1. Billion Prima Sdn Bhd v 1. Nuctech Company Limited (22IP-50-09/2015)

BILLION PRIMA SDN BHD

PAN ASIATIC TECHNOLOGIES SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 742846-D) … PLAINTIFFS

1.

TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY ... DEFENDANTS

1.

TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY … PLAINTIFFS

BILLION PRIMA SDN BHD

PAN ASIATIC TECHNOLOGIES SDN BHD

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS

THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA ... DEFENDANTS 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (enclosure 238) Introduction [1] The defendants filed enclosure 238 seeking that directions be given for assessment of damages or an account of profit pursuant to Order 37 rule 1 (1) and Order 34 of the Rules of Court (“RoC 2012”) (“Post-Trial Discovery Application”) in respect of the following –

Bahawa semua kertas kausa dan dokumen yang telah difailkan berkenaan dengan tindakan di sini digunakan dan dibaca untuk tujuan penaksiran ganti rugi atau akaun keuntungan, mengikut opsyen

Bahawa arahan diberi kepada pihak-pihak untuk pemfailan dan penukaran keterangan affidavit termasuk mana-mana dokumen-dokumen yang relevan dalam penaksiran ganti rugi atau akaun keuntungan;

Bahawa arahan diberi kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan Ketiga dan Keempat dalam Tuntutan Balas (secara kolektifnya dirujuk sebagai “Pihak-pihak Melanggar”) untuk memberi dan menzahirkan maklumat, data dan / atau dokumen-dokumen untuk yang berikut kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan Defendan-Defendan dan / atau peguamcara mereka:- 3

jumlah bilangan unit BBScan Portal X-Ray Screening Machine (“Sistem BBScan”) dan / atau mesin imbas yang sama dengan nama lain yang berada di dalam milikan, kuasa, jagaan atau kawalan Pihak-pihak Melanggar, ejen-ejen mereka, syarikat-syarikat berkaitan atau kontraktor-kontraktor;

(ii) kesemua maklumat dan dokumen tentang segala urusan-urusan dengan Sistem BBScan dan / atau mesin imbas yang sama dengan nama lain, terutamanya invois-invois, perjanjian, rekod jualan, pelepasan kastam, bill muatan, rekod kewangan, rekod penghantaran yang berkaitan dengan penjualan, pemasangan, penggunaan, penyimpanan stok, operasi, penyelenggaraan, servis, pembaikan dan / atau pelesenan dalam milikan, jagaan atau kuasa Pihak-pihak Melanggar;

(iii) wang yang diterima atau belum terima berkaitan dengan penjualan, pemasangan, penggunaan, penyimpanan stok, operasi, penyelenggaraan, servis, pembaikan dan / atau pelesenan Sistem BBScan dan / atau mesin imbas yang sama dengan nama lain;

(iv) wang yang dibayar atau belum bayar berkaitan dengan penjualan, pemasangan, penggunaan, penyimpanan stok, operasi, penyelenggaraan, servis, pembaikan dan / atau pelesenan Sistem BBScan dan / atau mesin imbas yang sama dengan nama lain;

kos atau anggaran kos yang ditanggung berkaitan dengan penjualan, pemasangan, penggunaan, penyimpanan stok, operasi, penyelenggaraan, servis, pembaikan dan / atau pelesenan Sistem BBScan dan / atau mesin imbas yang sama dengan nama lain;

(vi) petunjuk dan penjelasan jenis-jenis kos yang ditanggung. 4

Bahawa Notis Pelantikan untuk Ganti Rugi atau Akaun Keuntungan, mengikut opsyen Defendan-Defendan, harus difailkan dalam masa tiga puluh (30) hari dari tempoh akhir untuk pemfailan dan penukaran keterangan affidavit seperti yang diperuntukkan di atas;

Kos permohonan ini ditanggung oleh Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan Ketiga dan Keempat dalam Tuntutan Balas dan dibayar kepada Defendan-Defendan; dan

Perintah selanjutnya dan / atau perintah, arahan atau relif lain sebagaimana Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini fikirkan suai manfaat dan adil. Background Facts [2] The first plaintiff, Brillion Prima Sdn Bhd (“1st Plaintiff”), designed and developed “BBScan Potal X-ray Screening Machine System (“BBScan System”). [3] The second plaintiff, Pan Asiatic Technologies Sdn Bhd (“2nd Plaintiff), is licensed by the 1st Plaintiff to commercialise BBScan System. The 2nd Plaintiff has supplied units of BBScan System to the Royal Malaysian Customs Department. [4] The first defendant, Nuctech Company Ltd (“1st Defendant”), and second defendant, Tsinghua University (“2nd Defendant”), are co-owners 5 of patent No. MY-142862-1 (“862 Patent”) which is registered under the Patent Act 1983. [5] The 1st Plaintiff and 2nd Plaintiff (collectively referred to as the “Plaintiffs”) commenced this instant action seeking for a declaration under section 62 (1) Patent Act that the BBScan System does not infringe 862 Patent. [6] The 1st Defendant and 2nd Defendant (collectively referred to as the “Defendants”) counterclaimed against the 1st Plaintiff (“1st Defendant” in the Counterclaim), 2nd Plaintiff (“2nd Defendant” in the Counterclaim) and the Director General of Customs and Excise (“3rd Defendant” in the Counterclaim) and Government of Malaysia (“4th Defendant” in the Counterclaim) for patent infringement of the 862 Patent through their dealings with the BBScan System. [7] After the conclusion of a full trial –

it was found by the High Court that the Plaintiffs’ BBScan System has infringed the 862 Patent. The High Court therefore dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claim and allowed the Defendants’ Counterclaim; and 6

the High Court ordered, amongst others, that an inquiry for damages or an account of profits at the option of the Defendants (see Judgment dated 12 February 2019 at Exhibit “LKH-1” of the Defendants’ affidavit enclosure 239). Post-Trial Discovery Application [8] The Defendants’ contentions may be summarised as follows –

the Defendants, being the successful parties, must necessarily be entitled to the disclosure of the necessary information and document prior to making an election between damages and an account of profits;

it would be highly prejudicial and unfair to the Defendants if they are denied any access to the relevant information and document. The Defendants cannot be forced to choose blindly between damages and an account of profits;

the information requested by the Defendants is not unduly broad and excessive as the range of information, data and documents requested by the Defendants are essential to the 7 calculation or estimation of, among others, the Plaintiffs’ net profits.

the information and documents sought by the Defendants in prayers 3 (i) to (vi) of the Post-Trial Discovery Application (“Prayer 3”) relate to, among others, the revenues, costs and expenses of the Plaintiffs in dealing with the BBScan System whereby –

prayers 3 (i) and 3 (ii) would show the extent and number of the BBScan System sold by the Plaintiffs;

(ii) prayers 3 (iii) and 3 (iv) would assist the Defendants to estimate the transactions and revenues received by the Plaintiffs; and

(iii) prayers 3 (v) and 3 (vi) would assist the Defendants to estimate the costs incurred by the Plaintiffs.

the Plaintiffs cannot claim national security and public interest immunity to deny disclosure and discovery of relevant information and document for purposes of trial. Such claim are vague, bare and unsubstantiated; and 8

in any event the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the requirements to invoke public interest immunity as laid down in the recent Court of Appeal case of Ernst & Young v SJ Asset Management Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) & Anor [2019] 4 CLJ

[9] It is argued by the Plaintiff –

that the Post-Trial Discovery Application is misconceived as the said application should only be filed after the Defendants has made their election;

Prayer 3 of the Post-trial Discovery Application are unnecessary for the fair disposal of the matter in question, namely, the Defendants' election on whether to seek for an assessment of damages or an account of profits. This is because BBScan System is a product of a very niche market where the only user of the BBScan System is the Royal Malaysian Customs and the Government of Malaysia and not the general populace at large. Being competitors in the same niche market as the Plaintiffs, the Defendants are in an adequate position to make an informed decision as to whether 9 to elect for an assessment of damages or an account of profits;

the Defendants are in a position to assess the profitability of the Plaintiffs through publicly available documents filed with the Companies Commission of Malaysia without the need of any information, data and / or documents from the Plaintiffs;

the information, data and / or documents sought by the Defendants in Prayer 3 are highly confidential as they pertain to scanning systems which are currently being used by the Royal Malaysian Customs to safeguard the borders around Malaysia. Thus the said documents ought to be precluded from disclosure under the principle of public interest immunity as disclosure of such documents and / or information would be injurious to national interest and / or contrary to public policy;

an order for full disclosure of the documents sought for under Prayer 3 would result in an undue wastage of costs and time should the appeal against the Judgment dated 12 February 2019 be allowed by the Court of Appeal; 10

the Defendants will not be prejudice if the Post-trial Discovery Application is disallowed as the Defendants will be at liberty to seek for further discovery of the same documents at a later stage should such a need arise;

the Defendants are estopped from arguing that they are entitled to the relief sought for under Prayer 3 as the issue concerning Prayer 3 has been adjudicated by the trial judge presiding over this matter. Prayer 3 is a tactical manoeuvre by the Defendants to set aside and / or vary the order and / or decision of the High Court. The law and findings of the court [10] The statutory provision on discovery is provided under Order 24 RoC 2012. Relevant to the instant proceedings is Order 24 rules 3 and 8 which reads as follows – Order for discovery ( O. 24 r. 3)

Subject to the provisions of this rule and of rules 4 and 8, the Court may at any time order any party to a cause or matter (whether begun by writ, originating summons or otherwise) to give discovery by making and serving on any other party a list of the documents which are 11 or have been in his possession, custody or power and may at the same time or subsequently also order him to make and file an affidavit verifying such a list and to serve a copy thereof on the other party. …

The documents which a party to a cause or matter may be ordered to discover under paragraph (1) are as follows:

the documents on which the party relies or will rely; and

the documents which could –

adversely affect his own case;

(ii) adversely affect another party's case; or

(iii) support another party's case. … Discovery to be ordered only if necessary O. 24 r. On the hearing of an application for an order under rule 3, 7 or 7A, the Court, if satisfied that discovery is not necessary, or not necessary at that stage of the cause or matter, may dismiss or adjourn the application and shall in any case refuse to make such an order if and so far as it is of the opinion that discovery is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. (emphasis added). [11] Based on the words "may at any time " which appears in O. 24 rules 3 (1) and 7 (1) of the RoC 2012, it is clear that the court has the discretion to grant a post-trial discovery order subject to the applicant satisfying the Court that the disclosure of the documents is necessary to disposing fairly 12 the determination of the quantum of damages / profits to be recovered by the Defendants or for saving costs. [12] The issue to be determined is whether the Post-Trial Discovery Application ought to be allowed. It is to be noted that such application was made pursuant to Order 37 rule 1 (1) and Order 34 of the RoC 2012 for the purpose of preparing the second stage of the trial whereby the issue on liability was ventilated and adjudged by the court. As a result of the court finding in the first stage of the trial that the Plaintiff’s BBScan System has infringed the 862 Patent belonging to the Defendants, the Post-Trial Discovery Application is sought for the court’s direction in relation to the assessment of damages or an account of profits which will be the second stage of the trial. [13] Prayer 3 (i) – (iv) of the Post-Trial Discovery Application is basically seeking discovery against the Plaintiffs in respect of information, data or documents in relation to the BBScan System. As stated above one of the Plaintiff’s objection is that the Defendant ought to have make their election first either assessment of damages or on account of profits before the Post-Trial Discovery Application is filed. 13 [14] In Island Records Ltd v Tring International plc [1995] 3 All ER 444, the issue was whether the plaintiff (who owned the copyright in musical recordings by Cat Stevens, which the Defendants admitted infringing) had to elect between damages and an account of profits prior to judgment. It was contended by the plaintiff that no election should be required until after the plaintiff had by means of discovery or otherwise sufficient information to make an informed choice. However the defendant contended that the election had to be made at the hearing of the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment. The court said this – With a view to the saving of costs, the practice has developed, in particular in intellectual property cases, when this is practicable, to have a 'split trial'. The action is divided into two stages. The first stage is the trial at which the issue is limited to that of liability, i.e. whether the plaintiff's rights have been infringed. The second stage, which is contingent upon liability being established at the first stage, is concerned with the question of assessment of damages and calculation of profits. In this way, the costs of exploring the issue of damages and profits are put off until it is clear that the defendant is liable and the issue really arises and requires determination. As a concomitant with this practice, there has likewise developed the practice of limiting discovery at the first stage to documents relevant to the issue of liability and excluding documents relevant only to the second stage. In this way the burden of discovery at the first stage is reduced, and the invasion of confidence necessarily involved in discovery is postponed and (if liability is not established) entirely obviated (see Baldock v. Addison [1995] 3 All ER 437, [1995] 1 WLR 158). (It may be noted that this practice was in appropriate cases adopted by the courts of equity in the nineteenth 14 century: see Benbow v. Low [1880] 16 Ch D 93 at 98 and Fennessy v. Clark [1887] 37 Ch D 184.) The price at which this cost and time saving is achieved is that the plaintiff will not before judgment at the first stage on the issue of liability have the benefit by means of discovery or otherwise of the information otherwise available on which the plaintiff is able to make an informed election as to remedy between an assessment of damages and an account of profits. The question which arises is whether in this situation (as in the case of a motion for judgment where likewise the plaintiff is deprived of the opportunity to obtain such information before judgment) in the course or at the conclusion of the hearing the plaintiff must elect between the two remedies or is entitled first to sufficient information to make an informed election. Four principles are clear. First, whilst a plaintiff can apply in proceedings in the alternative for damages and an account of profits, he cannot obtain judgment for both: he can only obtain judgment for one or the other (see Neilson v. Betts [1871] LR 5 HL 1 and De Vitre v. Betts [1873] LR 6 HL 319 at 321). Second, once judgment has been entered either for damages or an account of profits, any right of election is lost: any claim to the remedy other than that for which judgment is entered is forever lost (see United Australia Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] 4 All ER 20 at 38, [1941] AC 1 at 30). Third, a party should in general not be required to elect or be found to have elected between remedies unless and until he is able to make an informed choice. A right of election, if it is to be meaningful and not a mere gamble, must embrace the right to readily available information as to his likely entitlement in case of both the two alternative remedies. It is quite unreasonable to require the plaintiff to speculate totally in the dark as to whether or not the sum recoverable by way of damages will exceed that recoverable under an account of profits. In an analogous situation, it has been held unreasonable to require a plaintiff to speculate whether a payment into court is sufficient to satisfy his claim 15 for damages for infringement of copyright before he has been afforded inspection of the records of sales in the defendant's books (see Mate & Son v Samuel Stephen Ltd [1928–35] Macg CC 257 at 261) … In my view, the court can at the split trial or on any other application for judgment be invited to defer entry of judgment for damages or profits. At this stage the court may either make no order as to the remedy for infringement (as in the Minnesota case) or (as I would prefer) may grant a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled at his election to judgment for either. The court may at the same time or thereafter give directions which secure that such information as is available and is reasonably required to enable the plaintiff to make an informed election (and accordingly is necessary for fairly disposing of the cause or matter: see Ord 24, rr 8 and 13(1)) is made available to him and that the election is made within a reasonable time thereafter. To secure that the plaintiff has the required information, the court may direct discovery, but if the information may be made available by some other satisfactory means (eg in an affidavit by the defendant or by way of audited accounts or reports) the court may hold that the alternative means be adopted. The court should not be deterred from this course by the fact that the information required may likewise be required on the taking of an account or an assessment. There should be no over-lengthy or unnecessarily sophisticated exercise. The plaintiff is not entitled to know exactly the amount of any damages or profits to which he is entitled, but only to such information as the court considers to be a fair basis in the circumstances of the particular case for an election. In this case, the plaintiff has sought discovery of the defendants' documents relevant to (1) the sums received or receivable by the defendants in respect of their infringements; (2) the sales 16 of infringing copies; (3) the number of infringing copies unsold; and (4) the costs incurred by the defendants in respect of the manufacture, distribution and sale of infringing copies. The defendants have challenged the right to order discovery but, in case such discovery can and should otherwise be ordered, so as to obviate discovery the defendants have offered to provide an audited schedule within two months detailing the figures sought. I think that prima facie discovery can and should be granted as sought by the plaintiff but that the defendants' offer of an audited schedule is an acceptable alternative… (emphasis added) [15] Pursuant to the Judgment dated 12 February 2019, this instant case is now at the second stage, namely, for the inquiry for damages or an account of profits at the option of the Defendants. Based on the principles laid down in the case Island Records, for the Defendants to make an election between assessment of damages and an account of profits, the Defendants are entitled to all relevant document and information as to enable the Defendants to make an informed decision. Thus the Plaintiffs’ contentions that the Defendants must first made their election and then filed this Post-Trial Discovery Application is completely misconceived. To deny the Defendants of relevant information and documents would tantamount to, as the court in the Island Records case said, asking the Defendants “to speculate totally in the dark as to whether or not the sum recoverable by way of damages will exceed that recoverable under an account of profits” and this would be highly prejudicial to the Defendants. 17 [16] The Plaintiffs contended that the issue concerning Prayer 3 of the Post-Trial Discovery Application has been adjudicated by the learned Judge and thus the Defendants are estop from litigating the matter again. The said contentions is premised on the decision of the learned Judge to remove an order akin to Prayer 3 of the said application as part of the draft Judgment filed by the Defendants (after the learned Judge delivered his decision after conclusion of the full trial) for the court’s approval. The order that was removed reads –

An Order that:

the Infringing Parties to provide for full discovery of all relevant documents and information on all dealings with the BBScan System and/or any other system or device that infringe Malaysia Patent No. MY- 142862-A, particularly invoices, agreements, sales records, customs clearance documents, bills of ladings, financial records, delivery records relating to the sale and/or license of the BBScan System in the possession, custody and/or control of the Infringing Parties for purposes of the Defendants' election for an inquiry as to damages or an account of profits; [17] This court is of the view that the Plaintiffs contentions is not tenable for the following reasons –

based on the Notes of Proceedings on 12 February 2012 (see Exhibit TBC-1 of enclosure 276 in particular page 34 and 35) it 18 is crystal clear that the learned Judge had removed the said order on the ground that the court was not in the position to make such an order at that juncture and that the Defendants are to file an application for post-trial discovery to assist them in making their election between assessment of damages and accounts of profits;

there is nothing in the Notes of Proceedings which indicates the merits of the Post-trial Discovery Application in particular Prayer 3 was ventilated and adjudged by the learned Judge. In Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd v Goh Keat Poh & Ors (And Other Appeals) [2003] 4 CLJ 505 the Court of Appeal held – 6(1) When the plea of res judicata is raised it is necessary to identify with precision the issue that was decided in the earlier proceedings. In Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v. Lee Yoke San [1979] 1 MLJ 24, [1981] 1 MLJ 54 Chang Min Tat FC held that to constitute a res judicata, the earlier judgment must, in terms of the Privy Council decision in Kok Hoong v. Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] MLJ 49 ‘necessarily and with precision’ determine the point in issue. (emphasis added)

based on the Notes of Proceedings, the issue was whether it was appropriate for an order for discovery be incorporated as 19 part of the draft judgment when no such order was made by the learned Judge. This is for the simple reason that the trial that was concluded before the learned Judge was in respect of liability and not on damages. Consequentially matters relating to damages is to be addressed in the second half of the trial which is before this court now where the Defendants are seeking pre-trial direction (under Order 34 RoC 2012) which includes among others order for post-trial discovery. The Plaintiffs’ objection – that such order was not made by the learned Judge (as evident from the Plaintiffs’ letter dated 11 December 2018 see Appendix C of enclosure 228) – clearly shows the issue on post-trial discovery was never raised let alone argued at the first stage of the trial. Thus the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the doctrine of res judicata is flawed and misplaced;

in any event the Post-Trial Discovery Application is consistent and in compliance with paragraph VIII of the Judgment dated 12 February 2019 (see enclosure 237) which states as follows –

An order that there be an injury as to damages, or at the Defendants’ option, an account of profits made by the Plaintiffs 20 in respect of the BBScan System for payment of all sums found due by the Infringing Parties to the Defendants upon the making of such inquiry or taking of such account; [18] Thus Post-Trial Discovery Application in relation to the BBScan System is appropriate and timely. Accordingly the issue of setting aside and varying the decision of the learned Judge concerning prayer 3 of the Post-Trial Discovery Application as contended by the Plaintiffs does not arise at all. [19] It was argued by the Plaintiffs that the documents and information sought by the Defendants are available in the public documents filed with the Companies Commission of Malaysia (“CCM”), which render the Post-Trial Discovery Application unnecessary. Under section 259 (1) of the Companies Act 2016, a company is required to lodge with the Registrar of the CCM for each financial year the financial statements and reports of the company. The financial statements (the balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement) reflect the overall business activities and the financial performance of a company for a particular period. Thus in so far as accounts of profits is concerned, the financial statements would not be adequate for purpose of determining the sales, profit and costs incurred by the Plaintiff specifically in respect of the BBScan System. 21 [20] The Plaintiffs claim that the documents and information sought are highly confidential and therefore cannot be disclosed on the ground of public interest immunity. However such claim is not substantiated. There is no evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs that the discovery of the information and documents trigger any of the recognisable head of public interest immunity ie national security, international relations, workings of central government, other branches of public service, the police and armed forces, confidentiality and informants (see Ernst & Young v SJ Asset Management Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) & Anor [2019] 4 CLJ 161). [21] The Plaintiffs’ claim that the BBScan System are currently being used by the Royal Malaysian Customs to safeguard the borders around Malaysia is not sufficient to invoke the principle of public interest immunity. The fact that the scanning system is used to safeguard the security of the borders is irrelevant to the Post-trial Discovery Application as the documents and information sought do not relate to the technical workings or security features of the BBScan System. Rather it relates to the Plaintiffs’ infringing commercial transactions and activities in relation to the BBScan System. As such the claim that the disclosure of such document and information would be injurious to the public interest is unfounded. 22 [22] Assuming for a moment there is confidential information, the confidentiality of the confidential information can be safeguarded by a Protective Order. In the case of Kingtime International Ltd & Anor v Petrofac E & C Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 1070, the court opined – [20] I am of the following view regarding a Protective Order:

a Protective Order may be granted pursuant to the court's inherent jurisdiction, court's inherent power and/or O. 92 r. 4 RC. Such a power is necessary to ensure that confidential information is disclosed to the court to enable the court to decide justly the case at hand and at the same time, to preserve the confidentiality of the information in question. I rely on the judgment of Lee Seiu Kin J in the Singapore High Court in BBW v. BBX & Ors [2016] 5 SLR 755, at [21]-[30] … [23] The documents and information sought in prayer 3 of the Post-Trial Discovery Application would indicate, among others, the sale, revenue, and costs incurred by the Plaintiffs in relation to the BBScan System. Having considered the nature of the documents and information sought, this court is of the view that, at this juncture, such documents and information is necessary for the Defendants to determine material facts and documents for purpose of either electing assessment of damages or on account of profits. In other words the Defendants relies or will rely on such documents which could adversely affect the Defendants’ case in relation to the election that they have to make. Thus the discovery of 23 such documents is necessary to dispose fairly the election that the Defendants are required to make between assessment of damages and accounts of profits (Order 28 rules 8 and 13 RoC 2012). [24] In his oral submission learned counsel for the Defendants informed this court that the Defendants are prepared to accept documents and information which provides the estimate revenue and profit generated in relation to the BBScan System (see Brugger v Medicaid [1996] FSR Vol 23). [25] Taking into account the Post-trial Discovery Application in particular the documents and information sought in prayer 3 of the said application, this court made the following order –

the Plaintiffs, 3rd Defendant and 4th Defendant in the Counterclaim to file and serve on the Defendants, by 9 December 2019, documents and information in relation to the following –

the total number of BBScan Portal X-Ray Screening Machines and / or the same screening machine with other name; 24

(ii) the revenue received or receivable in connection with the BBScan Portal X-Ray Screening Machines and / or the same screening machine with other name; and

(iii) the costs or estimated costs incurred in connection with the BBScan Portal X-Ray Screening Machines and / or the same screening machine with other name including calculation of the estimates.

the Defendants to make an election between assessment of damages and accounts on profits by 8 January 2020; and

a date for case management was accordingly fixed on 9 January 2020 for the Defendants to inform the court of their election. ( KHADIJAH BINTI IDRIS ) JUDGE HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) DATED 10 JANUARY 2020 25 Counsel: Plaintiff : Chew Kherk Ying and together with Raymond Tan Yan Kai of Messrs Wong & Partners Defendants : Kuek Pei Yee and together with Gooi Yang Shuh of Messrs Skrine