I am guided by the Supreme Court case of KPM Khidmat Sdn Bhd v Tey Kim Suie [1994] 2 MLJ 627. Which held that if the primary evidence or the source from which the statement of account is produced is not produced in court as evidence, then that statement of account is inadmissible. The Supreme Court said (at page 633 - 634) : below did not dispute the contents of the summary of accounts (at pp 117 - 121 of the appeal record). The learned judge held that as the appellant did not challenge the truth of the summary of accounts, he was of the view that the contents were true and admissible despite the fact that the appellant never agreed to dispense with formal proof of the debt. On this issue, we were referred by counsel to the decision of Edgar Joseph Jr J in Popular Industries Ltd v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360. The learned judge addressed the issue in the following manner (at p 368) : Now, it was alleged by the plaintiffs that both the oral testimony of the accountant Mr So (regarding their financial operations) and the statement P76 prepared by him, were based upon the results of his examination of the accounts books of the plaintiffs for the relevant period. However, the accounts books themselves were never produced and the defendants never dispensed with formal proof of the loss of profits alleged or at all. In my opinion, the result of this glaring omission, was to render such oral evidence of Mr So and P76 inadmissible in evidence and it makes not the slightest difference that Mr and Mrs Segal confirmed the accuracy of P76. I take the law on this point to be correctly stated by the Vice - Chancellor in Johnson v Kershaw 63 ER 1059. In that case, the evidence of an accountant was tendered containing the results of his examination of certain partnership books, but the accounts books themselves upon which he based his statement were not in evidence. The Vice - Chancellor said : If the account books had been in evidence, the accountant s statement of the results of his examination of those books, as the evidence of a person of skill, might be receivable; but, inasmuch as the books were not in evidence, I must decline to receive the deposition of Mr Peet as to their contents. We would adopt with gratitude the above statement of the law to the present case. Looking at the matter as a whole, we have come to the conclusion that the learned judicial commissioner was wrong in relying on the summary of accounts (at pp 117 - 121 of the appeal record) as sufficient proof of the debt due to the respondent bearing in mind that the burden of proof always lies on the respondent to prove his claim. We hasten to add that since the summary of accounts is inadmissible for reasons which we have adverted to above, it is our further conclusion that as there is no documentary evidence before the court which the respondent can rely to substantiate his claim, his case