1. ) Abdul Halim Bin Mubarak v 1. ) Perangsang Hotel and Properties Sdn Bhd (WA-22NCvC-267-05/2022)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) GUAMAN NO. : WA-22NCVC-267-05/2022

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Schedule A referred to in paragraph 33 above or such other sum as may be awarded; iii. Damages-General damages, aggravated and/or punitive damages, and equitable compensation; and iv. Interest and Costs [3] The trial took place over the course of four (4) days from 24th February until 27th February 2025. Witnesses [4] During the trial, a total of six (6) witnesses were called-Plaintiffs’ witnesses D1 and D2’s witnesses Rusli bin Affandi (PW1) Hawa Binti Esa (DW1) Jamal bin Sahak (PW2) Ganesan Murty s/o James (DW2) Ahmad Rosly bin Ahiar (PW3) Suzila Binti Khairuddin (DW3) S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg [5] On a balance of probabilities, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have succeeded in proving their claim against D1. Thus, the Plaintiff’s claim is allowed against D1 but not against D2 and D3. BRIEF FACTS [6] The Plaintiffs were the former employees of D1. [7] D1 is the registered proprietor of a land identified as PN9955 Lot 1702, situated in the District of Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan, upon which it operates a 15-storey hotel known as Quality Hotel City Centre (Quality Hotel), located at No. 21, Jalan Raja Laut, 50750 Kuala Lumpur. As such, PHP and Quality Hotel will be used interchangeably and refer to one and the same entity. [8] On 01.03.2016, D1 entered into a 20-year Lease Agreement (Lease Agreement) with MGH Hospitality Management Sdn Bhd (MGH) to operate Quality Hotel. [9] Under the Lease Agreement, the operational cut-off date was set for 31.05.2016, after which MGH was expected to assume the hotel operations. The Plaintiffs were informed that their employment would be migrated to MGH, although D1 continued to manage payroll and human resources functions during this transition. [10] However, on 27.12.2016, D1 terminated the Lease Agreement with MGH and executed a new lease agreement (New Lease Agreement) with D3. The New Lease Agreement was backdated to 01.03.2016 and S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg mirrored the terms of the previous Lease Agreement, including the same operational cut-off date. D1 continued to actively manage the hotel operations. [11] There was an important meeting known as Townhall Meeting organized by D1. During that Townhall Meeting held on 26.01.2017 (Townhall Meeting), D3 was introduced as the new business partner taking over Quality Hotel operations. Plaintiffs were offered new employment contracts with D3. [12] Thereafter, on 01.02.2017, D1 issued letters releasing the Plaintiffs from their employment, citing their acceptance of D3’s offers. [13] Subsequently, on 01.03.2018, D3 issued retrenchment letters to the Plaintiffs, citing termination of the Lease Agreement by D1 and 19.03.2018 as the Plaintiffs’ last working day, with final service ending on 31.03.2018. D3 later surrendered vacant possession of Hotel Quality. [14] There was also a Suit filed at the High Court of Shah Alam No. BA- 22NCVC-377-08/2018 (Suit 377) by D1 against D3 for breach of the New Lease Agreement. The pleadings in Suit 377 disclosed that the Plaintiffs’ employment had been migrated to D3 as early as 31.05.2016, which is eight months prior to the Townhall Meeting and issuance of the offer letters. The Plaintiffs maintain that they were unaware of this migration. [15] Later, on 15.5.2019, D3 was wound-up on the Petition of D1. The Plaintiffs have obtained leave to initiate legal proceedings against D3. S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg Plaintiffs’ Contention [16] The Plaintiffs contented that D3 was a shell company incapable of fulfilling its obligations and that D1 orchestrated the lease transitions to avoid retrenchment liabilities. [17] The Plaintiffs contended that the employment transition was made effective without prior notice, consultation, or consent, and was only disclosed during the Townhall Meeting. [18] The Plaintiffs also contended that they were pressured into accepting the new employment terms and that D1 remained their true employer at all times. The Plaintiffs accepted the offers in reliance on the representations made. The Plaintiffs further contended that the sequence of events demonstrates a deliberate and concealed employment migration, executed without their knowledge or consent. [19] The Plaintiffs contended that D1 and D2 have a duty of care and responsibility towards them, particularly as D1 continued to own the business at the material time. The approval of gratuity payments to the employees who opted for early retirement, further supports D1’s continued involvement. [20] The Plaintiffs contended that D1 and D2 had acted in bad faith by transferring their employment to an unqualified third party and alleged misrepresentation, breach of statutory and contractual obligations, negligence, and conspiracy to defraud. S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg [21] Above all, the Plaintiffs contended that D1, D2, and D3 must be held jointly and severally liable for the unlawful termination and the losses suffered. The Defendants failed to discharge their obligations in good faith. D1 and D2’s Contention [22] D1 and D2 contended that the Plaintiffs’ claim is essentially for retrenchment benefits following the termination of employment by D3 on 19.03.2018. Therefore, regardless of how the Plaintiffs labels the claim, whether as fraud, conspiracy, or negligence, it is in substance of a matter that should have been pursued before the Industrial Court against D3, the actual employer. [23] D1 and D2 further contended that the Plaintiffs wrongly seek to hold them liable for D3’s actions. During trial, the Plaintiffs’ own witnesses admitted that D3 alone was responsible for the termination. The suit against D1 and D2 was only initiated because D3 became insolvent and unable to pay any judgment sum. Therefore, D1 and D2 claim they are being used as scapegoats. [24] It was further contended by D1 and D2 that the Plaintiffs’ case is riddled with inconsistencies. Witnesses admitted to making false statements and filing inaccurate police reports. The Plaintiffs failed to produce original documents or call their makers, resulting in key documents, like retrenchment letters and pay slips which being marked only for identification and having no evidential value. This reliance on inadmissible documents undermines the credibility of the claim. S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg [25] It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs were previously employed by D1 but voluntarily accepted employment with D3 starting 01.02.2017. D1 issued release letters confirming this transition. There is no evidence that D1 or D2 retrenched the Plaintiffs on 19.03.2018. D2 is a publicly listed company and the parent of D1, but both are separate legal entities with no ownership or control over D3, which is independently owned by Koh Wooi Nyar and Yee Weng Yuen. [26] D2 had already decided to exit the hospitality industry in 2012. D1 leased the hotel premises to MGH in 2016 and later to D3. The Plaintiffs were informed of this change during a Townhall Meeting on 26.01.2017 and voluntarily accepted employment with D3. D1 then issued release letters on 01.02 2017. [27] D1 and D2 also contended that the Plaintiffs’ claim is an abuse of the court’s process. The Plaintiffs had previously pursued retrenchment benefits through the Pejabat Tenaga Kerja Kuala Lumpur but failed to prosecute or appeal the outcome. The delay in filing this suit suggests the claim is an afterthought. [28] The Plaintiffs has made serious allegations of fraud and conspiracy against D1 and D2 but failed to prove them. The Plaintiffs’ main witness was unreliable, having admitted to falsehoods and contradictions. There is no evidence of any scheme or misrepresentation by D1 or D2. On the contrary, their conduct was transparent and aligned with their corporate responsibilities. S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg [29] D1 and D2 deny any negligence or breach of statutory duty. They argue there was no legal obligation for them to conduct due diligence on D3 for the Plaintiffs’ benefit. The Plaintiffs were not employed by D2, and D1 had fulfilled its obligations during the Plaintiff’s tenure. [30] Further, D1 and D2 contended that the Plaintiffs’ delay in filing this action has prejudiced their ability to gather evidence. Therefore, the doctrine of laches applies, and it would be unfair to allow the claim to proceed. [31] Finally, D1 and D2 submit that the Plaintiffs failed to prove the alleged damages. The claim for RM2,777,952.21 in retrenchment benefits is unsubstantiated. The Plaintiffs had found alternative employment and did not suffer the losses claimed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS [32] It is trite law that the onus lies on the Plaintiff to prove his claim in order to succeed against the Defendant, pursuant to sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950 (see Datuk Mohd Ali bin Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Berhad [2014] 4 MLRA 397; [2014] 4 MLJ 465; [2014] 6 CLJ 269; [2014] 4 AMR 301, Tenaga Nasional Berhad (Formerly Lembaga Letrik Negara Tanah Melayu) v. Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd (Formerly Perwaja Terengganu Sdn Bhd) [1995] 3 MLRH 196; [1995] 4 MLJ 673; [1995] 4 CLJ 670 and Selvaduray v. Chinniah [1939] CLJU 107; [1939] 8 MLJ 253; [1939] 1 MLRA 446). S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg Why is D1 liable? [33] The Plaintiffs were employed by D1 until 1.2.2017, when their employment was transferred to D3. D1 entered the Lease Agreement with MGH in 2016, which later transitioned to D3. All of which, the Plaintiffs were unaware of their employment migration until the Townhall Meeting on 26.01.2017. [34] The Townhall Meeting was significant as it marked the time when the Plaintiffs were first informed of D1’s intention to exit the hospitality industry, the selection of D3 as their business partner, and D3’s employment offer. [35] Accordingly, the audio recording of the Townhall Meeting was produced and marked as exhibit IDP-2. The Plaintiffs were issued with offer of employment at the Townhall Meeting. It is undisputed that they were required to return the duly signed acceptance of the offer from D3 on or before 31.01.2017 as admitted by DW2. [36] This Court finds that the fact remained that the New Lease Agreement with D3 happened without the knowledge of the Plaintiffs, and that their employment was transferred from D1 to D3 without the Plaintiffs’ consent and/or knowledge, inducing the Plaintiffs to thereafter accepting the offer of employment from D3 purportedly on a "no less favourable terms". The letter dated 1.2.2017 from D1 (Release Letter) was an attempt to circumvent D1’s contractual and/or statutory obligations to S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg release or discharge itself from liabilities in terms of the retirement benefits that was expected by the Plaintiffs. [37] The Release Letter stated, among other things, the following- “.......In view of your acceptance of the offer of employment with Leo Hospitality Sdn Bhd dated 26 January 2017, we hereby agree to release you form your employment with the Company with effect from 1st February 2017. Pursuant thereto, the Company shall consequently be waived, released and discharged from any claims and liability arising from, or related to your employment with the Company and/or due to the cessation from employment with the Company. Immediately from the above-stated date hereof, you shall cease to accrue any employment benefits from the Company.”. [38] The Plaintiffs contended that their employment was effectively unilaterally terminated and transferred or migrated to D3 from the "Operational Cut-Off Date" of 31.05.2016, approximately eight (8) months before they received any employment offer from D3 at the Townhall Meeting on 26.01.2017, or the Release Letter from D1 dated 01.02.2017. The Plaintiffs were neither informed nor aware of this employment migration at the time. [39] In this context, D1 had not adduced any evidence to show that the Plaintiffs were notified of D1’s intention to issue the Release Letter. Therefore, D1 deliberately and intentionally had concealed its business operations and the migration of the Plaintiffs’ employment. These facts led to the conclusion that the Release Letter was not genuine instruments of mutual disengagement, but a calculated and premeditated device to shield S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg D1 from its legal obligations. Such conduct, while clothed in legal formality, offends every principle of equity, good conscience, and fair dealing. Further, DW3 also admitted that a retrenchment exercise would have incurred a staggering cost of approximately RM10 million for D1. [40] There is also a possibility that D1 wanted to get away from any liability and to avoid paying approximately RM10 million in retrenchment benefits (the amount as testified by DW3). D1 pleaded that they had exited the hospitality industry as announced at the Townhall Meeting. Linked to that is DW3’s answer to Q13 in her Q&A where she had appended a table which stated that a retrenchment exercise by D1 would have cost around RM10 million. It was also evident that when the New Lease Agreement was terminated by D1, the employment of all the Plaintiffs was also terminated, accordingly. [41] The Plaintiffs also contended that the Townhall Meeting was orchestrated with the objective of pressuring and/or unduly inducing the Plaintiffs into accepting the offer from D3. The Plaintiffs were not afforded any meaningful opportunity to seek independent advice or to consider alternative options, particularly in light of the fact that no other options were presented to them. This further underscores the lack of voluntariness and informed consent in the Plaintiffs’ acceptance of the said offer. [42] In a very short period of just about thirteen (13) months from the date of the Townhall Meeting, the Plaintiffs were served with letters of retrenchment dated 01.03.2018 by D3 which stated among others: S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg “It is with much regret to inform that unfortunately, Perangsang Hotel & Properties (the Lessor) has served notice of termination on the “Lease Agreement” to Leo Hospitality (the Lessee) and as such we have no option but to proceed with retrenchment exercise. .... Your last day of work will be 19th March 2018 and your last day of service will be on 31st March 2018” (Exhibit IDP- 13) [43] The deliberate concealment deprived the Plaintiffs of any opportunity to understand, question, or even object to the changes affecting their employment status, and reflects a clear breach of transparency and good faith in the handling of their employment rights. [44] There is no evidence whatsoever, to show that the consent of the Plaintiffs were obtained prior to the migration of their employment on 31st May 2016. The Plaintiffs testimony also showed that they were never aware of MGH’s existence, much less the MG Lease and the D3’s Lease. [45] Clearly, the MGH/D3 Lease was not a disposal of hotel business as the termination of these leases, had also put a stop to the Plaintiffs’ employment, if they did not accept the new employment. [46] This Court is of the considered view that, on a balance of probabilities, though slim, yet the Plaintiffs had managed to prove their case that D1 had played a role to the migration of the employees to D3. Obviously, the Plaintiffs were left with not much choice but to allow the migration to happen, otherwise they will be unemployed. It can be said that S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg such migration is a disguise to avoid payment of benefits based on the fact that the Plaintiffs were long serving employees, before they were transferred to work with D3. [47] In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Goh Bak Ming v. Yeoh Eng Kong and other appeals [2019] 3 MLRA 56; [2019] 1 CLJ 461; [2018] MLJU 1133, held that there are two distinct forms of conspiracy. Firstly, the unlawful means conspiracy, which involves an agreement to commit an unlawful act. Secondly, the lawful means conspiracy, which requires a predominant intention to injure the plaintiff, even if the acts themselves are lawful. [48] This Court finds that the business arrangement used by D1 to lease the Quality Hotel to D3 where D3 was considered as D1’s partner, and subsequently transferred its employees to D3 which later were retrenched, when the New Lease Agreement was terminated, indicated that D1’s conduct as lawful but the underlying effect of its conduct by transferring the employees without first consulted them, as inappropriate and wrong. Particularly when D1 releases itself from any liability towards the employees/Plaintiffs when the New Lease Agreement between D1 and D3 was terminated and as a result, the Plaintiffs were consequently terminated from employment. This was a direct consequence when D3 retrenched the Plaintiffs in March 2018. S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg [49] Additionally, this Court referred the Court of Appeal case of Ng Kim Fong v. Menang Corporation (M) Bhd [2020] 5 MLRA 350; [2020] 1 LNS 1263, cited by the Plaintiffs, where the Court held- (5) On the peculiar facts of the present appeal, s 20(4) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 did not bar the civil courts from granting the appellant relief by way of payment of her contractual entitlement ie, retirement benefits which she was deprived of due to the "forced retirement". Whilst the civil courts were not permitted to award any form of monetary compensation for wrong dismissal (apart from the payment of wages in lieu of notice), there was no legal or equitable impediment or restriction on this court granting the appellant relief by way of her retirement benefits which she was contractually entitled to in the ordinary course of events. (paras 172-176) [172] However, having considered the issue, and based on the peculiar facts of the present appeal, we do not agree that s 20(4) of the IRA bars the civil courts from granting the appellant relief by way of payment of her contractual entitlement, ie retirement benefits which she was deprived of due to the "forced retirement" in the circumstances as described in the earlier part of our conclusions. [173] Whilst we agree that the civil courts are not permitted to award any form of monetary compensation for wrong dismissal (apart from the payment of wages in lieu of notice), we do not think that s 20(4) of the IRA can be relied upon to deny the appellant her retirement benefits, which she would have been entitled to had she been allowed to work up her maximum retirement age of 60 years. [174] Of course, the respondent would in our view have stood on firmer ground had the Industrial Court handed down an award in the appellant's favour as in that event, all the monetary components of her claim predicated on a complaint of dismissal without just cause or excuse would or may have been subsumed in the award of the Industrial Court. [175] We must go on record as stating that the factual situation here is quite unique. Thus, but for the events which took place on 19 July 2016, the appellant would have worked until her 60th birthday and thereby entitling her to her full retirement benefits as per her contract of employment. [176] Accordingly, we do not see any legal (statutory) or equitable impediment or restriction on this Court granting the appellant relief by way of her retirement benefits which she was contractually entitled to in the ordinary course of events. S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg [50] This Court is inclined with the submissions of the Plaintiffs, on the case of Ng Kim Fong (supra), and distinguished the case of 7-Eleven Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Ashvine Hari Krishnan [2023] 3 MLJ 469 - (a) No Parallels with the 7-Eleven Case The 7-Eleven case involved constructive dismissal, which was heard and adjudicated by the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court rejected the claim, and the claimant subsequently pursued a civil suit for loss of employment. It is trite law that claims for loss of employment fall squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. (b) Factual Distinction in the Present Case In contrast to the 7-Eleven Case, the Plaintiffs in the present matter are not claiming for loss of employment. Rather, they are seeking, among others, compensation for the loss of benefits. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiffs' employment was unilaterally migrated followed by a Townhall Meeting 8 months later to persuade the Plaintiffs to accept an employment offer from D3—requiring a decision within just five (5) days. (c) Nature of the Remedy Sought in 7-Eleven The claim in the 7-Eleven case was predicated on a remedy available under the Industrial Relations Act, which is specifically designed to address compensation for loss of employment. The adjudication process in that context is thus distinct from a civil claim for loss of benefits. [51] In terms of admissibility of the IDs, this Court by discretion, have considered and given weight to the evidence tendered by referring to the case cited by the Plaintiffs of Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi (Malaysia) Bhd v Sim Lim Holdings Bhd & others [2001] 1 MLRH 149; [2001] 2 CLJ 474, on the observations of Section 73A of the Evidence Act 1950 where the Court held-In the Bank of Tokyo case, the counsel for the second and third defendants argued that documents marked as "ID" are for identification purposes only and not admissible. However, the court disagreed, stating that while the documents were initially marked as "ID," this did not preclude them from being admitted as evidence at the end of the trial. According to Section 73A(2) of the Evidence Act S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg 1950, the court has the power to admit such documents based on all the circumstances of the case. The court may exercise this power at any stage of proceedings, including during the submissions stage, and determine admissibility accordingly. Section 73A(2) and 73A(5) further allow the admission of documents when the maker is unavailable, if undue delay or expense would result from not admitting them, with reasonable inferences drawn from the documents or other circumstances. Further, in assessing the weight to be attached to such evidence, Section 73A(6) of the Evidence Act requires the Court to consider all relevant circumstances, including: (i) Whether the statement was made contemporaneously with the events it describes; and (ii) Whether the maker of the statement had any motive to conceal or misrepresent the facts. Case Against D2 [52] In the Plaintiffs’ amended Statement of Claim (Amended SOC), the Plaintiffs stated at paragraph 1- “1. Pada setiap masa material, Plaintif-Plaintif adalah pekerja-pekerja Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Ketiga di Quality Hotel City Centre, yang berlokasi di Jalan Raja Laut, Kuala Lumpur.”. [53] Clearly, the Plaintiffs were never the employees of D2. As a matter of fact, no cogent evidence was led from the Plaintiffs to prove that they were indeed employees of D2. [54] This evidently shows that D2 has never been the Plaintiffs’ employer at any time. Additionally, Quality Hotel is owned by D1 and therefore, is D1’s property. S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg [55] Furthermore, this Court is persuaded with the submission of the Defendants that the ‘separate legal entity’ concept is applicable and cited the case of Terranova Builders Sdn Bhd (previously known as Nisa Consolidated Sdn Bhd) v. Repc Services Sdn Bhd (previously known as Ranhill Engineers and Constructors Sdn Bhd) & Anor [2018] MLJU 1995; [2018] MLRHU 1746. D1 and D2 are distinct from each other in its legal capacity. [56] In Terranova Builders Sdn. Bhd. (supra) it was held- “[59] The fact that D1 may be a wholly-owned subsidiary of D2 does not blur or banish the doctrine of separate legal entities of each company within the Group. If authority is needed one can refer to Besalon International Ltd & Ors v South Strong Industries Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 131 at pg. 150 where it was stated as follows: “...on People’s Insurance’s case, what that case decided was that the parent (holding) and subsidiary companies are two separate legal entities. That I accept as trite law...” (emphasis added)” [57] Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the Plaintiffs have failed to show the connection of D2 to be liable in this case. Laches [58] The Defendants contended that the Plaintiffs action was caught by latches based on the fact that the Plaintiffs’ allegation arises out of their complaint of the alleged representations made at the Townhall Meeting and this suit was only filed in May 2022, after a lapse of 5 ½ years. The Defendants also contended that no explanation was provided by the Plaintiffs for their delay in instituting this claim, citing the case of Lim Teow S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg Yong & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Infolity Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 1 LNS 311; [2015] 4 MLRH 556. [59] This Court is not inclined with this line of argument by the Defendants. This Court is of the view that the Plaintiffs may at any time institute this claim, as long as the action is not time barred. The amount awarded to the Plaintiffs [60] In their Amended SOC, the Plaintiffs seek, among others, a total sum of RM2,777,952.21 representing the loss of retrenchment benefits. This claim is detailed and particularised in Schedule A attached to the Amended Statement of Claim, and is specifically referred to at paragraphs 33 and 35(b) therein. [61] The basis of this calculation was explained through the testimony of PW2, who confirmed that the original payslips could not be produced as they had been previously submitted to the Labour Department in 2018 during the Plaintiffs’ earlier efforts to seek redress. More importantly, PW2’s evidence reveals as follows: S50: Bagaimana dengan kiraan pampasan yang dikemukakan dalam

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Jadual A kepada Pernyata Tuntutan Kamu semua? J: Kiraan di Jadual A adalah kiraan yang dikemukakan kepada Pejabat Tenaga Kerja (“Labour Department”) pada tahun 2018 dan semua slip gaji telah dikemukakan kepada Pejabat Tenaga Kerja pada masa itu. Kami tidak menyimpan salinannya juga dan dokumen-dokumen asal tersebut juga tidak dipulangkan kepada kami. [62] In addition to the earlier evidence, PW2 proceeded to clarify during the trial that, based on the copies of pay slips produced, the Plaintiffs’ claim can be recalculated to a reduced sum of RM2,434,036.16. This revised S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg amount appropriately factors in the service charges to which the Plaintiffs were entitled as at February 2018, being the month immediately prior to their retrenchment by LEO in March 2018.This recalculation is clearly reflected in Schedule 1 annexed to PW2’s Witness Statement. While it is acknowledged that there are minor variations in the figures, the overall quantum of the claim is now accurately presented as RM2,434,036.17. At the very least, award the sum of RM2,434,036.17 or such other amount as the Court deems fit, fair, and reasonable in the circumstances of the case. [63] Upon further consideration, this Court awarded damages in lieu of one month’s notice amounting to RM63,952.53 as per the calculation in

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Schedule A based on the basic salary of the Plaintiffs. CONCLUSION [64] Based on the facts and circumstances of the case and totality of the evidence, this Court is of the considered view that the Plaintiffs have successfully proven their claim against D1 and ordered accordingly. DATED: 15 OCTOBER 2025 -SGD- (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of the High Court NCVC1 Kuala Lumpur S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg COUNSELS For The Plaintiffs : P. Arjan Vasdev Bakshani Tetuan Vasdev Bakshani & Assoc. (Kuala Lumpur) For D1 and D2 : Justin Ween Kim Fang Tan Yoong Yi Gabriel Tetuan Justin Wee (Petaling Jaya) For D3 : Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur S/N ztTNAVupUquTe7hdEpbIg