ABU BAKAR BIN MUSTAR v Taufek Bin Mohammad (seorang yang tidak berupaya dan diwakili oleh NORHIDAWATI BINTI MOHAMAD NOR [NO. K/P : 801228-01-5736] sebagai wakil litigasinya) (JA-12B-68-11/2023)

1.

ABU BAKAR BIN MUSTAR SOUTHERN DIGGERS ENTERPRISE SDN. BHD. …PERAYU-PERAYU

DAN TAUFEK BIN MOHAMMAD (seorang yang tidak berupaya dan diwakili oleh NORHIDAWATI BINTI MOHAMAD NOR (Plaintif Kedua) sebagai wakil litigasinya)

NORHIDAWATI BINTI MOHAMAD NOR …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN (DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO. JA-A53KJ-367-06/2022 ANTARA 1. TAUFEK BIN MOHAMMAD (seorang yang tidak berupaya dan diwakili oleh NORHIDAWATI BINTI MOHAMAD NOR [(Plaintif Kedua) sebagai wakil litigasinya)

NORHIDAWATI BINTI MOHAMAD NOR …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1.

SOUTHERN DIGGERS ENTERPRISE SDN. BHD. …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN] S/N eGjAvHno6EitnETf1nKgzw ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Mukadimah [1] Ini adalah rayuan pihak Perayu/Defendan-defendan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (“HMS”) yang dibuat pada 19.10.2023 dari sudut liabiliti mahupun kuantum gantirugi. [2] Pada masa yang sama Responden/Plaintif-plaintif juga membuat rayuan balas berkaitan dengan kos penjagaan pada masa hadapan. Latar belakang [3] Pada 16.6.2016 jam lebih kurang 7.45 malam, suatu kemalangan jalan raya telah berlaku di lorong kecemasan KM 7.9 Link Kedua arah selatan yang melibatkan Responden/Plaintif Pertama yang menunggang motosikal No. JCG 4069 dengan lori No. JRK 8088 yang dipandu oleh Perayu/Defendan Pertama yang dikatakan berhenti di lorong tersebut ekoran kerosakan yang terjadi pada lori berkenaan. [4] Pada 19.10.2023, Mahkamah Sesyen Johor Bahru memutuskan bahawa Perayu/Defendan Pertama adalah 80% bertanggungan terhadap kemalangan ini manakala di pihak Responden/Plaintif Pertama kecuaian sebanyak 20%. Mahkamah juga telah mengawardkan gantirugi am dan khas kepada Responden/Plaintif-plaintif. Keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi [5] Pada 2.7.2024 selepas mendengar hujah kedua-dua pihak, saya memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu/Defendan-defendan. Bagaimanapun, saya membenarkan rayuan balas Responden/Plaintif di S/N eGjAvHno6EitnETf1nKgzw mana kos penjagaan masa hadapan saya naikkan daripada RM1,500.00 sebulan kepada RM2,000.00 sebulan. [6] Tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan saya tersebut, Responden/Plaintif telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Responden/Plaintif Pertama berhujah bahawa beliau layak diberikan kos penjagaan masa hadapan sebanyak RM5,640.00 sebulan dan bukannya RM2,000.00 sebulan. [7] Di sini saya memberikan alasan mengapa saya hanya membenarkan kos penjagaan masa hadapan Responden/Plaintif Pertama dinaikkan daripada RM1,500.00 sebulan kepada RM2,000.00 sebulan dan menolak amaun yang diminta oleh Responden/Plaintif Pertama. Prinsip Mahkamah dalam memutuskan rayuan terhadap gantirugi [8] Adalah prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan secara umumnya tidak akan campur tangan terhadap keputusan mahkamah bicara dalam hal gantirugi. Abdul Hamid Omar KHN dalam kes Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani [1985] CLJ Rep 323; [1981] 5 MLJ 22; [1985] 1 MLRA 183, telah menggariskan prinsip utama bagi mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan dalam menguruskan rayuan terhadap jumlah gantirugi di mana beliau menyatakan – "Now, in appeal on quantum of damages, it is essential in order to come to a conclusion, to bear in mind certain principles which are well established. The appeal court is slow, indeed, disinclined to interfere with the judge's finding merely because the appeal court thinks that if the case had been before it in the first instance a lesser sum would have been awarded. Asmi CJ (Malaya) S/N eGjAvHno6EitnETf1nKgzw (as he then was) giving the judgment of the Federal Court in Topaiwah v. Salleh [1968] 1 LNS 161; [1968] 1 MLJ 284 said that: In order to justify reversing the trial judge on the question of the amount damages it will generally be necessary that this court should be convinced either that the judge acted on some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it entirely an erroneous estimate of the damages to which the Perayu is entitled (see Flint v. Lovell [1935] 1 KB 354). The principle that should guide this court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case in particular the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore it is for the appeal court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purpose of assessment some irrelevant considerations. If the court is satisfied or convinced that the judge had acted upon wrong principle of law then it is justified in reversing; indeed it is the duty to reverse the finding of the trial judge.". [9] Dalam kes Mokhtarudin Abdullah & Anor v. Norizan Rosdi & Ors [1998] CLJU 248; [1998] 1 LNS 248, Abdul Wahab Patail HMT (pada masa itu) memutuskan – “A long line of binding authority has established that an appellate Court would be slow to interfere with the award. In Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani [1985] CLJ Rep 323; [1985] 1 CLJ 429; [1985] 2 MLJ 22 SC, applying Greenfield v. London and North Eastern Railway Company [1945] KB 89, which held that the principle is not whether the appellate Court might have given rather more or rather less, but only if the trial judge had omitted some relevant S/N eGjAvHno6EitnETf1nKgzw consideration or admitted some irrelevant consideration or if the amount is so excessive or insufficient as to be plainly unreasonable.”. [10] Dalam kes Rasidin Bin Partorjo v. Frederick Kiai [1976] 1 LNS 123 Wan Suleiman HMP menyatakan – “The principle upon which an appellate court will interfere with an award of damages made by a judge sitting alone has been stated by Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd (2) at pp 616-617 as follows: Where the award is that of the judge alone, the appeal is by way of rehearing on damages as on all other issues, but as there is generally so much room for individual choice so that the assessment of damages is more like an exercise of discretion than an ordinary act of decision, the appellate court is particularly slow to reverse the trial judge on a question of the amount of damages. It is difficult to lay down any precise rule which will cover all cases, but a good general guide is given by Greer LJ in Flint v. Lovell. In effect the court, before it interferes with an award of damages, should be satisfied that the judge has acted on a wrong principle of law, or has misapprehended the facts, or has for these or other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. It is not enough that there is a balance of opinion or preference. The scale must go down heavily against the figure attacked if the appellate court to interfere, whether on the ground of excess or insufficiency. Thus the appellant here has to convince us that the learned trial judge has acted on a wrong principle of law, or has misapprehended the facts, or has for other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered.”. [11] Dalam kes Amar Singh v. Chin Kiew [1960] 1 LNS 5; [1960] 26 MLJ 77, Thompson CJ (pada masa itu) memutuskan – S/N eGjAvHno6EitnETf1nKgzw ".....The fixation of damages is so largely a matter of opinion or of impression that differences of calculation or assessment are to be expected. It is an exercise of judicial discretion. Merely disagree with the figure arrived at by the trial judge is no ground for interference unless it is wholly erroneous estimate.................." [12] Sehubungan itu, persoalan yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah ini sebagai mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan adalah sama ada Responden/Plaintif Pertama sebagai perayu berjaya membuktikan bahawa HMS telah bertindak atas prinsip undang-undang yang salah, atau amaun yang diawardkan terlalu rendah yang menjadikan kesilapan pada kos gantirugi penjagaan masa hadapan yang dipohonnya. Merit rayuan Responden/Plaintif Pertama mengenai kuantum bagi kos penjagaan masa hadapan [13] Saya mendapati semasa kemalangan berlaku Responden/Plaintif Pertama berumur 36 tahun. Ekoran daripada kemalangan tersebut, beliau mendapat kecederaan yang teruk pada hampir keseluruhan tubuhnya terutama di bahagian kepala di mana beliau mengalami “severe head injury with multiple intracranial bleed (minor neurocognitive disorder due to TBI/ cognitive impairment)”. [14] Saya juga teleh meneliti laporan perubatan yang dikemukakan oleh Responden/Plaintif Pertama dan mendapati beliau mengalami kecederaan serius pada bahagian otak. Beliau telah menjalani pelbagai pembedahan lanjutan di bahagian otak akibat tulang tempurung kepalanya dijangkiti kuman berpunca daripada “shunt” yang dipasang di kepala. S/N eGjAvHno6EitnETf1nKgzw [15] Selain itu, kedua-dua pakar dari pihak Responden/Plaintif dan Perayu/Defendan sepakat bahawa Responden/Plaintif Pertama mengalami keilatan kekal fizikal, kognitif dan intelek sehingga menyebabkan beliau menjadi orang kurang upaya (“OKU”) dan tidak berupaya menguruskan dirinya sendiri tanpa bantuan orang lain. [16]