1.CCH v Pendaftar Besar bagi Kelahiran dan Kematian, Malaysia (01(f)-35-11/2020(W))

1.

ADY (On behalf of themselves and as Litigation Representatives of one CYM, a child) …Appellants And Pendaftar Besar bagi Kelahiran dan Kematian, Malaysia …Respondent Coram: Tengku Maimun binti Tuan Mat, CJ Nallini Pathmanathan, FCJ Mary Lim Thiam Suan, FCJ Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal, FCJ Rhodzariah binti Bujang, FCJ JUDGMENT OF THE COURT INTRODUCTION [1] This appeal concerns essentially the question of the entitlement of a child, who was abandoned at birth and later adopted, to Malaysian citizenship by operation of law. 2 [2] The two appellants in this case are CCH and ADY. In addition to being joint litigation representatives, the first appellant is the adoptive father and the second appellant the adoptive mother of their adopted child CYM. For ease of reference we shall refer to both adoptive parents as the ‘appellants’, and to CYM as the ‘Child’. We have redacted their names in order to maintain anonymity. [3] The respondent is the Registrar-General of Births and Deaths of Malaysia, a department that operates under the purview of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Malaysia. [4] This case began when the appellants filed an application for judicial review against the respondent in the High Court seeking for the following reliefs: “1. A declaration that [name redacted], a child (“Child”) is a citizen of Malaysia by operation of law by virtue of his birth within the Federation of Malaysia pursuant to Article 14(1)(b), Part II section 1 paragraph (e) and section 2(3) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution;

A declaration that the Child is a citizen of Malaysia by operation of law by virtue of his lawful adoption by the Applicants pursuant to the Order for adoption dated 20.7.2017 made by the Pulau Pinang High Court in Adoption No. PA-34-3-01/2017, read with sections 9 and 25A of the Adoption Act 1952 and Article 14(1)(b) and Part II section (1) paragraph (a) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution;

An order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Respondent of 21.9.2017 to issue the birth certificate (Register No: 00019676, Serial No.: 001692XA) dated 21.9.2017 (‘Birth Certificate’) of the Child and signed by the 3 Respondent which registers the Child as a non-citizen (bukan warganegara) instead of a citizen of Malaysia;

An order of mandamus directing the Respondent to reissue the birth certificate of the Child to register the Child as a citizen of Malaysia;

… [prayer for costs] …

Such further Orders and/or directions as may be given or made as this Honourable Court deems fit and just in the circumstances.”. [5] For ease of comprehension and unless otherwise stated, all references in this judgment to ‘Articles’ and ‘Second Schedule’ are to that of the Federal Constitution (‘FC’). Similarly, and unless otherwise stated, any references to Part II or Part III are to that of the Second Schedule of the FC. BACKGROUND FACTS Preliminaries [6] The facts of this appeal are as gleaned and modified from the judgments of the Courts below, submissions of parties and the affidavits and other cause papers filed in the judicial review application. [7] The fulcrum of the judicial review application in this case is the decision of the respondent dated 21.9.2017 to issue a birth certificate (‘3rd Birth Certificate’) to the Child stating that the Child is not a citizen of Malaysia. The reason why we call it the ‘3rd Birth Certificate’ is adumbrated below. 4 General Context [8] From the narrative provided by the appellants in their affidavits filed in the High Court, the salient facts can be summarised thus. [9] Sometime in January 2004, the appellants were informed by a friend of theirs that a baby boy (the Child) was born and abandoned at Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras. The appellants jointly decided that they would adopt the Child and named him CYM. [10] According to the appellants, they were under the impression that they had formally adopted CYM. As such, when they completed the forms and provided information to the respondent, they represented themselves as the Child’s biological parents. The respondent accordingly issued the appellants with the Child’s birth certificate on 20.2.2004 (‘1st Birth Certificate’). [11] Sometime in April 2016, the Child turned twelve years old and like is usually the case with all parents, the appellants applied to the National Registration Department (‘NRD’) for a MyKad for the Child. The NRD declined to issue a MyKad to the Child. [12] The appellants state that in the process of applying for the MyKad, the NRD officer who inspected the Child’s 1st Birth Certificate, apparently noted some inaccuracies in their names. This was either between the appellants and the Child or between the appellants’ children (that is the Child and another female child that the appellants had earlier adopted – with the initials TYS). 5 [13] The appellants averred that TYS is another child who they believed to have formally adopted (before CYM) under their name but who was actually placed under the guardianship and care of a couple loosely called Mr and Mrs Tan. Going strictly by what has been averred in the affidavits, we assume that TYS took her surname from Mr Tan even though her actual ‘parents’ as recorded in her birth certificate appear to be the appellants. The appellants have not exhibited TYS’s birth certificate as proof of this fact but we have no reason to disbelieve it as the respondent did not aver anything to the contrary and considering that the respondent has access to the records and documents necessary to rebut these facts. [14] Thus, from our understanding and following the logical flow of the facts as recounted by the appellants, the respondent had reason to believe that the appellants were not the biological parents of the Child because when they inspected the Child’s 1st Birth Certificate, they noticed a difference in surnames between TYS and the Child. [15] Our understanding of the above facts is derived from the averments in the appellants’ affidavit in reply dated 12.4.2019 (RR, Volume 2, page 160): “4.8 We were subsequently investigated by an NRD officer in respect of the accuracy of our names on the Child’s 1st Birth Certificate. We subsequently understood from the NRD officer that the Child has not been formally adopted.

4.9 During the course of the investigations, we informed the NRD officer that TYS has also not been formally adopted.”. 6 [16] As a matter of fact, we noticed a similar discrepancy as well. In their earlier mentioned affidavit of 12.4.2019, the appellants refer to their said adopted daughter as TYS – T being the surname of Mr Tan. However, in the corrective form that the appellants filed leading up to the issuance of the 2nd Birth Certificate, the appellants listed their adoptive daughter in the ‘Family Information’ segment of the corrective form as CYS, the ‘C’ being the surname of CCH. See: The correction form located in RR, Volume 3, page 400). [17] The respondent has not really explained the actual reason that made them realise and inquire into the fact that the appellants are not the Child’s biological parents. The only thing we have to go by is a very general statement in the only affidavit filed by the respondent dated 22.3.2019, as follows (as translated into English): “5.3. In 2016, the Child’s birth certificate was withdrawn after an investigation by the National Registration Department revealed that the Applicants are not the birth parents of the Child.”. [18] In any case, in that affidavit of 12.4.2019, the appellants went on to aver that the NRD officer explained to the appellants that they (the appellants) would have to surrender the 1st Birth Certificate so that a new birth certificate could be issued for the Child stating the correct facts of parenthood. [19] The appellants complied, surrendered the 1st Birth Certificate and accordingly on 3.11.2016 were issued with a new birth certificate for the Child (‘2nd Birth Certificate’). 7 [20] The 2nd Birth Certificate, most crucially, recorded the Child’s parents’ information as ‘not available’ (‘maklumat tidak diperoleh’) and the Child’s citizenship status as ‘yet to be determined’ (‘belum ditentukan’). The 3rd Birth Certificate and the Filing of the Judicial Review Application [21] Dissatisfied with the details (or lack thereof) contained in the 2nd Birth Certificate, the appellants sought legal advice from their present solicitors and were accordingly advised that they ought to formally adopt the Child. The appellants thus filed an originating summons in the High Court in Malaya at Penang in case number PA-34-3-01/2017 (‘Adoption Summons’). [22] On 20.7.2017, the learned Judicial Commissioner who heard the Adoption Summons was satisfied that the appellants were fit and proper persons to be declared the adoptive parents of the Child. His Lordship, after the usual process of hearing from the Welfare Department and completing the standard procedures, pronounced the following final orders (translated into English) which we think are pertinent to reproduce (‘Adoption Order’): “1. That CCH and ADY be given the power to adopt CYM [Birth Certificate No: redacted] (‘the Child’) (referring to the 1st Birth Certificate) pursuant to the Adoption Act 1952 (‘the said Act’).

That the Registrar of Births and Deaths of Malaysia is directed to make an entry to record this adoption in the Register of Adoption in the Form contained in First Schedule to the Act, pursuant to section 25(2) of the said Act, as per Annexure A. 8

That the Registrar of Births and Deaths of Malaysia is directed to issue a Birth Certificate to the Child under the said Act.

That the Registrar of Births and Deaths of Malaysia is directed not to enter the words “adopted child” or any other words with the same connotation in the Birth Certificate of the Child.

That the Plaintiffs (the present appellants) be given leave to retain the name of the Child as CYM, and to register the Child’s name as CYM in the Birth Certificate.

That the Birth Certificate of the Child [Birth Certificate No.: redacted] (referring to the 2nd Birth Certificate) be surrendered to the Registrar of Births and Deaths of Malaysia.”. [23] In Annexure ‘A’ of the Adoption Order, under the header ‘Date and State of Birth of the Child’, it is recorded as a fact that the Child was born on 31.1.2004 at Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras. [24] Armed with the Adoption Order, the appellants again made their way to the NRD and reapplied for a new birth certificate for the Child. On 21.9.2017, the respondent issued the 3rd Birth Certificate (Exhibit A-7 of CCH’s Affidavit dated 11.12.2017 filed in Support of the Judicial Review Application (RR, Volume 3, page 389). [25] The material differences between the 3rd Birth Certificate and the 2nd Birth Certificate are as follows: 9 i) The information in the column on ‘status of citizenship’ was changed from ‘yet to be determined’ to ‘non-citizen’ (‘bukan warganegara’); ii) The colour of the birth certificate was changed from greyish-green (the colour coding for citizens) to pinkish-red which is the colour coding for non-citizens; iii) The status of father and mother were changed from ‘information not obtained’ to CCH (father) and ADY (mother) respectively. [26] The primary issue the appellants have with the changes made in the 3rd Birth Certificate is that the Child was essentially rendered a non-citizen and since he is not a citizen of any other country, effectively stateless. [27] The underlying purpose of their judicial review application and thus this appeal is therefore to seek declaratory relief and related orders to the effect that the Child is entitled to citizenship by operation of law. [28] A material fact to take note of is that the appellants have averred, and the respondent cannot appear to suggest otherwise, that the citizenship status and identities of the Child’s biological parents in this case are completely unknown. See paragraph 1.4 of the Statement filed by the appellants pursuant to O.53 Rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012. The 2nd and 3rd Birth Certificates are also reflective of this fact. 10 The Material Constitutional Provisions [29] After reading and hearing the written and oral submissions respectively of parties, we respectfully concluded that the arguments taken were essentially the same as the ones advanced and decided in the Courts below. [30] Before delving into the arguments, we find it necessary to first set out the constitutional provisions material to this appeal as follows: “Article 14 (Citizen by operation of law)

14.

(a) …

(b) every person born on or after Merdeka Day, and having any of the qualifications specified in Part II of the Second Schedule… Article 31 (Application of Second Schedule)

Until Parliament otherwise provides, the supplementary provisions contained in Part III of the Second Schedule shall have effect for the purposes of this Part. … SECOND SCHEDULE … 11

Subject to the provisions of Part III of this Constitution, the following persons born on or after Malaysia Day are citizens by operation of law, that is to say:

(a) every person born within the Federation of whose parents one at least is at the time of birth either a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation; and… …

(e) every person born within the Federation who is not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this paragraph.

(1) …

For the purposes of Part I or II of this Schedule any new born child found exposed in any place shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been born there of a mother permanently resident there; and if he is treated by virtue of this section as so born, the date of the finding shall be taken to be the date of the birth.”. Submissions and Decisions of the Courts Below [31] The appellants’ contentions in the Courts below can be summarised as follows. [32] Firstly, the appellants appeared to argue that the Child is entitled to citizenship under section 1(e) of Part II. It was suggested that the said section 1(e) which is only qualified by section 2(3) of Part II, section 19B and other related sections were inserted by the constitutional amendments effected through the Malaysia Act 1963 to guard against statelessness. Learned counsel essentially argued that because the Child was born an abandoned child, there is no proof that he is a citizen of any other country and is thereby entitled to citizenship under section 1(e). [33] On this issue, the Courts below found, based on previously decided cases that in order to fulfil the requirements of section 1(e), the applicant must show that his or her birth parents are not citizens of any other country. 13 [34] In the present case, the respondent, in refusing to accord the Child citizenship under that provision deposed exactly that. In his affidavit in reply dated 22.2.2019, the then Director-General of NRD cum Registrar-General of Births and Deaths deposed as follows (as translated into English): “8. … I state that the said Child (referring to CYM) was registered as a non-citizen as there was no credible evidence of the birth of the Child specifically information relating to the citizenship status of his birth parents.” [35] The second argument advanced by the appellants was that the Child ought to be accorded citizenship pursuant to section 1(a) of Part II. The appellants contended that the words ‘parents’ in that section ought to be construed liberally to include adoptive parents. They further argued that provisions of the Adoption Act 1952 which confer full legal rights on adoptive parents and which extinguish all legal connection to the biological parents, ought to be read into section 1(a). [36] The High Court and the Court of Appeal rejected this argument. Both Courts were guided by earlier precedents of the High Court and the Court of Appeal which have held that section 1(a) must be construed having regard to the words ‘at the time of birth’. As such, the Courts below were of the view that the word ‘parents’ means biological parents and is essentially incapable of being stretched to mean ‘adoptive parents’. Further, reliance cannot be placed on ordinary law to interpret provisions of the FC which reigns supreme. 14 Proceedings in the Federal Court [37] In light of the above arguments and the decisions rendered thereupon, the appellants sought leave to appeal to this Court. The five questions (‘Leave Questions’) which were allowed are these: “Question 1 Whether a child who (i) was born in Malaysia and (ii) did not acquire citizenship of any other country within one year from his date of birth, is a citizen of Malaysia by operation of law pursuant to Article 14(1)(b) and Part II Section 1(e) and Section 2(3) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution? Question 2 Whether Part II Section 1(e) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution requires a child to prove the identity of his/her biological parents and/or that they are not foreign citizens? Question 3 Whether the word “parents” in Part II Section 1(a) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution should be given a restrictive interpretation to mean only the child’s biological parents? Question 4 Whether a certificate of birth issued under Section 25A of the Adoption Act 1952 shall pursuant to subsection (5) “for all purposes be known as the Certificate of Birth of the child” and pursuant to subsection (6) “shall be received without further or other proof as evidence” of the child’s parents for the purposes of Article 14(1)(b) and Part II Section 1(a) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution? 15 Question 5 Whether a birth certificate which has been “surrendered” to the Registrar-General of Births and Deaths pursuant to Section 25A(1)(b) of the Adoption Act 1952 and “replaced” by a new birth certificate issued pursuant to section 25A(5) of the Adoption Act 1952, can still be referred to by the Registrar General of Births and Deaths or the courts for the purposes of determining the child’s “parents”?”. OUR DECISION/ANALYSIS Whether the Child is Entitled to Citizenship by Operation of Law The Scope of the Arguments [38] We begin our analysis by recording our gratitude to learned counsel for the appellants, Dato’ Dr Cyrus Das, for his efforts in meticulously taking us through the legislative history leading up to the insertion of the provisions of sections 1(e) and 2(3) of Part II and section 19B of Part III into the FC. Without expressly setting out those provisions, we accept that the speeches and debates that took place in Parliament in respect of those amendments clearly establish that the purpose of their insertion was to guard against statelessness. We also commend learned counsel for the arguments he advanced on section 1(a) in relation to the interpretation of the phrase ‘parents’ therein appearing and how it includes ‘adoptive’ parents. [39] That said, one will notice that we have taken great pains to state the facts of this case in as much detail as possible. After considering the facts of this case in light of the submissions made, we are of the considered 16 view that none of the Leave Questions need be considered or answered. This is because the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case do not call for such deliberation. [40] During the hearing of this case, we queried counsel for the appellant on whether section 19B of Part III ought to be read together with section 1(a) of Part II. He conceded that such a reading was possible. We also asked the same question of learned Senior Federal Counsel (‘SFC’) Shamsul Bolhassan and he accepted the same though he took issue with the facts i.e. that he is unable to concede that the Child was in fact abandoned. We shall address that issue later. [41] It is trite that while concessions of fact bind parties, concessions of law do not. This is a Court of law and just because parties concede that something is or is not law, that itself does make it the legal position. On issues of law, Courts are always required to apply their own judicial minds and reasoning to determine points of law quite without regard to parties’ concessions on them. We shall therefore proceed to deliberate on the application of section 1(a) of Part II read alongside with section 19B of

Subject to the provisions of Part III of this Constitution, the following persons born on or after Malaysia Day are citizens by operation of law, that is to say:

(a) every person born within the Federation of whose parents one at least is at the time of birth either a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation; and… Section 19B of Part III:

For the purposes of Part I or II of this Schedule any new born child found exposed in any place shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been born there of a mother permanently resident there; and if he is treated by virtue of this section as so born, the date of the finding shall be taken to be the date of the birth.”. [Emphasis added] [43] Dato’ Dr Cyrus Das referred us to the dissenting judgment of this Court in CTEB & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 236 (‘CTEB’) where it was stated that Part III which contains enabling provisions is meant to aid or assist in the interpretation of Parts I and II, and not to qualify or conditionalise the application of Parts 1 and II to Part III. The dissenting judgment had commented on section 19B of Part III, as follows: “[65] Both ss 19A and 19B of Part III are constitutional presumptions as to births. Section 19A codifies in part the international principle of flag state jurisdiction and applies in relation to persons who are born on a vessel such that their birth there is attributed to the place of registration of the vessel. Section 19B applies in relation to children who are found abandoned in 18 any given place such that the place of abandonment is treated as their place of birth and where their mother is also permanently resident there. [66] All the above sections, namely ss 17, 19, 19A and 19B exist as supplementary or filler sections — so to speak — to supplement or to close any gaps or to resolve technicalities that may arise when the person’s parents’ identity is in issue or even if their own place of birth is in issue so long as that is a relevant question for the purposes of Part I or Part II respectively.” [Emphasis added] [44] The principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis as well as the principles on how the FC was drafted to enable citizenship as broadly as possible while weeding out statelessness have been discussed in great length by the minority of this Court in CTEB (supra). We adopt the reasoning there as part of this judgment being the only other decision of the Federal Court apart from this one, to our knowledge, to have touched on this issue most recently. [45] Before proceeding to examine section 19B with those principles in mind, we seek to remind ourselves of other important concepts on constitutional interpretation. [46] Citizenship no doubt is governed by Part III of the FC, but it is also a concept so inextricably linked to the right to life and personal liberty contained in Article 5(1). As such, any provisions on it must be construed as widely as possible. [47] Having said that, we are completely mindful of the following warning by Abdoolcader J (as he then was) in Merdeka University Berhad v Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356, at page 360: 19 “I said in Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116… that the Constitution is not to be construed in any narrow or pedantic sense (James v Commonwealth of Australia) [1936] AC 578… but this does not mean that a court is at liberty to stretch or pervert the language of the Constitution in the interests of any legal or constitutional theory, or even, I would add, for the purpose of supplying omissions or of correcting supposed errors.” [Emphasis added] [48] The Courts have always had to do battle with these two conflicting principles. On the one hand, it is said that the Judiciary cannot purport to usurp the role of the Legislature. On the other hand, it is said that the Judiciary must be proactive to protect fundamental rights. No matter the argument, we are constantly reminded of these fears and/or duties by both sides taking their respective positions in constitutional cases. Where do we draw the line between these two extremes? [49] We believe that the answer to the question has been discussed an innumerable amount of times with the most recent being CTEB (supra). The starting point is the understanding that fundamental rights and provisions must be construed as broadly as possible. Next, provisions which limit those rights must be construed as narrowly as possible. Finally, judicial precedent must play a lesser part when construing constitutional provisions. One cannot afford to be pedantic or cling helplessly to tabulated legalism. [50] When construing a word or words in the FC protective of or guaranteeing a fundamental right, the Court should give their widest possible meaning without changing or warping the ‘base’ meaning. And when construing interrelated provisions, the Court should read them as a whole having regard to the purpose and intent of those provisions and 20 harmonise their collective meaning rather than put them at odds with another. [51] With the above principles in mind, we now come to section 1(a) of Part II and section 19B of Part III. [52] Section 1(a) of Part II very clearly adopts the concepts of jus soli (citizenship based on birth place) and jus sanguinis (citizenship based on blood relation). Section 19B in turn contains two presumptions – one of which relate to jus sanguinis. [53] The operative words in section 19B are ‘any new born child found exposed in any place’. The purpose of this section, when read in context, must be to cover new born children who are left and discovered in a place without any trace of their biological parents. We take judicial notice of the harsh realities of life: this includes new born children left abandoned near dumpsites, baby hatches, public or school toilets, places of worship and so on. A literal meaning of ‘exposed’ suggests a new born child who was ‘discovered’ exposed at any of these locations. [54] As such, the broadest possible interpretation of the word ‘found exposed’ is to accord it a meaning to include a child abandoned at the place of birth by the birth mother whose identity is unknown. The operative word ‘exposed’ in section 19B must therefore encompass the plight of abandoned new born children, otherwise the overarching intent of preventing statelessness would be defeated or rendered illusory. [55] In the present case, we took pains to emphasise that throughout the course of this case, it has been an accepted fact that the Child is an 21 abandoned Child who was born in Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras. This fact was acknowledged in the Adoption Order and in the 3rd Birth Certificate. During the hearing, learned SFC disagreed with the application of section 19B to the facts of this appeal, suggesting that the appellants had actively concealed facts, that the identity of the biological parents is known or discoverable but kept hidden. [56] The simple answer to that assertion is this. The follow up words in section 19B are contained in the phrase ‘until the contrary is shown’. Meaning, any person who claims that the child was not ‘found exposed’ or otherwise abandoned by the mother as the case may be, bears the burden of showing the identity of the mother and more importantly, that the mother is not permanently resident at the place of the finding. [57] Evidence-wise, the answer to this predicament is in the recent judgment of this Court in Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 181 (‘Rosliza’) which deals with proof of negative facts. It is quite illogical in this appeal to expect the appellants to show that they do not have knowledge of the biological parents or the mother at least. This is what the appellants averred in their affidavit in reply dated 12.4.2019: “4.5 In January 2004, we were informed by a friend that a baby boy (the Child) has been born and abandoned at Hospital University Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras. We decided to adopt the Child and named him CYM…” [58] There is nothing in the evidence, as far as we have examined it, to suggest that the appellants were lying about the fact of abandonment. According to section 19B therefore, the burden of showing that the Child’s 22 mother was not permanently resident at the place of finding rests on the respondent. Given that the Child was born in the said Hospital, surely the respondent has the means to verify from the Hospital’s admission records, the identity of the Child’s biological mother, if not the father. Therefore, as the record stands, the respondent has not been able to discharge that burden. No affidavit has been deposed nor a modicum of evidence adduced to suggest that the narrative provided by the appellants is inherently incredible or even false or untrue. [59] This leads us now to the final portions of section 19B. Once it is shown or averred that a new born child is ‘found exposed’ (or abandoned), two things are presumed, that is:

(i) that the child is born to a mother who is permanently resident at the place where the finding was made (the jus sanguinis presumption); and

An order of certiorari to quash the decision of the respondent of 21.9.2017 to issue the birth certificate (Register No: 00019676, Serial No.: 001692XA) dated 21.9.2017 (“Birth Certificate”) of the Child and signed by the Respondent which registers the Child as a non-citizen (bukan warganegara) instead of a citizen of Malaysia; and

An order in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondent to reissue the birth certificate of the Child to register the Child as a citizen of Malaysia”. [76] As alluded to earlier, in light of our findings above, the Leave Questions are academic and as such they do not require our further deliberation. Dated: 19th November 2021 signed (TENGKU MAIMUN BINTI TUAN MAT) Chief Justice, Federal Court of Malaysia. 28 List of Counsel For the appellants: Dato’ Dr Cyrus Das (with him Raymond Mah, Jasmine Wong and Eric Toh) [Messrs. Mah Weng Kwai & Associates] For the respondent: Shamsul bin Bolhassan SFC (with him Mazlifah binti Ayob) [Attorney General’s Chambers of Malaysia] Watching Brief – Bar Council Low Wei Loke and Larissa Ann Louis DHRRA Rani Sreedharan