1. ) Ab Rashid Bin Rause (Menuntut Sebagai Bapa Dan Orang Tanggungan Yang Sah Kepada Muhammad Faizal Bin Ab Rashid (No. Kp: 990724-07-5485) Si Mati Dan Bagi Orang-orang Tanggungan Yang Lain) v XXXX (PA-12B-19-07/2021)

Ini merupakan kes kemalangan motosikal melibatkan Simati (yang (dituntut melalui bapa dan orang tanggungan yang sah) dengan Defendan pada 20.05.2019 di Jalan Besar, Sungai Jawi Pulau Pinang. Kes ini 3 diputuskan melalui perbicaraan penuh di Mahkamah Sesyen pada 30.06.2021. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana telah memutuskan bahawa Defendan adalah 100% bertanggungan. Mahkamah ini tidak akan menyentuh fakta kes berlakunya kemalangan dan liabiliti memandangkan tiada rayuan atas liabiliti oleh Plaintif.

Ini merupakan Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini yang telah membenarkan rayuan Plaintif terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen yang membenarkan gantirugi atas kehilangan kebergantungan pendapatan sebanyak 1/3 daripada jumlah pendapatan Simati. Plaintif tidak berpuashati kerana menyatakan tiada tolakan sewajarnya dibuat daripada pendapatan Simati yang sepatutnya diambil kira oleh mahkamah adalah RM153,600 (RM800 sebulan x12 bulan x16 tahun = RM154,600.00). Mahkamah Sesyen telah membenarkan sebanyak RM74,880 (1/3x RM1170 x 196 bulan).

Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan rayuan dan mengubah keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut dan memutuskan sejumlah RM112,300.00 (½ x RM1170.00x 196 bulan= RM112,320.00). Atas keputusan tersebut permohonan rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan ini difailkan. Pihak-Pihak dirujuk sebagaimana kedudukan mereka di Mahkamah Sesyen.

Dalam sesuatu rayuan daripada mahkamah perbicaraan, mahkamah tidak akan campurtangan atas penemuan fakta kecuali mahkamah bicara telah melakukan kekhilafan yang nyata.

Prinsip ini diputuskan dalam kes TAN KUAN YAU V SUHINDRIMANI (1985) CLJ REP 323 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan: “The principle that should guide this Court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case in particular the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore, it is for the appeal court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was 5 an omission on the part of the Judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purpose of assessment some irrelevant considerations. If the Court is satisfied or convinced that the Judge has acted upon wrong principles of law the it is justified in reversing; indeed, it is its duty to reverse the finding of the trial Judge.”

Prinsip yang sama juga dinyatakan oleh Raja Azlan Shah (CJ Malaya pada ketika itu) dalam kes SALBIAH & ANOR V JAMIL BIN HARUN (1981) 1 LNS seperti berikut: “It must be remembered that the purpose of damages is to try, so far humanly possible, to put the victim back to the position he would have been in but for the accident. The damages must be fair, adequate and not excessive. A reasoned judgment must therefore be given by the judge, following legal principles and precedents. Other awards in other cases should normally be prayed in aid, but consideration must be given where the circumstances differ.” (lihat juga RASIDIN BIN PARTOJO V. FREDERICK KIAI [1976] 2 MLJ 214)

Mahkamah Sesyen memutuskan bahawa, jumlah yang wajar adalah tolakan sebanyak 1/3 daripada tuntutan oleh Plaintif berdasarkan prinsip perundangan sedia ada. Mahkamah Sesyen tidak menyatakan sebab kenapa 1/3 adalah wajar dibenarkan dalam Alasan Penghakiman. Namun walaupun Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah tersebut, Mahkamah Sesyen juga telah menyatakan dalam Alasan Penghakiman bahawa Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan tuntutan tersebut. Dalam kes TOPAIWAH V. SALLEH [1968] 1 LNS 61, juga dinyatakan seperti berikut: “So far as this Court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer LJ in Flint v. Levell [1935] 1 KB 354, 360 be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial Judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the Courts have made 7 over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate Court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case.”

Alasan Mahkamah ini dalam mengenepikan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen adalah kerana melalui keterangan, Plaintif berpendapatan sebanyak RM1,700.00 sebulan melalui keterangan majikan Simati. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana dalam memutuskan bahawa Plaintif telah membuktikannya.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana telah memberikan tolakan 1/3 daripada pendapatan untuk sumbangan Simati kepada Plaintif. Peguam Plaintif Yang Bijaksana merumuskan keputusan ini adalah tidak wajar kerana tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan untuk mencabar keterangan ini. Namun dalam hujahan, Defendan mencadangkan jumlah RM300.00.

Mahkamah ini, melihat semula keterangan Plaintif semasa perbicaraan yang berkaitan untuk menilai keterangan keseluruhan kes ini. Sama ada ianya telah dibuktikan. Berdasarkan nota keterangan yang ada, Plaintif telah memberikan keterangan berkaitan pecahan kepada penggunaan sumbangan RM800.00 oleh Simati seperti berikut:

Perbelanjaan makan minum

(ii) Perbelanjaaan Bil Elektrik RM70.00 sebulan

(iii) Perbelanjaan Bil Air RM30.00 setiap 2 bulan

(iv) Perbelanjaan Bil Telefon Bimbit RM 60.00 sebulan

Perbelanjaan Ubat Kencing Manis dan Darah Tinggi RM100.00 sebulan [11] Peguam Plaintif Yang Bijaksana menyatakan bahawa 1/3 daripada pendapatan tidak wajar ditolak tetapi jumlah RM800.00 sepenuhnya hendaklah diberikan untuk perbelanjaan kehidupan Plaintif. Defendan pula berhujah, sekiranya jumlah tesebut diambil kira, hanya RM300.00 sebulan saja wajar diberikan kepada Plaintif dan bukannya RM800.00 yang mana melebihi separuh daripada pendapatan Simati. [12] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes WONG LI FATT WILLIAM (AN INFANT) V. HAIDAWATI BT BOLHEN & ANOR [1994] 1 LNS 196; [1994] 2 MLJ 497, Yang Arif Hakim Richard Malanjum, (pada ketika itu) menyatakan, "In considering the issue of quantum of damages, I bear in mind that an award must be fair which means that must be a proper compensation for the injury suffered and the loss sustained. " [13] Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa perlu ada tolakan daripada jumlah RM800.00 seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana. Namum Mahkamah mendapati jumlah tersebut sewajarnya ditolak sebanyak ½ daripada jumlah RM800.00. Ini adalah kerana sekiranya jumlah RM800.00 sepenuhnya diberikan maka ini menunjukkan Simati telah menyerahkan melebihi separuh daripada pendapatannya kepada Plaintif dan hanya berbaki RM370.00 sahaja untuk Simati sendiri. (RM1170- RM 800 = RM370). Adalah menjadi tanggapan umum yang diiktiraf oleh kes-kes terdahulu bahawa, setiap orang memerlukan pendapatan untuk perbelanjaan sara hidup termasuk untuk diri sendiri. Berdasarkan keterangan, terdapat perbelanjaan yang akan ditanggung oleh Simati, misalnya kos penggunaan motosikal ke tempat kerja, makan minum dan lain-lain perbelanjaan hidup seharian [14] Merujuk kepada kes MUHAMAD BIN HASHIM v TEOW TEIK CHAI & ANOR [1996] 4 MLJ 7, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: “The amount of actual support received, the direct benefit to a 'dependant', and the amount of damages are of course matters pre-eminently for a trial court to decide, and per Thompson CJ in Nam Thiam Siew v Chuang Wai Lan [1959] MLJ 126 'a matter of assessment and not a matter of pure calculation'. The trial court provisionally assessed the years' purchase as eight at RM250 per month. Considering the deceased was 21 years old and single, and was drawing a salary of at least RM565 per month, the court found the trial court's provisional assessment of RM250 per month on a multiplier of eight years as the loss of support was reasonable, any difference between the trial court's provisional assessment and this court's assessment was also negligible and did not warrant any interference.” Dalam kes MUHAMAD BIN HASHIM (SUPRA), Mahkamah membenarkan tolakan ½ daripada gaji Simati setelah mengambilkira fakta kes tersebut. Jelaslah bahawa tolakan 1/3 bukanlah satu kemestian tetapi boleh diubah berdasarkan fakta kes. Ia bukanlah formula perundangan yang dinyatakan dalam mana-mana perundangan bertulis yang mesti dipatuhi oleh mahkamah. [15] Dalam kes REBECCA MATHEW & ORS v. SYARIKAT KERJASAMA SERBAGUNA GEMA WONG SIONG BHD & ANOR [1989] 1 LNS 136, mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: “I now come to the lost support to the two dependants in monetary terms. Counsel for the plaintiffs advocates the totalling up of all the moneys spent by the deceased from his earnings on the plaintiffs in order to calculate the loss of the value of the dependency. This would involve the tedious process of adding up all sorts of sundry expenditure which in most circumstances would be based on guess work. And in the present case, the evidence is too scanty to be of help to the court for it to arrive at a sensible sum using the approach that is advocated. With respect, in the circumstances of this case, I think the more sensible approach is the one advanced by counsel for the defendants; find the net income of the deceased and deduct from that a percentage representing the deceased's personal living expenses; the remainder is the value of the dependency for the plaintiffs. He cites the Singapore case of Chan Heng Wah v Peh Thiam Choh & Anor [1986] 2 MLJ 175; [1988] 1 MLJ 74 which went on appeal to the Court of Appeal as an example of this approach. The Singapore case is concerned with an estate claim and there is an exhaustive examination of relevant authorities in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal judgments as regards the approach to be taken in deducting living expenses of a deceased; the clear conclusion is that the approach of deducting a percentage leaving the remainder as surplus income for the dependants is a modern trend for both estate and dependency claims. To my mind, such a practical and sensible approach can safely be adopted in this case, there being no contrary local structures and no circumstances in this case against such an approach.” Dapatan Mahkamah [16] Adalah jelas berdasarkan kes di hadapan Mahkamah sekarang terdapat keterangan bahawa ianya adalah munasabah bagi Mahkamah ini untuk membuat tolakan ½ daripada jumlah pendapatan Simati kerana jumlah yang dinyatakan secara khusus melalui keterangan Plaintif perbelanjaan sebanyak RM 70 + RM30 +RM60 + RM100 = RM260 sebulan. Namun Mahkamah ini mengambil kira jumlah perbelanjaan makan minum (yang mana di dalam keterangan dinyatakan juga anak-cucu Plaintif yang lain juga ada datang ke rumah tersebut) dengan membenarkan sebanyak tambahan sebanyak RM325.00 (RM585-RM260= RM325) [17] Jumlah RM585.00 (½ x RM1170.00) tersebut adalah wajar dan munasabah kerana ia merupakan separuh daripada pendapatan Simati, setelah mengambilkira keperluan dan perbelanjaan Simati yang sudah berusia 19 tahun, sudah tentu mempunyai keperluan hidup dan perbelanjaan sendiri untuk diguna daripada hasil pendapatan yang diperolehi itu. [18] Dalam kes CHANG CHONG FOO & ANOR. v. SHIVANATHAN PERUMAL [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 27, diputuskan bahawa: “In fatal accident cases in respect of a dependency claim, the deceased's own expenses have to be deducted: See Amar Singh v. Chin Kiew [1960] 1 LNS 5 CA. This was the position at common law. It made sense because the deceased before his death could not have contributed the whole of his earnings towards the maintenance of his wife and children and that at least some part of his earnings must have been devoted to his own maintenance. This principle is now reflected in s. 7(3)(iv)(c) which came into force on 1 October 1984 and states: In assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the damages under this section the Court shall: take into account any diminution of any such amount as aforesaid by such sums as is proved or admitted to be the living expenses of the person deceased at the time of his death. It will be seen that the same language is used in both s. 7(3)(iv)(c) and s. 28A(2)(c)(iii). It follows that the legislature intended that the same principle be applied in both cases, that is to say, in respect of a dependency claim for loss of earnings arising out of a fatal accident and in respect of a claim for loss of future earnings for personal injury. We are accordingly of the view that the term 'living expenses' in s. 7 and s. 28A bear the same meaning. In Harris v. Empress Motors Ltd. and Cole v. Crown Poultry Packers Ltd. [1983] 3 All ER 561, the Court of Appeal held that:

the ingredients that go to make up 'living expenses' are the same whether the deceased was young or old, single or married, or with or without dependants;

(ii) the sum to be deducted as living expenses is the proportion of the deceased's net earnings that he would have spent exclusively on himself to maintain himself at the standard of life appropriate to his situation;

(iii) any sums that he would have expended exclusively to maintain or benefit others will not form part of his living expenses and will not be deductible from his net earnings. In White v. London Transport Executive [1982] 1 All ER 410, Webster J said at p. 418: ... in the cost of maintaining himself I include the cost of his housing, heating, food, clothing, necessary travelling and insurances and things of that kind... Where no details are given as to the deceased's living expenses, the Court of Appeal in P R Panickar V. Chwee May Kwong & Anor. [1957] 1 LNS 52 made an arbitrary deduction of RM50 p.m. as the deceased's living expenses out of monthly earnings of RM250.” (Sila rujuk kes RAHMAHYANI (AS WIFE AND DEFENDANT OF MUHROJI MOHD SIDIK (DECEASED) V. YAMUNA SUNDARI NAGARAJOO & ANOR AND ANOTHER CASE [2017] 1 LNS 1157; RENHOME BRICKS FACTORY SDN BHD & ANOR V. WATAH UMPIN [2009] 9 CLJ 494 DAN REBECCA MATHEW & ORS V. SYARIKAT SERBAGUNA GEMA WONG SIONG BHD & ANOR [1989] 1 LNS 136.) [19] Untuk membenarkan tolakan 1/3 atau jumlah yang tertentu adalah berdasarkan kepada fakta sesuatu kes. Tiada formula yang khusus untuk diikuti oleh mahkamah tetapi berasaskan kepada justifikasi dan sebab yang munasabah dalam perlaksaaan budibicara tersebut. Dalam kes PANG AH CHEE V. CHONG KWEE SANG [1985] CLJ REP 236; [1985] 1 MLJ 153, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: "The finding that a trial judge has erred in the discretion of being too generous would not be itself constitute a matter to be appealed from and the appellate court is always slow to reverse the trial judge's decision on assessment of damages unless there are strong grounds for interference." [20] Dalam kes BALAKRISHNAN A/L SINNAPPAN & ANOR V MARIAMMAH A/PGANAPRAGASM DAN WAKIL PERIBADI ANTHONYSAMY A/L ATPUTHAM [2006] 4 MLJ 567, mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: “Prinsip undang-undang bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan seharusnya berhati-hati (be slow) untuk masuk campur di atas pendapat fakta oleh mahkamah perbicaraan di mana telah mendengar dan melihat saksi-saksi memberi keterangan tidak boleh diambil atau diterima sebagai 'stereotyped formula' kerana setiap rayuan adalah berdasarkan kepada fakta bersendirian dan individu atau misdirection atau non-direction oleh mahkamah perbicaraan dan meneliti di atas satu kes ke satu kes (on a case to case basis).” [21] Atas isu bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana telah membuat dua penghakiman yang berbeza, ianya adalah salah tanggapan di sisi undang-undang. Dapatan dalam perintah oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana, beliau bersetuju bagi tuntutan Plaintif, jumlah yang wajar dibenarkan adalah untuk jumlah setelah tolakan 1/3 tersebut dibuat. Perintah yang telah diputuskan telahpun dimeterai dan berkutkuasa. [22] Dakwaan bahawa wujudnya Penghakiman Kedua oleh Peguam Plaintif sebenarnya ia adalah salah arah undang-undang kerana ianya hanyalah Alasan Penghakiman dan bukan Perintah. Beliau dengan jelas mengatakan walaupun sekiranya pembuktian diambilkira oleh mahkamah, Plaintif telah gagal membuktikannya kerana tiada bukti yang dikemukakan. Tidak wujud sebarang percanggahan seperti dakwaan Peguam Plaintif Yang Bijaksana. [23] Dalam kes KERAJAAN MALAYSIA V GLOBAL UPLINE SDN BHD AND ANOTHER APPEAL [2017] 1 MLJ 170 Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa: “an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its conclusion and where there has been insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence” [24] Juga dalam kes NG HOO KUI & ANOR V WENDY TAN LEE PENG, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATES OF TAN EWE KWANG, DECEASED & ORS [2020] 10 CLJ 1 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengesahkan prinsip bagi campurtangan Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu sekiranya terdapat “unmistakable clarity that the principle on which an appellate court could interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is 'the plainly wrong test' principle.” [25] Hujahan oleh Peguam Plaintif Yang Bijaksana bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana adalah funtus officio bila membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif. Peguam Plaintif Yang Bijaksana seterusnya berhujah bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana tidak lagi boleh memutuskan dalam Alasan Penghakiman bahawa Plaintif tidak membuktikan tuntutan tersebut kerana telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dalam perintah dan penghakiman mahkamah terbuka. Hujah ini adalah tidak berasas dan mahkamah ini menolaknya berdasarkan alasan yang telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah ini sebelumnya. Perintah adalah muktamad kecuali diakas atau diketepikan. Kesimpulan [26] Atas alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, rayuan terhadap kuantum dibenarkan kehilangan sumber pendapatan untuk jumlah RM112,320 (1/2 x RM1170.00 x 196 bulan) dengan kos sebanyak RM3,000.00 dibayar kepada Perayu. …………sgd…………… AZIZAN MD. ARSHAD Persuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi (3) Pulau Pinang Bertarikh pada 1 Julai 2022 Peguamcara kepada Perayu: Manjit Singh a/l Ram, Singhshuroma Guha Thakurta Tetuan Manjit & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara NO. 23 & 25, 1st Floor Jalan Seri Betik, Taman Sri Betik 14000 Bukit Mertajam Peguamcara kepada Responden: Joshua Narendran, Kuan Aun Wan Tetuan Ajmer Sandhu & Ong Peguambela & Peguamcara No.89, 1st Floor, Bishop Street 10200 Georgetown, Pulau Pinang Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

RASIDIN BIN PARTOJO V. FREDERICK KIAI [1976] 2 MLJ 214

TOPAIWAH V. SALLEH [1968] 1 LNS 61

WONG LI FATT WILLIAM (AN INFANT) V. HAIDAWATI BT BOLHEN & ANOR [1994] 1 LNS 196; [1994] 2 MLJ 497

MUHAMAD BIN HASHIM v TEOW TEIK CHAI & ANOR [1996]

REBECCA MATHEW & ORS v. SYARIKAT KERJASAMA SERBAGUNA GEMA WONG SIONG BHD & ANOR [1989] 1

CHANG CHONG FOO & ANOR. v. SHIVANATHAN

PANG AH CHEE V. CHONG KWEE SANG [1985] CLJ REP 236; [1985] 1 MLJ 153

BALAKRISHNAN A/L SINNAPPAN & ANOR V MARIAMMAH A/PGANAPRAGASM DAN WAKIL PERIBADI ANTHONYSAMY A/L ATPUTHAM [2006] 4 MLJ 567

NG HOO KUI & ANOR V WENDY TAN LEE PENG, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATES OF TAN EWE KWANG, DECEASED & ORS [2020] 10 CLJ 1