Badan Pengurusan Bersama Pangsapuri Molek v Adeline Yap Poh Hong (JA-22NCvC-14-02/2024)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO. : JA-22NCvC-14-02/2024 BETWEEN BADAN PENGURUSAN BERSAMA PANGSAPURI MOLEK [REGISTRATION NO. : JMB 0181] ...PLAINTIFF AND ADELINE YAP POH HONG [SINGAPORE PASSPORT NO. : K1790532N] ...DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosures 60 & 75) 25/06/2026 12:07:48 JA-22NCvC-14-02/2024 Kand. 111 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 INTRODUCTION

1. Before this Court, there are two interlocutory applications –

2. This Court shall address each application in turn. Enclosure 75 - Application of Perbadanan Pengurusan Pangsapuri Molek to be Added as Plaintiff INTRODUCTION

3. Enclosure 75 is an application by Perbadanan Pengurusan Pangsapuri Molek (the “MC”), filed on 06.02.2026, pursuant to Order **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 15 Rule 6(2)(b), Order 20 Rule 5 and/or Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”) for the following orders –

4. The application is supported by the Affidavit in Support affirmed by Keith Woo Chi Leung, Chairman of the MC, on 06.02.2026 (Enclosure 76) and the Affidavit in Reply affirmed by him on 05.03.2026 (Enclosure 85). The MC’s Written Submissions were filed on 13.03.2026 (Enclosure 86).

5. The Defendant, opposes this application through her Affidavit in Reply dated 24.02.2026 (Enclosure 81), Written Submissions dated 13.03.2026 (Enclosure 88) and Reply Written Submissions dated 25.03.2026 (Enclosure 90). **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Background

6. The Plaintiff, is an interim statutory body established under the Strata Management Act 2013 [Act 757] for the management of Pangsapuri Molek (Molek Regency) in Johor Bahru.

7. On 09.02.2024, the Plaintiff filed this action against the Defendant, a Singaporean citizen and owner of residential unit C-10-03 at Pangsapuri Molek. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant carried out extensive and unauthorised renovation works to the said unit, including hacking of shear walls, drilling through building beams, modifying the plumbing and sewerage systems and installing windows without approval. These works are alleged to have compromised the structural integrity of the building and raised serious safety concerns for all residents.

8. A strata register was opened and the MC came into existence by operation of law. The first Annual General Meeting of the MC was held on 15.11.2025, at which the management committee members were elected.

9. The one-month period stipulated under section 27(2) of Act 757 expired on 15.12.2025. The Plaintiff was dissolved on 15.02.2026, being three months after the first AGM of the MC, pursuant to section 27(1) of Act 757. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5

10. The MC passed a resolution on 12.01.2026 to intervene in this action. The application in Enclosure 75 was filed on 06.02.2026, that is, before the dissolution of the Plaintiff on 15.02.2026.

11. The Defendant opposes the MC’s application on the following grounds –

12. This Court identifies three issues for determination – Issue 1 : Whether this proceeding has abated and become a nullity following the dissolution of the Plaintiff; Issue 2 : Whether it is necessary and proper for the MC to be added as the Second Plaintiff in this suit; and Issue 3 : Whether the addition of the MC as Second Plaintiff would cause prejudice to the Defendant. Issue 1 : The Proceedings Have Not Abated And Are Not A Nullity

13. The central question before this Court is whether the dissolution of the Plaintiff on 15.02.2026 has caused this action to abate automatically. This Court holds that this action has not abated and is not a nullity for the following reasons.

14. Section 28(2) of Act 757 provides in clear and mandatory terms that any right, power or remedy granted to, or any liability imposed on, the Plaintiff under Part IV of the Act 757, including those rights in respect of any legal proceedings pending immediately before the date of expiry of the period specified in section 27(2) of Act 757, shall vest in the MC. The MC shall have the same right, power, remedy or liability **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 as if it had at all times been a right, power, remedy or liability of the MC.

15. This Court refers to the decision of High Court in Aragreens Residences Joint Management Body v. HSB Development Sdn Bhd [2024] CLJU 1109, where the facts were nearly identical to the present case. In Aragreens, the plaintiff was a JMB and the MC subsequently applied to intervene as the second Plaintiff. The Defendant therein opposed the application on grounds substantially similar to those raised in the present case. The High Court rejected those objections and allowed the MC’s application and held that that section 28(2) of Act 757 contains two independent limbs.

16. The first limb provides that upon the expiry of the one-month period specified in section 27(2) of Act 757, all rights, powers and remedies of the Plaintiff under Part IV of Act 757 “shall vest” in the MC. The use of the word “shall” makes the vesting mandatory.

17. The second limb provides that where a suit is pending immediately before the lapse of the said period, the MC shall have the same right, power, remedy or liability as if it had at all times been a right, power, remedy or liability of the MC, including those rights in respect of the pending suit.

18. The High Court further held that the purpose and object of the two independent limbs of section 28(2) of Act 757 is to ensure that, upon the expiry of the period specified in section 27(2) of Act 757, the MC has a statutory right to apply to intervene in a suit filed by or against **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 the Plaintiff. This is to protect the rights and interests of the MC, the parcel owners, and the occupiers of the development area.

19. This Court also refers to Order 15 Rule 7(1) of the ROC, which provides that where a party to an action dies or becomes bankrupt but the cause of action survives, the action shall not abate by reason of the death or bankruptcy. The same principle applies by analogy here. The cause of action is not extinguished by the dissolution of the Plaintiff. Rather, it has been statutorily transferred to the MC by virtue of section 28(2) of Act 757.

20. In the present case, this suit was undeniably pending before 15.12.2025, being the date of expiry of the section 27(2) of Act 757 period. Accordingly, the statutory vesting under section 28(2) of Act 757 has been engaged. All the rights of the Plaintiff in this suit have vested in the MC since 15.12.2025.

21. As regards the authorities relied upon by the Defendant, this Court finds that the decisions in Badan Pengurusan Bersama Kristal Heights 2 & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak & Ors [2020] CLJU 1727 and Park Access Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Badan Pengurusan Bersama Prima Avenue Dan DPCC Fasa 1 (Blok G, H, I) And Other Appeals [2018] CLJU 711 are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In both those decisions, the JMB was attempting to continue prosecuting or initiate proceedings on its own, without the MC stepping in. The question there was whether the JMB alone had standing. Here, the situation is the reverse. The MC is applying to be added to take over the suit, which is precisely what section 28(2) of Act 757 contemplates. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9

22. This Court further observes that the MC’s Reply Submission (Enclosure 92) draws a significant distinction between the nature of the claims in Park Access and Kristal Heights on the one hand and the present case on the other. In both cases, the disputes concerned proprietary ownership of land, specifically, whether certain areas constituted common property and who held the proprietary right over those areas. The present case is fundamentally different. It concerns the statutory duty to manage and protect the common property from unauthorised renovation works that compromise the building’s structural integrity. The question here is not “who owns the property” but “who may act to protect the property”.

23. This Court also notes the MC’s submission that Park Access concerned the pre-amended Strata Titles Act 1985 and the repealed Building and Common Property (Maintenance and Management) Act

2007. The Court therein did not have occasion to consider the effect of section 28(2) of Act 757, which came into force only on 1 June

2015. As the MC correctly submits, the statutory framework has since evolved and section 28(2) of Act 757 now expressly provides for the vesting of the JMB’s rights in the MC in respect of pending legal proceedings. This further limits the applicability of Park Access to the facts of the present case.

24. The MC’s Reply Submission also relies on the High Court’s decision in PJ Centrestage JMB v. Cherish Springs Sdn Bhd & Anor and another case [2020] 1 LNS 525. In that case, the High Court adopted a purposive interpretation of Act 757 pursuant to section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 [Act 488], and held that the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 purpose of Parliament in establishing JMBs was to protect purchasers and parcel owners. It was further held that a JMB may continue to sue during the interim period before its dissolution, even after the MC is established, because the MC, although existing in law upon the opening of the strata register, is incapable of acting until its management committee is duly constituted at its first annual general meeting.

25. Court in PJ Centrestage further held that during the interim period between the establishment of the MC and the dissolution of the JMB, the JMB is a constructive trustee of the common property for the sole benefit of the MC. This Court echoes the persuasive reasoning in PJ Centrestage which is consistent with the parliamentary intention as expressed in the Dewan Rakyat proceedings of 8 November 2016, where the Minister acknowledged that the continued existence of the JMB was necessary even after the MC comes into existence through the opening of the strata register, given that the MC may not yet have a management committee composed of parcel owners.

26. Importantly, neither Park Access nor Kristal Heights considered whether an MC, in the absence of a duly elected management committee, is capable of making decisions or commencing proceedings. That is a material factual distinction from the present case, where the MC had no management committee at the time the JMB filed suit. The reasoning in PJ Centrestage and Aragreens addresses this precise gap and is directly applicable.

27. Indeed, the Court of Appeal’s finding in Park Access that the JMB loses its locus standi once the MC is established actually supports the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 MC’s application. If the JMB no longer has standing, then the MC must be added to ensure the suit can continue. This is the very purpose of the application before this Court.

28. The Court in Aragreens also specifically held that the two independent limbs of section 28(2) of Act 757 do not require the MC to apply to court to intervene before the dissolution of the JMB pursuant to section 27(1) of Act 757. In any event, in the present case, the MC filed its application on 06.02.2026, which was prior to the dissolution of the JMB on 15.02.2026.

29. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that this proceeding has not abated and is not a nullity. The JMB’s cause of action has been statutorily vested in the MC by operation of section 28(2) of Act 757. Issue 2 : Necessity Of Adding The MC As Second Plaintiff

30. Order 15 Rule 6(2)(b) of the ROC provides that at any stage of the proceedings, the Court may order any person to be added as a party, namely –

31. The Court of Appeal in Dato’ Dr HJ Mohamed Haniffa Hj Abdullah & Ors v. Koperasi Doktor Malaysia Bhd And Ors & Another Appeal [2008] 3 CLJ 323 held that Order 15 Rule 6(2)(b) ROC 2012 should be “widely or liberally interpreted” and that its purpose is to enable the Court to prevent injustice being done to a person whose rights will be affected by its judgment.

32. In Mohamed Azmal Noor Naina Mohd Noor v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 505, the Court of Appeal also held that the purpose of adding a party to a cause or matter is to contribute to the “effective, complete, and global disposal or determination of the dispute”.

33. This Court is satisfied that the addition of the MC as Second Plaintiff is necessary for the following reasons –

34. In Aragreens, the Court held that it was “necessary” for the MC to intervene as the Second Plaintiff pursuant to Order 15 Rule 6(2)(b)(i) of the ROC 2012. The Court explained that if the Court were to dismiss the MC’s application, three forms of injustice would result –

35. This Court also refers to Maisson Residence JMB v. Newfields Property Management Sdn Bhd [2024] CLJU 1136, where High Court allowed the MC’s application under Order 15 Rule 6(2) of the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 ROC. The Court’s found that the application was not motivated by ill intent or mala fide, but was a genuine concern to address the continuity of the suit after the dissolution of the JMB.

36. As regards the Defendant’s argument that the proper course was to substitute the MC for the JMB rather than to add the MC as Second Plaintiff, this Court finds that both approaches, either addition and substitution, are permissible in law. The decision in Aragreens allowed the MC to be added as Second Plaintiff alongside the JMB. This approach is procedurally safer as it preserves the procedural history of the suit and avoids any argument that earlier steps taken by the JMB become irregular. The Court has ample discretion under Order 15 Rule 6(2) and Order 92 Rule 4 of the ROC 2012 to fashion the appropriate order.

37. As regards the allegation of delay, this Court finds that the MC passed its resolution on 12.01.2026 and filed the application on 06.02.2026, less than one month after the resolution and before the JMB’s dissolution. The period of approximately seven weeks from the vesting date of 15.12.2025 is reasonable, given that the MC needed time to assume management, instruct solicitors and prepare the application. The Court in Aragreens expressly held that section 28(2) of Act 757 does not even require the MC to apply before the dissolution of the JMB. The delay, if any, is not unreasonable.

38. The Defendant further relies on Fima Bulking Services Bhd & Ors v. Kazhou Pte Ltd; Lembaga Minyak Sawit Malaysia (Proposed Intervener) [2026] 1 CLJ 127 for the proposition that intervention requires a “direct legal interest” and not merely a commercial interest **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 and that the application must be made at the earliest possible opportunity. This Court finds that the MC’s interest is not merely commercial. It is statutory. By operation of section 28(2) of Act 757, all the JMB’s rights in this pending suit have vested in the MC. The MC is now the proprietor of the common property. Its legal interest is direct and unmistakable. As for timeliness, for the reasons stated above, this Court is satisfied the application was made within a reasonable time.

39. The Defendant’s reliance on the Hong Leong Finance Bhd v. Low Thiam Hoe & Another Appeal [2015] 8 CLJ 1 principles regarding late amendments is also misplaced. Those principles apply to amendments that introduce a new case on the eve of trial. Here, the proposed amendment does not introduce any new cause of action or new claim. It merely adds the MC as a party to continue the existing claims.

40. Accordingly, the addition of the MC as Second Plaintiff is necessary and proper pursuant to Order 15 Rule 6(2)(b) of the ROC, read together with section 28(2) of Act 757. Issue 3 : No Prejudice to The Defendant

41. The Defendant contends that the addition of the MC as Second Plaintiff would create “double liability” as both the JMB and the MC would be claiming the same relief. This Court finds this argument to be without merit. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16

42. This Court had examined the proposed Amended Statement of Claim at Annexure A and found that the MC does not introduce any new claims against the Defendant. The MC merely seeks to continue and maintain all existing claims originally brought by the JMB. The proposed amendments only involve adding the MC as Second Plaintiff and changing references from “Plaintiff” to “Plaintiffs”. The Defendant has had knowledge of these claims since the commencement of proceedings in February 2024.

43. Further, this Court also found that the argument of double liability is misconceived. The relief sought is claimed jointly by the Plaintiffs, not separately by each plaintiff. Any judgment obtained would be a single judgment, not two separate judgments creating double recovery. The JMB, having been dissolved, no longer has any independent capacity to enforce any judgment. In practice, only the MC would benefit from any judgment made. There is no mechanism by which the Defendant would be liable twice for the same matter.

44. The Plaintiff’s Reply Submission (Enclosure 92) also makes the apt observation that the Defendant’s position is internally contradictory. The Defendant cannot simultaneously maintain that the JMB no longer exists and has no locus standi to maintain this suit following its dissolution, while at the same time asserting that the Defendant faces double liability from two Plaintiffs. If, as the Defendant contends, the Plaintiff has been dissolved and has no standing, then logically there can be no double liability, as only the MC would be in a position to enforce any judgment. This Court agrees with the Plaintiff’s submission that the double liability allegation is without basis. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17

45. This Court further observed that the Defendant has also failed to particularise the alleged prejudice with any specificity. At paragraph 13 of the Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 81), the Defendant merely states in general terms that the addition of the MC would cause prejudice, without explaining how such prejudice would arise. This is a bare allegation without basis.

46. The proposed amendments are made bona fide, do not change the character of the suit into an inconsistent character and do not cause prejudice that cannot be compensated by costs. This accords with the principles established by the Federal Court in MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2002] 3 CLJ 577.

47. The Defendant’s characterisation of the application as an abuse of process and mala fide is rejected. This suit concerns the structural safety of a residential building, the alleged hacking of shear walls and drilling through beams. This is a serious matter affecting the safety of all residents. There is nothing mala fide about ensuring that the proper body with legal standing can continue prosecuting these claims. The application is driven by the statutory transition from JMB to MC, a process mandated by Parliament.

48. This Court further observed the MC’s submission (Enclosure 92, paragraph 52) that the abuse of process allegation was not raised by the Defendant in her Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 81), but was raised for the first time in the Defendant’s Written Submission (Enclosure 88). As such, it constitutes a submission from the bar unsupported by any evidence on affidavit, and this Court accords it limited weight. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18

49. It is also significant that this Court had previously allowed the JMB’s application for an Injunction Order (Enclosure 20), which remains in force. In granting that order, this Court was satisfied that there was a serious question to be tried. The MC seeks to continue those very same claims. The continued subsistence of the Injunction Order reinforces the conclusion that this suit is not frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of court process.

50. As regards the Defendant’s reliance on Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7, this Court finds that the authority is inapplicable to the present case. That case concerned different factual circumstances and did not involve the statutory transition from a JMB to an MC under the Act 757.

51. Conversely, this Court also observed that refusing this application would cause significant and irreparable prejudice. This Court adopts the reasoning in Aragreens, who identified three forms of injustice that would result if the MC’s application were dismissed –

52. This Court finds that the same considerations of injustice apply in the present case with even greater force, given that the underlying dispute involves the structural safety of the building.

53. Accordingly, I found that no prejudice that cannot be compensated by costs will be caused to the Defendant. Conversely, refusing this application would cause irreparable prejudice to the MC, the parcel owners, and the occupiers of Pangsapuri Molek.

54. Although the MC's application is allowed and the Defendant's substantive objections fail, this Court recognises that the Defendant has been put to the necessity of responding to this application and to consequential amendments. As the addition of the MC is in the nature of a procedural indulgence, albeit one grounded in statutory entitlement, this Court considers it just that costs of this application be paid to the Defendant. This accords with the principle that prejudice arising from such procedural steps may be adequately compensated by costs. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 COURT’S DECISION

55. For the foregoing reasons, this Court orders as follows –

56. The Defendant via Enclosure 60, seeks leave to amend her Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 2.6.2024 (Enclosure 23) pursuant to Order 20 Rule 5 and Order 92 Rule 4 of the ROC

2012. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21

57. The Plaintiff opposed this application through an Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 65) and a Further Affidavit (Enclosure 66). The Defendant filed Affidavits in Reply (Enclosures 68 and 69). Both parties filed written submissions (Enclosures 70/74 and 72/78 respectively) and reply submissions (Enclosures 77 and 78). BACKGROUND

58. The background facts are as set out at paragraphs 6 to 10 above. The Defendant filed her Defence and Counterclaim on 2.6.2024 (Enclosure 23). The Plaintiff filed its Reply to Defence on 27.6.2024. Pleadings closed on 12.7.2024. The following additional facts are material to this application.

59. Since the close of pleadings, the parties attended four (4) Case Managements. Pre-Trial Documents were finalised and filed in November 2024. At the Case Management on 11.11.2024, this Court fixed trial dates from 11.5.2026 to 15.5.2026.

60. The Defendant's former solicitors, Messrs Richard Law & Co, had filed an application to discharge themselves from acting for the Defendant. The Defendant then acted in person. At several Case Management dates (8.5.2024, 25.7.2024, 4.9.2024, 6.10.2024 and 11.11.2024), this Court advised the Defendant to appoint solicitors. The Defendant elected to continue the proceedings without legal representation. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22

61. In October 2025, the Defendant appointed Messrs Veer & Co as her solicitors. The present amendment application was filed on 5.12.2025, approximately 16 months (511 days) after the close of pleadings. ANALYSIS

62. Order 20 Rule 5(1) of ROC 2012 provides that the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, allow any party to amend his pleading, on such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just and in such a manner as it may direct.

63. The principles governing the exercise of this discretion were established by the Federal Court in Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd. v. Yamaha (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. [1983] CLJ Rep 428, namely –

64. Where amendments are sought at a late stage, the Federal Court in Hong Leong Finance Bhd v. Low Thiam Hoe & another appeal **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [2015] 8 CLJ 1 held that the Yamaha Motor principles are not the sole considerations. The Court must also consider –

65. Based on the above jurisprudence, the Court's analysis and findings on the issue beforehand are as follows.

66. This Court observed that there has been a significant delay in the filing of this application. The application was filed approximately 16 months after the close of pleadings and one year after trial dates were fixed. This is not disputed, and the Defendant herself acknowledges that the application was made at a late stage.

67. The Plaintiff submits, relying on Kenanga Investors Bhd v Zulrafq Capital Sdn Bhd & Anor [2025] MLJU 3981, that the delay is **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 inordinate, no cogent explanation has been provided and the application is therefore not bona fide. The Plaintiff points to the court records showing that the presiding judge repeatedly advised the Defendant to appoint solicitors, but the Defendant elected and insisted on proceeding without legal representation.

68. The Defendant’s explanation is that she was a foreign national unfamiliar with Malaysian legal procedure, her former solicitors withdrew suddenly, and she was in a state of confusion and financial difficulty. She contends that upon appointing Messrs Veer & Co in October 2025, the application was filed promptly in December 2025.

69. The Defendant relied on Datuk Dr Soon Choon Teck v. Datuk Robert Lau Hoi Chew & Ors [2009] 4 MLRA 505, where the Court of Appeal held that amendments should generally be allowed even if late, provided they are necessary to do justice between the parties. The Defendant also relied on Lim Nyuk Foh v. Jamili Muhiman [2010] 1 LNS 1623, where the High Court allowed a previously unrepresented defendant to amend his pleadings upon appointing counsel, subject to costs.

70. This Court finds that the Defendant’s explanation for the delay is not entirely satisfactory. The evidence establishes that the former solicitors discharged themselves due to the Defendant’s failure to provide instructions, not due to any involuntary circumstance. The Defendant was repeatedly advised by the Court to appoint solicitors but chose not to do so. She participated in the proceedings, including the completion of Pre-Trial Documents, without raising any complaint about the adequacy of her pleadings. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25

71. Nevertheless, this Court is mindful that the question of delay and bona fide must not be considered in isolation from the nature and quality of the amendments sought. As the Federal Court in Low Thiam Hoe made clear, delay per se is not an absolute bar to amendment, but is an important factor to be weighed alongside the nature of the proposed amendments. This Court will therefore examine each category of amendment individually, applying a more stringent standard to those amendments that are truly new and a more liberal standard to those that are genuinely corrective.

72. The original Defence and Counterclaim (Enclosure 23) was filed in English. The Plaintiff itself objected to the use of English. The proposed amended pleading is prepared entirely in Bahasa Kebangsaan, in compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court 2012.

73. This Court finds that the amendment insofar as it relates to the translation of the existing content into the national language is proper and necessary. The Plaintiff does not substantively contest this aspect. Accordingly, this Court allows the amendment to the extent that it translates the existing content of the Defence and Counterclaim into national language. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26

(ii) Proposed Amendments to the Defence - Retraction of Admissions

74. This Court observed that the Plaintiff identifies two material admissions which the Defendant seeks to retract –

75. The Plaintiff relies on High Court decision of Pan Malaysian Pools Sdn Bhd v. Kwan Tat Thai & Anor [2010] CLJU 968, where it was held that a party seeking to retract an admission must provide cogent reasons as to why the admission was made in the first place and why the retraction should be allowed. It was further held that retracting an admission is akin to withdrawing a withdrawal or recanting a recantation and the court is not inclined to grant such an amendment in the absence of credible and cogent reasons.

76. The Defendant contends that these are not retractions of admissions made in bad faith, but rather a “clarification of facts”, as the Defendant was originally unrepresented and had used imprecise legal language in the original Defence.

77. This Court finds that the admissions at paragraphs 12 and 16 of Enclosure 23 are clear and material admissions of fact. They go to the core issue in this case, namely whether the renovation works **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 affected the structural integrity of the building. The Defendant has not provided a credible and cogent explanation as to why these admissions were made and why they should now be retracted, beyond the general assertion that she was “unrepresented”. Applying the principles in Pan Malaysian Pools, this is insufficient.

78. Accordingly, this Court refuses the amendment insofar as it seeks to retract the material admissions at paragraphs 12 and 16 of the original Defence and Counterclaim.

(iii) Proposed Amendments to the Defence - New Defences and Additional Facts

79. This Court observed that the Defendant seeks to introduce several new defences including –

80. The Plaintiff submits that these are entirely new defences that were never pleaded in the original Defence, constituting new pleaded defences rather than corrections of defects. The Plaintiff relies on Pentamaster Smart Solution Sdn Bhd v. Velocity Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2021] 1 CLJ 747, where the High Court refused an application for amendment on the ground that the proposed amendments were immaterial and of no use to the central issues.

81. On this issue, it is the duty of this Court to distinguish between new defenses that fundamentally alter the character of the case and those that elaborate upon or develop existing defenses. Having carefully considered each proposed amendment, this Court finds as follows –

82. As to proposed amendment (a), regarding the renovation cost being less than RM5,000.00. This is material to the core issue of whether the renovation works were “major” or “minor”, which is central to the Plaintiff’s claim. The amendment does not change the character of the case but rather provides material particulars in support of the existing defence against the Plaintiff’s principal allegation. This Court allows this amendment.

83. As to proposed amendment (b), regarding the inspection notice period. The issue of inspection is already part of the existing factual matrix. The Defendant had addressed the inspection issue in the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 original Defence. The proposed amendment elaborates upon this existing defence with greater specificity. This Court allows this amendment.

84. As to proposed amendments (c) regarding the police report as intimidation and (d) regarding CCTV surveillance. These are entirely new allegations never raised in the original Defence. They do not relate to the central issue of whether the renovation works affected the building’s structural integrity. Applying the principle in Pentamaster Smart Solution that amendments which are immaterial to the central issues should not be allowed, this Court refuses amendments (c) and (d).

85. As to proposed amendment (e), that the Defendant did not understand the agreements she personally signed and executed, this is a new defence not previously pleaded, unsupported by sufficient particulars, and potentially contradictory to the Defendant’s conduct in having signed the said agreements. This Court refuses this amendment.

(iv) Proposed Amendments to the Counterclaim

86. This Court observed that the proposed amendments to the Counterclaim are fundamentally different from the original Counterclaim. The original Counterclaim essentially raised issues of trespass (entering the unit area to leave a notice), procedural unfairness (failure to serve documents to the Singapore address), **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 privacy infringement (opening cupboards during inspection without permission), misuse of common funds (suing without AGM approval), and a challenge to the validity of the house rules/DMC.

87. The proposed amended Counterclaim introduces entirely different claims –

88. Regarding the AGM issue dated 15.11.2025, the Plaintiff relies on Sio Koon Lin & Anor v SB Mehra [1981] 1 MLJ 225 and U-Meng Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Tan Sri Datuk Ibrahim Mohamed; Ambank (M) Bhd (Third Party) [2010] 9 CLJ 411, which establish that an amendment will not be allowed if the facts or substantially the same facts did not exist at the commencement of the action. The AGM took place on 15.11.2025, well after the filing of the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Counterclaim on 2.6.2024. This principle is clear and this Court agrees with the Plaintiff’s submission on this point.

89. On the other hand, the Defendant relies on Datuk Dr Soon Choon Teck to argue that amendments may be allowed even if they give rise to a new cause of action, provided they do not turn the suit from one character into another.

90. This Court finds that case to be distinguishable. In that case, the amendments supplemented what had already been pleaded. Here, the proposed amended Counterclaim introduces causes of action that are entirely different in nature from the original Counterclaim. Accordingly, this Court refuses the amendment to the Counterclaim insofar as it introduces new causes of action (emotional distress, abuse of process, loss of rental income, obstruction of access, and the AGM issue) that did not exist in the original Counterclaim.

91. However, this Court allows the Defendant to amend the Counterclaim insofar as it elaborates upon and clarifies the existing claims in the original Counterclaim (namely the issues of trespass, service of documents, privacy during inspection, misuse of common funds and the DMC challenge) and to insert specific reliefs aligned with those existing claims. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32

92. The Plaintiff relies on Kenanga Investors and submits that the prejudice resulting from the reopening of pleadings and potential postponement of trial dates cannot be compensated by costs.

93. The Defendant raises a material new development, namely a pending application by the Management Corporation (Perbadanan Pengurusan Pangsapuri Molek) to intervene as Second Plaintiff and to amend the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim. The Defendant argues that this development renders the Plaintiff’s prejudice arguments academic, as pleadings will inevitably be reopened regardless.

94. This Court has allowed the MC's application to be joined as Second Plaintiff. While this necessarily involves consequential amendments to the intitulement and Statement of Claim, the nature of those amendments is fundamentally different from what the Defendant seeks in Enclosure 60. The MC's amendments introduce no new cause of action. The Defendant's proposed amendments, by contrast, seek to retract admissions and introduce entirely new claims. The prejudice analysis is therefore not rendered academic by the MC's joinder.

95. Although the Defendant has succeeded in part, the amendments allowed are largely formal or elaborative in nature, while the substantive amendments sought, being the retraction of material admissions, the introduction of new defences and the wholesale **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 recasting of the Counterclaim, have been refused. Having regard to the late stage at which the application was brought, the inadequate explanation for the delay and the substantial failure of the application on its core elements, this Court considers RM 8,000.00 to be a fair and proportionate costs order in favour of the First Plaintiff. COURT’S DECISION

96. For the reasons set out above, the Defendant’s application in Enclosure 60 is allowed in part as follows –

(ii) incorporating the defence that the total renovation cost was less than RM5,000.00;

(iii) elaborating upon the defence regarding the notice period for inspection given by the Plaintiff; and

(iv) elaborating upon and clarifying the existing claims in the original Counterclaim and inserting specific reliefs aligned therewith. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34

(ii) Introducing the new defence that the Defendant did not understand the agreements she signed;

(iii) Introducing the new allegations regarding the police report as intimidation and CCTV surveillance; and

(iv) Introducing new causes of action in the Counterclaim (emotional distress, abuse of process, loss of rental income, obstruction of access and the AGM issue).