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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO: BA-23NCVC-43-07/2025
BA-23NCvC-43-07/2025
High Court of Malaysia4 Sept 2025
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“2.1 Compliance with Sabah Mining Ordinance. Bumi Suria had obtained approval and licence in compliance with Section 6 of the Sabah Mining Ordinance which provides: “6(1) It shall be lawful for the Director with the approval of the Minister t”
“14. The law on interim injunctions is trite as established in American Cynamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 AER 504; [1975] AC 396 and adopted in Malaysia in the case of Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v. Mohd Noor Bin Abdullah [1995] 1 CLJ 293. In defamation cases, reference is made to the Federal Court case of The New St”
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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO: BA-23NCVC-43-07/2025
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BUMI SURIA SDN BHD [COMPANY NO.: 202101034745 / 1435045-M]
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DATUK SERI FARHASH WAFA SALVADOR [I/C NO.: 820705-08-6435]
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DATUK MOHD AMINUDIN BIN MUSTAPHA [I/C NO.: 700516-08-5939] … PLAINTIFFS
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MNOW MEDIA SDN BHD [COMPANY NO.: 202001023482 / 1379802-A]
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MUHAMMAD ABD AR-RAHMAN KOYA [I/C NO.: 741111-01-5423] … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 08/12/2025 11:48:51
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Enclosure 4 is the Plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction to restrain the Defendants from further publishing and making statements against the Plaintiff pending final disposal of this action.
2
Having heard both parties and read the submissions, I am of the opinion that Plaintiff has not met the threshold requirements for granting an interim injunction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 4 is dismissed with costs.
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Plaintiffs now appeal to the Court of Appeal, and below are my reasons for the above decision.
4
The 1st Plaintiff, Bumi Suria Sdn Bhd (Bumi Suria) is a company engaged in the business of coal mining and agglomeration. The 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs were the directors of Bumi Suria, up to a certain point in time.
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The 1st Defendant operates an online news portal, “MalaysiaNow”, and the 2nd Defendant is its editor, sole director and shareholder.
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Plaintiff’s cause of action is defamation. Defendants published three articles on MalaysiaNow between 21.7.2025 and 24.7.2025, which, in their ordinary meaning and by innuendo, are allegedly defamatory to the Plaintiffs.
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The 1st statement (published on 21.7.2025) was from an article titled “Company owned by Farhash gets mineral exploration license in Sabah for area three times larger than KL” – Exhibits FWS-3 of Enclosure 5. The 2nd statement was published on the same day, in an article titled “Letters, meeting minutes, audio clip confirm Farhash-linked company awarded coal exploration licence in Sabah” – Exhibit FWS-4 of Enclosure 5.
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The 3rd statement was published on 24.7.2025, an article titled “Revealed: Audio clip of SMM meeting awarding Farhash-linked firm mineral exploration licence for 70,000ha plot in Sabah” – Exhibit FWS-5 of Enclosure 5.
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The statements in the articles were allegedly intended to convey that Plaintiffs had abused their influence, obtained the license through corrupt or non-transparent means, acted unethically, colluded with government officials in a corruption scandal, and misused their positions for personal gain.
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Plaintiff contended that the defamatory innuendo arises from extrinsic facts known to the public that SMM is chaired by the Chief Minister of Sabah, who is under investigation for corruption, public allegations of corrupt licensing, and that the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs became directors of the 1st Plaintiff two weeks before the alleged approval.
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The Plaintiff submitted that the publication was malicious, factually unverified, and caused serious reputational harm. Furthermore, the statements were published without verification or right of reply.
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Defendants’ objection to this interim injunction application is premised on the importance of the right of free speech and the public interest, as such “news” is not a wrongful act. Defendant relies on the principles in The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v Airasia Bhd (1987) 1 MLJ 36, which held as follows: “The Court should act cautiously in granting interim injunction to restrain publication of an alleged defamatory statement. In fact it should not grant the injunction where the Defendant says he is going to justify it at the trial of the action except where the statement is obviously untruthful or where the Plaintiff has satisfied the Court that the defence will fail.”
13
The Defendants submitted that an injunction should not be granted if the defence raised is that of justification, fair comment or privilege (see Ngoi Thaim Woh v CTOS Sdn Bhd (2001) 4 MLJ 510) and further, the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that the Defendants do not have any basis that the impugned articles can be justified. The Defendant relied on documents exhibited in their affidavit to substantiate their defence of justification, fair comment and/or qualified privilege.
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The law on interim injunctions is trite as established in American Cynamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 AER 504; [1975] AC 396 and adopted in Malaysia in the case of Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v. Mohd Noor Bin Abdullah [1995] 1 CLJ 293. In defamation cases, reference is made to the Federal Court case of The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd V Airasia Bhd, supra as above-mentioned.
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The principle adopted in The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd V Airasia Bhd, supra was initially decided in the case of Bonnard v Perryman (1891) 2 Ch 269, also known as Bonnard Principle which in essense held that a Court should not grant an interim injunction in respect of an allegedly defamatory publication when the Defendant takes a plea of truth of the content as justification and the Court thinks that the Defendant is not certain to fail at trial. Also, there is an additional requirement that the alleged defamatory publication be ex facie (on the face of it) defamatory, not prima facie.
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In the case of Ngoi Thaim Who, supra, the above principle has been enumerated in the four-limb test, namely that the Plaintiff must establish:
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Are the impugned words/articles unarguably defamatory?
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Were there grounds for the Defendants to succeed in justification, fair comment or privilege?
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Is there another defence which is likely to succeed?
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Was there an intention to repeat the publication?
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In any defamation case, the impugned statement must be read in relation to what was being written and published in order to understand its raw meaning before analysing the elements of defamation. Therefore, I refer to the relevant excerpt as submitted by the Plaintiff reproduce below for reference:
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The 1st statement: “Company owned by Farhash gets mineral exploration licence in Sabah for area three times larger than KL...” “A company owned by controversial former PKR politician turned multi-millionaire businessman Farhash Wafa Salvador has been granted mining exploration licence in Sabah...” “Bumi Suria Sdn Bhd was awarded the exploration licence... by Sabah Mineral Management Sdn Bhd (SMM)... chaired by Chief Minister Hajiji Noor...” “Checks revealed... the licence was confirmed... just two weeks after Farhash and Amin took control of the company.” “The licence was reinstated... just two weeks after Farhash and Amin joined Bumi Suria.”
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The 2nd statement: “Letters, meeting minutes, audio clip confirm Farhash-linked company awarded coal exploration licence in Sabah Documented evidence in the form of letters, company records, board meeting minutes and an audio recording will confirm that a company linked to PKR leader turned businessman Farhash Wafa Salvador has been granted the licence to explore minerals in a vast forest reserve area in Sabah bordering Kalimantan. The meeting resolved to approve Bumi Suria’s application for a prospective licence that granted it the exclusive right to explore coal covering some 70,000 hectares in the Kalabakan and Gunung Rara forest”
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The 3rd statement: “Revealed: Audio clip of SMM meeting awarding Farhash-linked firm mineral exploration licence for 70,000ha plot in Sabah On Monday, MalaysiaNow revealed that SMM had approved an application involving a forest reserve area measuring 70,000 ha — three times the area of Kuala Lumpur — by Bumi Suria Sdn Bhd, a company controlled by Farhash and another individual named Aminuddin Mustapha. On May 14, a meeting of SMM unanimously withdrew the cancellation — a move that came a week after Farhash and Amin became involved in Bumi Suria. “The article referred to will remain published, as it constitutes fair and accurate reporting on matters of public interest, supported by credible and verifiable evidence.”
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I have read the articles to see or feel the “sting” as submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel, and at the same time, perused the list of documents tendered by Defendants. ~This space is intentionally blank~
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On the issue of approval and license, I find it noteworthy to refer to the Defendants’ submission at paragraph 2. For ease of reference, I reproduce as below: “2. Key events relevant to the issue of approval and licence:
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2.1 Compliance with Sabah Mining Ordinance. Bumi Suria had obtained approval and licence in compliance with Section 6 of the Sabah Mining Ordinance which provides: “6(1) It shall be lawful for the Director with the approval of the Minister to grant licences to prospect for metals or minerals subject to such terms, conditions and limitations and upon payment of such fee as may be prescribed.”
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2.2 Application for Licence On 5.1.2023, Bumi Suria duly made an application for a Prospecting Licence.
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2.3 Minister’s Response By letter dated 31.3.2023, the Minister responded “tiada halangan sekiranya teratur”, thereby granting ministerial approval in principle.
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2.4 First Conditional Approval On 14.6.2023, Bumi Suria was granted a First Conditional Approval, approving its application to apply for a Prospecting Licence for an area of 70,000 hectares within the Kalabakan Forest Reserve and Gunung Rara Forest Reserve for purposes of coal mining.
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2.5 Cancellation and Appeal On 23.1.2024, the Chief Minister purported to cancel the licence without any reasons being provided. Bumi Suria filed its appeal on 26.1.2024.
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2.6 Appointment of Directors On 7.5.2024, the 2nd Plaintiff and 3rd Plaintiff were appointed as directors of Bumi Suria.
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2.7 SMM’s Conditional Approval (Board Meeting No. 12) Two weeks later, on 21.5.2024, Sabah Maju Mining Sdn Bhd (“SMM”), at its 12th Board Meeting chaired by the Chief Minister, issued a letter to Bumi Suria stating that its application for permission to apply for a Prospecting Licence was approved, subject to the condition that the applied area did not overlap with the application area of Pro Raptor Sdn Bhd (see minutes at Exhibit R-10, PDF page 52).
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2.8 This demonstrates two material facts:
a
Ministerial approval, as the Chief Minister himself chaired the meeting; and
b
Board approval by SMM.
c
SMM's Conditional Approval (Board Meeting No. 12) was once again a conditional approval pending confirmation of non-overlap with Pro Raptor.
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2.9 Confirmation of Non-Overlap On 7.6.2024, Bumi Suria confirmed in writing that the area applied for did not overlap with Pro Raptor’s application.
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2.10 Final Approval (Board Meeting No. 13) Subsequently, at its 13th Board of Directors Meeting, SMM formally approved the Prospecting Licence with the Chief Minister himself chairing the meeting, thereby evidencing his participation in and approval of the decision.”
23
The Plaintiff’s concern or main objection was that Bumi Suria had not yet been awarded the licence as reported in the article; therefore, the allegation was false and untrue.
24
However, it was not disputed that Bumi Suria had once been granted the “kebenaran untuk memohon”, which was later terminated.
25
The other facts that were apparently not disputed were that both the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs were made shareholders and directors of Bumi Suria, by which, later, Bumi Suria was reconsidered to be again “dibenarkan untuk memohon”.
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Hence, Bumi Suria was, in actual fact, awarded the kebenaran untuk memohon; therefore, this is a truthful fact. Moreover, the application went through the proper procedure, or at least allegedly through an adequate one, to procure the “kebenaran”.
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When Bumi Suria was then given a second approval “untuk memohon”, I do not see that these approvals are linked or proven to be linked to any alleged corruption; therefore, I do not see any need to grant a restrictive order to the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs. Perception might suggest the contrary, but this has yet to be determined.
28
Upon perusing the facts narrated and the document tendered, at this juncture, I repeat, at this preliminary stage, this Court is not in a position to decide the whole truth or untruth of the allegations.
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Not even to determine whether the articles published were unarguably defamatory, because the narratives do not seem to be obviously untruthful.
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I am of the opinion that the articles published were not posted out of thin air or proven out of bad intention or malice by the Defendants. There was documentary evidence to support the narrative. Whether it was wrongly construed or understood, the basis was there.
31
This Court is not hearing the matter summarily; it is limited to whether an injunction is proper to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the disposal of the action.
32
Be it “kebenaran untuk memohon” or “was awarded the licence”, this would be the main issue to be explored and determined during the trial, that is, to what extent it is false or otherwise, in order to succeed in the defence of justification.
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I am grateful for counsel for the Plaintiff’s extensive submissions. Still, I am inclined to agree with the Defendants’ contention that an interim injunction should not be granted if the Defendants can justify the alleged defamatory statement at trial. I am also not convinced that the Defendant’s defence would ultimately fail as submitted by the Plaintiff.
34
Based on the above reasons, I find that Plaintiff had not met the threshold requirements for granting an interim injunction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 4 is hereby dismissed with costs of RM5000 to the Defendants. Dated this: 4th December 2025 ~signed~ (NOOR HAYATI BINTI HAJI MAT) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR For the Plaintiffs : Rajan Navaratanam together with Sheena Stephanie Sebastian, Aswath a/l Ramakrishnan and Ezryl Azlyzan Ahmad Damanhuri Messrs Ahmad Deniel, Ruben & Co. For the Defendant : Rajesh Nagarajan together with
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