicial review even though she acted by virtue of a prerogative power. In his judgment, Lord Scarman after having referred to the authorities of R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864 (DC) and R v Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Hosenball [1977] 1 W.L.R 766 (CA), stated at p.407 that the modern law of judicial reviews had overwhelmed the old restrictions on the justiciability of the prerogative: “The law relating to judicial review has now reached the stage where it can be said with confidence that, if the subject matter in respect of which prerogative power is exercised is justiciable that is to say if it is a matter upon which the court can adjudicate, the exercise of the power is subject to review in accordance with the principles developed in respect of the review of the exercise of statutory power .. Today, therefore, the controlling factor in determining whether the exercise of prerogative power is subject to judicial review is not its source but its subject matter.” [60] This landmark decision moved the courts from a position of deciding whether prerogative power existed to deciding if they were being carried out lawfully. Lord Diplock in his speech at p.401D of the GCHQ case enunciated three classic grounds for judicial review: “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when … one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety.” … By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can now succinctly be referred to as “Wednesbury unreasonableness” (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in it defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no reasonable person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. I have described the third head as “procedural impropriety” rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.” [61] The prerogative powers of the AG were not expressly considered in the GCHQ case. However, the necessary implication of the decision is that these powers (once considered unreviewable) are now potentially open to judicial scrutiny by the courts, except for a list of prerogatives that Lord Roskill categorised as being non-reviewable “because their nature and subject matter are such as not to be amenable to the judicial process”. [62] Writing in Public Law in January 2010, Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC and Richard Drabble QC, revisited the GCHQ case, calling it the “locus classicus of a modern public law” and noting that it “effectively buried the old concept of the prerogative power was unreviewable judicially” (see Sir Louis Blom-Cooper and Richard Drabble, “GCHQ revisited”, Public Law, January 2010, p.p 18 – 24). [63] Subsequent cases show that this list has largely been accepted, and there is indication that judges have continued to move with a degree of circumspection, and even in reaction against such development (see Leyland & Anthony, “Express and Implied Limits on Judicial Review: Ouster and Time Limit Clauses, the Prerogative Power, Public Interest Immunity”, Textbook on Administrative Law (6th ed., Oxford University Press 2009 pp. 392 – 437 at 414). However, in the case of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin); ILDC 662 (UK 2002), Lord Maurice Kay accepted that the ambit of the “forbidden areas”, identified by Lord Roskill in the GCHQ case is not immutable, and had been reduced in some cases (para 50). [64] The attitude of the courts in the United Kingdom is summarised in the obiter comments of Lord Justice Simon Brown in R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1995] EWCA Civ 23, [1996] Q.B. 517 at 539: “To my mind only the rarest cases today be ruled strictly beyond the court’s purview – only cases involving national security properly so called and where in addition the courts really do lack the expertise or material to form a judgment on the point at issue”. [65] The case of R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008], “Bancoult (No.2)” concerned a challenge to the UK government’s decision not to repatriate inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago, a group of about 60 islands in the Indian Ocean. Originally a French possession (and leper colony), it was ceded to Britain after Napoleon’s defeat in 1814. The Archipelago was turned into a separate territory (the British Indian Overseas Territory) in 1965 and depopulated in order to make room for a US military base on the Archipelago’s chief island, Diego Garcia. All this was achieved through the exercise of prerogative powers – first the BIOT Order 1965 and then the Immigration Ordinance 1971, which gave the newly established BIOT Commissioner the authority (in colonial boilerplate) to ‘make laws for the peace, order and good government of the territory’. [66] One of the issues before the House of Lords concerned the general question of the reviewability of prerogative legislation. The Law Lords unanimously ruled that judicial review applied. While it is true that prerogative Orders in Council are a type of primary legislation they said, it does not follow that they share all the characteristics of Acts of Parliament, in particular their immunity from judicial review. [67] Lord Hoffman said at para 35: “The fact that such Orders in Council in certain important respects resemble Acts of Parliament does not mean that they share all their characteristics. The principle of the sovereignty of Parliament, as it has been developed by the courts over the past 350 years, is founded upon the unique authority Parliament derives from its representative character. An exercise of the prerogative lacks this quality, although it may be legislative in character, it is still an exercise of power by the executive alone. … I see no reason why prerogative legislation should not be subject to review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety in the same way as any other executive action.” [68] The House did, however, rule that the Orders evicting the inhabitants were lawful, primarily due to the interdiction of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865. [69] We also make reference to the case of Brown v Executor of the Estate of HM Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother [2008] 1 WLR 2327 EWCA. The brief facts of that case are these: Following the death in 2002 of Princess Margaret and the Queen Mother, litigation was brought by a Mr. Andrew Brown who claimed to be an illegitimate son of the late Princess Margaret. He also sought to inspect the Will of the late Queen Mother. It appears that the general practice is that Royal Wills are sealed. [70] The Court of Appeal held that a private individual was entitled, in public interest, to have a substantive hearing of his claim to inspect the Wills of members of the Royal family. Lord Phillips M.R. observed at para 38: “The conclusion (of the House of Lords in Gouriet’s case) that, in the absence of the consent of the Attorney-General, Mr. Gouriet was barred from pursuing the proceedings was based the analysis of the statutory provisions in issue. By contract, there is nothing on the face of section 124 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 to suggest that the court may only exercise its powers under it on an application by the Attorney-General.” [71] The decision of the case above would suggest that the decision in Gouriet’s case is no longer good law and that the basis upon which it was decided no longer prevail. The present position is the AG is no longer regarded as the sole guardian of what is public interest, which was a central principle of the decision in the Gouriet’s case. [72] It is interesting to note that in England private individuals may now properly seek judicial review of decisions of the Public Prosecutor whether or not to initiate criminal proceedings. This power does not exist at the time of the judgment in the Gouriet’s case. In R (B) v Director of Public Prosecutors (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) [2009] EWHC 106 (Admin) [2009] 1 WLR 2072, it was held at page 52: “The exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review is less rare in the case of a decision not to prosecute than a decision to prosecute (because a decision not to prosecute is final, subject to judicial review, whereas a decision to prosecute leaves the defendant free to challenge the prosecution’s case in the usual way through the criminal court) but is still exceptional.” [73] The Courts in England have consistently held that private individuals may seek judicial review of decisions of the public prosecutor not only in matters of initiation or failure to take court proceedings or to discontinue police investigations, but additionally of decisions whether to take over or discontinue ongoing private investigations (see R v DPP, Ex parte Duckenfield [2000] 1 WLR 55 per Laws LJ at pp 67 – 68 and R v Crown Prosecution Service [2011] EWHC 472 (Admin), [2011] 2 Cr. App. R 12 at para 147). [74] The legal principle propounded in the GCHQ case enjoy considerable support from the decision of a very strong bench of Law Lords sitting as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Mohit v The Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius [2006] UKPC 20 (25 April 2000). In that case, the Mauritian Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”), who enjoys similar prosecutorial powers to the English AG, filed a nolle prosequi and terminated the proceeding each time the appellant tried to bring a private prosecution against a senior politician. The appellant requested leave to apply for judicial review from the Supreme Court of Mauritius but the court upheld the DPP’s argument that the effect of the decision in the Gouriet’s case was that the exercise of the DPP’s powers was not amenable to judicial review. [75] However, on appeal to the Privy Council, the DPP, in an apparent attempt to avoid the adverse implication of the GCHQ case for the Gouriet’s precedent, supported the decision of the Supreme Court by relying less on the source of the power to enter a nolle prosequi than on the nature of the decision to enter one. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in The State v Ilori [1983] 1 SCNLR 94 – that the controlling factor in determining whether the exercise of prerogative power is justiciable is its subject matter – the DPP contended that a prosecutorial decision ‘involves the assessment of factors which the courts cannot and should not seek to review’. The Privy Council emphatically rejected this contention, and refused to disturb what it described as “the ordinary assumption that a public officer exercising statutory functions is amenable to judicial review.” Lord Bingham, who delivered the judgment, indicated at para 14 that Viscount Dilhorne’s dictum in the Gouriet’s case could now be “reviewed or modified in the light of the later decision of the House of Lords in the GCHQ case”. [76] Singapore’s courts have repeatedly affirmed that all powers are subject to legal limits. In Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525, [1988] SGCA 16, para. 86; Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779, [2015] SGCA 59, paras 1–2.), the Courts held thus: “under the law, the AG’S discretionary power is not absolute and he must act according to law, as his prosecutorial power is subject to legal limits. Prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised in bad faith, or in a manner contrary to the quality guaranteed under Article 12 of the Constitution” (see Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 49, [2007] SGHC 207, para. 148). [77] Reverting back to our present appeals, we have carefully considered the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No.58 while keeping in mind the principles of law on the subject as propounded by the Courts in other jurisdiction. We found there was no flaw in its reasoning in holding that the power of the AG to give or refuse consent under section 9(1) of Act 359 is amenable to judicial review. We are in total agreement with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning as alluded to earlier in paragraph 18. [78] On the issue whether Attorney General is a public officer, we are of the view that the matter has been settled by the decision of Supreme Court in Tun Dato Haji Mohamed Salleh bin Abas v Tan Sri Dato Abdul Hamid bin Haji Omar & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 149 (SC) where it was held that AG is indeed a public officer under the Federal Constitution and Article 145 gives ample power to the AG to represent the government or person performing any functions under the Constitution. [79] The AG’s discretionary power to give or refuse consent pursuant to section 9(1) of Act 359 derives from a statute law and any restrictions and conditions applicable to statutory power cannot be ignored. [80] In this context, it is useful to reproduce Professor Edwards’ opinions on the issue of justiciability of the statutory prosecutorial powers of the Attorney-General, which was approved by the Privy Council in Mohit. According to him: “Since the source of the discretionary power rests in statute law there are no inherent constitutional objections to the jurisdiction of the courts being invoked such as arise with respect to the prerogative powers of the Law Officers of the Crown. Most of the celebrated cases which have been concerned with the reviewability of the Attorney-General’s decisions fall within this latter category … These powers derive from the prerogative authority vested in the Attorney-General and must be carefully distinguished from the discretionary powers that owe their origin to the actions of Parliament and which are to be found embedded in the long list of statutory provisions.” (See John Llewelyn Jones Edwards, The Attorney-General, Politics and the Public Interest (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1984) p.p 29-30) [81] Before concluding the present appeals, we would like to reiterate the important pronouncement in Indira Gandhi Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and Other Appeals [2018] 3 CLJ 145. In this case, the Federal Court emphatically declared that the power of judicial review “cannot be changed or altered by Parliament by way of a constitutional amendment”. The Court further stated, “The power of judicial review is essential to the constitutional role of the courts, and inherent in basic structure of the constitution”. The Federal Court’s reassertion of constitutional judicial power and its status as superior court meant that the power of the AG to grant or refuse consent under section 9(1) of Act 359 is amenable to judicial review. [82] In Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri Lembah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135, Raja Azlan Shah, CJ (Malaya) (as His Majesty then was) said at p.148: “Unfettered discretion is a contradiction in terms. My understanding of the authorities in these cases, and in particular the case of Pyx Granite (ante) and its progeny compel me to reject it and to uphold the decision of the learned judge. It does not seem to be realised that this argument is fallacious. Every legal power must have legal limits, otherwise there is dictatorship. In particular, it is a stringent requirement that a discretion should be exercised for a proper purpose, and that it should not be exercised unreasonably. In other words, every discretion cannot be free from legal restraint; where it is wrongly exercised, it becomes the duty of the courts to intervene. The courts are the only defence of the liberty of the subject against departmental aggression. In these days when government departments and public authorities have such great powers and influence, this is a most important safeguard for the ordinary citizen: so that the courts can see that these great powers and influence are exercised in accordance with law. I would once again emphasise what has often been said before, that “public bodies must be compelled to observe the law and it is essential that bureaucracy should be kept in its place”, (per Danckwerts L.J. in Bradbury v London Borough of Enfield).” [83] We hasten to add that unfettered discretion is contradictory to the rule of law. Therefore, the AG’s power to give consent or otherwise under section 9(1) of Act 359 is not absolute and is subject to legal limits. [84] In the same vein, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs (supra) said at para 86: “In our view, the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion was contrary to the rule of law. All powers has legal limits and the rule of law demands that courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power.” [85] For all the reasons given above, we would answer the leave question in Civil Appeal No.58 in the negative and the leave question in Civil Appeal in No.59 in the affirmative. Consequently, we dismissed the appellant’s appeal in Civil Appeal No.58 and we allowed the appellants’ appeal in Civil Appeal No.59. No order as to costs. So ordered. Dated: 8th March 2019 sgd. (MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH) Federal Court Judge Malaysia Civil Appeal No. 01(f)-58-10/2017(P) Counsel for the Appellant: Shamsol Bolhassan (Rosli Ahmad with him) Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Jabatan Peguam Ngara Bahagian Guaman, Aras 6 No.45, Persiaran Perdana 62100 Putrajaya. Counsel for the Respondent: Ravi Chandran Tetuan SC Ravi & Associate Peguambela & Peguamcara Suite 7.02, Wisma Sri Weld 3A, Pengkalan Weld, Georgetown 10300 Pulau Pinang. Civil Appeal No. 01(f)-59-11/2017(P) Counsel for the Appellants: Karin Lim Ai Ching (A.Suppiah with her) Tetuan Juli & Ameleena Peguambela & Peguamcara 51-8 D2, Menara BHL Jalan Sultan Ahmad Shah 10050 Penang. Counsel for the 1st Respondent: Shamsol Bolhassan (Rosli Ahmad with him) Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Jabatan Peguam Ngara Bahagian Guaman, Aras 6 No.45, Persiaran Perdana 62100 Putrajaya. Counsel for the 2nd Respondent: Ravin Vello Tetuan Vello & Associate No.105, Jalan Anson 10400 Pulau Pinang. Counsel for the 3rd Respondent: Balwant Singh (T.Gunaseelan with him) Tetuan Balwant Singh & Co. Peguambela & Peguamcara No. 69, Lebuh Bishop 10200 Penang.