Amanahraya Development Sdn Bhd v Sheikhmah Development Sdn Bhd (WA-22NCC-659-10/2025)

AMANAHRAYA DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (Company No.: 200101010338 (546094-U))

AMANAH RAYA CAPITAL SDN BHD (Company No.: 200101013300 (549057-K)) … PLAINTIFFS

SHEIKHMAH DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (Company No.: 198501014204 (146660-H))

SYARIKAT DAMAR SENTIR SDN BHD (Company No.: 198701003007 (161679-K))

KHATAMMI DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (Company No.: 200601012564 (732314-K))

SHEIKH AHMAD BIN SHEIKH SADARUDIN (NRIC No.: 520301-01-5011) S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw

FATIMAH BINTI SUDIN (NRIC No.: 550911-10-6292)

SEIKH FAKIRA BIN SEIKH AHMAD (NRIC No.: 790416-10-5949) … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT AmanahRaya Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sheikhmah Development Sdn Bhd & Ors I. INTRODUCTION [1] This Court heard together two interrelated applications for summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“the ROC 2012”), each brought by the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs. Enclosure 52 is the Plaintiffs' application for summary judgment against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants (“the Principal Debtors”). Enclosure 18 is the Plaintiffs' application for summary judgment against the 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants (“the Guarantors”). [2] The Plaintiffs' claim is for the sum of RM12,285,138.67 as at 28.02.2026, said to arise from the Defendants' breach of a Third Settlement Agreement dated 14.10.2024 (“the 3rd SA”) and the corresponding Joint and Several Directors' Guarantee. [3] The questions for decision may be stated shortly. First, whether the Plaintiffs have satisfied the preliminary requirements for S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw proceeding under Order 14 and established a prima facie case. Secondly, whether the Principal Debtors have raised any bona fide triable issue — in particular upon their defences of prior extinguishment of the debt and of fraudulent misrepresentation. Thirdly, whether the Guarantors have any independent triable issue, including whether they stand discharged by variation of the principal obligation. Fourthly, the quantum recoverable and the proper basis and rate of interest and costs. [4] For the reasons set out below, this Court is satisfied that the Defendants have raised no issue fit to be tried. Enclosure 52 and Enclosure 18 are each allowed. This Court now sets out its grounds. II. BACKGROUND FACTS [5] The following narrative is, in the main, not in dispute and is drawn from the contemporaneous documents exhibited by the parties. [6] The Plaintiffs extended financing to the 1st Defendant for the Taman Sri Nelayan Telok Gong Project. Following defaults, the parties entered into a 1st Settlement Agreement dated 18.03.2014 and thereafter a 2nd Settlement Agreement dated 08.10.2015. It is common ground that a measure of part satisfaction was later achieved. By Recital G of the 3rd SA the parties recorded that the earlier settlements had been breached — S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw “… save and except for the part payment of (RM4,532,662.38) only through the transfer of the fourteen (14) vacant plots of land.” [7] On 14.10.2024 the Plaintiffs and the Principal Debtors executed the 3rd SA. By Clause 2 the Defendants acknowledged an outstanding liability of RM12,866,280.59 [Exh A-8, Encl 55, p. 268]. By Schedule 1 the Defendants agreed to a repayment schedule commencing with an initial payment of RM150,000.00, followed by monthly instalments of RM60,000.00. [8] The 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants executed a Joint and Several Directors' Guarantee in respect of the facility [Exh A-12, Encl 54, p. 532]. The instrument is undated on its face but bears a stamping certificate dated 07.10.2025. Its recitals define the “Facility” as the outstanding Settlement Sum of RM12,866,280.59, being the very sum acknowledged under the 3rd SA. [9] The Defendants made the initial payment and a number of monthly instalments but defaulted upon the instalment due on 15.04.2025. The Plaintiffs issued a Notice of Demand dated 24.04.2025 [Exh A-13, Encl 54, p. 544] and thereafter a Notice of Termination dated 18.08.2025 [Exh A-15, Encl 54, p. 574]. As at 28.02.2026 the outstanding sum stood at RM12,285,138.67 [Exh A-16, Encl 54, p. 588], the computation of which is set out in the S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw statement of account exhibited as the “Jadual Pembayaran Hutang” [Exh A-17]. [10] As to procedure, the Writ and Statement of Claim were filed on 01.10.2025 and served upon the Defendants, receipt being acknowledged on 19.11.2025. The Defendants entered a Memorandum of Appearance through Messrs Shukor & Associates on 21.11.2025. III. THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE CASES The Plaintiffs' case [11] The Plaintiffs' case is straightforward. They say that the 3rd SA is a valid and binding contract by which the Principal Debtors unequivocally acknowledged the debt; that the Defendants defaulted; that the sum claimed is fully vouched by the statement of account; and that the Guarantors are liable, jointly and severally, under an absolute and continuing guarantee. They contend that the several matters raised in answer are afterthoughts contradicted by the Defendants' own executed documents, and that the claim is a plain and obvious one for summary judgment. S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw The Defendants' case [12] The Defendants resist both applications. Their answer, as this Court understood it, comprises the following distinct contentions, each of which this Court addresses in turn later in these grounds:

Extinguishment — that the debt was already discharged under the 2nd Settlement Agreement through the transfer of 161 property units and certain land plots, so that nothing (or a much smaller sum) remains owing;

Misrepresentation / sham — that the 3rd SA is a sham agreement procured by fraudulent misrepresentation, the Defendants alleging that one Tuan Hj. Hussin bin Jidin represented that, if they signed the 3rd SA, the Plaintiffs would release the lien-holders' caveats over Blocks A, F, H and J and over the 4th Defendant's land, so as to permit the project to be developed;

Co-extensive liability / prematurity — that the Guarantors' liability is co-extensive with that of the Principal Debtors, so that judgment against the Guarantors is premature while the principal debt is disputed. [13] This Court records that it has considered each of these contentions, together with the supporting affidavits and exhibits, S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw and disposes of every one of them below. No submission has been left unaddressed. IV. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [14] The issues for determination are: i. whether the Plaintiffs have satisfied the preliminary requirements of Order 14 and whether the action comes within that Order; ii. whether the Plaintiffs have established a prima facie entitlement to judgment on the 3rd SA and the Guarantee; iii. whether the defence of prior extinguishment (the 161 units and the land plots) raises a triable issue; iv. whether the defence of fraudulent misrepresentation / sham raises a triable issue; v. whether the acknowledgment in Clause 2 of the 3rd SA and the Defendants' subsequent conduct bind the Principal Debtors; vi. whether the Guarantors have any independent triable issue, including discharge by variation under the rule in Holme v Brunskill; and S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw vii. the quantum recoverable, and the basis and rate of interest and costs. V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Issue (i): The preliminary requirements and the ambit of Order 14 [15] Order 14 rule 1 of the ROC 2012 provides: “1. (1) Where in an action to which this rule applies a statement of claim has been served on a defendant and that defendant has entered an appearance in the action, the plaintiff may, on the ground that that defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such a claim, or has no defence to such a claim or part except as to the amount of any damages claimed, apply to the Court for judgment against that defendant.

Subject to paragraph (3), this rule applies to every action begun by writ other than one which includes — (a) a claim by the plaintiff for libel, slander, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment; or (b) a claim by the plaintiff based on an allegation of fraud.” [16] Order 14 rule 2(1) further requires that the application be supported by an affidavit verifying the facts on which the claim is S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw based and stating that in the deponent's belief there is no defence to the claim. [17] In National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300 the Federal Court held that in every application under Order 14 the Court must first be satisfied (a) that the case comes within the Order, and (b) that the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements — namely that the defendant has entered an appearance, that the statement of claim has been served, and that the supporting affidavit complies with rule 2. Only if those matters are satisfied does the Court proceed to the merits. [18] Applying that authority, this Court is satisfied that the threshold is met. The Defendants entered a Memorandum of Appearance on 21.11.2025. The Writ and Statement of Claim, filed on 01.10.2025, were served and their receipt acknowledged on 19.11.2025. The Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support affirmed by Lokman bin Ab Latif states, at paragraph 30 — “Saya sesungguhnya percaya bahawa D1, D2 dan D3 tidak mempunyai pembelaan yang bermerit terhadap tuntutan P1 dan P2 …” [19] — that is to say, that the deponent verily believes that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants have no meritorious defence to the Plaintiffs' claim. The affidavit accordingly complies with rule 2. S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw [20] This Court has also considered, of its own motion, whether the action falls outside Order 14 by reason of the fraud alleged in these proceedings. It does not. The exclusion in Order 14 rule 1(2)(b) is confined to a claim by the plaintiff based on an allegation of fraud. Here the Plaintiffs' claim is founded upon a settlement agreement and a guarantee; the allegation of fraud is raised by the Defendants by way of defence. The action therefore comes squarely within the Order. Issue (ii): Burden, standard, and whether a prima facie case is established [21] On an application of this nature the legal burden rests upon the Plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case, whereupon the evidential burden shifts to the Defendants to satisfy the Court that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried, or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial. The ultimate civil standard, were the matter to proceed to trial, is proof on the balance of probabilities: Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372. At the summary stage, however, this Court does not try the action upon affidavit and makes no findings upon the credibility of deponents; the narrower question is whether a triable issue has been shown. S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw [22] Order 14 rule 3(1) provides: “3. (1) Unless on the hearing of an application under rule 1 either the Court dismisses the application or the defendant satisfies the Court with respect to the claim, or the part of a claim, to which the application relates that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim or part, the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against that defendant on that claim or part as may be just having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed.” [23] The governing authority is Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400, in which the Supreme Court held that the Court must be satisfied upon affidavit evidence that the defence has not only raised an issue but that the issue is triable; that a complete defence need not be shown, the defendant needing only to show a triable issue; but that where an assertion or denial is equivocal, lacking in precision, inconsistent with undisputed contemporaneous documents, or inherently improbable in itself, the Court has a duty to reject it, thereby rendering the issue not triable. Their Lordships further affirmed that even where a defendant cannot pinpoint a precise issue, if it is apparent that for some other reason there ought to be a trial, judgment ought not to be given under Order 14. S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw [24] This Court is equally mindful of the countervailing caution in Malayan Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd v Asia Hotel Sdn Bhd [1987] 2 MLJ 183, that Order 14 is not intended to shut out a defendant and that the jurisdiction is to be exercised only in very clear cases where there is no reasonable doubt of the plaintiff's entitlement. These two lines of authority are not in tension. A defendant is not to be shut out from a defence fairly arguable; but neither may a bare or self-contradictory assertion be dressed up as a triable issue. This Court has approached both enclosures on that footing. [25] The Plaintiffs' prima facie case rests upon four planks: the executed 3rd SA and the acknowledgment of debt in Clause 2; the executed Directors' Guarantee; the admitted default upon the instalment due on 15.04.2025; and the statement of account evidencing the outstanding sum. Each is documented and, on its face, unanswered. This Court finds that a prima facie case is established, and the evidential burden passes to the Defendants. Issue (iii): The defence of prior extinguishment [26] The Principal Debtors contend that the debt was extinguished under the 2nd Settlement Agreement through the transfer of 161 property units and certain land plots, and they exhibit 20 sample Sale and Purchase Agreements [Exh SFS-3], stating that the remainder would be produced at trial. S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw [27] This Court finds that no triable issue arises. The contention is answered by the Defendants' own executed instrument. As set out above, Recital G of the 3rd SA records that credit was given for part payment of RM4,532,662.38 through the transfer of fourteen (14) vacant plots of land, and the sum of RM12,866,280.59 acknowledged in Clause 2 is the net balance struck after that credit. The transfers upon which the Defendants rely are therefore already accounted for within the acknowledged figure. As to the 161 units, the Plaintiffs' evidence — which is not met — is that the units were abandoned and incomplete and failed to obtain their Certificates of Completion and Compliance, with the consequence that no value in fact passed. The 20 sample agreements do not answer that evidence; they do not demonstrate that any further credit fell to be given beyond that already recorded. [28] This finding is reinforced by, though it does not depend upon, the supersession clause. By Clause 13.11 of the 3rd SA the parties agreed that “This Agreement shall supersede all previous agreements, arrangements or negotiations either written or verbal made between the Parties” [Encl 55, p. 366]. In Master Strike Sdn Bhd v Sterling Heights Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 MLJ 585 and BsyncLive Sdn Bhd v Technology Park Malaysia Corp Sdn Bhd [2018] 7 MLJ 189 it was held that an entire agreement or supersession clause denudes prior agreements, arrangements and negotiations of independent legal effect, so that a party may not rely upon a superseded arrangement to displace the S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw operative contract. Applying those authorities, the Defendants cannot resurrect the 2015 arrangement to escape their 2024 bargain. The defence of extinguishment is rejected. Issue (iv): The defence of fraudulent misrepresentation / sham [29] This is the defence to which this Court has given the closest attention, for an allegation of fraud is not lightly to be disposed of summarily. The Defendants' case, pleaded with some particularity, is that one Tuan Hj. Hussin bin Jidin represented that, upon their signing the 3rd SA, the Plaintiffs would release the lien-holders' caveats over Blocks A, F, H and J and over the 4th Defendant's land, and that they were thereby induced to sign. [30] It is necessary at the outset to be precise as to what the entire agreement and non-reliance clauses can and cannot achieve. To the extent that the Defendants advance the alleged assurance as a collateral promise or warranty subsisting alongside the written contract, Clause 13.11 (supersession) and Clause 13.4(c) — by which the Defendants agreed that the agreement was not entered into in reliance upon any representation not expressly contained therein — are a complete answer, upon the authorities already cited. To the extent, however, that the Defendants advance the assurance as a fraudulent misrepresentation, this Court does not rest its conclusion upon those clauses at all. A party may not exclude the consequences of its own fraud by an entire agreement or non-reliance clause. Nor does the parol S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw evidence rule assist the Plaintiffs on this point, for section 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides: “92. When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property … have been proved according to section 91, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from its terms: Provided that — (a) any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto, such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution … want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law …” [31] By force of proviso (a), evidence of fraud is admissible notwithstanding the writing. The allegation must therefore be examined upon its merits, and this Court now does so. [32] Examined upon its merits, the allegation does not rise to a triable issue, for two reasons. First, the matter said to have been represented is a promise as to future conduct — that the Plaintiffs would release the caveats. A representation as to future intention is not actionable as a misrepresentation of fact unless it be shown that, at the time it was made, the representor held no such S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw intention. The Defendants' affidavits do not descend to any particulars capable of establishing that the Plaintiffs never intended to release the caveats at the time the assurance is said to have been given. The dishonesty is asserted; it is not particularised. [33] Secondly, and decisively, the alleged oral assurance is flatly contradicted by the express terms of the very instrument it is said to have induced. Clause 4.2(a) of the 3rd SA provides that “The lienholders' caveat lodged by ARC on the Land shall remain in full force and effect” [Encl 55, p. 354]. The Defendants executed that clause with the benefit of independent legal advice: the 3rd SA identifies Messrs Kesh, Dave & Partners as solicitors for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants, and the Guarantors separately declared, by Clause 25(c) of the Guarantee, that they had “sought, obtained and relied upon our own independent legal advice”. An assertion that the parties orally agreed the precise opposite of what they solemnly reduced into writing, with legal advice, is exactly the species of assertion which — being inconsistent with undisputed contemporaneous documents and inherently improbable in itself — this Court is bound to reject upon Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail. [34] By way of observation only, and not forming part of this Court's ratio: even had the entire agreement and non-reliance clauses fallen away entirely, the result would be unchanged, for this Court's rejection of the defence turns not upon the exclusionary S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw force of those clauses but upon the internal contradiction and improbability of the assertion itself. This Court records the point lest it be thought that the conclusion depends upon a party contracting out of its own fraud, which it may not do. [35] For these reasons this Court finds that the defence of fraudulent misrepresentation and sham raises no triable issue. Issue (v): The acknowledgment and the Defendants' conduct [36] The acknowledgment in Clause 2 of the 3rd SA is an admission. Section 17(1) of the Evidence Act 1950 provides: “17. (1) An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons and under the circumstances hereinafter mentioned.” [37] This Court does not, however, treat that admission as conclusive, for section 31 provides: “31. Admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may operate as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained.” [38] The acknowledgment is nonetheless a formal and deliberate admission of a precise sum, and it is cogent evidence of liability. That evidence is fortified by the Defendants' conduct: they paid S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw the initial sum of RM150,000.00 and thereafter a series of monthly instalments. Having executed the agreement with legal advice and thereafter performed it, the Defendants affirmed it. This Court has considered whether affirmation might be displaced on the footing that the payments were made in ignorance of the matters now relied upon; but no material is advanced to that effect, and the alleged representation is said to have been made before execution, not discovered afterwards. This Court finds that the acknowledgment and the conduct bind the Principal Debtors and are inconsistent with the existence of any triable issue. Issue (vi): The Guarantors — Enclosure 18 [39] The Guarantors say that their liability is co-extensive with that of the Principal Debtors, so that judgment against them is premature. That contention falls away with this Court's disposal of Enclosure 52: the principal debt being established, there is nothing premature in the enforcement of a guarantee of it. [40] This Court has, however, gone further and considered a defence not pressed but latent upon the documents — whether the Guarantors stand discharged by variation of the principal obligation. The rule in Holme v Brunskill (1878) 3 QBD 495 is that a surety is discharged where the principal contract is materially varied without the surety's consent, unless the variation is patently insubstantial or incapable of prejudicing the surety. That rule may, however, be excluded by appropriately drawn anti-S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw discharge or consent-to-variation provisions within the guarantee itself. This Court finds that the Guarantors are not discharged, for two independent reasons. [41] First, the Guarantee was given in respect of the 3rd SA itself. Its recitals define the “Facility” as the outstanding Settlement Sum of RM12,866,280.59, and the instrument bears a stamping certificate dated 07.10.2025, being after the 3rd SA. There is accordingly no antecedent principal obligation which was afterwards varied to the Guarantors' prejudice; the obligation guaranteed is the 3rd SA as it stands. [42] Secondly, and in any event, the Guarantee contains the very provisions which exclude the rule. By Clause 1(a) the Guarantors undertook payment on demand of all monies due “on the general balance of the Borrower's account with you anywhere and on any account whatsoever”. By Clause 7(b) the Guarantors are not released by any “increase, decrease, extension … or any variation of any terms and conditions thereof with or without our consent or notice to us”. By Clause 9(a) the Guarantors waived the need for their knowledge or consent to subsequent arrangements. Those are anti-discharge and consent-to-variation clauses in conventional form, and they oust the operation of the rule. [43] The validity and execution of the Guarantee are not in dispute, and Clause 25(c) records the Guarantors' independent legal S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw advice. This Court finds that the Guarantors have raised no independent triable issue. Issue (vii): Quantum, interest and costs [44] The quantum is fully vouched. The statement of account [Exh A- 17] shows that the acknowledged sum of RM12,866,280.59 was reduced by the Defendants' payments — the initial RM150,000.00 together with monthly instalments of RM60,000.00 and RM30,000.00 made between October 2024 and October 2025 — bringing the outstanding principal to RM12,266,280.59, to which accrued late payment compensation of RM18,858.08 was added, producing the sum claimed of RM12,285,138.67 as at 28.02.2026. The figures reconcile, and this Court is satisfied to enter judgment for that sum. [45] As to interest, the rate is fixed by contract. Clause 3.2 of the 3rd SA provides for “late payment Compensation at the rate of eight per centum (8%) per annum on the Settlement Sum or any part thereof remaining outstanding, calculated on a daily basis”. Order 42 rule 12 of the ROC 2012 provides: “12. Subject to rule 12A, except when it has been otherwise agreed between the parties, every judgment debt shall carry interest at such rate as the Chief Justice may from time to time determine or at such other rate not exceeding the rate aforesaid as the Court determines, S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw such interest to be calculated from the date of judgment until the judgment is satisfied.” [46] Pursuant to Practice Direction No. 1 of 2012 the Chief Justice has fixed the prescribed rate at 5% per annum. The rule, however, operates “except when it has been otherwise agreed between the parties”. The parties having agreed a rate of 8% by Clause 3.2, this Court gives effect to their bargain and awards interest at 8% per annum upon the judgment sum from 28.02.2026, being the date to which interest has already been computed within the sum awarded, until full realisation. [47] As to costs, costs follow the event under Order 59 of the ROC 2012, the Plaintiffs having succeeded upon both applications. This Court orders the Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs' costs of Enclosure 52 and Enclosure 18, to be agreed between the parties failing which taxed, and subject to allocatur. S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS [48] This Court is satisfied that the Defendants have raised no issue or question fit to be tried, and that this is a plain case in which the Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court orders as follows: 1) Enclosure 18 is allowed. Summary judgment is entered against the 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants. 2) The 4th to 6th Defendants shall, jointly and severally, pay the Plaintiffs the sum of RM12,360,068.00 as at 28.07.2025. 3) The said sum shall carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum, base on the sum of RM12,356,280.59 from 29.07.2025 until the date of full and final settlement. 4) Enclosure 52 is allowed. Summary judgment is entered against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. 5) The 1st to 3rd Defendants shall, jointly and severally, pay the Plaintiffs the sum of RM12,285,138.67 as at 28.02.2026. 6) The said sum shall carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum, pursuant to Clause 3.2 of the 3rd SA, from 28.02.2026 until the date of full and final settlement. S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw 7) The Defendants shall pay the Plaintiffs' costs of RM15,000.00 for both applications, to be agreed failing which taxed, subject to allocatur. VII. APPRECIATION [49] This Court records its appreciation to counsel on both sides for their assistance and for the manner in which the applications were argued. Dated 16hb July 2026 (MOHAMAD REDZUAN BIN IDRUS) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER KUALA LUMPUR HIGH COURT NCC 5 WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw APPEARANCES For the Plaintiffs: Nor Shahadah binti Saari (Messrs Shukor Baljit & Partners (Kuala Lumpur)) For the Defendants: Abd Shukor bin Tokachil (Messrs Shukor & Associates (Simpang Renggam)) CASES REFERRED TO

Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400, SC (folld)

BsyncLive Sdn Bhd v Technology Park Malaysia Corp Sdn Bhd [2018] 7 MLJ 189 (folld)

Holme v Brunskill (1878) 3 QBD 495 (distd)

Malayan Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd v Asia Hotel Sdn Bhd [1987] 2 MLJ 183 (refd)

Master Strike Sdn Bhd v Sterling Heights Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 MLJ 585 (folld)

Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 (refd)

National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300, FC (folld)

Evidence Act 1950, ss 17(1), 31, 91, 92, proviso (a)

Rules of Court 2012, O 14 rr 1(1), 1(2), 2(1), 3(1), O 42 r 12, O

Practice Direction No. 1 of 2012 S/N aADeJliyV0Weh6l5awYlw