Ini dapat dilihat perbincangan perkara ini dalam artikel yang bertajuk The Prerogative Writs In English Law oleh Edward Jenks, D.C.L. [1923] Yale Law Journal Vol. xxxii No. 6 523 seperti yang berikut: “ The Quo Warranto and the Prohibition appear to be "prerogative" in the strictest sense. They are both very old; and both date from the critical years of the thirteenth century, when the newly consolidated State was entering upon its struggle with rival jurisdictions for the sole custody of the Fount of Justice. The Quo Warranto is a statutory writ invented to try the validity of the feudal franchises. It took its rise in the great Statute of Gloucester of 1278, which initiated the sweeping reforms of the English Justinian; and, after the long and acrimonious enquiry which resulted in the compilation of the Hundred Rolls, and the concession of the "time whereof the memory of man," etc.,15 it was consecrated as an established form, "to be awarded as an original out of the chancery," in 1301, when the old reformer, his great life's work done, was passing to his grave.16 The paraphrase of Edward's statutes given in Britton17 makes it fairly clear that the Quo Warranto was originally intended solely as a royal weapon; and it is worthy of notice that (seemingly) it does not appear in the ordinary printed Register. But it is equally clear that, at a later time, by the process of "informing" the royal officials of an alleged usurpation, a private person could make use of the writ; and though "informations" became unpopular after the Restoration,18 and were definitely checked at the Revolution,19 the information in the nature of a Quo Warranto" took its place during the eighteenth century as a process open to the ordinary citizen. Though it could not be issued strictly as "of course," it was exhibited with leave of the courts at the relation of any person or persons desirous to sue or prosecute the same. The Prohibition was the special weapon of the King's courts against the ecclesiastical tribunals. Its scope, though varying from century to century, was more or less settled for pre-Reformation times by certain apocryphal statutes of the early fourteenth century-the so-called Articuli Cleri 21 and the Articles against Prohibitions. 22 Unlike the Quo Warranto, it appears in the ordinary Register of Originals; and it is quite clear that, from the very first, the royal judges relied largely on the private litigant to start proceedings under it. 23 Still, the fiction, of its prerogative character was kept up by a requirement that the party applying by "suggestion" should allege that the King's interest was threatened, until the year 1831, when it was formally abolished by statute. After that step it became easy to apply the writ to all cases of exceeded jurisdiction in inferior tribunals, whether royal or not; and the writ is at the present day aft ordinary means of deciding questions of jurisdiction. But it is significant that, unlike most of the so-called "prerogative writs," the Prohibition has always been, according to the better opinion, ex debito justice, when the excess of jurisdiction is clear. 25 ” [33] Mahkamah telah menjelaskan hakikat perintah quo warranto dalam kes Lim Cho Hock v Government of The State of Perak, Menteri Besar, State of Perak and President, Municipality of Ipoh [1980] 2 MLJ 148 melalu penghakiman YA Hakim Abdoolcader yang menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “I should perhaps also touch on one other matter with regard to the plaintiff's standing. It would have been open to the plaintiff to apply for a writ in the nature of quo warranto under the provisions of section 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 and paragraph 1 of the Schedule thereto to challenge the office of President of the Council simultaneously held by the Menteri Besar. In England, an information in the nature of a quo warranto (which had replaced the old prerogative writ of quo warranto) was abolished and substituted by an injunction by the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938. The High Court, however, has power to entertain proceedings for a quo warranto by virtue of the statutory provisions I have referred to, and adverting to the old rules of substantive law applicable in relation thereto, the position is that in order to exhibit an information against a member of a borough corporation, the relator has to have an interest in the proceedings such as that of a ratepayer or corporator; the court however exercises a broad discretion in determining questions of locus standi, and in the most recent of the leading cases, Rex v Speyer [1916] 1 KB 595; affd [1916] 2 KB 858, involving an information against a member of the Privy Council, the court adopted a liberal view, holding that any member of the public could sue if he had no private interest to serve and that it was to the public advantage that a matter concerning the public government should be judicially affirmed when there was no other remedy. If then the plaintiff would have standing in quo warranto proceedings there can be no justification to refuse him that when he seeks declaratory relief in respect of a public office such as that of President of the Council.” [34] Sementara itu habeas corpus pula dan remedi yang berkaitan dengannya telah diperjelaskan oleh YA Hakim Abdoolcader dalam kes Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister For Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 seperti yang berikut: “Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ of summary character for the enforcement of this cherished civil right of personal liberty and entitles the subject of detention to a judicial determination that the administrative order adduced as warrant for the detention is legally valid, in the sense that it is pursuant to valid statutory authority, and to test whether the detention proceedings are, in the words of Frankfurter J. in Estep v United States (1946) 327 US 114 141 “a mere sham, nothing but an empty form.” The grant of habeas corpus is as of right and not in the discretion of the court as in the case of such extraordinary legal remedies as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. It is a writ of right against which no privilege of person or place can be of any avail (R v Pell And Offly 84 ER 720. The heavy musketry of the law will always be brought to bear upon any suggestion of unlawful invasion or infringement of the personal liberty of an individual in the form of habeas corpus and kindred orders where necessary to grant relief when warranted. It was aptly put in the American case of State ex rel Evans v Broaddus 245 Mo 123 140 that at least in times of peace every human power must give way to the writ of habeas corpus and no prison door is stout enough to stand in its way. Such then is the purpose and power of this great writ of liberty that I am impelled to the view that the principles governing the exercise of the court's discretion and the rules pertaining to the existence of alternative remedies in granting mandamus, prohibition and certiorari should not apply to habeas corpus. My conclusion in this respect is not inhibited or affected by the judicial discretion provision in section 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code that “The High Court may whenever it thinks fit direct –” and certain Indian decisions on the like provision in section 491 of the former Indian Criminal Procedure Code (now replaced by the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which omits this section), in view of the fact that the complaint now made by the applicant purports to be one of a breach of his fundamental right of personal liberty under the Constitution and this application must of necessity be made both under the procedural provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 5(2) of the Constitution which must be read together with its enforcement provision enacted in section 25(2) and paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964. section 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code must now therefore be read, in my view, in this light and as modified accordingly by the application of the provisions of Article 162(6) of the Constitution.” [35] Adalah wajar juga untuk memahami undang-undang berkaitan habeas corpus dengan meneliti artikel yang bertajuk Habeas Corpus in Malaysia and Singapore [1977] 2 MLJ lv oleh Low Hop Bing. [36] Malahan penelitian kepada sejarah habeas corpus dapat dilihat dengan menarik bagaimana ia berkembang dan termasuk dalam writ prerogatif melalui catatan Sir Henry Montagu pada tahun 1619 di dalam Palmer 54, 81 ER 975 (Bourne, 1619) yang menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Habeas corpus was a writ of the prerogative in order to be a writ of liberty. In the first two decades of the seventeenth century, the judges of King's Bench attached habeas corpus to the prerogative, taking it for their own use, thereby making themselves the sun that lit the heavens.” [37] Penelitian ringkas kepada hakikat semakan kehakiman dan remedi-remedi yang boleh diberikan menunjukkan ia tidak secara langsung melibatkan apa-apa perintah bagi pembayaran wang. Ia lebih melibatkan kepada penentuan sama ada adakah proses yang dilakukan oleh badan awam adalah teratur dan mengikut undang-undang. Di samping itu adakah sebarang perlanggaran kepada jaminan yang diberikan di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa di dalam Aturan 53 kaedah 5 KKM 2012 membolehkan Mahkamah semasa mendengar semakan kehakiman mengawardkan gantirugi. Ia memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “5. Ganti rugi (A. 53 k. 5)