1. ) Afnan Hamimi Bin Taib Azamudden v Hanini Binti Siron (PA-12B-53-12/2025)

GALERI MEDIA SERBANIKA SDN BHD (NO SYARIKAT: 1084907-V) ...PERAYU-PERAYU DAN HANINI BINTI SIRON (NO. K/P:840713-02-5120) ... RESPONDEN

This is an appeal by the Appellants/Defendants against the decision of the Sessions Court which allowed the Respondent/Plaintiff's claim in defamation and awarded damages in the sum of RM100,000.00 together with costs of RM15,000.00 after a full trial.

The factual matrix of this case bears some peculiarity. An original Facebook posting was made by the Respondent/Plaintiff herself. The present claim, however, does not arise from that original posting. Instead, it is founded upon two subsequent responses/postings published by the First Appellant/Defendant. These postings were then republished by the Second and Third Appellants/Respondents, who are respectively the Editor-in-Chief and publisher of an online news portal.

The Respondent/Plaintiff's initial posting on her Facebook account, which had gone viral, contained allegations concerning the conduct of the Menteri Besar of Kedah, in particular alleged breaches of the Movement Control Order ("MCO") standard operating procedures. This prompted the First Appellant/Defendant to issue two subsequent postings, which were made in his capacity as Political Secretary to the Menteri Besar of Kedah and which are characterised by the Respondent/Plaintiff as defamatory of her.

The parties are referred to as they were in the Sessions Court.

The First Defendant's first posting reads as follows: "Ada cerita FITNAH baru tentang MB. Kononnya MB langgar SOP PKP. Pi drive kereta Ford Ranger di Juru Auto City Penang. Ni kisah sebenar yang berlaku:-

MB otw ke KL petang tadi ada hal mustahak. Ada seorang pemandu dan seorang anggota polis pengiring bersama MB. 3 org semuanya.

Pergerakan MB keluar daerah atau rentas negeri adalah dibenarkan di dalam SOP PKP kerana termasuk di dalam perkhidmatan perlu (essential service) yang dibenarkan pergerakan.

Dari Alor Setar, singgah di Juru sebab nak beli makanan sebelum masuk highway. RnR tutup. Beli siap-siap bekal untuk makan dalam perjalanan.

Kebetulan kedai tempat beli makanan di Juru itu dekat dengan show room kereta Ford. Show room itu TUTUP.

Ada seorang salesman duk susun kereta Ford Ranger di luar show room. MB pi jengok kereta itu. Bukan pi nak beli. Saja nak pi tengok. Minat. Kalau pi hendap-hendap satgi orang tengok pelik pula.

Walaupun show room tutup, salesman itu bersopan, layan orang yang mai sambil-sambil duduk alih kereta-kereta itu. Dia tahu waktu ni tak boleh berniaga. SOP PKP. Orang berniaga, macam tu la.

Lepas siap beli makanan, MB sambung perjalanan ke KL. Ford Ranger tu duk ada kat Juru tu. Tak ikut pi sekali.

Tiada 'test drive' berlaku.

Kereta Vellfire yg MB naik tu memang SADA punya. MB Pengerusi SADA. Tiada masalah untuk guna kereta itu bagi urusan rasmi. Tulisan perkataan 'Menteri Besar Kedah' pada kereta tu untuk memudahkan pengecaman pihak polis ketika melalui SJR. Itulah kisahnya. Tolong sampaikan pada akak yang ambik gambaq tu. Baguih akak ni. Rajin.

Following that response, the Plaintiff deleted her original Facebook posting. In ordinary circumstances, that development ought to have brought the matter to an end.

However, notwithstanding the deletion of the original post, the First Defendant subsequently made a second Facebook posting, which is said to take the form of a political satire. This second posting referred to the Plaintiff's earlier deleted publication and included a link thereto.

The second posting reads as follows: "ARAHAN PENTING KEPADA SEMUA RBA!!!

Posting Nini Siron pasai MB Kedah tu tak betoi. Dia DAH DELETE awal pagi ni. Ni link asal dia: https://m.facebook.com/story.php?storyfbid=4195 084567179461&id=100000 338785307

Team kita kena teruskan sebar print screen dia dalam semua media kita termasuk fake acc. Tolong buat seperti arahan awal sebelum ni!

Yang penting kena damage MB Kedah ni. Ini sahaja satu-satu isu yg kita ada utk damage lebai ni!

Viral sampai MB lebai ni rakyat benci. Minggu ni turn dia. Next week kita ada target lain.

Payment ikut berapa jumlah share. Nana Siren Chip War Room NOTA: Ayat di atas adalah CONTOH sahaja. Tiada kaitan dengan sesiapa."

As against the Second and Third Defendants, the complaint relates to an article published by the Third Defendant, an online news portal known as Harakahdaily, together with the Second Defendant as its Editor-in-Chief. The article, dated 6 June 2021 and entitled "Fitnah kononnya MB Kedah 'test drive' masa PKP", reproduced in full the First Posting made by the First Defendant.

The position of the Second and Third Defendants was that the publication was made because the issue had already gone viral and concerned a matter of public interest, namely whether the Menteri Besar of Kedah had breached the MCO regulations.

The Learned Sessions Court Judge concluded that the First Posting amounted to defamation on the basis that the posting, when read together with the Plaintiff's own earlier posting, referred to the Plaintiff and conveyed that she was a liar, a purveyor of falsehoods and a person not to be trusted.

The Learned Sessions Court Judge stated in the Grounds of Judgment as follows: "Mahkamah ini dengan rendah diri berpendapat walaupun dalihan SD 2 bahawa kedua-dua pernyataan pertama tidak pernah merujuk kepada peribadi SP 3 namun setelah mahkamah ini menggunakan ujian di dalam kes Syed Husin Ali v. Syarikat Perchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 1 LNS 146; [1973] 2 MLJ 56; [1973] 1 MLRH 153, mahkamah mendapati pernyataan pertama oleh SD 2 adalah fitnah yang merujuk kepada kepada SP 3 kerana apabila pernyataan pertama tersebut jika dibaca bersama hantaran SP 3 tersebut yang mana menurut keseluruhan konteks kepada pengguna-pengguna media sosial dari maksud semulajadi dan biasa ianya adalah merujuk kepada SP 3 yang memberi maksud SP 3 adalah seorang pemfitnah dan tidak boleh dipercayai dan menyebarkan berita tidak benar mengenai MB Kedah."

The Learned Sessions Court Judge further held that the Second Posting was also defamatory on the basis that the posting, when read together with the First Posting and the Plaintiff's own posting, referred to the Plaintiff and carried defamatory imputations against her.

The Learned Sessions Court Judge stated as follows: "Sekali lagi setelah mahkamah ini menggunakan ujian juga di dalam kes-kes Syed Husin Ali v. Syarikat Perchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor (supra) dan Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v. Hue Shieh Lee (supra). Mahkamah ini berpuashati pernyataan kedua oleh SD 2 juga adalah fitnah yang merujuk kepada kepada SP 3 kerana apabila pernyataan kedua ini jika dibaca bersama pernyataan pertama dan hantaran SP 3 tersebut yang mana menurut keseluruhan konteks kepada pengguna-pengguna media sosial dari maksud semulajadi dan biasa ianya adalah merujuk kepada SP 3. Ini adalah kerana walaupun tanpa memerlukan sokongan fakta-fakta lain yang melangkaui pengetahuan am dan secara literal, inferen, tersurat dan tersirat, atau sindiran ianya telah merujuk kepada SP 3.”

The Learned Sessions Court Judge further rejected the defences raised by the Defendants, including the defence of qualified privilege advanced by the Second and Third Defendants.

The First Defendant submitted that the Learned Sessions Court Judge's approach is contrary to settled principles of defamation law. Reliance was placed on the Federal Court decision in Dato' Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah Anwar & Anor [2021] 4 CLJ 327; [2021] MLJU 239; [2021] 2 MLRA 626 for the proposition that the natural and ordinary meaning of an alleged defamatory statement must be assessed by reference to the entire publication and the impression created in the mind of an ordinary reasonable reader.

The First Defendant contended that the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred by isolating portions of the postings rather than construing them as a whole.

It was argued that the First Posting was plainly explanatory in nature and constituted a clarification in response to allegations already publicly made by the Respondent concerning the Menteri Besar of Kedah's alleged breach of SOPs during the MCO period.

The First Defendant further submitted that the Second Posting was political satire directed not at the Plaintiff personally, but at the broader political narrative and alleged political attacks against the Menteri Besar of Kedah. It was emphasised that the Second Posting expressly contained a disclaimer stating: "NOTA: Ayat di atas adalah CONTOH sahaja. Tiada kaitan dengan sesiapa."

The First Defendant submitted that no ordinary reasonable reader, reading the Second Posting fairly and in context, would conclude that it attributed defamatory characteristics to the Plaintiff.

The First Defendant further contended that there was no malice. The postings were said to have been made in response to a matter already circulating publicly and concerning a matter of public interest.

The Defendants further submitted that the Plaintiff herself had elected to delete her original posting, thereby lending credence to the clarification issued by the First Defendant.

The Second and Third Defendants, for their part, submitted that the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in rejecting the defence of qualified privilege, including Reynolds privilege.

The Second and Defendants contended that the publication concerned a matter plainly within the realm of public interest, namely whether the Menteri Besar of Kedah had breached MCO SOPs during a period of national restrictions.

It was further submitted that the requirement of responsible journalism had been satisfied as the article merely reproduced the First Posting, which had already entered the public domain, without embellishment or distortion.

The Second and Third Defendants also contended that the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in suggesting that only mainstream media publications could rely on the defence of qualified privilege.

The Defendants further submitted that the publication is additionally protected by Article 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and expression.

The Plaintiff submitted that the Learned Sessions Court Judge did not err either in fact or in law in finding that the First and Second Postings were defamatory of the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff contended that when the postings are read in their entirety, an ordinary reasonable reader would conclude that the Plaintiff was portrayed as a liar who had fabricated allegations against the Menteri Besar of Kedah.

The Plaintiff further submitted that the inclusion of the Plaintiff's profile picture and references to her Facebook account reinforced the defamatory sting and exposed the Plaintiff to hatred, ridicule and condemnation by members of the public.

The Plaintiff additionally contended that the First Posting was not a genuine clarification but was instead intended to embarrass and humiliate the Plaintiff.

As regards the Second Posting, the Plaintiff argued that it portrayed her as part of or leader of the "Red Bean Army (RBA)" allegedly orchestrating political attacks against the Menteri Besar of Kedah.

The Plaintiff further submitted that the postings were made maliciously and were intended to incite criticism and attacks against the Plaintiff by followers of the First Defendant.

The Plaintiff also argued that the Defendants failed to call the Menteri Besar of Kedah as a witness during trial, thereby undermining the truthfulness and reliability of the explanation advanced in the postings.

In relation to the Second and Third Defendants, the Plaintiff submitted that the defence of qualified privilege was correctly rejected by the Learned Sessions Court Judge. The Decision of this Court

Having carefully considered the pleadings, the evidence adduced, the Grounds of Judgment of the Learned Sessions Court Judge, the submissions of parties and the applicable authorities, this Court is respectfully unable to agree with the conclusions reached by the Learned Sessions Court Judge.

The law is settled that in determining whether words are defamatory, the Court must consider the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of by reading the publication as a whole and from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable reader: Dato' Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah Anwar & Anor [2021] 4 CLJ 327; [2021] MLJU 239; [2021] 2 MLRA 626.

Equally settled is the principle that words are not to be examined in isolation or through strained or over-elaborate interpretation. The Court must consider the entire context of the publication and the overall impression conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader: see for example, Chong Chieng Jen v Government of State of Sarawak [2019] 1 CLJ 329; [2019] 1 MLRA 515; [2019] 10 BLR 110; [2019] 3 MLJ 300.

In the present case, the Learned Sessions Court Judge appeared, with respect, to have approached the matter by reading the impugned postings together with the Plaintiff's original posting in a manner which effectively imported defamatory meaning into words that, objectively construed, do not bear such meaning.

This Court accepts the submission of the Defendants that the First Posting, when read in its entirety, was fundamentally explanatory and responsive in nature.

The First Posting arose directly from the Plaintiff's own public allegations concerning the alleged conduct of the Menteri Besar of Kedah during the MCO period. The issue had already entered the public domain and had generated public discussion.

The First Posting, read fairly and objectively, sets out an explanation concerning the Menteri Besar's presence at Juru Auto City, the circumstances under which he stopped there, and the denial that any "test drive" had taken place.

Although the posting used the expression "FITNAH", this Court is of the considered view that the expression must be understood contextually as part of a rebuttal to allegations already publicly circulating.

Importantly, the sting of the publication, viewed objectively and in its full context, was directed at rebutting allegations concerning the Menteri Besar's alleged breach of SOPs rather than attacking the Plaintiff personally.

This Court is unable to agree that an ordinary reasonable reader, reading the First Posting fairly and as a whole, would necessarily conclude that the Plaintiff was being personally defamed in the manner contended.

The First Posting was, in substance, a clarification and response to a matter already raised publicly by the Plaintiff herself.

This Court also takes into account that following the First Posting, the Plaintiff deleted her original posting.

Turning now to the Second Posting, this Court similarly finds that the Learned Sessions Court Judge fell into error in concluding that the publication was defamatory of the Plaintiff.

Having read and considered the Second Posting in its entirety, this Court agrees with the Defendants that the characterisation of the publication as political satire, together with the disclaimer therein, is not without basis.

The Second Posting adopts an exaggerated and satirical tone referring generally to alleged political operatives and coordinated political attacks. Significantly, it concludes with the disclaimer: "NOTA: Ayat di atas adalah CONTOH sahaja. Tiada kaitan dengan sesiapa."

This disclaimer cannot simply be ignored.

Further, although the Second Posting referred to the Plaintiff's earlier posting, this Court is unable to conclude that the publication, fairly read, would convey to the ordinary reasonable reader that the Plaintiff was in fact a member or leader of the "RBA" or that she was engaged in a coordinated political campaign.

With respect, the Plaintiff's interpretation requires a strained and overly elaborate reading of the publication.

The Court must guard against interpretations which are far fetched, forced or unduly suspicious.

Viewed objectively and contextually, the sting of defamation is not made out.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that either the First Posting or the Second Posting was defamatory of the Plaintiff.

In the event this Court is wrong in the above findings, this Court is nevertheless satisfied that the Defendants have successfully established the defences relied upon.

The postings concerned a matter plainly within the realm of public interest, namely allegations of non-compliance with MCO SOPs by a sitting Menteri Besar during a period of national restrictions.

Political speech and public commentary concerning the conduct of public office holders necessarily attract a broader latitude of permissible expression: see for example, Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan bin Kassim and another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 514; [2021] 4 CLJ 155; [2021] 3 MLRA 207; [2021] AMEJ 0200.

The First Posting constituted comment and response upon facts already publicly raised by the Plaintiff herself.

The Second Posting, meanwhile, bore the hallmarks of political satire and commentary relating to perceived political attacks against the Menteri Besar.

This Court is unable to find malice on the evidence before the Court.

As regards the Second and Third Defendants, this Court is also satisfied that the publication falls within the protection of qualified privilege, including Reynolds privilege. In Datuk Husam bin Musa v The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd & Ors [2014] 8 MLJ 370; [2013] 1 LNS 798; [2013] MLRHU 728, it was held that "the defence of qualified privilege according to the Reynolds' case rests on the duo requirements of public interest and reasonable journalism".

The relevant inquiry is whether the publication concerned a matter of public interest and whether the publication was made responsibly and without malice.

The subject matter in the present case plainly concerned a matter of public interest, namely allegations that a Menteri Besar had breached MCO SOPs.

There is no evidence establishing malice on the part of the Second and Third Appellants.

In those circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the defence of qualified privilege has been established.

In view of the findings above, the question of damages does not strictly arise.

However, for completeness, and in the event this Court is wrong in its findings and the matter proceeds further on appeal, this Court is of the view that the award of RM100,000.00 granted by the Learned Sessions Court Judge was excessive in the circumstances.

Having regard to the nature of the publications, the context in which they were made, the surrounding political climate at the material time, and the limited gravity of the imputations complained of, this Court is of the considered view that a sum of RM50,000.00 would have been fair and reasonable had liability been established.

For the reasons set out above, this Court finds that the appeal has merits and ought to be allowed.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's claim is dismissed and the judgment of the Sessions Court dated 28 November 2025 is hereby set aside.

Costs in the sum of RM20,000.00, both here and below, are awarded to the Defendants. 2 June 2026 CHOONG YEOW CHOY HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI GEORGETOWN PULAU PINANG Counsel: For the Appellants Yusfarizal bin Yussoff Mohd Faizi bin Che Abu (Tetuan Faizi & Associates) For the Respondent Fatima Zulaikha bt Ahmad Bashri Faizal bin Rahman (Tetuan Faizal Rahman & Co)