BOOMSLANG TECHNOLOGY SDN. BHD. (dahulunya dikenali sebagai Blackstone Technology Sdn Bhd) v THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd (WA-28NCC-147-02/2024)

BOOMSLANG TECHNOLOGY SDN BHD (formerly known as Blackstone Technology Sdn Bhd)

DYNAC SDN BHD … PETITIONERS AND THHE FABRICATORS SDN BHD (In Members’ Voluntary Liquidation) (Company No. 200101001422 (537178-X)) … RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT

This judgement concerns a petition filed pursuant to section 464(1), read together with section 464(2)(d) and section 465(1) of the Companies Act 2016, seeking to convert the Members’ Voluntary Liquidation (MVL) of THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, into a winding-up ordered by the Court, and to facilitate the appointment of independent liquidators.

Although winding-up petitions are generally heard and disposed on affidavit evidence alone, this Court allowed the application for oral evidence to be adduced. The oral evidence was to be by way of cross-examination of the deponents of affidavits filed by the Petitioners and the Respondent.

After meticulous consideration of the affidavits, oral testimonies, written submissions, and accompanying documentation, this Court is satisfied that the continuation of the voluntary winding-up is no longer rational, particularly in light of the interests of all the creditors.

By petition dated 9 February 2024, the petitioning creditors seek an order that THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, be wound up by the Court and that liquidators nominated by the petitioning creditors be appointed. The petition seeks conversion of an existing voluntary winding‑up into a compulsory winding‑up under sub-sections 464(1) and 464(2)(d) of the Companies Act 2016.

The following references and abbreviations concerning the main relevant parties, are set out below in a table for easy reference: - PARTIES POSITION ABBREVIATIONS Boomslang Technology Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Blackstone Technology Sdn Bhd) 1st Petitioner “Blackstone” Dynac Sdn Bhd 2nd Petitioner “Dynac” THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd Respondent 100% subsidiary of THHE 100% holding company of TDSB “TH FAB” Urusharta Jamaah Sdn Bhd Holding company and largest shareholder of THHE (64.45%) Ultimate holding company of TH FAB “UJSB” MBSB Bank Berhad Creditor in opposition of this Petition “MBSB” TH Heavy Engineering Berhad 100% holding company of TH FAB “THHE” Globalmariner Offshore Services Sdn Bhd Creditor of THHE as recognized under 2017 Scheme “GMOS” THHE Destini Sdn Bhd In early 2022, TDSB became 100% owned by TH FAB. “TDSB”

The hearing proceeded over 4 days from 18.8.2025 until 21.8.2025 during which the oral testimonies before me was principally that of:

the petitioners’ deponent, Dato’ Md Jasman bin Bongkek

two deponents called by the respondent (TH Fab): Dato’ Ir. Jauhari bin Hamidi and Mr Ashvin Mahendran. The witness evidence, both oral and in affidavit, was tested in cross‑examination and the documentary record includes contemporaneous corporate announcements, scheme documents, loan documents, auditors’ reports and invoices. I have considered all the evidence and exhibits before me.

There were some companies under the THHE Group of Companies in serious financial distress for a considerable period of time and struggled to maintain regulatory compliances.

This court observes, that UJSB is a substantial creditor, and it is the ultimate shareholder of THHE. A number of directors and officers served across UJSB, THHE and TH Fab.

UJSB notetable on the record, the largest shareholder of THHE, holding approximately 64.45% stake in THHE, being an asset management company set up by the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) with a specific 10-year mandate to manage, rehabilitate and revive the underperforming investments of pilgrim funds, Lembaga Tabung Haji (“LTH”). One such underperforming investment was THHE, which UJSB took over in 2018.

The Petitioners contend that the same professionals who advised on prior schemes (notably in 2017 and 2023) also accepted appointment as MVL liquidators, creating potential conflicts.

A number of companies within the Group, including THHE and TH FAB, applied to the Kuala Lumpur High Court to put forward a statutory scheme of arrangement to settle their debts with their creditors.

The 2017 Scheme was formulated by Ferrier Hodgson MH Sdn Bhd and Mr. Ashvin Mahendran, (Respondents Witness 2), who was attached with Ferrier Hodgson at that time, was specifically involved. Presently, the same individual, is now, one of the liquidators, acting for TH FAB in the MVL.

Essentially THHE failed to come up with an acceptable regularisation plan for Bursa Malaysia’s approval and that led to THHE’s de-listing by Bursa Malaysia, marking the collapse of the 2017 Scheme.

In July 2023, after the failure of the 2017 Scheme, THHE and TH FAB sought to propose yet another scheme of arrangement to restructure their debts to the scheme’s creditors. This new debt restructuring exercise was formulated by Baker Tilly Insolvency PLT, whom foresaw the disposal and sale of the valuable assets of the THHE Group to UJSB, namely the Fabrication Yard and TDSB, which was awarded with the OPV Project. (Awarded by the Government of Malaysia to TDSB on 18.1.2017 worth RM738.9 million)

The Petitioners argued, as for TDSB, the intended disposal to UJSB stated in the Proposed 2023 Scheme, have been pre-approved by the Directors of TH FAB, and notably without any purchase consideration disclosed to the creditors under the scheme. During the course of the cross-examination of Mr Ashwin had in his testimony, clearly indicated, facts confirming the above contention by the Petitioners.

The Proposed 2023 Scheme for TH FAB cannot be viewed in isolation as it was interrelated and interdependent with THHE’s scheme. THHE’s scheme was doomed to failure as it did not and could not satisfy the RM288.7 million debt owed to Globalmariner Offshore Services Sdn Bhd (“GMOS”) under the Judgment.

Subsequently, the Petitioners contended, that the filing of OS 403 and OS 409 came shortly after GMOS obtained a Judgment against THHE for USD63.4 million (RM288.7 million) in the Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA-22NCC-374-11/2016 (“Suit 374”). “OS 403” Filed in the KL High Court, by Originating Summons No. WA 24NCC-403-07/2023 on 27.7.2023 An ex parte application filed by THHE seeking leave under sections 366 and 368 of the CA 2016 to call a creditors’ meeting to consider the Proposed 2023 Scheme and concurrently seeking a restraining order “OS 409” Filed in the KL High Court, by Originating Summons No. WA 24NCC-409-07/2023 on 28.7.2023. An ex parte application filed by TH FAB seeking leave under sections 366 and 368 of the CA 2016 to call a creditors’ meeting to consider the Proposed 2023 Scheme and concurrently seeking a restraining order

The Petitioners, together with GMOS, applied to intervene in both the OS 403 and OS 409 for the Proposed 2023 Scheme proceedings and leave to intervene was granted by the court. The Petitioners argued that in substance, the ultimate objective was not to benefit other creditors, but rather to wrongfully compartmentalise and barricade valuable assets of TH FAB in favour of UJSB. In addition, they argue that the 2023 scheme could not satisfy the RM288.7 million debt owed to GMOS under the Judgment. TH FAB going into MVL

On 6 September 2023 TH Fab was placed in a members’ voluntary liquidation and the directors signed a declaration of solvency dated 4 September 2023 stating that after due enquiry the company could pay its debts within twelve months. The declaration and the accompanying statement of assets and liabilities represented, on their face, a solvent position with a modest surplus recorded as at 30.8.2023. At this point in time there were also issues of TH Fabs solvency status from insolvent to solvent and then back to insolvent again. I refer to the diagram below to illustrate the timeline mentioned to the solvency of the company.

Subsequent to the MVL and following professional review of the company books by the liquidators’ accountants, adjustments were recommended which showed that, with recognised inter‑company liabilities properly recorded, TH Fab was insolvent and the management accounts plus the report by the liquidators’ accountants’ record the identification of additional significant liabilities, including sums recorded as owing to UJSB and other inter‑company adjustments.

The Petitioners argue that the MVL of TH Fab was initiated based on a false declaration of solvency and for ulterior motives namely, I. to prevent creditor-initiated compulsory winding-up proceedings, II. to shield assets from independent creditors, and III. to appoint liquidators Mr. Andrew Heng and Mr. Ashvin Mahendran) who are conflicted and unlikely to conduct an impartial review.

The Petitioners seek the Court’s intervention to convert the winding-up into a court-ordered process and to appoint independent liquidators. Supporting Creditors (Elite Ventures, EV Oilfield, Pasifik Cekap)

These creditors support the Petition namely emphasizing the necessity for an independent enquiry and the appointment of independent liquidators.

The respondents however argue that this petition is totally unnecessary as the MVL and subsequent creditor processes are all lawful. The auditors’ qualifications and the inter-company transactions do not establish sufficient grounds for this courts intervention. The current proposed joint liquidators are suitable, and there is no necessity for the appointment of independent liquidators.

As a major shareholder at the group level and a significant creditor of TH Fab, UJSB contends that the Petitioners’ claims are an attempt to manipulate the liquidation process for the benefit of other parties. UJSB maintains that payments made by it were bona fide concerning the OPV project and that the voluntary route should be pursued. Any residual concerns can be addressed within and during the voluntary liquidation framework process.

Opposes the conversion, citing concerns over delays and the practical effectiveness of such a move. It contends that changing the liquidators would not significantly impact recoveries.

The company executed a Declaration of Solvency on 4 September 2023 and was placed into MVL on 6 September 2023. The Petitioners assert that the directors lacked reasonable grounds for believing the company was solvent. Nonetheless the Respondent and certain witnesses contend that the Declaration was made after obtaining professional advice and was based on a valuation deemed legitimate at the time.

The auditors issued repeated qualifications and disclaimers over several years, citing deficiencies in book keeping and supporting documentation. The company’s reported financial position fluctuated evidently from a deficit as of 26 July 2023, to a surplus as of 30 August 2023, and then to a larger deficit following the MVL on 31 October 2023, primarily due to reclassification of inter-company items. The propriety of these reclassifications is very much contested. Inter-company payments and UJSB Indebtedness and the exceeding RM63 million subsequently increased, were made by or through UJSB concerning the OPV project. The origin, beneficiaries, and accounting treatment of these sums are disputed, raising questions regarding their legitimacy and proper characterization.

The Petitioners contend that the same professionals who advised on prior schemes, notably in 2017 and 2023 have also accepted appointment as MVL liquidators, creating potential conflict of interest. The Respondent and UJSB maintain that their roles were appropriate and do not disqualify them. Conduct Surrounding the Proposed 2023 Scheme and the Creditor’s Meeting.

The conduct of the Respondents and its advisors during the period leading up to the MVL, and the validity of resolutions passed at the creditors’ meeting scheduled for 15 February 2024, are very much in dispute and contested. During the cross-examinations of the Respondent’s witnesses, this court observed the conduct encompassing the said schemes were questionable.

Whether the MVL of TH Fab was tainted from its inception, specifically whether the Declaration of Solvency was false and whether the MVL was used for an ulterior purpose.

Whether the circumstances surrounding TH Fab’s accounts namely audit qualifications, disclaimers, sudden changes in reported solvency, and the emergence of substantial inter-company claims, provide sufficient prima facie grounds for an independent investigation.

Whether the current joint liquidators Mr. Andrew Heng and Mr. Ashvin Mahendran are fit and independent to continue, or whether conflicts or biases necessitate the appointment of independent liquidators.

Whether the Petitioners’ grievances can be adequately addressed within the voluntary winding-up process, or if a court-ordered winding-up is warranted in the best interests of the creditors.

The appropriate weight to be accorded to the wishes of the creditors, particularly considering the majority by both number and value, including the positions of UJSB and MBSB.

In the event of a court-ordered winding-up, who should be appointed as liquidators and what interim directions are necessary.

The relevant statutory provisions which allow for the conversion of a voluntary liquidation into compulsory liquidation is section 464

of the CA 2016, which opening words provide:- “A company, whether or not it is being wound up voluntarily, may be wound up under an order of the Court on the petition of any one or more of the following:

the company;

any creditor, including a contingent or prospective creditor, of the company; Section 464 (2)(d) provides: - “Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) – …

the Court shall not, where a company is being wound up voluntarily, make a winding up order unless the Court is satisfied that the voluntary winding up cannot be continued with due regard to the interests of the creditors or contributories.”

The statutory test is sub-paragraph 464(2)(d) CA 2016 where the Court has a broad judicial discretion which would be exercised by reference to commercial realities and equitable principles of fairness. Relevant matters include whether an independent inquiry is required, the suitability of the voluntary liquidators, and the wishes and interests of the general body of creditors, in particular the views of substantial independent creditors.

On a more persuasive note, there were many foreign authorities giving their propositions of law and comparisons. I have meticulously, gone through each case law provided and made a brief summation on how these authorities should be read in accordance to the current facts. AUTHORITIES FROM DIFFERENT JURISDICTION HAVE BEEN

For the purpose of easy reference, I have divided the cases mentioned, into two categories, firstly favoring the Petition and secondly cautioning against the conversion. Authorities favoring the Petition: -

Re Palmer Marine Surveys Ltd [1986] BCLC 106- English Courts;

Korea Asset Management Corp v Daewoo Singapore Pte Ltd [2004] 1 SLR(R) 671 — Singapore High Court.

Re Zirceram Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 751 — English Courts;

Re Lowerstoft Traffic Service Ltd [1986] BCLC 81— English

Courts Re STX Pan Ocean (Hong Kong) (HCCW 324/2013) — Hong Kong Courts.

Re Gordon & Breach Science Publishers [1995] 2 BCLC 189 —

English Courts Re Gordon & Breach Science Publishers [1995] 2 BCLC 189 — English Courts.

Re Magnus Consultants Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 203- English Courts

Re Samwell Spare Parts Ltd (in CVL) [2022] HKCU 4621 Authorities cautioning against conversion

1.Re B Karsberg Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 57

Re New York Exchange (1888) 39 Ch D 415

Re Medisco Equipment Ltd [1983] BCLC 305

Petroships Investment Pte Ltd v Wealthplus Pte Ltd [2018] 3 SLR 687 (Singapore)

Sysma Construction Pte Ltd v EK Development [2007] SGHC 36

Re Dragon Seafoods Ltd [2024] 1 HKC 284

Re J.D. Swain Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 909 (and other older authority)

Advance Housing (Australia) and other procedural authorities (e.g. Re Inside Sport Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 302) Authorities favoring the Petition: -

In the case of Re Palmer Marine Surveys Ltd [1986] BCLC 106, J Hoffmann, in summary the English Courts, pointed out that where there is evidence of possible improper transfers/asset extraction and the voluntary liquidator is chosen by those whose conduct, is under suspicion, creditors are entitled to insist on an investigation by a liquidator who is independent and seen to be so.

Here the courts must be vigilant to fair play and commercial morality as independent investigation may require the court’s appointment because voluntary liquidator chosen by suspicious parties will not engender confidence. This case further supports the Petitioners’ core contention, that related-party control and prior advisors now acting as voluntary liquidators, lack of perceived independence and need for court liquidation so an independent (and perceived independent) liquidator can investigate transfers/transactions.

I do agree that this authority is an English case and must be applied persuasively, but Malaysian courts have cited and followed the principle commonly.

In the case of Korea Asset Management Corp v Daewoo Singapore Pte Ltd [2004] 1 SLR(R) 671 decided by the Singapore High Court, explains the policy behind the equivalent to the Malaysian section S464(2)(d) of CA 2016, where the voluntary liquidation may be hijacked to keep assets out of reach. In those circumstances, the courts must scrutinise and ensure fair play and the standard to ask whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify further inquiry by a court-appointed liquidator. “1 … There are, however, instances when those responsible for running a company may choose the voluntary liquidation route, in order to “hijack” the liquidation process for reasons that may be viewed as less than legitimate. The voluntary route is a particularly tempting option when related entities of the company or its shareholders are the majority or significant creditors of the company. Directors may also, in certain situations, be averse to having an independent third party mount an enquiry as to the circumstances that precipitated the insolvency of the company. If the directors and management have been involved in corporate shenanigans, it can be expected that they will strenuously take steps to keep out unwelcome prying eyes. In such cases, independent minority creditors may have a legitimate sense of grievance, if their interests are disregarded or if they genuinely fear that the liquidation process may not be fairly implemented. The independence of the liquidators in such situations is often in issue. In a leading English authority, Re Palmer Marine Surveys Ltd [1986] BCLC 106 at 111, Hoffmann J (as he then was) observed: The public is frequently astonished by the ease with which unsuccessful businessmen appear to be able to transfer the assets, goodwill, premises and employees of an insolvent company to a pristine entity with which they continue trading as before, leaving the creditors unpaid. This may be the price which has to be paid for the entrepreneurial incentives of limited liability. But in cases which it appears to have happened, thorough investigation is required. Disappointed creditors are bound to view with cynicism any investigation undertaken by a liquidator chosen by the very persons whose conduct is under suspicion. 2 … I also think it is important to signal to company management and liquidators alike that the court will vigilantly strive to ensure that fair play and commercial morality prevail in all insolvency matters that come to its attention.”

In my opinion, the above case law is directly on point, as the judgement closely fits the TH Fab facts and circumstances. UJSB is the controlling shareholder with common directors across group and the prior scheme advisers are now appointed as the liquidators. Furthermore, the alleged inter‑company transactions as well as the late emergence of large UJSB claims are very persuasive for this court in adopting the legal principles applied to determine the conversion.

In addition, this court strongly cogitates for the Conversion for the following reasons:

UJSB is the ultimate controller;

same professionals, the two individuals, acted as scheme advisers and then became liquidators and arguably lack of independence;

auditors’ repeated disclaimers and accounts in a mess;

large unexplained transfers/charges, creation of government loan and securities around the same period; and

late recognition of RM63m and intercompany indebtedness that appeared after the MVL commenced. Those facts align with the classic Palmer/Korea Asset pattern: suspicion of ring‑fencing, assets being taken out of reach, and volunteer liquidator chosen by interested parties.

Next, I would like to refer to the English case of Re Zirceram Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 751 where it was decided, that the courts may have regard to general principles of fairness and commercial morality and will not leave substantial independent creditors with a strong legitimate grievance. The substantial independent creditors who feel prejudiced by sharp practice may insist on the process that follows a compulsory order. In my judgement this case stresses the entitlement of independent creditors to insist on courts for supervision where the independent creditors’ complaints about the related‑party control and unusual transactions.

Justice Hoffmann in the case of Traffic Service Ltd [1986] BCLC 81, stated that: - “… It was suggested that there is an onus on the petitioning creditor to justify the making of a winding-up order, but I am not sure that the concept of an onus can easily be applied to a case in which the discretion requires a number of matters to be taken into account. One of these must certainly be the number, value and quality of the creditors who favour a winding-up order as against those who do not. … In addition, it is, I think, proper to discount the opposition of those opposing creditors who are clearly associated with the management of the company, particular when, as in this case, it is said that the main reason why there should be an order for compulsory winding up is the necessity for an independent investigation into their management… … Of course, it is important that where there are matters to be investigated the liquidator should do so with competence and integrity, but I think it is also in the public interest that the creditors should have confidence in his independence. It is well known, and a matter of frequent public scandal, that directors of insolvent companies occasionally succeed in transferring the assets and goodwill to a new company, often at the same premises, and start up in business again as if nothing had changed, leaving their creditors unpaid. Where it appears that something of that kind may have happened, and where, as in this case, there is prima facie evidence of a serious case of fraudulent trading by those directors I think that the public interest requires that the liquidator should not only be independent, but seen to be independent…”

I accept the fact, that the disposal of a company asset shortly before winding‑up petition can be prima facie evidence of improper conduct or fraudulent preference that justify a compulsory winding up. Most importantly where transfers occur in a twilight period, prima facie case is sufficient to warrant court supervision or investigation. The Petitioner in this case have proven significantly that there are momentous transactions and creation of securities close to and shortly before the MVL together with large inter‑company advances that the above case of Lowerstoft warrants for an investigation. Authorities cautioning against conversion

The Respondents also provided a long list of supporting authorities mainly on the fact that, the creditors’ meeting, voted to convert to VL and the majority of creditors both in value and numbers have supported the VL.

Cases referred by the Respondents state that the courts should not lightly overthrow the wishes of the majority giving weight to the mainstream wishes. They also stress that many investigative powers are available to voluntary liquidators and that theoretical remedies namely the removal, should be exhausted before conversion, unless those remedies are misleading for example being controlled by the majority.

I would not superficially override the wishes of the majority of creditors but the question before this court is whether these majority of creditors are unrelated, independent of the company’s management and they are entitled to have their views conferred. If the majority are related or aligned with management, thus greater judicial vigilance is required in considering whether the voluntary process fairly protects the rights of all creditors.

Conversion to a compulsory winding‑up is an exceptional remedy and would not be readily available just upon an application by the Petitioner. It is primarily granted where either: -

an independent inquiry is necessary and cannot reasonably be achieved within the voluntary framework, or

the present officeholders are demonstrably unfit, conflicted or so compromised that the voluntary process cannot be continued with due regard to creditor interests.

In this case, I have weighed all relevant factors and determined, whether the statutory conditions are satisfied as a conclusion satisfied that a conversion to a compulsory winging up in inevitable.

My decision, moving towards a conversion, comes from the High Court’s finding in Petition 175, a winding-up proceeding relating to THHE, decided by Justice Attan Mustafa. The court decided in that case where in which that the same liquidators lacked objectivity in respect of THHE is a very important factual predicate that strengthened the Petitioners’ case today. His Lordship observed: - “[43] This sequence of events indicates that the scheme applications appear to have been pursued to delay enforcement, the voluntary liquidation was initiated to pre-empt compulsory winding up, and the process was structured to maintain control through the appointment of liquidators with prior relationships to the companies. [44] … The companies’ subsequent decision to commence voluntary winding up during the pendency of these applications appears inconsistent with their stated objectives of debt restructuring to “alleviate the risk of being wound up”, raising questions about the genuine purpose of the scheme proposals… [45] … The timing and circumstances suggest the companies may have sought to maintain control over the liquidation process by placing it in the hands of their chosen liquidators, rather than risk court-appointed liquidators in compulsory proceedings. …”. …”

The above-mentioned case, shows a pattern across the THHE Group of companies and prior judicial concern about the two appointed liquidators. That was the key that unlocked this conundrum.

This court is satisfied with the above reasons stated, under subparagraph 464(2)(d) that the voluntary winding-up cannot be continued with due regard to the interests of creditors.

The evidence demonstrates a substantial prima facie case indicating that the company’s affairs warrant independent inquiry. The deficiencies in accounting records, repeated audit disclaimers, abrupt changes in reported solvency, large late-disclosed inter-company claims, and the timing and use of the MVL to control assets collectively support this conclusion.

The remedies available within a voluntary liquidation such as creditor-led resolutions, liquidator removal, are insufficient in the present circumstances.

The involvement of related parties and the influence of significant creditors diminish the effectiveness of self-regulation, thereby necessitating this Court’s intervention to ensure an unbiased investigation.

While the wishes of creditors are to be given due consideration, particular weight must be accorded to the interests of independent creditors, especially where related or connected creditors hold substantial voting power. Their legitimate grievances justify the Court’s intervention.

The involvement of persons with prior advisory roles in the transactions under scrutiny further diminishes confidence in the process. These factors collectively demonstrate that the continuation of the voluntary winding-up would not adequately protect the interests of creditors. An independent, court-supervised liquidation is therefore necessary to ensure a fair, transparent, and thorough investigation, safeguarding creditor rights and the public interest.

This Court’s intervention is a measure of last resort, taken with due regard for its serious implications. However, given the circumstances, particularly where statutory protections for creditors and the public interest are at stake, this Court must act to uphold the integrity of the insolvency process. The orders issued aim to facilitate a fair and independent investigation, asset preservation, and proper reporting, thereby ensuring that the interests of all stakeholders are duly protected.

After meticulous consideration of the affidavits, oral testimonies, written submissions, and accompanying documentation, this Court is satisfied that the continuation of the voluntary winding-up is no longer an option, in light of the interests of the creditors. This Court shall issue a winding-up order on a compulsory basis and shall appoint independent liquidators as per Enclosure 1. Dated : 17 March 2026 SGD SHOBA DORAI RAJAH JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER KUALA LUMPUR HIGH COURT Solicitor for the Petitioners: David Mathews, Olivia Loh, Lai Ann Xing and Koh Jo Vin [MESSRS MATHEWS HUN LACHIMANAN)] Solicitor for the Respondent: Mark Ho Hing Kheong, Eldarius Yong Zhen Jie, Venkat Ram V K Dasaratharaj and Elouise Lim Yee [MESSRS CHELLAW WONG] Solicitor for the Supporting Creditors: Joyce Pang [MESSRS JOYCE PANG] Solicitor for the Opposing Creditor: Jasman Arisa bt Ahmad Mirza [MESSRS SHAIKH DAVID & CO.] Solicitor for the Opposing Creditor: Alvin Tang, Teo Ju Ling and Chin Wui Imm [MESSRS ALVIN TANG LAW OFFICE]