Baskaran A/L Krishna v Thai Haa Ling (BA-22NCvC-230-06/2025)

This is my judgment in respect of the Defendant’s application vide Enclosure 10 seeking an order pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to strike out the Plaintiffs’ Writ and Statement of Claim. 22/12/2025 13:07:17

The Plaintiffs (three individuals and a company, Ascenta Logistics Sdn Bhd) commenced the present action by Writ of Summons dated 13.06.2025. The suit centres on the estate of the late Bobby Rao, who passed away on 12.03.2023. The Defendant is the widow of the deceased and the administrator of his estate pursuant to a Letter of Administration (“LA”) issued by the District Land Administrator on 21.11.2023.

Broadly stated, the Plaintiffs allege that the deceased had left a Will, prepared by Maybank Trustees Berhad and witnessed by the 1st and 3rd Plaintiffs, and that the Defendant had suppressed or destroyed the said Will to procure the LA and to distribute all the deceased’s assets to herself, save for one savings account for the minor daughter, Davinia.

Among the remedies sought by the Plaintiffs are:

(ii) recognition of the alleged Will;

(iii) an order compelling the Defendant to sell the deceased’s 150,000 shares in the 4th Plaintiff company; and

(iv) consequential orders.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs’ entire action should be struck out because:

The Plaintiffs resist the application, asserting that serious triable issues arise particularly whether the Will existed and whether the Defendant had fraudulently suppressed or destroyed it. They rely on Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 3 CLJ 305 to argue that striking out is inappropriate where factual disputes exist.

After considering all affidavits, the submissions of parties, and the authorities cited, I allow the Defendant’s application for the reasons that follow. B.

Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012

The law on striking out is well settled. Under O.18 r.19(1), pleadings may be struck out if they:

disclose no reasonable cause of action;

are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action;

are otherwise an abuse of process of the court.

The Court’s power is exceptional and exercised sparingly. The oft-cited Federal Court authority Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 emphasises that striking out is appropriate only in “plain and obvious cases” where the claim is bound to fail.

However, where the facts are undisputed, the pleadings defective, or the suit is legally untenable, the Court is duty-bound to strike out an action that cannot be salvaged by a trial. C.

The Defendant’s application crystallises four principal questions:

Whether the Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded fraud.

Whether the Plaintiffs’ action is time-barred under S.29(1) SEDA.

Whether the Plaintiffs’ claim is frivolous, vexatious, scandalous or an abuse of process. I address each in turn. D. ISSUE 1 – LOCUS STANDI

Applicable legal framework

The deceased’s estate falls within the statutory regime of the Small Estates (Distribution) Act 1955. A “person interested” under the Act typically includes beneficiaries, creditors, purchasers, or parties claiming rights in the estate.

It is trite that only a person with a direct legal interest has standing to challenge the issuance of a distribution order or LA. The Federal Court in Ikatan Kelab-Kelab Melayu Pulau Pinang v Yayasan Bumiputra Pulau Pinang [2014] 1 MLJ 27 held that a party lacking a direct legal interest is not entitled to challenge probate or administrative decisions concerning an estate.

The Plaintiffs are:

(ii) one of them is a corporate entity; and

(iii) two Plaintiffs claim to be witnesses to the alleged Will.

They are not executors, beneficiaries, creditors or persons otherwise entitled to the deceased’s estate under law. Witnesses to a Will do not gain legal rights or interests to enforce the Will.

The Plaintiffs rely heavily on Lai Yoke Ngan (supra). However, that case involved executors, whose locus standi was inherent and undisputed. The Federal Court held that executors are duty-bound to protect the estate and therefore have standing. That principle does not extend to business partners or witnesses.

Accordingly, I find the Plaintiffs lack locus standi to bring this action. On this ground alone, the action is unsustainable. E. ISSUE 2 – FRAUD NOT PARTICULARISED

Allegations of fraud must be pleaded with full particulars – who committed the fraud, how it was committed, when, and by what means. This requirement is codified in Order 18 rule 12 ROC.

Numerous authorities confirm that general or bare allegations of fraud are legally insufficient. In Tung Kean Hin v Yuen Heng Phong [2019] 2 MLJ 334, the Court held that fraud must be pleaded with full and proper particulars and that mere assertions do not satisfy the pleading standard. Similarly, in CIMB Bank v Yap Wee Leong [2021] MLJU 485, the Court reiterated that unsupported allegations cannot give rise to triable issues. This principle was further affirmed in KKRMC Trading v Richallenge Corp [2021] MLJU 2246, where the Court held that vague, unparticularised allegations of fraud are fatal to a party’s case.

The Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400 held that bare assertions which are inconsistent, vague or unsupported by contemporaneous evidence must be rejected. Mere allegation does not create a triable issue.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant “suppressed or destroyed the Will”.

However: i) no particulars are pleaded; ii) no document from Maybank Trustees Berhad is exhibited; iii) no copy of the alleged Will is produced; iv) no detail is given as to when or how the Defendant allegedly destroyed it.

The Defendant has expressly stated, on affidavit, that she has never seen any such Will. That averment is not contradicted by evidence of substance. No particulars are pleaded

The Plaintiffs’ case is therefore premised entirely on speculation and inference, not material facts. Applying Bank Negara v Mohd Ismail & Otrs [1992]1 MLJ 400 and Puncak Niaga v NZ Wheels [2012] 1 MLJ 27, such bare allegations cannot give rise to triable issues.

On this basis, the Plaintiffs’ claim is legally defective and liable to be struck out. F. ISSUE 3 – THE CLAIM IS TIME-BARRED

Section 29(1) SEDA 1955 provides that any appeal against a decision of the Land Administrator must be brought within 30 days. The LA in this case was issued on 21.11.2023. The Plaintiffs filed this suit on 13.06.2025 approximately 18 months later.

Numerous authorities confirm that general or bare allegations of fraud are legally insufficient. In Tung Kean Hin v Yuen Heng Phong [2019] 2 MLJ 334, the Court held that fraud must be pleaded with full and proper particulars and that mere assertions do not satisfy the pleading standard. Similarly, in CIMB Bank v Yap Wee Leong [2021] MLJU 485, the Court reiterated that unsupported allegations cannot give rise to triable issues. This principle was further affirmed in KKRMC Trading v Richallenge Corp [2021] MLJU 2246, where the Court held that vague, unparticularised allegations of fraud are fatal to a party’s case.

Section 29(1) is strict. A party seeking to challenge a small estate distribution must file within time. The Plaintiffs did not do so. Instead, they attempted to bypass the statutory appeal route by filing a civil action long after the period had lapsed.

Although the Plaintiffs allege fraud, they have not shown when the alleged fraud was discovered nor any reasonable basis for the 18-month delay. Tung Kean Hin (supra) confirms that even allegations of fraud do not pause limitation when the plaintiff fails to show due diligence.

Accordingly, the action is time-barred, rendering continuation of the suit an abuse of process. G. ISSUE 4 – WHETHER THE CLAIM IS SCANDALOUS OR AN

Order 18 rule 19(1)(b) ROC empowers the Court to strike out pleadings that are scandalous. The High Court in Boey Oi Leng v Trans Resources Corporation [2001] MLJU 566 explained that “scandalous” means wholly unnecessary or irrelevant material.

The Court of Appeal in Solai Realty v UOB [2013] 4 MLJ 545 expanded the meaning to include allegations made to cast improper aspersions on the moral character of a party.

The Plaintiffs’ averments alleging that the Defendant lived separate lives from her husband, acted maliciously out of spite, sought to “grab” all assets, and so on are not only irrelevant to the validity of the LA but appear intended to embarrass the Defendant.

When read together with the absence of particulars of fraud and the lack of locus standi, these allegations constitute a scandalous and vexatious misuse of the Court’s process.

In Singapore Salvage Engineers Pte Ltd v Nagalingam [2021] 9 MLJ 351, the High Court held that where no triable issues exist, striking out is warranted to prevent unnecessary trial. I find the present case fits squarely within that principle. H.

Having examined the pleadings and evidence, I make the following findings:

Without locus standi, the Plaintiffs cannot invoke the court’s jurisdiction to challenge a grant of LA. The entire suit is thus legally untenable regardless of its merits.

Further, the Plaintiffs seek reliefs inconsistent with succession law such as compelling the Defendant to sell shares of the estate to them. There is no statutory or contractual foundation for such a claim.

Their core allegation suppression or destruction of the Will lacks any particularised fact. This violates O.18 r.12 and deprives the Defendant of a fair opportunity to respond.

Courts should not permit trials based on conjecture. To do so would defeat the purpose of the striking-out mechanism.

Section 29(1) SEDA is clear. The Plaintiffs missed the statutory deadline by more than 17 months. No explanation is offered. The Court cannot cure this defect.

That case involved executors with inherent standing. Here, Plaintiffs are strangers to the estate. The factual matrix is entirely different. The authority is therefore distinguishable.

Given the complete lack of pleadable facts, proceeding to trial would unfairly burden the Defendant and misuse judicial resources. The Courts should not condone litigation grounded in bare allegations and speculation. I.

For all the reasons above, I am satisfied that this is a plain and obvious case where the Plaintiffs’ action is bound to fail.

I therefore exercise my powers under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a),

(b), and (d) ROC 2012 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to prevent abuse of process. J. ORDER OF THE COURT

46.

Enclosure 10 (Defendant’s Notice of Application dated 08.08.2025) is allowed.

The Plaintiffs’ Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 13.06.2025 are struck out in entirety.

This action is therefore dismissed.

Costs at RM2000 of this application and of the action are awarded to the Defendant, to be taxed unless agreed. Dated this 12 December 2025 -sgd- ………………………………….. Datin Asmah binti Musa Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Plaintiff : Mr. Won Walter Pereira Messrs. Kamarudin & Partners Counsel for Defendant : Mr. Eloise Tan Chiaw EE