Boulevard One Sdn Bhd v Vocation Empire (MA-12BNCC-3-09/2025)

BOULEVARD ONE SDN BHD [No. Syarikat: 201101020193 (948327-V)]

BOULEVARD EXCEL SDN BHD [No. Syarikat: 201101020194 (948328-D)] ... APPELLANTS

VOCATION EMPIRE [No. Syarikat: 202103062269 (MA0263932-A)]

LINDA YATI BINTI ABU BAKAR (NRIC: 850902-04-5250) ... RESPONDENTS (On appeal from the decision of the Sessions Court at Ayer Keroh, Melaka, in Civil Suit No. MA-A52NCC-89-07/2024) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A. INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal by the Appellants, who were the Plaintiffs in the court below, against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge, Puan Haderiah binti Siri, sitting at Ayer Keroh, Melaka, in Civil Suit No. MA-A52NCC-89-07/2024. By that decision, the Appellants' Writ Summons and Statement of Claim dated 11 July 2024 were dismissed with costs. The sealed order records that the decision was made in open court on 18 September 2025. I observe that while the Notice of Appeal and sealed order refer to 18 September 2025, the intituling in parts of the Record of Appeal and the Memorandum of Appeal refers to 19 September 2025. Nothing turns on the discrepancy save that the record should accurately reflect the date of the impugned decision. [2] At the case management held on 31 March 2026, the Second Respondent appeared in person on behalf of all the Respondents. The Respondents were not represented by counsel, notwithstanding that reasonable and sufficient time had been afforded to them to appoint solicitors for the purposes of this appeal. Directions were nonetheless given for the filing of written submissions: the Appellants' written submissions were to be filed on or before 24 April 2026; the Respondents' written submissions on or before 22 May 2026; the Appellants' submissions in reply on or before 12 June 2026; and the Respondents' submissions in reply on or before 26 June 2026. [3] The Appellants filed their written submissions on 24 April 2026, in compliance with those directions. The Respondents did not comply. No written submissions have been filed by the Respondents up to and including today, the date fixed for the hearing of this appeal. By a letter dated 25 June 2026 (Enclosure 18), the Appellants' solicitors placed on record that the Appellants had no objection to the Respondents making oral submissions at the hearing, or to the Respondents relying upon the written submissions filed on their behalf by their former solicitors in the Sessions Court, without prejudice to the Appellants' right to respond to any submissions so made and to raise the Respondents' non-compliance with the filing directions should it become necessary. In fairness to the unrepresented Respondents, I have not treated their failure to file written submissions as any concession on the merits; the appeal has been considered and determined upon the entirety of the Record of Appeal and the submissions before the Court. [4] The dispute arises out of a commercial contract for building repair works. The Appellants are the owners of two adjoining business units at Kota Syahbandar, Melaka, which experienced persistent roof leakage. They engaged the First Respondent, a registered sole proprietorship, to carry out repair works pursuant to two written quotations dated 23 November 2022 and paid deposits amounting to 60% of the respective contract sums. The Appellants contend that the contractual works were left incomplete and failed to remedy the water leakage. The Respondents maintain that the works undertaken were commensurate with the payments received and that any outstanding work arose from a structural crack to the external wall of one unit, which fell outside the scope of the original contract. [5] From that disagreement arise three further issues. The first is whether the Second Respondent's written undertaking, endorsed upon the Appellants' letter of demand and reinforced by subsequent WhatsApp communications, constituted a valid and binding agreement to refund the deposits and, if so, whom it bound. The second concerns liability, if any, in respect of the external wall defect which the Respondents contend lay outside the contractual scope of work. The third is whether the Appellants have established an entitlement to recover damages for loss of rental. The action proceeded to a two-day trial at which three witnesses gave oral evidence, supported by a substantial body of contemporaneous documentary evidence. The learned Sessions Court Judge resolved all issues against the Appellants and dismissed the action. By their Amended Memorandum of Appeal, the Appellants advance ten grounds challenging that decision. [6] Reduced to its essentials, the appeal turns on four matters capable of disposing of it: first, whether the Appellants discharged the burden of proving that the contracted works were not completed; secondly, whether any contractual obligation arose in respect of the external wall defect; thirdly, whether the Second Respondent's written undertaking dated 7 October 2023, read together with the subsequent WhatsApp communications, is legally binding and, if so, upon whom; and fourthly, whether the Appellants proved an entitlement to recover damages for loss of rental. Governing all of those issues is the well-established standard upon which this Court, sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, may interfere with findings of fact made after a full trial. These are my grounds. B. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [7] The material facts are largely common ground and may be stated shortly; where a fact is in dispute I have said so, and I have refrained from stating any finding upon it at this stage. [8] The First Appellant is the proprietor of the premises at No.32, and the Second Appellant of the premises at No.30, Jalan KPKS 7, Kompleks Perniagaan Kota Syahbandar, Melaka. The First Respondent, Vocation Empire, is a sole proprietorship of which the Third Respondent is the sole proprietor. The Second Respondent is the Third Respondent's husband and was the person who dealt directly with the Appellants throughout the material period. During cross-examination, the Second Respondent accepted that he acted on behalf of the First Respondent in offering the repair services to the Appellants. These matters are not in dispute. [9] Following a site inspection in November 2022, for which an inspection fee of RM150 was paid in respect of each premises, the First Respondent issued two quotations dated 23 November 2022: one for RM11,400 for the First Appellant's premises and the other for RM3,200 for the Second Appellant's premises. The Appellants accepted those quotations and paid deposits equivalent to 60% of the respective contract sums, namely RM6,840 and RM1,920, making a total deposit of RM8,760. The payment and receipt of those deposits are not in dispute. Thereafter, the Second Respondent indicated that the works were targeted for completion by the end of April 2023. Whether that statement amounted to a binding promise or merely an estimate became one of the issues at trial. [10] Between April and October 2023, the Appellants repeatedly sought updates on the progress of the works. In August 2023, following discussions concerning cracking to the external wall, the Second Respondent quoted a further RM3,500 for additional waterproofing and external wall restoration works, and the Appellants instructed him to proceed with those additional works. Dissatisfied with the progress and completeness of the contractual works, the Appellants terminated the engagement and, by a letter dated 7 October 2023, demanded repayment of the deposits previously paid, amounting in aggregate to RM8,760. [11] Thereafter, in a series of WhatsApp messages, the Second Respondent repeatedly indicated that arrangements would be made to refund the deposits. In addition, on the Appellants' letter of demand dated 7 October 2023, he signed a handwritten undertaking in the first person agreeing to repay the aggregate sum of RM8,760 by instalments commencing at the end of December 2023. A police report was subsequently lodged on 5 December 2023. The Appellants thereafter commenced the present action in the Sessions Court, claiming repayment of the deposits and inspection charges, damages for loss of rental amounting to RM63,600 in respect of the First Appellant's premises and RM33,600 in respect of the Second Appellant's premises, together with general damages, interest and costs. [12] At trial, the Appellants called two witnesses, SP1 (Lester Seow Yee Shiong) and SP2 (Ng Pei Sze), the latter being the Appellants' representative and the person who dealt directly with the Second Respondent throughout the material period. The Respondents called only the Second Respondent as SD1. The principal issues at trial were whether the contractual works had been completed in accordance with the parties' agreement; whether any outstanding work resulted from an external wall defect lying outside the contractual scope or from the Respondents' own default; whether the refund undertaking was valid, binding and enforceable, or had been procured under pressure as alleged by the Respondents; and whether the Appellants had proved their claim for loss of rental. [13] The Writ of Summons was filed on 11 July 2024. Following amendment of the defence, the action proceeded to trial on 16 and 17 June 2025 and was dismissed on 18 September 2025. In the Alasan Penghakiman, the learned Sessions Court Judge organised the decision under six issues, lettered A to F, and resolved each in favour of the Respondents. The learned Judge held that the Appellants had failed to prove that the contractual works were not completed (Issue A); that the works under the two quotations had substantially been carried out, save that the remaining internal repainting at Unit 32 could not proceed until the external wall defect was rectified (Issue B); that the external wall crack fell outside the agreed contractual scope and required rectification by another contractor, whom the Appellants failed to engage (Issue C); that no binding contract arose in respect of those additional external wall works (Issue D); that the refund undertaking was vitiated by coercion within the meaning of section 15 of the Contracts Act 1950 and, in any event, the Second Respondent lacked authority to bind the remaining Respondents (Issue E); and that the Appellants had failed to mitigate their loss and had not established their claim for loss of rental, whether as to entitlement or quantum (Issue F). C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [14] Although the grounds of appeal are numerous, the issues that genuinely arise on this appeal, framed independently of the parties' formulations, are these:

as a threshold matter, the standard upon which an appellate court may interfere with findings of fact made by a trial court after a full trial;

whether the learned Sessions Court Judge was plainly wrong in finding that the Appellants had failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the contracted repair works under the two quotations were not completed;

whether any contractual or other liability arose in respect of the external wall defect;

whether the Second Respondent's written undertaking dated 7 October 2023 to refund the deposit is valid and binding, and, if so, upon whom, thereby engaging both the finding of coercion under section 15 of the Contracts Act 1950 and the question of personal liability; and

whether the Appellants established an entitlement to recover damages for loss of rental, including whether they discharged their duty to mitigate their loss. D. GOVERNING LAW AND FRAMEWORK [15] The dispositive controversies on this appeal are predominantly factual. Save where a question of law is genuinely engaged, the law need not be set out at length, and the centre of gravity must rest where the real controversy lies. Two bodies of principle require statement. [16] The first is the standard of appellate intervention. This being a first appeal against findings reached after a full trial at which the witnesses were seen and heard, this Court does not simply retry the case. It must review the whole of the evidence and draw its own conclusions, while giving due weight to the trial judge's advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. It will not disturb findings of fact unless the trial court has erred in law, misapprehended the evidence, failed to undertake a proper judicial appreciation of the evidence, or arrived at a conclusion that is plainly wrong because no reasonable tribunal, properly directing itself, could have reached it. The Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ1 affirmed that appellate intervention is justified where the trial court's findings are plainly wrong because of a failure properly to evaluate the evidence. Likewise, in CGU Insurance Bhd v Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd [2006] 3 MLJ1, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that intervention is warranted where there has been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence or where the trial judge has seriously misdirected himself in its evaluation. Those authorities define the proper boundary of appellate review: deference to findings properly made, but correction where demonstrable error is established. [17] The second is the burden and standard of proof. By sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act 1950, a party who asserts a fact must prove it, and in a civil claim the standard is the balance of probabilities. The burden of proving the matters constituting the claim, including non-completion and the loss said to flow from it, lay throughout on the Appellants. [18] Two further principles, engaged only by the third issue, are more conveniently considered when that issue is reached. The first concerns the statutory meaning of coercion under section 15 of the Contracts Act 1950. The second concerns the evidential significance of a written acknowledgment of liability and contemporaneous electronic communications in establishing an admitted debt. In that regard, the Federal Court in Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 4 MLJ 478 recognised the evidential value of contemporaneous electronic communications, whilst the High Court in Vizione Construction Sdn Bhd v Pembinaan Gerak Yakin Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 01513 treated a written acknowledgment, WhatsApp communications and subsequent conduct as establishing an admitted debt in the absence of a bona fide dispute. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Issue (b): Whether the Contracted Works Were Proved Not To Have Been Completed [19] The starting point is the incidence of the burden of proof. It was for the Appellants to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the works contracted for under the two quotations were not completed, and not for the Respondents to prove that they were. That elementary proposition, drawn from sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act 1950, governs the disposal of this issue. [20] On the Notes of Evidence (Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3B), the learned Judge had before her several matters which informed her conclusion that the Appellants had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the contractual works remained incomplete. First, during cross-examination, PW1 (Ng Pei Sze) accepted that the contemporaneous WhatsApp communications recorded the Second Respondent's representation that the rectification works on both rooftops had been completed, although she did not accept that the representation was true. Secondly, PW1 accepted that there was no evidence that the Appellants had invited the First Respondent to conduct a joint inspection of the works said to have been completed. Thirdly, the Appellants elected not to call any independent expert witness, such as an engineer, architect or building surveyor, nor did they produce any technical report to establish that the contractual works remained defective or incomplete. Those matters formed part of the evidential basis upon which the learned Judge concluded that the Appellants had failed to discharge the burden resting upon them. [21] Against that, the Appellants contend that the continuing leakage and the unfinished internal repainting were themselves sufficient to establish that the contractual works had not been completed, and that the learned Judge ought not to have accepted the Respondents' explanation founded upon the external wall crack. I am unable to agree. The learned Judge carefully considered the contemporaneous WhatsApp communications and found that they did not amount to an admission that the Respondents had failed or refused to complete the contractual works. Rather, they reflected that the works were being carried out and that the delay in completing the remaining internal repainting arose from the structural defect affecting the external wall. The learned Judge further found that the Appellants produced no objective evidence capable of displacing that explanation. No technical assessment, expert report, independent contractor's report, comparative photographs or documentary evidence of remedial works was adduced to establish that the contractual works remained incomplete or were executed contrary to the agreed specifications. In those circumstances, the learned Judge was entitled to conclude that the Appellants had failed to discharge the burden resting upon them under sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. That conclusion was plainly open on the evidence. [22] The Appellants further invoke section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, contending that an adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the Respondents for failing to produce the alleged audio recordings. I am unable to accept that submission. The learned Judge expressly considered the issue and correctly recognised that an adverse inference under section 114(g) does not arise automatically upon the non-production of evidence. Having evaluated the totality of the evidence, the learned Judge concluded that the Respondents' version remained supported by the contemporaneous documents, including the original quotations, the technical report and the WhatsApp communications, notwithstanding the absence of the recordings. In those circumstances, the refusal to draw an adverse inference was plainly a conclusion open on the evidence. Equally, the nonproduction of the recordings did not relieve the Appellants of the burden, which remained throughout upon them, of proving that the contractual works had not been completed. Ground 10, properly understood, therefore discloses no error warranting appellate intervention. [23] I should nevertheless address the learned Judge's reasoning under Issue C, namely that the Appellants' failure to engage another contractor for the external wall crack contributed to the contractual works remaining incomplete. That aspect of the reasoning is not without difficulty. The contemporaneous WhatsApp communications show that the Appellants instructed the Second Respondent to "go ahead" with the additional restoration works valued at RM3,500, to which the Second Respondent responded "Noted". During cross-examination, the Second Respondent accepted that he acknowledged the communication, although he disputed that it amounted to acceptance of the additional works. Those matters tend to weaken the proposition that the Appellants had abandoned the Respondents in favour of engaging another contractor. Even so, the point is not determinative of the appeal. The learned Judge's principal findings under Issues A and B, namely that the Appellants failed to prove that the contractual works had not been completed and that the Respondents had substantially performed the contractual scope of work, stand independently of the reasoning under Issue C. Accordingly, even if some aspects of the reasoning under Issue C may be open to question, they do not undermine the essential findings upon which the dismissal of the Appellants' claim rested. [24] There remains the observation at paragraph [86] of the Alasan Penghakiman that there was "an element of failure" on the part of the Respondents in completing the repair works. Viewed in isolation, that observation might appear difficult to reconcile with the learned Judge's earlier findings under Issues A and B. Read in its proper context, however, it was made in the course of determining the Appellants' claim for loss of rental under Issue F. The learned Judge was addressing causation, mitigation and the extent to which the Appellants' own conduct contributed to the losses claimed, rather than making a finding that the Respondents had committed a fundamental breach of the contractual works. In my judgment, paragraph [86] cannot properly be read as displacing the learned Judge's earlier findings that the Appellants failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the contractual works had not been completed. Nor can it bear the significance that the Appellants seek to attribute to it. [25] For those reasons, although certain aspects of the learned Judge's reasoning under Issue C may be open to question, the essential findings under Issues A and B disclose no error warranting appellate intervention. The learned Judge was entitled, on the evidence, to conclude that the Appellants had failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the contractual works had not been completed. No misdirection of law, material misapprehension of the evidence or plainly erroneous finding has been demonstrated. The learned Judge's conclusion on this issue should therefore be affirmed. Issue (c): Liability For The External Wall Defect [26] The next issue concerns the structural crack affecting the external wall of Premise No. 32. More particularly, the question is whether the Respondents were contractually bound, whether under the original contract or by a subsequent agreement, to undertake those additional repair works. The original contractual relationship between the parties was constituted by the two quotations dated 23 November 2022. The learned Judge concluded that the external wall repairs fell outside the scope of those quotations and that no subsequent binding agreement had come into existence, treating the parties' discussions as no more than pre-contractual negotiations or cost estimates. The correctness of that conclusion must be examined against the contemporaneous documentary evidence and the oral testimony adduced at trial. [27] The Appellants seek to recast the issue as one of representation, contending that the Respondents had represented that they possessed the expertise and capability to resolve the water ingress as a whole, including any underlying structural causes. That submission cannot be accepted in that form. A representation as to expertise or capacity does not, without more, enlarge the contractual obligations assumed by the parties. The contractual rights and obligations remain governed by the agreement objectively concluded between them. While the contemporaneous WhatsApp communications may arguably support the existence of discussions concerning additional restoration works, they do not, without more, establish that the Respondents assumed a contractual obligation extending beyond the scope of the original quotations. Whether the Respondents duly performed the works falling within that contractual scope has already been considered under the preceding issue. The remaining question is therefore whether the subsequent communications created a separate and enforceable contractual obligation in respect of the external wall repairs. It is to that question that I now turn. [28] This is the issue upon which the appeal principally turns. The learned Judge's reasoning comprised two distinct and independent strands which should not be conflated. First, the learned Judge held that the Second Respondent's undertaking was vitiated by coercion within the meaning of section 15 of the Contracts Act 1950 and was therefore unenforceable. Secondly, the learned Judge held that, even if the undertaking had been voluntarily given, the Second Respondent lacked authority to bind the First Respondent or the Third Respondent. Each ground therefore requires separate consideration. [29] I take the coercion finding first, because it raises a question of law. Section 15 of the Contracts Act 1950 defines coercion in confined terms: the committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Penal Code, or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person, with the intention of causing that person to enter into an agreement. The burden of establishing coercion lay on the party asserting it, namely the Respondents. On the evidence, there was no act forbidden by the Penal Code and no unlawful detention, or threatened detention, of property. What the evidence disclosed was a termination of the engagement, a demand for refund of the deposits, and a police report lodged in respect of a grievance arising from the contractual dispute. Those acts, without more, were the exercise of legal rights. A firm demand, pressure arising from a commercial dispute, or the prospect of lawful complaint does not, without proof of the statutory elements, amount to coercion under section 15. The learned Judge's finding that the undertaking was vitiated by coercion was therefore an error of law. It involved a misdirection as to the legal effect of the evidence and warrants appellate correction. [30] The second strand stands on a different footing. The First Respondent is a registered sole proprietorship and, as a matter of law, has no legal personality separate from its proprietor, the Third Respondent. The question, however, is not one of separate legal personality but of authority. Whether the Second Respondent possessed actual or ostensible authority to bind the proprietorship, or the Third Respondent personally, to a fresh obligation to refund the deposits was a question of fact. The learned Judge found that there was no evidence of any mandate, authority, resolution or other authorisation empowering the Second Respondent to assume such an obligation on behalf of the First or Third Respondents. Having regard to the trial court's advantage in evaluating the evidence, and the absence of any objective evidence establishing such authority, I am not persuaded that this finding was plainly wrong. I would therefore not disturb it in so far as it concerns the First and Third Respondents. [31] But that is not the end of the matter, and it is here that the Alasan Penghakiman fell into error. The undertaking dated 7 October 2023 is, on its face, expressed as the personal undertaking of the Second Respondent. It is couched in the first person, whereby he stated that he was willing to refund the sums demanded, and it bears his own signature. That undertaking was subsequently reinforced by a series of contemporaneous WhatsApp messages in which he repeatedly stated that he would arrange the refund, that he was processing it and would send the cheque, and that arrangements for repayment were being made. Whatever the position regarding his authority to bind the First or Third Respondents, those matters plainly required the learned Judge to consider whether the Second Respondent had assumed a personal obligation by his own words and conduct. Instead, having concluded that he lacked authority to bind the remaining Respondents, the learned Judge treated that finding as disposing of the issue altogether. In my respectful view, that left unaddressed the distinct question of the Second Respondent's own personal liability arising from his signed undertaking and subsequent acknowledgments. That omission concerned a material issue raised by both the pleadings and the evidence and therefore warrants appellate intervention. [32] The character of the undertaking reinforces that conclusion. It is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms and records the Second Respondent's personal acknowledgment that the deposits would be refunded. That acknowledgment did not stand in isolation. It was repeatedly reaffirmed in the contemporaneous WhatsApp communications, in which the Second Respondent consistently stated that he would arrange the refund, that he was processing it, that a cheque would be sent, and that arrangements for repayment were being made. In Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 4 MLJ 478, the Federal Court recognised the evidential significance of contemporaneous electronic communications. Likewise, in Tseu Fui Loong v Optimax Healthcare Services Sdn Bhd & Anor [2024] MLJU 881, the High Court held that WhatsApp communications acknowledging an obligation to repay constituted clear evidence of liability and rejected the maker's subsequent attempt to deny those communications as an afterthought. The same reasoning applies here. Once the finding of coercion is set aside, there remains no legal basis upon which the Second Respondent may resile from his own signed undertaking and the repeated acknowledgments that followed. [33] It follows that the appeal succeeds on this issue to a limited extent. The learned Judge's finding that the undertaking was vitiated by coercion is set aside. The undertaking is enforceable against the Second Respondent personally, and he is accordingly liable to refund the sum of RM8,760. The dismissal of the claim against the First and Third Respondents on this issue is, however, affirmed. For completeness, I add that this conclusion is not inconsistent with the conclusions reached under Issue (b). Whatever rights or defences the Second Respondent might otherwise have asserted in relation to the underlying contractual dispute, he subsequently executed a clear written undertaking and repeatedly reaffirmed it in contemporaneous communications. Having failed to establish any vitiating factor recognised by law, he cannot now resile from that personal undertaking. [34] The Appellants claimed damages for loss of rental amounting to RM63,600 in respect of the First Appellant's premises and RM33,600 in respect of the Second Appellant's premises, each calculated by reference to an asserted monthly rental over a period of twelve months. The learned Judge rejected that claim on two independent grounds. First, the Appellants had failed to prove the quantum of the alleged rental loss by objective documentary evidence. Secondly, and in any event, the Appellants had failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate their loss. [35] Two difficulties confront the claim. The first concerns proof and causation. The Appellants tendered no tenancy agreements, no evidence from any identified prospective tenant ready and willing to take a lease at the rentals pleaded, and no objective documentary material establishing either the quantum of the alleged rental loss or that the inability to let the premises was caused by any breach on the part of the Respondents. In light of the conclusions already reached under Issues (a) and (b), the Appellants likewise failed to establish that any loss of rental flowed from a breach of the Respondents' contractual obligations. The second difficulty concerns mitigation. The learned Judge found that the Appellants did not take reasonable steps to reduce their loss, including by engaging another contractor or otherwise bringing the situation to an end within a reasonable time. That finding is supported by the evidence. Moreover, the principle stated in Joo Leong Timber Merchant v Dr Jaswant Singh a/l Jagat Singh [2003] 5 MLJ 116 is that a claimant is under a duty to mitigate his loss and cannot recover losses which reasonable steps would have avoided. On the facts of this case, the learned Judge was entitled to conclude that the Appellants had failed both to prove the rental loss claimed and to mitigate it. [36] The Appellants are correct, as a matter of principle, that the duty to mitigate does not require an innocent party to assume the contractual obligations of the party alleged to be in default. That proposition, however, does not assist them on the facts of this case. The learned Judge's rejection of the claim for loss of rental did not rest upon mitigation alone. The Appellants failed to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the Respondents were in breach of the contractual obligations relied upon; they further failed to prove that the alleged rental loss was caused by any such breach or to establish the quantum of that loss by objective evidence. The issue of mitigation therefore became only an additional reason why the claim could not succeed. In those circumstances, the learned Judge's conclusion was plainly open on the evidence and discloses no error warranting appellate intervention. The claim for loss of rental must therefore fail. [37] For completeness, the Appellants' claim to recover the inspection charges likewise cannot succeed. The evidence establishes that the agreed inspection of both premises was carried out, the agreed inspection fee of RM150 per premises was paid, and a technical report was subsequently prepared following those inspections. The inspection services for which the charges were levied were therefore performed. Those charges were earned and do not form part of any recoverable refund. F. CONCLUSION [38] Drawing the threads together, and without repeating the reasoning already given, the appeal succeeds only in part. Although certain aspects of the learned Judge's reasoning under Issue C are open to question, the ultimate conclusions reached in relation to the completion of the contractual works, the external wall issue, and the claim for loss of rental were, for the reasons already given, sustainable on the evidence and disclose no error warranting appellate intervention. Those conclusions are therefore affirmed. The learned Judge fell into error only in relation to the Second Respondent's undertaking dated 7 October 2023. The finding that the undertaking was vitiated by coercion cannot stand, and the learned Judge ought to have considered, and given effect to, the Second Respondent's personal liability arising from his own signed undertaking. To that extent, and to that extent only, the appeal is allowed. G. ORDER OF THE COURT [39] Accordingly, I make the following orders:

The appeal is allowed in part.

The order of the Sessions Court is varied only to the extent set out below and is otherwise affirmed.

Judgment is entered against the Second Respondent in favour of the First Appellant in the sum of RM6,840.00 and in favour of the Second Appellant in the sum of RM1,920.00 pursuant to the written undertaking dated 7 October 2023.

Interest on the said sums at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of filing of the Writ until full realisation.

The claim against the First Respondent and the Third Respondent remains dismissed.

The claims for loss of rental, refund of the inspection charges and general damages remain dismissed.

In view of the divided success on the appeal, there shall be no order as to costs of the appeal. The dismissal with costs in favour of the First and Third Respondents is affirmed. The costs order in favour of the Second Respondent is set aside.

Liberty to apply. Dated (MELAKA) Lawyer For Appellant : Cik Audrey Tan Kah Yee bersama Cik Dharushini Bai a/p Sailanatan Tetuan Audrey Tan Law Chambers Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 3, Lorong 11/8A,,, 46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Lawyer For Respondents : Encik Mohd Sabri bin Abdul Rashid (Def.2 dan mewakili Def.1 & Def.3) No.14A, KM27, Jalan Datuk Nawar, 77300 Merlimau, Melaka.