The 3rd respondent had applied for the 3rd Exemption Period out of time in contravention to s 38C(3) of the Covid-19 Amendment Act. S 38C(3) provides as follows: The Minister shall not consider an application under subsection (1) if the application is made after the expiry of the time for delivery of vacant possession or the completion of common facilities specified under the agreement. [21] Before me, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the Minister had failed to observe the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel submitted that the Minister should have afforded the right to be heard or even consulted the applicants before arriving at the impugned Exemptions. [22] My attention was drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shamsiah Ahmad Sham v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1990] 2 MLRA 81 SC. It was held that the principle of audi alteram partem means that a decision-maker must afford an opportunity to be heard to a person whose interest will be adversely affected by the decision. [23] Applying the proposition to the facts of the case, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that some form of opportunity should have been given to the applicants, whose rights would be adversely affected by the impugned decisions. This was not done and it is undisputed that the applicants were only made known of the impugned Exemptions after they were made. [24] Secondly, learned counsel submitted that in arriving at the impugned Exemptions, the Minister should have been aware that the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (“HDA”) is a social legislation designed to protect the house buyers. [25] It is therefore the applicants’ case that the Minister should have safeguarded the interest of the applicants as the purchasers, in particular in taking cognisance that Schedule H of the 1989 Regulations, under normal circumstances, cannot be waived, modified or added to; Ang Ming Lee & Ors v Kementerian Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor & Other Appeals [2019] 6 MLRA 494 FC. [26] Learned counsel for the applicants, while conceding that the Covid- 19 Act and the Covid-19 Amendment Act empower the Minister to grant the exemption periods, the Minister must not forget his paramount duty in safeguarding the interests of the purchasers. [27] Thirdly, learned counsel highlighted that the impugned Exemptions period was granted in full by the Minister without any grounds provided. The grounds, if at all, only surfaced in the affidavits in reply by the Housing Controller. The Minister did not affirm any affidavit to explain the impugned decisions. [28] Learned counsel for the applicants contended that the grounds relied upon by the Minister were not substantiated by any cogent supporting documents. In the circumstances, and in the absence of any cogent supporting documents, learned counsel urged this Court to conclude that the Minister had acted mechanically in arriving at the impugned Exemptions. [29] Since the Minister had acted mechanically in arriving at the impugned Exemptions, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that, he had failed to take into account relevant considerations. [30] Fourthly, learned counsel contended that the Controller had acted out of jurisdiction in signing the impugned letters. Learned counsel for the applicants further contended that under the Covid-19 Act, only the Minister has the authority to determine whether additional time is required. S 35(3) of the Covid-19 Act employs the word “if the Minister is satisfied that additional time is required”. The same applies to s 38C(1) to (3) of the Covid-19 Amendment Act. [31] As alluded to earlier, the Minister did not affirm any affidavit. Instead, the affidavits were affirmed by the Housing Controller. Learned counsel submitted that this has given rise to the question of whether the Minister has applied his mind to the matter and not delegated the responsibility to the Housing Controller. At best, according to learned counsel, the affidavits affirmed by the Housing Controller, in so far as they refer to the decisions of the Minister, are hearsay in nature. [32] My attention was then drawn to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Menteri Bagi Kementerian Dalam Negeri & Anor v Jill Ireland Lawrence Bill & Anor Appeal [2015] 6 MLRA 629 CA. The Court of Appeal held that the exercise of a statutory power may only be made in the manner intended by the legislature as expressed in the statutory provisions. [33] Learned counsel highlighted that the Housing Controller signed all of the impugned letters. The letters did not indicate that they were signed on behalf of the Minister. They were neither issued by the Minister’s office nor were the impugned letters copied to the Minister or his private office. [34] In short, the applicants contended that the Housing Controller was acting ultra vires. [35] Relying on Jill Ireland, learned counsel submitted once ultra vires has been established, this ground alone is sufficient to quash the impugned Exemptions. [36] Fifthly, the applicants contended that the Minister should not have acted on the request for the 3rd Exemption since it was made out of time. S 38C(3) of the Covid-19 Amendment Act provides that the Minister shall not consider an application for an exemption if the application is made after the time for delivery of vacant possession specified under the SPA. [37] It is not in dispute that the letter seeking the 3rd Exemption, dated 24.3.2022, was written by the 3rd respondent’s Architect and addressed to the National Housing Department instead of to the Minister. [38] Learned counsel for the applicants submitted, even if we were to take into account the delivery of vacant possession is 48 months under the SPA (instead of 36 months under Schedule H), which was dated 12.5.2017, the date for completion and delivery of vacant possession would be 12.5.2021. The impugned letter was issued well after the date of the time for delivery of vacant possession specified in the SPA. The respondents’ response [39] As to the right to be heard, the learned Senior Federal Counsel highlighted that the issue of the right to be heard, though addressed by the Court of Appeal, was not discussed by the Federal Court in Ang Ming Lee. [40] The learned SFC, however, attracted my attention to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Bludream City Development Sdn Bhd v Kong Thye & Ors [2022] 2 MLJ 241 CA. The Court of Appeal held that there was no express requirement of a right to be heard that must be given to the purchasers. According to the Court of Appeal, what is more important is that the Minister must act fairly, taking into consideration that the purchasers were not obliged to consent to any extension of time implored by the developer. [41] The learned SFC then referred me to the affidavit in reply of the Housing Controller, in Encl 20 (“AIR-20”). Paras 43 to 45 of AIR-20 state as follows: [43] Berdasarkan maklumat-maklumat yang sepenuhnya berada di bawah pengetahuan saya dan mantan Menteri Responden Pertama, Responden Pertama berpuas hati bahawa punca-punca kelewatan yang masih berterusan sepertimana disebut di atas adalah hal-keadaan khas yang di luar kawalan Responden Ke-3. [44] Dalam mempertimbangkan permohonan Responden Ke-3 di atas, mantan Menteri Responden Pertama memahami tanggungjawab beliau di bawah Akta 118 selaku Menteri dalam menjamin kepentingan para pembeli rumah Projek ini. [45] Mantan Menteri Responden Pertama dalam setiap masa sedar akan sebab dan akibat sekiranya permohonan ini diluluskan, pengecualian tempoh ini boleh menjejaskan pembeli yang terpaksa menanggung bayaran faedah pinjaman perumahan, beban sewaan rumah sementara pemajuan diserahkan dan hilang hak untuk menuntut ganti rugi ke atas kelewatan serahan milikan kosong. [42] In the circumstances, the learned SFC, to whom learned counsel for the 3rd respondent deferred, submitted that even if the applicants were to be given the right to be heard, it would not have changed the Minister’s decision to approve the Exemptions. [43] As to the contention that the Minister had mechanically granted the impugned Exemptions without addressing his mind, the learned SFC submitted that based on the impugned letters, we can conclude that the Minister was personally briefed by the Housing Controller on the necessity to allow the 3rd respondents for exemptions for the delivery of vacant possession. [44] In any event, citing Ang Ming Lee as an authority, the learned SFC submitted that generally, a Minister need not sign a letter personally. [45] As to whether the Minister ought to give reasons in the impugned letters, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent submitted that there is no legal requirement to do so. My attention was then drawn to the judgment of the Federal Court in Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja bukan Eksekutif Maybank Bhd v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Bank & Anor [2018] 2 MLJ 590 FC. The Federal Court held that “the law does not at present recognise a general duty to give reasons for an administrative decision”. It was further held that “in a case where the decision is one that is straight forward and one that is not mired in circumstances that would invite further or deeper rationalisation, then perhaps the need to give reason by the decision maker may not arise”. [46] On the applicant’s assertion that the Minister’s impugned Exemptions were unreasonable, the learned SFC attracted my attention that the grounds of the applications by the 3rd respondent that the development of the Project was affected due to the implementation of the Movement Control Order during the Covid-19 pandemic. [47] The learned SFC contended that the Covid-19 Act was enacted and designed to give temporary release both to the developer and the purchaser. Under the Act, the purchaser’s grievance relating to the late payment charges under the SPA is also addressed. [48] The learned SFC urged this Court to apply an objective test in that any reasonable Minister appraised of the said facts would be satisfied that additional time is required. [49] On the issue that the 3rd respondent had made an application for the 3rd Exemption period out of time in contravention to s 38C(3) of the Covid-19 Amendment Act, the learned SFC submitted that the new delivery of vacant possession for the respective applicants after taking into account the 1st and 2nd Exemptions was between 21.2.2023 to 19.9.2023 (based on the respective SPAs). [50] Since the application for the 3rd Exemption was made on 24.3.2022, the 3rd respondent was well within the time stipulated under s 38C(3) of the Covid-19 Amendment Act. The Analysis [51] Let me begin by reiterating that the applicants are only concerned with the 2nd and 3rd Exemptions. The 1st Exemption, irrespective of its legal position, is not the subject matter of this application for judicial review. [52] As to the right to be heard, I respectfully agree with the learned SFC that the Federal Court in Ang Ming Lee did not make any ruling on whether the purchasers ought to be given the right to be heard before the Minister exercises his discretion in granting the exemption. [53] The Court of Appeal in Bludream City was of the view that there was no need for the Minister to hear the purchasers individually or independently unless he had some doubts as to how the purchasers’ interest may best be safeguarded as in various options and permutations open to the purchasers. I am bound by this ratio. In any event, I find it impractical for the Minister to actually seek the view of the individual purchasers especially so during the MCO. For so long as he acts fairly, that is sufficient. [54] But in order to ascertain whether the Minister has acted fairly or otherwise, this Court must be convinced that he had addressed his mind properly before making such a decision. After all, the HDA, the Covid-19 Act and the Covid-19 Amendment Act stipulate that the Minister must exercise his powers personally and cannot delegate it to his officers. The maxim of delegatus non potest delegare applies. [55] Let us go through AIR-20, which was affirmed by Dato’ Jayaseelan, the Housing Controller. This is how he explained the Minister reached his decisions in the form of the Impugned Exemptions: