1. Capital Dynamics Sdn Bhd v Yeap AI Suan @ Cindy Yeap (WA-23NCvC-46-09/2016)

CAPITAL DYNAMICS SDN BHD

CAPITAL DYNAMICS ASSET MANAGEMENT SDN BHD

TAN TENG BOO (NRIC NO. 540211-02-5441) …PLAINTIFFS AND YEAP AI SUAN @ CINDY YEAP (NRIC NO. 780921-01-6024) …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT BRIEF FACTS [1] The 1st Plaintiff is the Investment Adviser icapital.biz Berhad (“ICAP”) which was incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Page 2 of 53 Act 1965 and was licensed by the Securities Commission since 14.4.1989 and; [2] The 2nd Plaintiff is the Fund Manager for ICAP which was incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1965 and was licensed by the Securities Commissions since 22.5.1997. ICAP and the 2nd Plaintiff had entered into a Fund Management Agreement on 6.9.2005; [3] The 3rd Plaintiff is an individual who is both the founder and Managing Director of the 1st Plaintiff and the 2nd Plaintiff. The 3rd Plaintiff is the Designated Person (as defined under the Securities Commission Guidelines for Public Offerings of Securities of Closed-end Funds) appointed by the Fund Manager who is responsible for managing the investments of ICAP. The 3rd Plaintiff is also licensed by various regulatory authorities in Hong Kong, Australia and Malaysia; [4] ICAP was established as a Closed-Ended Fund (“CEF”). CEFs are public companies, which are usually quoted on the stock exchange. The capital structure of CEFs is like any other company, but instead of selling goods and services, its principal business is to invest in the securities of other companies, whether listed or unlisted. ICAP is also the only listed CEF in Bursa Malaysia since 2005 and it has a total of Page 3 of 53 3,537 shareholders as at 29.7.2016. The main business activity of ICAP is to engage in the business of investing in Malaysia Securities or Other Permitted Assets for the purpose of:-

Spreading investment risks; and

Managing a portfolio of investments, to gain revenue and profit for the benefit and on behalf of its shareholders. [5] CEFs are termed “closed” because they have a fixed number of shares in issue at any one time, the prices which will fluctuate according to supply and demand. Buying and selling of shares in the listed CEFs take place through the stock exchange via licensed stockbroking companies. CEFs pool together money for investment and outsource the management of their assets to a fund management company i.e. the 2nd Plaintiff in this case. The fund manager is accountable to the directors of CEF, who are in turn accountable to the company’s shareholders. The Plaintiffs Case [6] On 14.9.2015, the Defendant authored and cause to be published on DIGITALEDGE WEEKLY (“the Article”) which referred to the Plaintiffs with the headline “icapital.biz largest shareholders says fund fee high, to vote down director reappointments”. Page 4 of 53 (refer paragraph 16.1 of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim (“SOC”) at p.40 of Bundle A) [7] In the Article, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant had authored and published defamatory words about the Plaintiffs. By the said words in their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by way of innuendo, and by reason of the publication of the said words in the Article, the Plaintiffs allege that they have been lowered in the estimation of the right thinking members of society. [8] The Plaintiffs plead that overall, the Article as a whole casts negative aspersions on the Plaintiffs in that they mismanaged the fund and thereby caused losses to the shareholders of ICAP and has brought the Plaintiffs into public contempt, incited hatred, anger and frustration amongst shareholders and the investing community, as well as the public at large. The Defendant’s Case [9] The Defendant is a financial journalist and currently a senior editor in corporate and capital markets with The Edge Communications Sdn Bhd. Page 5 of 53 [10] The Defendant authored the Article headlined “icapital.biz largest shareholder says fund fees high, to vote down director reappointments”. [11] In the Article, the Defendant made reference to a letter dated 26.8.2015 from City of London Investment Management Company Ltd (“CLIM’s 2015 Letter”), the largest single shareholder in ICAP, addressed to the directors of ICAP about the ICAP’s performance. The complaint was made public by the London Stock Exchange’s website via Regulatory News Service (“RNS”) as early as 28.8.2015. The Defendant had extracted the letter from the London Stock Exchange’s website and noted from CLIM’s 2015 Letter that CLIM had expressed its intention to vote against the re-election of four of ICAP’s directors at ICAP’s 11th Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) scheduled on 19.9.2015. [12] In the letter, CLIM raised several issues to support its intention to vote against the re-election of ICAP’s directors. One of CLIM’s explanations is that ICAP’s directors did not adequately respond to CLIM’s complaint regarding ICAP’s poor performance and persistently wide discount to Net Asset Value (“NAV”). CLIM had also highlighted issues of ICAP’s performance, cash management, Page 6 of 53 expense ratio and discount control which according to CLIM, have not been adequately dealt with by ICAP’s directors. [13] The Defendant pleads that as a responsible financial journalist, she had written the Article comprising of issues that may be of interest to the shareholders who will be attending the 11th AGM of ICAP and other parties who were interested in ICAP, including matters raised by CLIM. [14] The Article has greater significance since ICAP’s 11th AGM was scheduled on 19.9.2015 in which the subject matter and issues raised were of current concern and would be relevant to the potential shareholders as well as shareholders attending the 11th AGM. The Article raised issues that would have been of interest and provided legitimate questions for shareholders attending ICAP’s 11th AGM. ICAP is a company listed on Bursa Malaysia and hence, its affairs would be of public interest. The Defendant had contacted CLIM before publishing the Article inquiring whether CLIM will be attending the 11th AGM as well as getting CLIM’s feedbacks about ICAP’s performance. [15] The Defendant had taken all reasonable steps to ensure that the information published in the Article was true and accurate and without Page 7 of 53 any malice. The Defendant had considered ICAP’s Prospectus, ICAP’s Annual Reports and other reports and documents. The article was written fairly, without interest and neutral in manner. The analysis made was verified and merely raising questions about ICAP only. The Defendant did not making any allegation or defamatory statements or referring to the Plaintiffs in any way suggested by the Plaintiffs in their Statement of Claim. [16] The Defendant pleads, inter alia, justification, fair comment, qualified privilege and reportage. The Article does not lower the Plaintiffs’ reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person or giving any negative views towards the Plaintiffs or exposing the Plaintiffs towards bad impression of the public, anger or disappointment. The Plaintiffs’ Claim [17] The reliefs the Plaintiffs are claiming against the Defendant in this case are as follows:- a) Damages in the sum of RM6.37 million; b) General damages to be assessed; c) Aggravated damages; d) Exemplary damages; Page 8 of 53 e) An injunction to restrain the Defendant by herself, her servants or agents or otherwise from further publishing or causing to be printed, published or distributed similar words defamatory of the Plaintiffs in the DIGITALEDGE WEEKLY portal and this would include such other media, printed or otherwise; f) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of filing of the Writ of Summons until full settlement of this matter; and g) Costs. ISSUES TO BE TRIED [18] The issues to be tried before the Court: A. Whether the Plaintiffs have proven the 3 elements of defamation required under the law against the Defendant vide the Article:

the words are defamatory;

(ii) the words refer to the plaintiff; and

(iii) the words were published. B. Whether the Defendant has proven her defences of:- I. Justification; II. Fair Comment; III. Qualified Privilege; and IV. Reportage. Page 9 of 53 DECISION OF THE COURT [19] Having heard the evidence given by the Plaintiffs’ and the Defendant’s witnesses, and after considering the submissions of the parties, on the balance of probabilities the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have proven their case against the Defendant. The Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have established a case of defamation against the Defendant. The Defendant on the other hand has failed to prove the defences raised by her. Therefore, the Court allows the Plaintiffs claims as follows:- a) Global sum of RM100,000.00 only for damages; b) An injunction restraining the Defendant by herself, her servants or agents or otherwise from further publishing or causing to be printed, published or distributed similar words defamatory of the Plaintiffs in the DIGITALEDGE WEEKLY portal and this would include such other media, printed or otherwise; c) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the Judgment Sum from the date of filing of the Writ of Summons until full settlement of this matter; and d) Costs of RM20,000 to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs. Page 10 of 53 THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT THE LAW [20] In Halsbury’s Law of England (4th Ed) at p.7, defamatory statement has been defined as follows:- “A defamatory statement is a statement which would tends to lower a person in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to his office, profession, calling, trade or business.” [21] The principles in establishing a claim under libel is well explained by His Lordship Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as he then was) in the case of Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 321 (Rep) where said: “In our law of libel, which is governed by the Defamation Act 1957, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show:

the words are defamatory;

(ii) the words refer to the plaintiff; and

(iii) the words were published.” Page 11 of 53 [22] Therefore, for the Plaintiffs to succeed in the claim for defamation against the Defendant, the Plaintiffs must prove the 3 elements required under the law that:

the contents of the Article is defamatory in nature;

(ii) the defamatory statement in the Article is referring to the Plaintiffs; and

(iii) there is publication of the Article. Whether the Plaintiffs have proven the 3 elements of defamation required under the law against the Defendant vide the Article.

The words complained of are defamatory in nature [23] The Court of Appeal in the case of Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd. [1999] 1 CLJ 461 explained the test to be applied in determining whether the words/statements complained of are defamatory in nature as follows:- “.....the test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the words published in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the Plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or lack of integrity on his part? If the question invites an affirmative response, then the words complained of are defamatory.” Page 12 of 53 [24] In the case of Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’akub v. Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 393 His Lordship Richard Malanjum J (as he then was) states: “As to whether the words complained of in this case capable of being, and were, in fact, defamatory of the plaintiff, the test to be considered is whether the words complained of were calculated to expose him to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man or would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally (see JB Jeyaratnam). Mohamed Azmi J (as he then was) in Sued Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 at p 58 said: Thus the test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, although no one believes the statement to be true. Another test is: would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally? The typical type of defamation is an attack upon the moral character of the plaintiff attributing crime, dishonesty, untruthfulness, ingratitude or cruelty. Page 13 of 53 Words could still be defamatory even if they did not really lower a plaintiff in the estimation of those to whom they were published. The law looks only to its tendency (see JB Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong; Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor).” [25] For better appreciation of the issues with regard to the Article which the Plaintiff allege to be defamatory in nature against the Plaintiffs, it would be appropriate to reproduce the whole Article with its headline as follows:- “icapital.biz largest shareholders says fund fee high, to vote down director reappointments. Paragraph 1 – Another bedroom tussle could be brewing at closed-end fund icapital.biz Bhd (ICAP), which saw the proposed reappointment of its former chairman Tunku Abdul Aziz Tunku Ibrahim shot down last year, despite support from the fund’s designated person Tan Teng Boo, founder and managing director of Capital Dynamics group.

(CLIM), ICAP’s largest shareholder, will vote against the reappointment of the current chairman, Datuk Ng Peng Hong @ Ng Peng Hay, and two other directors at the company’s upcoming annual general meeting (AGM) and investor Day on Sept 19 and 20 respectively at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center. Paragraph 5 – Teng Boo last last year reportedly adjourned ICAP’s AGM from Oct 11 to Nov 30 after learning of CLIM and Laxey Partners Ltd’s intention to vote against Tunku Abdul Aziz’s appointment as he saw the move as a second attempt by Laxey to secure board representation after failing to do so in 2012. Paragraph 8 – In its letter, CLIM also says it is unhappy with the fund management and investment advisory fee, which has arisen from RM5.11 million in FY2011 to RM6.37 million in FY 2015 ended May 31 and has been above RM6 million a year for the past for the past three years. Page 15 of 53 Paragraph 9 – Boards have a duty, in CLIM’s opinion to negotiate competitive fees,” CLIM says, pointing out that ICAP’s expense as a percentage of average shareholder’s equity….. Paragraph 13 – CLIM also says ICAP shareholders in 2015 annual report are given [a] misleading impression of ICAP’s relative performance compared to a total return comparison, which includes dividends received. Paragraph 14 – On a total return basis, ICAP’s NAV return in the 12 months to May 2015 was -4.9%, compared with the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI’s – 3.9%. This underperformance compared to the FBM KLCI is despite ICAP being less than 50% invested in this period. Shareholders are given no explanation of this poor result from stock selection over the year, CLIM says, adding that ICAP’s total return on NAV performance in the five-year period (June 2, 2010 to May 29, 2015) of +43.8% “appears respectable compared to the capital only FBM KLCI’s +35.6% but is profoundly disappointing compared to the FBM KLCI’s total return of +60.4% when dividends are included. Page 16 of 53 Paragraph 15 – It is worth noting that the RM6.37 million in fund management and advisory fee ICAP paid in FY2015 is 60.82% of the fund’s profit after tax (PAT) of RM10.48 million in a year the fund had 63.6% cash holdings and saw a RM21.5 million year-on-year decline in its shareholder equity, ICAP’s audited accounts show. Paragraph 17 – It is worth noting that the reason ICAP’s shareholder equity fell in FY 2015 despite ICAP making PAT of RM10.48 million, is that the fund has since FY2010 adopted FRS139 fair value accounting, under which its investment are deemed “available-for-sale financial assets” which are carried at market value rather than historical cost. Paragraph 18 – That means that the RM8.28 million net gain on investment disposal that was booked in ICAP’s top line would not significantly boost shareholder equity because it was already recognized in the fair value reserves. Prior to FY2010, ICAP’s shareholder equity gained the same amount as the net profit it made and fell the same amount as its net loss. Page 17 of 53 Paragraph 19 – The recognition of sizeable fair value gains in FY2010 and FY2011 was why ICAP’s shareholder equity jumped from RM234.8 million in FY2010 to RM388.23 million in FY2011 and NAV per share jumped from RM2.10 on May 31, 2010 to RM2.77 on May 31, 2011. This is important because ICAP’s investment advisory fee and management fee amount to 1.5% of the fund’s NAV per year, and are payable quarterly. Capital Dynamics Asset Management Sdn Bhd (CDAM) is ICAP’s fund manager and investment adviser. Paragraph 21 – “Investors are advised to consider the fees and charges before investing in icapital.biz,” read the prospectus of ICAP, which made its then Main Board debut nearly a decade ago with a RM140 million fund size on Oct 19, 2005. In other words, the fees are legitimate and will continue in writing by CDAM or ICAP. According to its prospectus, ICAP can terminate CDAM’s appointment as investment adviser with shareholders’ approval by way of special resolution. Paragraph 22 – In fact, CDAM’s Teng Boo said in ICAP’s 2013 annual report “if by resigning the sustainable intrinsic value of Page 18 of 53 your fund [ICAP] would be increased, I would be the first to retire. My message was that we would do whatever is humanly possible to protect the long term interests of share owners. Paragraph 26 – For one, not only did ICAP’s shareholder equity fall RM21.55 million year on year, it recognized RM2.39 million impairment loss on investment in FY2015, higher than its first impairment loss of RM513,988 recognised in FY2014. Paragraph 27 – In addition, ICAP recognized RM26.15 million fair value loss in FY2015, its first since FY2015 when fair value accounting was adopted. Paragraph 28 – There is also a marked increase in the amount ICAP spends on AGM expenses and advertisements. Between RM60,000 a year, before going up to RM135,000 in FY2010, RM420,737 in FY2011 and RM795,000 in FY2012. Paragraph 29 and 30 – Since FY2013, ICAP disclosed the amount spent on advertising as well as what it spent on AGM and “other” expense alone was RM708,202 while AGM expense was RM451,578 and “other” expenses of RM123,897 Page 19 of 53 brought the tally of the year to RM1.28 million. In FY2015, advertisement, AGM and “other” expenses fell to RM406,751, RM417,303 and RM148,146 respectively, but the total tally was still RM972,200 – sizeable considering that it was 4.5% of RM21.81 million revenue and 9.3% of 10.42 million PAT. Paragraph 31 – While Teng Boo says 1 ½ -day AGM and Investor Day ICAP Organizes is a form of corporate social responsibility exercise to raise public awareness of value investing, shareholders might want to ask how the fund’s spending compares to what its manager spends on the same effort and how the spending fits the closed ended fund’s goal. Paragraph 32 – In its letter, CLIM also notes that ICAP’s prospectus included a narrative on tools available to boards to narrow or eliminate the discount [to NAV], including share re-purchase, open-ending (converting ICAP into an open–end fund) and liquidation. This section also referred to the possible replacement of existing management, without saying whether it intends to push for any of those moves. Page 20 of 53 Paragraph 33 – When contacted, CLIM’s spokeman said the company did not have anything to add to what it had already said. Paragraph 34 – Converting ICAP from a closed-end to open-end structure, like that of a unit trust, means investors can sell shares back to the fund manager, who redeems them at NAV, ICAP’s prospectus read. As a shareholder can only hold up to 20% equity interest in a closed-end fund like ICAP, a hostile takeover attempt is difficult. ‘But that also means no single party has voting control and shareholders can exert their influence over the direction and affairs of the closed-end fund’, the prospectus read. (refer paragraphs 16.1 to 16.22 of the SOC at pp. 40-45 of Bundle A) [26] The crux of the complaint of the Plaintiffs in the Article written by the Defendant is on the issue of excessive expenses spent by ICAP. Reading the Article in its entirety, the Plaintiffs contend that the Article in their natural and ordinary meaning is defamatory in nature. The Plaintiffs in Paragraph 17.1 of the Statement of Claim state:- Page 21 of 53 “Firstly, the Plaintiffs state that the Article must be read in its entirety to appreciate the full effects of the defamatory statements made by the Defendant”. [27] Reading the headline of the Defendant’s Article itself where it states “icapital.biz. largest shareholders says fund fee high, to vote down directors reappointments” in the opinion of the Court, will give a bad impression about high fund fee being charged to ICAP by the Plaintiffs. Going through the Article as a whole, the Court finds that the Defendant’s reporting of the expenses spent by ICAP is excessive, is clearly unjustified and has put an impression to the investors or potential investors or anyone reading it, that the Plaintiffs have caused ICAP to spend excessively. The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs’ contention that the Defendant’s attempt to justify the various figures from the Annual Reports misses the point altogether. The innuendo of the Defendant on the issue of expenses is that ICAP has incurred excessive expenses due to the Plaintiffs. [28] The Defendant could have easily sought clarification from the Plaintiffs the purpose of the expenses but from the evidence it is clear that she has failed to do so. The Plaintiffs argue that even the Defendant’s expert, Mr David Meow (SD2) was able to cite the Page 22 of 53 benefits of the Investor Day from the 2015 Annual Report which was spent. The failure of the Defendant to seek clarification from the Plaintiffs on the expenses, in the Court’s view, only proves that the Defendant was careless in her reporting and contrary to what she has claimed. [29] Going through the facts and evidence, and upon close reading of the Article, the Court finds that the Defendant had selectively highlighted the expenses of Investor Day without reporting the benefits of Investor Day and thus insinuating that the Plaintiffs are spending ICAP’s money unnecessarily. Reading the Article in its entirety would clearly show that the Defendant had taken the initiative to contact City of London (“CLIM”), one of the shareholders from the 3,537 shareholders of ICAP as at 29.7.2016 which was based in London but did not even attempt to contact any of the Plaintiffs who are based in Malaysia. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that the Defendant has failed to conduct extensive research before producing her Article. [30] There is no doubt that the defamatory statements authored by the Defendant in the Article have cast imputation of the competency and qualifications of the Plaintiffs to act as Investment Adviser, Fund Page 23 of 53 Manager and Designated Person of ICAP. Reading the Article as a whole, one cannot deny that what the Defendant is trying to say is that the Plaintiffs are incompetent, unqualified and irresponsible in acting in those capacities for ICAP. [31] The Article dated 14.9.2015 in the Court’s opinion was cynical and when read in their context as whole, in their natural and ordinary meaning is undeniable defamatory of the Plaintiffs. The words complained of are capable of giving the expression or were understood to mean that the Plaintiffs were dishonest, irresponsible, incompetent and lack of integrity. Further, the Defendant also admits that she has made the following mistakes in the Article:- i. at paragraph 17 of the Article regarding ICAP’s adoption date of FRS 139 (NOP 16.7.2018, page 36); ii. at the right side of the article, the bottom table, where it stated FRS 136 instead of FRS139 (NOP 12.6.2018, page 42) and (NOP 12.6.2018, page 77); iii. at paragraph 19 of the Article where it was stated that CDAM is ICAP’s Fund Manager and Investment Advisor (NOP 16.7.2018, page 48) and (NOP 12.6.2018, page 26-27, NOP 16.7.2018, page 110); Page 24 of 53 iv. at the right side of the article, the bottom table at the writer states ”9.3% of 10.42 million PAT” however at the same Article at paragraph 15, she states “10.48 PAT” (NOP 16.7.2018, page 79); v. at paragraph 1 of the Article regarding the designation of Tunku Abdul Aziz Tunku Ibrahim (NOP 16.7.2018, page 8); vi. at paragraph 20 of the Article, about the missing additional number “RM6.2 million” which is the fund management and investment advisory fee for 2014 (NOP 16.7.2018, page 32); vii. at paragraph 16, failing to correctly state that the share price is at a discount to NAV (NOP 16.7.2018, page 33); viii. on the issue of the Plaintiffs were unreasonably charging high fees. This insinuation of the Defendant here is clearly erroneous since the fees have been fixed in the Prospectus and is determined by the Net Asset Value (NAV) and the Defendant has admitted that she had access to the Prospectus (NOP

16.7.2018, Page 132) but failed to make proper and sincere reporting with regard to this issue; ix. the Defendant failed to make the proper comparisons on this issue by equating ICAP (being a Closed Ended Fund) with a Page 25 of 53 normal company (Paragraph 17.11 Statement of Claim). Thus giving a wrong measure of ICAP’s performance and making a false representation that Plaintiffs’ fees are high; x. the Defendant has also wrongly insinuated that adoption of FRS 139 by the Plaintiffs has caused to increase the Net Asset Value of ICAP when she said in Paragraph 17; and xi. the Defendant has failed to mention in the Article that the FRS 139 is a mandatory requirement implemented in the Malaysian Accounting Standard Boards. xii. the Defendants have attempted to justify the accuracy of the Article in reference to various documents such as the Annual Reports and Prospectus. [32] From the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that the words complained of by the Plaintiffs in the Article disparage the Plaintiffs’ reputation and in the Court’s view are defamatory in nature as enunciated in the cases cited above.

(ii) The words in Article dated 14.9.2015 refers to the Plaintiffs [33] For the Plaintiffs to be successful in their defamation claim against the Defendant, the Plaintiffs must furnish an answer to satisfy the Court that the words or statements complained of referred to the Page 26 of 53 Plaintiffs. This requirement of law is explained by His Lordship Lim Beng Choon J in the case of The Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v. The New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 365 where he said: “It is an essential element of the cause of action for defamation that the words complained of should be published ‘of the plaintiff’. The test which the plaintiff has to furnish an answer to satisfy the court whether the words would reasonably in the circumstances lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to.” [34] Going through the Article, the Court is satisfied that the Defendant in her Article dated 14.9.2015 had clearly refers to the Plaintiffs as follows:- i. The Article contains the photograph of the 3rd Plaintiff. The name of the 3rd Plaintiff was stated below the photograph. It was stated in Paragraph 1 of the Article that the 3rd Plaintiff is the “fund’s designated person”; ii. In Paragraph 19 of the Article, the Defendant has referred to the 2nd Plaintiff as ICAP’s Fund Manager and Investment Advisor; Page 27 of 53 iii. The headlines of the Article referred to “fund fees high”. In the context of the Article, “fund fees high” paid by ICAP can only be taken to mean the fund fees payable by ICAP to the Plaintiffs. Also the headline of the article refers to “icapital.biz” where the 1st Plaintiff is the investment advisor; iv. In other words, a third person reading the Article would understand that the Article refers to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs’ witnesses, SP2, Mr Loh Hong Pai had testified that the Article did attempt to run down icapital.biz Berhad, its Designated Person, Fund Manager and Investment Advisor; and v. The role of the three Plaintiffs have been set our clearly and equivocally in the Prospectus (pages 441, 480, 486 and 487 of ICAP’s Prospectus Bundle E, Volume 4). In Paragraph 21 of the Article, the Defendant has made express reference to ICAP’s prospectus, she therefore ought to have known of the Plaintiffs roles in ICAP.

(iii) There is publications of the words complained of [35] In the case of S Pakiananthan v. Jenni Ibrahim & Another Case [1998] 1 CLJ 771; [1998] 1 CLJ (Rep) 233, the Supreme Court held: Page 28 of 53 “In order to constitute publication, the defamatory matter must be published to a third party, and not simply to the Plaintiff. By publication is meant the making known of the defamatory matter, after it has been written, to some person other than the person of whom it is written.” [36] In the present case, this element of defamation is not disputed since the Defendant herself (SD1) has admitted that her Article was in fact sent to 16,000 subscribers. [37] Based on the above reasons, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have fulfilled the 3 elements for defamation as required under the law. As such, the burden now shifts to the Defendant to prove otherwise. THE DEFENDANT’S DEFENCES [38] Whether the Defendant has proven her defences of:-

Justification;

(ii) Qualified Privilege;

(iii) Reportage; and

(iv) Fair Comment. For the Defendant to succeed in her defence against the claim made by the Plaintiffs, the Defendant has to prove that the words Page 29 of 53 complained of in the alleged defamatory statements consist of statements of fact, they are true in substance and in fact, and it is justified as it is a fair comment and reporting on a matter of public interest. The Defence of Justification [39] On the defence of justification, in the case of Irene Fernandez v. Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 2 CLJ 814 it was held: “In a defamation action, the defence of justification is complete defense if it succeeds.” [40] The Defendant states that from the 3rd Plaintiff’s own testimony there were a lot of appreciation emails sent to him after the publication of the Article in “digitaledge WEEKLY” on 14.9.2015. Therefore, the Defendant contends that the business, image and reputation of the Plaintiffs remain the same even after the publication of the Article. Until today the 3rd Plaintiff continues to be the Designated Person for ICAP. The Securities Commission which is the regulatory body that regulates ICAP continues to invite the 3rd Plaintiff to speak at its events. The Plaintiffs’ witness, Mr. Loh Hang Pai (“PW-2”) also during his cross-examination had testified that although he had read the Article, he did not sell his shares in ICAP. Page 30 of 53 [41] Therefore, the Defendant avers that it proves that the shareholders of ICAP were not affected by the contents of the Article or the words complained of and the Plaintiff in so far as the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs are concerned, they have not suffered any loss. They were not terminated as the investment adviser and fund manager of ICAP or stripped of any of their licence either in Malaysia or abroad. [42] Further, the Defendant alleges that the Plaintiffs filed an action against the Defendant as the author. The Plaintiffs have chosen not to sue Asia Analytica Data Sdn Bhd as the publisher of the Article. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the Article which contains the words complained of had in fact been published by the Defendant. The Plaintiffs’ witness, Mr. Loh Hang Pai (PW-2) merely testified that the Article was given to him by his son who is an investor in ICAP but it is not clear who forwarded the Article to his son. All that was proven was that she wrote the Article. It is not sufficient for the Plaintiffs to prove “publication” merely because the Defendant wrote the Article. [43] It is the Defendant’s contention that that the Plaintiffs had not been lowered by the alleged publication of the Article. She avers that the Plaintiffs have failed to adduce any cogent evidence to justify or show Page 31 of 53 that the Article or the words complained of had lowered the Plaintiffs in the estimation of right thinking members of the society or injure their reputation in office or expose them to hatred, contempt or ridicule or cause them to be shunned or avoided. [44] To support her contention the Defendant alludes that the 3rd Plaintiff had during examination-in-chief testifies that a number of appreciation emails from a number of individuals who had thanked him for his hard work for ICAP and the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs. Some of the emails were sent to him after the publication of the Article which confirmed that the Article did not affect his standing. The Defendant’s counsel had cross-examined the 3rd Plaintiff on a number of other appreciation emails which were also sent to him after the publication of the Article which was admitted by the 3rd Plaintiff. [45] The Defendant contends that the business, image and reputation of the Plaintiffs remain the same even after the publication of the Article. Until today the 3rd Plaintiff continues to be the Designated Person for ICAP. The Securities Commission which is the regulatory body that regulates ICAP continues to invite the 3rd Plaintiff to speak at its events. The Plaintiffs’ witness, Mr. Loh Hang Pai (“PW-2”) also during Page 32 of 53 his cross-examination testifies that although he had read the Article, he did not sell his shares in ICAP. [46] Going through the facts evidence of the case and upon considering the submissions by the parties, the Court is of the opinion that the Defendant’s contention could not hold water. Just because the Plaintiffs appointment as the investment adviser and fund manager of ICAP have not been terminated or stripped of any of their licence either in Malaysia or abroad it does not mean that they have not been defamed by the Defendant. In defamation cases, the claimant need not necessary proved any losses, what is relevant to be proven is that the impugned statement is capable of conveying the defamatory meanings as pleaded and that words complained of are defamatory in nature. [47] For the above reasons, the Court holds the Defendant’s defence of justification unacceptable and is therefore rejected. It is worthy to also note that the Defendant admits there were various mistakes in the Article. The errors / mistakes as stated earlier in the opinion of the Court are quite substantial and as such did not reflect the true facts of the Plaintiffs in the eyes of the public. The Defendant expert witness’ evidence is also of not much help as he has failed to identify what Page 33 of 53 was written by the Defendant i.e. the words complained of by the Plaintiffs consist of statements of fact, that they are true in substance and in fact (NOP 31.7.2018, PG.140-147). As such, the Defendant in this case has clearly failed to comply with the requirement under Order 78 rule 3 (2) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) where it provides:- “Obligations to give particulars. (O.78, r.3)

Where in an action for libel or slander the plaintiff alleges that the words or matters complained were used in a defamatory sense other than their ordinary meaning, he must give particulars of the facts and matters on which he relies in respect of such sense.

Where in an action for libel or slander the defendant alleges that, in so far as the words complained of consist of statements of fact, they are true in substance and in fact, and in so far as they consist of expressions of opinion, they are fair comment on a matter of public interest, or pleads to the like effect, he must give particulars stating which of the words complained of he alleges are statements of fact and of the facts and matters Page 34 of 53 he relies on in support of the allegation that the words are true.

Where in an action for libel or slander the plaintiff alleges that the defendant maliciously published the words or matters complained of, he need not in his statement of claim give particulars of the facts on which he relies in support of the allegation of malice, but if the defendant pleads that any of those words or matters are fair comment on a matter of public interest or were published upon a privileged occasion and the plaintiff intends to allege that the defendant was actuated by express malice, he must serve a reply giving particulars of the facts and matters from which the malice is to be inferred.

This rule shall apply in relation to a counterclaim for libel or slander as if the party making the counterclaim were the plaintiff and the party against whom it is made the defendant.” (Emphasis added) [48] The Court also observes that the expert had made substantial mistakes in his report and also made substantial contradictions in his oral evidence (NOP 31.7.2018, pg.148, 157, 164, 168, 173). With regard to the fund fee, he agrees that the Plaintiffs’ claim of 1.5% Page 35 of 53 fees from ICAP is not high as mentioned in his report “1.5% is common in Malaysia” (NOP 31.7.2018, pg.138). [49] On the issue of the defence of justification, His Lordship Richard Malanjum J (as he then was) in the case of Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’akub v. Bre Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393 had this to say: “In a defamation action, the defence of justification is a complete defence if it succeeds. And the question of malice or bad faith does not arise. But in order to succeed in the defence of justification a defendant must establish the truth of all the material statements in the words complained of which may include defamatory comments made therein. And in order to justify such comments, it is necessary to show that the comments are the correct imputations or conclusions to be drawn from the proved facts. However, the plea of justification does not fail ‘by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation having regard to be truth of the remaining charges’ (see s. 8 of the defamation Act 1957 and Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66). It is also to be Page 36 of 53 noted that partial justification may be useful in the mitigation of damages. Of course, the standard of proof required is on the balance of probabilities, and the burden of establishing the defence of justification is on a defendant. There is no burden on a plaintiff to prove that a defamatory statement is false. The presumes that the defamatory words are false.” (Emphasis added) [50] From the above, the Court finds the Defendant in this case has failed to show that the comments are the correct imputations or conclusions to be drawn from the proved facts as the Article contained substantial mistakes in her report and therefore has failed to establish the truth of all the material statements in the words complained of. The Defence of Qualified Privilege [51] The Defendant in this case argues that this matter is of “public and general concern” (Paragraph 8.2 of the Amended Statement of Defence at p 232 of Bundle A1), hence her Article is of “public interest”. Going through the Article as a whole, the Court is of the opinion that it is not of public interest as it contains numerous Page 37 of 53 mistakes and the Defendant herself admits to the mistakes that she has made when giving evidence in Court. The Court also rejects her defence of qualified privilege as the Court finds that the mistakes made by the Defendant are capable of giving unreasonable interpretation on the Plaintiffs’ reputation and would give the imputations that the Plaintiffs were dishonest, irresponsible, incompetent and lack of integrity. In Paragraph 33 of the Article that she has contacted CLIM’s spokesman on whether he has anything to add to the Article. The Defendant actually did not contact any of the Plaintiffs nor CLIM to seek confirmation of the Article. This would clearly indicate that she was malicious. [52] It is worthwhile to mention that the Defendant has previously published three (3) unfavourable Articles against the Plaintiffs on 8.11.2012 (Bundle C at pp. 149-150), 20.11.2012 (Bundle M at pp. 5- 6) and 2.12.2013 (Bundle C at p 155). Referring specifically to the Article on 2.12.2013, the 3rd Plaintiff has also E-mailed a response to the Managing Editor of the Edge Group Mr Shanmugam Murugasu. Despite the response given by the Plaintiffs then, the Defendant has continued with the unfavourable dan defamatory Article in the present suit. Page 38 of 53 [53] In Paragraph 6 of the Article, the Defendant had irresponsibly quoted CLIM that CLIM “is not and never has acted in association with any other ICAP shareholder”. However, in the Defendant’s previous Article dated 20.11.2012 as stated above shows otherwise. In the said article, the Defendant reported “The London-based hedge fund seen aligned to activist investor Laxey Partners Ltd…” and “While City of London had kept mum on the matter, Pegge told reports Laxey had been in communication with City of London…”. Contrary to what was written by the Defendant in the Article, she clearly knew that CLIM had acted in association with Laxey Partners, who was then one of ICAP’s substantial shareholders in 2012, and yet she misled the readers in her malicious manner. If the Defendant had done extensive research as claimed in her Amended Defence before publishing the Article, she would have found that CLIM and Laxey Partners had worked together to liquidate Amanah Milenia Fund Berhad in 2007. In fact, if she had responsibly checked, considered and corroborated the information published in her Article, she would have known that there is an article published by her own colleague from The Edge, a Ms Charlotte Chong, who wrote an article titled ‘City of London strengthens its hold on icapital.biz’ on 1.12.2014 Page 39 of 53 which confirmed that CLIM was working in association with Laxey Partners. The article reads, “Together with British activist hedge fund Laxey Partners Ltd, City of London now holds 11.74% in icapital.Biz, signifying that the two parties now form an even stronger alliance to act against the company’s Board of Directors. Already, the two parties have voted out a resolution to reappoint Tunku Abdul Aziz Tunku Ibrahim as a director of icapital.biz…”. The Defence of Reportage [54] With regard to the defence of reportage which is also known as the Reynolds privilege defence i.e. a defence available to anyone who publishes any material of public interest in any medium as enunciated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v MKINI DOTCOM Sdn Bhd & Ors [2018] 1 LNS 62 where it states: “The Reynolds privilege defence is a defence available to anyone who publishes any material of public interest in any medium. The defence is two-staged or two-pronged. First, the public interest test has to be satisfied. Once that is satisfied, the inquiry then shifts to whether the Respondents acted reasonably in publishing in impugned words. The second test Page 40 of 53 has been described as “responsible journalism” – see Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Kee [2015] 6 MLJ 187, para 34. The focus inter alia whether steps had been taken to verify, gather and publish the information in a responsible and fair manner. In Bonnick v Morris [2002] UKPC 1 at [23],; [2002] 12 BHRC 558 at [23],; [2003] 1 AC 300, Lord Nicholls stated that “the Reynolds privilege is concerned to provide a proper degree of protection for responsible journalism when reporting matters of public concern. Responsible journalism is the point at which a fair balance is held between freedom of expression on matters of public concern and the reputations of individuals. Maintenance of this standard is in the public interest and the interests of those whose reputations are involved. It can be regarded as the price journalist pay in return for the privilege.” [55] The Reynolds privilege propounded by the House of Lords in the case of Reynolds v Times Newspaper Ltd and others [2001] 2 AC 127; [1999] 4 ALL ER 609 where the test is as per the oft-cited ten-points (10) list:- “Depending on the circumstances, the matters to be taken into account include the following. The comments are illustrative Page 41 of 53 only.

The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 2. The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public concern. 3. The source of the information. Some informants have no direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories. 4. The steps taken to verify the information. 5. The status of the information. The allegation may have already been the subject of an investigation which commands respect.

The urgency of the matter. 7. Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may have information others do not possess or have not disclosed. 8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story. 9. The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements of facts. 10. The circumstances of the publication, including timing. The list is not exhaustive. The weight to be given to these and any other relevant factors will vary from case to case. Any disputes or primary fact will be a matter for the jury, if there is Page 42 of 53 one. The decision on whether, having regard to the admitted or proved facts, the publication was subject to qualified privilege is a matter for the judge. This is the established practice and seems sound. A balancing operation is better carried by a judge in a reasoned judgment than by a jury. Over time, a valuable corpus of case law will be built.” [56] Relying on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (supra), the Court finds that the Defendant has not met the two-staged or two-pronged test under the Reynolds privilege defence as adopted by His Lordship Zawawi Salleh J (as he then was) in the case of Sivabalan a/l P Asapathy v. The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [2010] 9 MLJ 320. The Defendant in this case has failed in the First Test to prove that the Article concerned a matter of public interest as the Article contained numerous errors and substantial mistakes as mentioned earlier. [57] With regard to the Second test on the ten factors set out in case of Reynolds (supra) by Lord Nicholls, from the evidence, it is not disputed that the Defendant has also failed to take reasonable steps to call the Plaintiffs to verify the information before publishing the said Article. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that the Defendant has also Page 43 of 53 failed to prove the ten-points (10) factors which are illustrative and not exhaustive and the Court is to give weight to these and other factors, and that it will vary from case to case. Going through facts and evidence, the Court is satisfied that the Defendant has not met with the 4th, 7th and 8th requirements as the Defendant admits that she did not take make any efforts or steps to call the Plaintiffs for any verifications on the Article especially when some of the information should have be reported in full not in part for a better understanding of the facts about the Plaintiffs’ activities and responsibilities. The failure on the part of the Defendant to seek the proper verifications from the Plaintiffs has resulted in the Article carrying false information about the Plaintiffs as it is full of errors or mistakes which eventually cast defamatory imputations on the Plaintiffs. From the Article it is clear that the Defendant has failed to seek any comments from the Plaintiffs. Hence, the Plaintiffs’ side of the story was not represented in the Article at all. The Defendant only relied on CLIM’s complaints and her own interpretation of the financial information contained in the Annual Reports of ICAP without the Plaintiffs’ side of the story or comments. Page 44 of 53 [58] With regard to the 1st, 9th and 10th requirements of the ten-points test, the Court is of the view that the tone of the Article indeed had raised questions on the Defendant’s capabilities and competency as a responsible journalist. Reading the Article closely one could not help but feel uneasy and have reservation on the Plaintiffs’ reputation especially the headline of the Defendant’s Article itself states “icapital.biz. largest shareholders says fund fee high, to vote down directors reappointments” which in the opinion of the Court, is capable of giving a bad impression about high fund fee being charged to ICAP by the Plaintiffs. Going through the Article as a whole, the Court finds that the Defendant’s reporting of the expenses spent by ICAP is excessive, is clearly unjustified and has put an impression to the investors or potential investors or anyone reading it, that the Plaintiffs have caused ICAP to spend excessively. It is evidenced that no reasonable steps were taken by the Defendant to verify the information from the Plaintiffs hence misleading the public on the information in the Article. [59] In addition, the Article was written very close to the AGM in terms of timing. This was done to incite the shareholders to remove the Plaintiffs during the upcoming AGM which was only few days after the Page 45 of 53 Article was published. There is also no doubt that the allegations in the Article were serious as the Plaintiffs would face the risk of losing their licences as fund manager and investment advisor, as the licences are regulated by the Securities Commission. The Court is satisfied that the Defendant’s irresponsible and reckless act of reporting vide her Article has the effect to lower the Plaintiffs’ reputation in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society generally or cause the Plaintiffs to be shunned or avoided or exposed the Plaintiffs to hatred, contempt or ridicule. The Defence of Fair Comment [60] For the Defendant to succeed in her defence of fair comment, the Defendant has to establish the following:-

that the words complained of are comments, although they may consist of or include inferences of fact;

the comments are on a matter of public interest;

the comments are based on facts; and

the comments are one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved. (see Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’akub (supra)) Page 46 of 53 [61] The Defendant must show that the words complained of are comment, and not a statement of fact. She must also show that there is basis of fact for the comment contained in her Article. Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th Ed defined fair comment as follows:- “More accurately it has been said that the sense of comment is ‘something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc.’ Per Cussen J in Clark v. Norton [1910] VLR at 499.” Having perused the Article in its entirety, the Court could not conclude that the Defendant’s Article can be said to be of public interest due to numerous errors or mistakes made by the Defendant, and that the Defendant has also failed to get the Plaintiffs’ verification as discussed earlier in the other head of defences of the Defendant. As such, the Court finds the defence of fair comment raised by the Defendant baseless and rejects it. Damages [62] The Plaintiffs in this case are claiming against the Defendant general and aggravated damages only (p 42 of Hujahan Bertulis Plaintif-Plaintif (Selepas Perbicaraan Penuh) & p 8 of Hujahan Bertulis Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif (Selepas Perbicaraan Penuh). Page 47 of 53 [63] On the issue of damages His Lordship Malanjum J (as he then was) in the case of Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’akub (supra) at p 416 said: “It is settled law that a libel action, the general rule is that damages are assessed on a compensatory basis. However, in certain circumstances, exemplary damages, or punitive damages as they are otherwise described may be awarded. Compensatory damages may include not only actual pecuniary loss and anticipated pecuniary loss or any social disadvantage which result, or may be thought likely to result, from the wrong which has been done. They may also include the natural injury to his feelings – the natural grief and distress which he may have felt at having been spoken of in defamatory terms, and if there has been any kind of high-handed, oppressive, insulting or contumelious behavior by the defendant which increases the mental pain and suffering caused by the defamation and may constitute injury to the plaintiff’s pride and self-confidence, these are proper elements to be taken into account in a case where the damages are large.” Page 48 of 53 General Damages [64] In a defamation case, it is trite that a plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damage since the injury need not necessarily be confined to loss of income but to the loss of goodwill and reputation. In determining an appropriate quantum of general damages, the factors to be taken into consideration by the Court are as follows:- a) the position and standing of the plaintiff; b) the gravity and seriousness of the libel; c) the mode and extent of the publication; d) the mental distress, hurt, anxiety and mental anguish caused to the plaintiff as a result of the libel; e) the uncertainty undergone in litigation; f) the conduct of the defendant from the time of the libel down to the very moment of the verdict; and g) the absence or refusal of any correction, retraction or apology. (see Datuk Seri Utama Dr Rais Bin Yatim v. Amizudin Bin Ahmat [2012] 2 MLJ 807; Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (supra) and MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [1995] 2 MLJ 493). Page 49 of 53 [65] The 1st Plaintiff is the Investment Adviser icapital.biz Berhad (“ICAP”) which was incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1965 and was licensed by the Securities Commission since 14.4.1989, the 2nd Plaintiff is the Fund Manager for ICAP which was incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1965 and was licensed by the Securities Commissions since 22.5.1997 and the 3rd Plaintiff is an individual who is both the founder and Managing Director of the 1st Plaintiff and the 2nd Plaintiff, and also the Designated Person (as defined under the Securities Commission Guidelines for Public Offerings of Securities of Closed-end Funds) appointed by the Fund Manager who is responsible for managing the investments of ICAP, in the opinion of the Court have been injured by the Article written by the Defendant which has been circulated to 16,000 subscribers as admitted by the Defendant herself. [66] The words complained of by the Plaintiffs in the Article written by the Defendant is undeniable defamatory of the Plaintiffs. Reading the Article as it entirety, would only cast the imputation that the Plaintiffs are incompetent, unqualified and irresponsible in acting as Investment Adviser, Fund Manager and Designated Person of ICAP. Such defamatory allegations by the Defendants against the Plaintiffs Page 50 of 53 in the Court opinion is serious and damaging to the Plaintiffs’ reputation. As such, the Plaintiffs in this case deserve to be awarded general damages for the unethical, careless and reckless conduct of the Defendant. [67] Aggravated Damages The Federal Court in the case of Mohd Ridzwan Abdul Razak v. Asmah Hj Mohd Nor [2016] 6 CLJ 346 said: “[76] In appropriate cases, substantial damages may be awarded for any indignity, discomfort or inconvenience suffered; even aggravated damages may be awarded in light of the motive or conduct of the tortfeasor (Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 at 1221-23 (HL); W v. Meah [1986] 1 All ER 935).” The law is trite that a company may sue in libel to protect its reputation and the company need not necessarily be confined to loss of income but to the loss of goodwill and reputation as enunciated in the case of Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC

Page 51 of 53 [68] On the practice of global award by the courts in defamation cases, the Court of Appeal in the case of Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v. Chua Jui Meng [2005] 3 MLJ 494 has this to say: “There is one matter of some importance that this case has raised. It appears to be the respondent’s argument that separate awards for aggravated and exemplary damages should be made. That is what the High Court did. With respect, we disagree with approach. For many years it was thought that all cases of tort global awards should be made, including in claims for personal injuries. However, only in respect of claims for personal injuries, when courts started awarding interest at different rates on the different heads of damages, it became necessary for courts to make separate awards for pain and suffering and loss of amenities, actual loss of income, future loss and special damages. But in defamation cases it is never a practice to award interest on each separate head of damages. Interest is merely granted on the single award. In our judgment, we should, in defamation cases, maintain the age old practice of making a global award in order to limit the size of awards. Otherwise we will have runaway damages once again. The speech of Lord Hailsham in Cassell Page 52 of 53 v. Broome appear to fairly support the view we take of the matter.” (Emphasis added) [69] Taking all the facts and the circumstances of this case, and relying on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut (supra), the Court is of the view that a separate award for general and aggravated damages is not necessary and that a global award of damages would be more appropriate to be awarded to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court is mindful to grant a global award of damages to the Plaintiffs in the sum of RM100,000.00 together with interests and costs. Dated 7th December 2018 …………………………………… (ROHANI BINTI ISMAIL) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER CIVIL HIGH COURT (NCvC 8) KUALA LUMPUR Page 53 of 53 Mr. Annou Xavier, Mr. Robin Lim Fang Say and Ms. Larissa Ann Louis (Counsels for the Plaintiffs/Appellants) Messrs Azri, Lee Swee Seng & Co. Advocates and Solicitors Mr. Abdul Rashid Ismail and Ms. Siti Nurani Md Zahidi (Counsels for the Defendant/Respondent) Messrs rashid zulkifli