Schedule
SCHEDULE H Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulation 1989 [Regulation 11(1)] Sale and Purchase Agreement (Building or Land Intended for Subdivision into Parcels) Selain daripada Perjanjian Jual Beli di atas, ujud juga Perjanjian-perjanjian oleh Plaintiff-plaintiff Ke 22 hingga Plaintiff Ke 25 yang jelas memperuntukkan pengeluaran hak milik strata secara berasingan kepada setiap unit-unit. 17 11… Separate Strata Title and Transfer of Title (1) The Proprietor / Vendor shall, at its own cost and expense and as expeditiously as possible, apply for subdivision of the said Building or Land Intended for subdivision into parcels, as the case may be, so as to obtain the issue of a separate strata title to the said Parcel under the Strata Titles Act 1985 (2) Upon the issuance of the strata title to the said Parcel and subject to the payment of the Purchase Price by the Purchaser to the Vendor in accordance with subclause 4(1) and the observance of all the terms and conditions herein provided, the Vendor shall, within twenty one (21) days, execute or cause the Proprietor to execute a valid and registrable Memorandum of Transfer of the said Parcel in favour of the Purchaser and the Vendor shall forward the same together with the strata title to the Purchaser 18. Payment of services charges (1) The Purchaser shall be liable for and shall pay the services charges for the maintenance and management of the common property and for the services provided by the Vendor prior to the establishment of a Joint Management Body under the Building and Common Property (Maintenance and Management) Act 2007 (2) …………………. 18 13. Justeru itu dalam keadaan yang sedemikian, pada hemat saya mahkamah ini seharusnya memberikan kesan terhadap perkataan-perkataan yang jelas di dalam Perjanjian tersebut dan hasrat serta niat pihak-pihak yang memasuki Perjanjian. Pada hemat saya, adalah menjadi undang-undang mantap bahawa mahkamah ini seharusnya memberikan kesan terhadap tawaran-tawaran pihak-pihak menurut niat pihak-pihak dan perjanjian dan sekiranya tawaran-tawaran tersebut secara bertulis, maka niat-niat dan perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut perlulah dinilai atau ditentukan melalui perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan. Plaintiff Pertama sehingga Plaintiff ke 25 telah memasuki Perjanjian Jual Beli dengan Defendan Pertama dan juga bersetuju dengan segala terma-terma yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut. Dalam Perjanjian Jual Beli yang dimasuki oleh Plaintiff Pertama sehingga Plaintiff ke 25 telah menyatakan bahawa hakmilik strata ke atas rumah (strata title to the said parcel) akan dikeluarkan. Justeru itu Plaintiff Pertama sehingga Plaintiff ke 25 mempunyai pengetahuan tentang hakmilik strata ke atas rumah semasa mereka memasuki Perjanjian Jual Beli dengan Defendan Pertama. Dalam kes : Mulpha Pacific Sdn Bhd v Paramount Corp Bhd (2003) 4 MLJ 357 (CA), Mohd Ghazali JCA memberikan penghakiman mahkamah menegaskan bahawa : “…………In The Royal Selangor Golf Club v Anglo-Oriental (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 995, Lim Beng Choon J said: In considering the disputes of the parties I must first of all bear in mind the general principle of construction of 19 contract as enunciated in the National Coal Board v Wm Neill & Son (St Helen) [1984] 1 ALL ER 555 where it is said at p 560: The first two issues involve the construction of the contract. I bear in mind the principles of construing a contract. The relevant ones for the purpose of this case are: (1) construction of a contract is a question of law; (2) where the contract is in writing the intention of the parties must be found within the four walls of the contractual documents; it is not legitimate to have regard to extrinsic evidence (there is, of course, no such evidence in this case); (3) a contract must be construed as at the date it was made: it is not legitimate to construe it in the light of what happened years of even days later; (4) the contract must be construed as a whole, and also, so far as practicable, to give effect to every part of it. In Central Bank of India v Hartford Fire Insurance Co Ltd AIR [1065] SC 1288, the Supreme Court of India lays stress on the second principle advocated in the Wm Neill & Sons (St Helens) Ltd case when it says at p 1290: Now it is commonplace that it is the court’s duty to give effect to the bargain of the parties according to their intention and when that bargain is in writing the intention is to be looked for in the words used unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If those words are clear, there is very little that the court has to do. The court must give effect tothe plain meaning of 20 the words however much it may dislike the result……………….” Begitu juga dalam kes : Wee Lian Construction Sdn Bhd v Ingersoll-Jati Malaysia Sdn Bhd (2010) 3 MLJ 425(CA), seseorang yang menandatangani dokumen-dokumen kontrak adalah terikat dengan segala terma-termanya tanpa keperluan samada ianya telah dibaca ataupun tidak. Low Hop Bing JCA memberikan penghakiman mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: “……(37) Thus,a person who signs a contractual document is bound by its terms even though he has not read it. In L’Estrange v. F. Graucob, Ltd., the proprietress of a café bought an automatic cigarette vending machine. She signed, but did not read, a sales agreement which contained an exemption clause “in regrettably small print”. It was held that she was bound by the clause, so that she could not rely on defects in the machine, either as a defenceto a claim for part of the price, or as entitling her to damages……..” 14. Dalam meneliti kepada kedua-dua kes di atas, saya mendapati dalam memberikan tafsiran kepada perjanjian tersebut, ianya mestilah dibuat menurut skop perjanjian tersebut. Justeru itu, pada hemat saya pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff tidak boleh mengambil mana-mana peruntukan lain yang terdapat dalam lain-lain perjanjian untuk diguna pakai bagi maksud perjanjian jual beli dalam kes ini. Apa yang lebih menarik adalah, Plaintiff-plaintiff menandatangani Perjanjian Jual Beli dengan disaksikan oleh 21 peguam. Kalaulah sedemikian, bagaimana mungkin mahkamah ini boleh secara kehakiman mencampuri urusan penjualan dan belian hartanah tersebut. 15. Melalui Bahagian B Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (Common Bundle of Documents), pada perenggan 3.3 atas tajuk Kebenaran Merancang yang telah diluluskan pada 28 Julai 2011 oleh Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam dinyatakan seperti berikut: “….hal-hal tanah hendaklah diselesaikan terlebih dahulu sebelum pelan bangunan dikemukakan (a) Hakmilik Individu Tanah…..” Dalam meneliti kepada perkataan di atas, hakmilik individu tanah pada hemat saya boleh merujuk kepada tanah milik perseorangan dan juga hakmilik secara berasingan terhadap hartanah tersebut boleh dikeluarkan. Melalui penelitian kepada dokumen-dokumen dalam Ikatan Dokumen Bersama ini, saya mendapati bagi maksud pembangunan projek ini, hakmilik strata berasingan telah dipohon dan dikeluarkan. Sekiranya peguam Plaintiff-plaintiff menyatakan bahawa hakmilik individu tanah tersebut bermaksud hakmilik tanah secara individu dan bukannya suatu hakmilik strata, ianya lebih merupakan perkara-perkara di antara pihak berkuasa dengan pihak pemaju kerana melalui Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut, pihak-pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff telahpun memperolehi hartanah tersebut. Dalam keadaan yang sedemikian, pada hemat saya dan saya ingin menegaskan bahawa mahkamah ini tiada mempunyai 22 bidangkuasa untuk mengistiharkan dan menukarkan bentuk pembangunan yang sedia ada kepada perkara-perkara yang bukan dalam pertimbangan pihak-pihak menurut Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut. 16. Dalam memberikan pertimbangan kepada kes pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff yakni membuat sesuatu pengistiharan, mahkamah ini akan lebih berhati-hati apabila mendapati perkataan-perkataan dalam Perjanjian Jual Beli di antara pihak-pihak adalah sangat jelas dan terang. Dalam kes : Haris Fatillah bin Mohd Ibrahim v Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia (2017) 3 MLJ 543 (CA), Zamani A. Rahim JCA dalam memberikan penghakiman mahkamah telah menerima dan mengambil pandangan Lord Dunedin dalam kes : Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade, Limited [1921] 2 AC 438 memutuskan: “…………that the granting of a mere declaration is a matter of discretion, and that that discretion ought to be shown in granting such declaration ‘sparingly’, ‘with care and jealousy’ and ‘with extreme caution’. I confess that, to my mind, such expressions give little guidance ... The rules that have been elucidated by a long course of decisions in the Scottish Courts may be summarized thus: The question must be a real and not a theoretical question; the person raising it must have a real interest to raise it; he must be able to secure a propercontradictor — that is to say, someone 23 presently existing who has a true interest to oppose the declaration sought........................ “……….There is nothing in both the Federal Constitution and the Election Act 1958 or other express statutory provisions which require the respondent to do what the appellant is asking for from the court…… The appellant’s action is clearly seeking a ‘clocked declaration’, meaning a declaration for a collateral purpose or with improper motive: see Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd. The court cannot flagrantly override an express provision of the Federal Constitution………………..” 17. Dalam kes di atas, Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak relief untuk suatu pengistiharan atas alasan ianya memberikan suatu kesan bagi mengistiharkan Responden untuk membuat sesuatu yang mana Responden tidak dikehendaki untuk berbuat demikian menurut Perlembagaan. Mahkamah Rayuan turut menolak rayuan yang dibuat oleh pihak Perayu. Justeru, pada hemat saya relief pertama ini seharusnya ditolak kerana melalui Perjanjian Jual Beli yang telah ditandatangani dan dimasuki tersebut secara jelas menyatakan pihak-pihak telah bersetuju Pembangunan Hak milik Strata. Sekiranya mahkamah ini membenarkan pengistiharan relief pihak-pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff ianya semestinya memberikan kesan kepada pihak Defendan Pertama untuk mengambil tindakan yang mana Defendan Pertama tidak dikehendaki untuk berbuat demikian. Dalam isu persoalan pertama ini, ianya mengesahkan pembangunan hakmilik strata 24 berdasarkan kepada Perjanjian Jual Beli di antara pihak-pihak menurut Jadual H. ISU KEDUA Sekiranya ia merupakan Pembangunan dengan pengeluaran Hak Milik Individu (Bukan Hak Milik Strata), samada Mahkamah mempunyai Bidang Kuasa untuk menganugerahi Relif-relif yang dipohon dalam Tuntutan 1 Pernyataan Tuntutan??? 18. Isu Kedua di atas adalah berkaitan dengan relief (b) Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintiff-plaintiff. Relief ini menghendaki mahkamah untuk meminda Perjanjian Jual Beli kepada satu hakmilikan individu dan bukannya hakmilik strata serta diberikan kesan retrospektif. Lanjutan daripada ini, persoalan yang timbul adalah : Bolehkah Mahkamah ini mengeluarkan perintah bagi mengarahkan Pihak Pemaju (Defendan) – Greenhill Development Sdn. Bhd. dan Pemunya Tanah (Proprietor) – Permodalan Negeri Selangor Berhad untuk meminda Perjanjian Jual Beli dan memberi kesan retrospektif?? Dalam memutuskan isu ini, saya merujuk kepada penghakiman kes : Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan (In this case the Appellant in the appeal was the land executive committee, and not as stated in the appeal, the Pengarah Tanah dan Galian however, the parties made nothing of this, presumably because the Government agree that whoever is cited as Appellant the Government will be bound if the Appellant losses – MNG Ed MLJ) v. Sri Lempah 25 Enterprise Sdn. Bhd. (1979) 1 MLJ 135 (FC), Suffian LDmenegaskan bahawa : “………Lastly, it is not the province of the courts to review the decisions of government departments merely on their merits. Government by judges would be regarded as an usurpation. That clear statement of principle has since been approved and applied by the appellate courts. In Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. (ante), Lord Greene M.R. in the course of a judgment since approved by the House of Lords in Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] AC 736 763, and in Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council (ante), in dealing with the power of the court to interfere with the decision of a local authority which has acted unreasonably, said (page 686)- ……..The power of the court to interfere in each case is not that of an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but is that of a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in it. ………….” Merujuk kepada Perjanjian Jual Beli di antara pihak-pihak secara jelas menerangkan bahawa Plaintiff-plaintiff menghendaki Defendan Pertama menyerahkan hartanah tersebut dengan pemilikan strata. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, Plaintiff-plaintiff memohon kepada mahkamah ini seolah-olah untuk menulis kembali (Rewrite) transaksi pihak-pihak dalam Perjanjian Jual Beli. Dalam keadaan sebegini, saya ingin menegaskan bahawa bukanlah fungsi 26 mahkamah ini untuk berbuat demikian. Pihak-pihak adalah terikat dengan Perjanjian Jual Beli yang dimasuki mereka terdahulu daripada ini. Pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff di peringkat ini tidak boleh membawa kepada mahkamah ini untuk mencelah dan menulis kembali perjanjian yang dibuat terdahulu daripada ini. Dalam kes : Ong Thye Peng v. Loo Choo Teng & Ors (2008) 4 MLJ 31(FC), Augustine Paul FCJ (pada ketika itu) memberikan penghakiman mahkamah menyatakan : “..............On principle, having regard to the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case at hand, if the test of reasonableness of the price was to be based on the market value of the property at the time of the hearing of the application, that would militate against two other principles of law. The first principle is that the court cannot rewrite the parties' agreement (see Law and Practice of Compromise by David Foskett at p 81, (4th Ed and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeal in Lee Lim Huat v Yusuf Khan bin Ghows Khan & Anor [1997] 3 AMR 2401, at p 2415). The second principle is that a party shall never take advantage of his own wrong (see New Zealand Shipping Co v Societe des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1991] AC 1). On the first principle, the agreement clearly stipulated the sale price at RM1.60 per square foot. In respect of the second principle, it is evidently clear that the trustees did not apply for the sanction for so long by reason of refusal to perform. On commonsense, I decline to express of what is obvious to a reasonable man. As the learned judge had exercised his discretion judiciously on the matter, hisdecision needs no appellate interference. Therefore, I will dismiss the appeal with costs. The deposit is to be paid to the third to eighth respondents towards the account of taxed costs…………………..” 27 Begitu juga dalam kes : Perantara Properties Sdn. Bhd. v. JMC-Kelana Square and another appeal (2016) 5 CLJ 367(CA), David Wong Dak Wah JCA ketika memberikan penghakiman : “…………..Further it is significant that the 1995 sales and purchase agreements at that particular time were perfectly legal agreements. There were no common law or statute law which prohibited the same. Hence when the purchasers and the appellant entered into those agreements they were exercising their rights pursuant to the concept of “freedom of contract” as submitted by learned counsel. These rights are fundamental rights and the courts must presume that Parliament would not invade such rights unless clear words are used. We find no such clear words in BCPA 2007. The parties knew exactly what the bargains were when they entered into the 1995 sales and purchase agreements and it is trite law the courts cannot rewrite contracts when they are freely entered into………………” 19. Berdasarkan kepada penghakiman kes-kes di atas, pada hemat saya permohonan pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff seperti Relief (a) dan (b) Pernyataan Tuntutan adalah di luar bidang kuasa Mahkamah ini. Hartanah tersebut adalah tertakluk di bawah bidang kuasa Pihak Berkuasa Negeri. Adalah sesuatu yang melampaui bidang kuasa Mahkamah untuk memerintahkan pihak Pemaju (Greenhill Development Sdn. Bhd.) dan pemilik hartanah (Permodalan Negeri Selangor Berhad) untuk meminda Perjanjian Jual Beli yang ditandatangani oleh pihak-pihak. Tidak mungkin Mahkamah akan campur tangan dalam urusan status hartanah tersebut yang hanya boleh dikeluarkan oleh Pihak Berkuasa 28 Negeri. Justeru itu, saya tiada dapat mengeluarkan sebarang perintah bagi pihak-pihak untuk meminda Perjanjian Jual Beli kepada satu hakmilikan individu dan diberikan kesan retrospektif. Apatah lagi dalam kes ini, saya mendapati pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff dan Defendan Pertama menandatangani Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut dengan kehadiran pihak peguam. 20. Setelah meneliti penghujahan-penghujahan peguam Plaintiff-plaintiff dan Defendan Pertama, di atas Imbangan Kebarangkalian, saya mendapati tuntutan pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff terhadap Defendan Pertama ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM10,000.00. Dalam keadaan yang sedemikian, berikutan kegagalan dalam Isu Pertama dan Kedua ini, relief-relief sampingan pihak Plaintiff-plaintiff turut gagal dan tiada kuatkuasa. Bertarikh 16 Ogos 2018. (DATO’ HJ. MOHAMAD SHARIFF BIN HJ. ABU SAMAH) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman (NCVC 6) Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan 29 Pihak-pihak Kaunsel: Bagi pihak Plaintiff : En. Zairus Effendi bin Suhaimi (Tetuan Zairus & Dora) Bagi pihak Defendan : Joseph Yeo & H.Y Fang (Tetuan HK Ang & Partners)