(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which, in the opinion of the Court, would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter. [Emphasis added] [32] The presence in Order 15 rule 6[2][b] of the ROC 2012 of these words- “to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon” and “any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which, in the opinion of the Court, would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party” S/N j4x/o8KJakuS87zbnAN8bA show that the Courts can, in a proper case, allow a person to be added as a defendant even when the person will not be legally affected by the subsequent judgment in the said suit, but will only be affected commercially. [33] Support for this broad-based approach can be seen from this passage of the Privy Council’s grounds in Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52 PC Lord Diplock at page 56 - The cases illustrate the great variety of circumstances in which it may be sought to join an additional party to an existing action. In their Lordships' view one of the principal objects of the rule is to enable the court to prevent injustice being done to a person whose rights will be affected by its judgment by proceeding to adjudicate upon the matter in dispute in the action without his being given an opportunity of being heard. To achieve this object calls for a flexibility of approach which makes it undesirable in the present case, in which the facts are unique, to attempt to lay down any general proposition which could be applicable to all cases. [Emphasis added] [34] Indeed, the Singapore courts have similarly considered applications to intervene under their Singapore Rules of Court Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) and (ii), which are pari materia with our Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) and (ii) ROC 2012, by construing whether the facts come within the words of Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) and (ii). S/N j4x/o8KJakuS87zbnAN8bA [See Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 4 SLR 25 Singapore Court of Appeal, Chao Hick Tin JA at (18) and Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] SGCA 60; [2016] 1 SLR 915 Singapore Court of Appeal, Sundaresh Menon CJ at [39]]. [35] Access to justice is one of the main pillars of a vibrant democracy. If a person comes to Court to apply to be added as a defendant in a suit, his application should be viewed favourably unless it is clear he is a “busybody” in law or mala fide in his application. After all, court litigation is expensive and time-consuming. No one will want to voluntarily be embroiled in a litigation unless he or she is clearly aggrieved. [36] With that, I now apply the law to the facts of this case. Application to Facts [37] In my view, an application to be added as a defendant in a suit will be allowed if serious charges of fraud and attacks on character are made on the Proposed Intervener in the Statement of Claim of the plaintiffs even if no reliefs are claimed against the Proposed Intervener by the plaintiffs. [38] The Proposed Intervener is perfectly entitled to say “I want to come in and defend my reputation as well as to defend against liabilities which will accrue to me if there are findings against me by the judge in the suit. Why should I leave my honour and good name as well as potential liabilities to be defended by counsel for the other defendants, no matter S/N j4x/o8KJakuS87zbnAN8bA how eminent as in this case, when their duties are owed to other defendants and not me?” [39] In the instant case, in my view it is right that Low Beng Choo be allowed to intervene in the suit to defend her good name and reputation as well as against liabilities which will accrue to her if there are adverse findings against her by me in the suit. [40] As a senior lawyer, her good name and reputation is her bread and butter. Any adverse findings on her at the trial is also likely to result in a complaint of misconduct against her to the Disciplinary Board and this can lead to her being struck off the rolls. [41] I am aware of the following passage of the Privy Council in Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52 PC where Lord Diplock at page 56 said “While their Lordships agree that the mere fact that a person is likely to be better off financially if a case is decided one way rather than another is not a sufficient ground to entitle him to be added as a party…” [emphasis added]. The passage is not applicable here as Low Beng Choo’s case is that she will to be worse off financially. [42] I am also conscious of the fact that in Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 4 SLR 25 Singapore Court of Appeal, where the material facts are roughly similar to the case before me, Chao Hick Tin JA speaking for the Singapore Court of Appeal refused intervention by two advocates and solicitors in a complaint lodged by S/N j4x/o8KJakuS87zbnAN8bA Wee Soon Kim Anthony to the Law Society of Singapore against the two advocates and solicitors. [43] The facts are as follows. The complaint was lodged against two advocates and solicitors, namely, Davinder Singh SC and Hri Kumar. The gist of the complaint relates to the preparation of affidavits for clients in relation to judicial proceedings and which affidavits allegedly contained false statements. The two solicitors argued that they were entitled to intervene pursuant to Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i), namely, that they are persons whose presence before the court is necessary to ensure that all matters in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. [44] The Singapore Court of Appeal refused to allow intervention on the ground that the solicitors are neither persons who ‘ought to be joined’ as parties, nor is their presence ‘necessary’ to ensure that all matters in the cause may be effectually and completely determined, within the meaning of Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) of the Rules of Court. The hearing of the application could quite properly proceed without the presence of the two solicitors. While they have an interest in the outcome of the application, an adverse decision by a judge in such an application does not mean that the solicitors’ rights are affected. All it means is that the solicitors must explain themselves formally before the disciplinary committee (See [17]). [45] The Singapore Court of Appeal judges furnished the following reasoning in support of their decision - S/N j4x/o8KJakuS87zbnAN8bA [28] As this court noted in Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 2 SLR 145, Pt VII of the Act sets out an elaborate scheme on how a complaint against a solicitor should be dealt with, with emphasis on objectivity and transparency and the need for maintaining the highest standards of professionalism and integrity. This can be seen from the fact that the Act allows the complainant, should the conclusion of the IC or the DC be in favour of the solicitor concerned, to apply to the High Court for a review of the decision. There is no corresponding facility accorded to the solicitor should the decision of the IC or DC be against him. But of course, if the IC should decide that the complaint warrants a formal investigation by the DC, the solicitor would have the opportunity to respond before the DC. Similarly, if the DC should find that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under s 83, the solicitors would have the opportunity to challenge that finding before the court of three judges. [29] It cannot be disputed that the solicitor complained against has an interest in the outcome of an application made by a complainant under s 96. It is also understandable why the solicitor may wish to intervene in that proceeding even though it is quite unnecessary for him to do so. But it is altogether another thing to say that there is a necessity for him to do so, a need of such a gravity that the court should invoke its inherent jurisdiction. The intervention in such a situation by the solicitor may or may not be of assistance to the court. After all, the report of the IC, with all the necessary annexes, would be before the court when it considers the application. Besides counsel for the complainant/applicant making submission, counsel for the Law Society would also be heard in response, the latter no doubt seeking to support the recommendation S/N j4x/o8KJakuS87zbnAN8bA of the IC and the decision of the Council. Even if the solicitors should be allowed to intervene, what their counsel would seek to do would really be no more than what the Law Society’s counsel would be doing. Thus, we hold that the circumstances do not warrant the court invoking its inherent jurisdiction. [Emphasis added] [46] In my respectful view, Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 4 SLR 25 Singapore Court of Appeal has taken a rather restrictive view of Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) of the Singapore Rules of Court, which are pari materia with our Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) of the ROC 2012. The decision should, with respect, be confined to the facts of that case. [47] As I have said earlier above, access to justice is one of the main pillars of a vibrant democracy. If a person comes to Court to apply to be added as a defendant in a suit, his application should be viewed favourably unless it is clear he is a “busybody” in law or mala fide in his application. After all, court litigation is expensive and time-consuming. No one will want to voluntarily be embroiled in a litigation unless he or she is clearly aggrieved. [48] Furthermore, much harm can happen from the time intervention is denied till the lawyer have his day in Court, to use an English idiom. In these days of social media, a person, i.e. Low Beng Choo may well suffer irreparable harm if not allowed to intervene now to defend herself but to await her day in the Disciplinary Board or in a subsequent suit where she is named as a defendant. S/N j4x/o8KJakuS87zbnAN8bA All parties affected by a court order must be made parties to the suit [49] A further legal principle that supports Low Beng Choo’s application to be added as a defendant is the principle that “All parties affected by a court order must be made parties to the suit.” [50] This principle can be seen from the Court of Appeal decision in Saujana Resort (M) Bhd v Chin Cheen Foh & Ors And Another Appeal [ 2021] 3 CLJ 71 CA which held at [41] - It is trite that in an application for declaration, all parties who would potentially be affected by such an order must be before the court. An action for a declaration is an important device for ascertaining and determining the rights of parties. And it is settled that when a declaratory order is sought, all interested parties must be before the court. See dicta of Viscount Maugham in London Passenger Transport Board v. Moscrop [1942] AC 332 at 345 (HL) which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v. Kajing Tubek & Ors And Other Appeals [1997] 4 CLJ 253 p. 282 vide Lord Radcliffe’s observation in Ibeneweka v. Egbuna [1964] 1 WLR 219, p.