Chek Zaharah Binti Awang v Yahaya Bin Baharom Wakil Di Sisi Undang-undang Harta Pusaka Puan Binti Saman (KA-22NCvC-12-03/2023)

CHEK ZAHARAH BINTI AWANG

NOOR AZIAH BINTI ABDUL KARIM (NO. K/P: 750817-02-5054) --- PLAINTIFFS

YAHAYA BIN BAHAROM (Legal Representative of the estate of

ZAKARIA BIN BAHAROM (NRIC NO: 580130-02-5323) 28/04/2026 22:30:16 KA-22NCvC-12-03/2023 Kand. 89

YAHAYA BIN BAHAROM (Personal Representative of the estate of

YAHAYA BIN BAHAROM (Personal Representative of the estate of

YAHAYA BIN BAHAROM (Personal Representative of the estate of

DISTRICT LAND ADMINISTRATOR OF YAN, KEDAH --- DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (After trial) Introduction [1] This case presents a classic clash between equitable principles and strict statutory compliance, centring on a half-century-old Surat Perjanjian Jual Tanah Kebun Getah (Sale and Purchase Agreement) dated 20 June 1972 (“the 1972 Agreement”). It is a generational dispute wherein the descendants of the original purchaser seek to enforce an equitable right against the successors-in-title of the original registered proprietor. [2] The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive reliefs, alongside an order for specific performance, to compel the transfer of a parcel of land known as GM 4309, Lot 8796, Mukim Sala Besar, Daerah Yan, Kedah ("the said Land") to the estate of the late Haji Saad bin Haji Haron. The 1st to 6th Defendants vigorously and fiercely oppose the claim, mounting a multi-pronged defence rooted in the Plaintiffs' alleged lack of locus standi, the indefeasibility of their registered title, and the strict application of the Limitation Act 1953. Brief Facts of the Case [3] The genesis of this dispute traces back to 20 June 1972, when the late Haji Saad bin Haji Haron ("Haji Saad") entered into the 1972 Agreement with Mek binti Saad, Baharom bin Saad, Kaltum binti Saad, and Ahmad bin Awang Kechik—the predecessors of the 1st to 6th Defendants. [4] The agreed purchase price for the said Land was RM800.00, of which a sum of RM600.00 was paid by Haji Saad and acknowledged by the vendors. Pursuant to the express terms of the agreement, specifically Clauses 1(b) and 1(i), Haji Saad was permitted to enter, clear, and occupy the said Land immediately upon the execution of the agreement. It is undisputed that Haji Saad and, subsequently, the Plaintiffs have continuously occupied and cultivated the said Land since 1972. [5] Following Haji Saad’s demise in 1977, the Plaintiffs—who are the lawful beneficiaries of his estate—retained possession of both the said Land and the original title deed. [6] The catalyst for the present litigation occurred decades later. On 4 January 2023, the 2nd Defendant (SD1) expressly informed the 2nd Plaintiff that the Defendants intended to take back the said Land. Shortly thereafter, on 6 January 2023, representatives of the 4th Defendant forcefully entered the said Land to clear a portion of it for the purpose of constructing a house. This unequivocal threat to their long-standing possession prompted the Plaintiffs to issue a notice of demand on 12 February 2023, culminating in the filing of this suit. Issues to be Determined by the Court [7] Based on the pleadings and the agreement of the parties, the core issues calling for this Court's determination are:

(a) Whether the Plaintiffs, in the absence of Letters of Administration, possess the requisite locus standi to commence this action.

(b) Whether the 1972 Agreement dated 20 June 1972 is a genuine, valid, and enforceable contract of sale.

(c) Whether the Plaintiffs' claim is statute-barred by the Limitation Act 1953 and/or the doctrine of laches.

(d) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance, and

(e) Whether the Defendants' registered title is defeasible. Decision and Findings of the Court [8] Upon a holistic evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses, the documentary evidence adduced, and the meticulous written and oral submissions by all parties, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have successfully proven their case on a balance of probabilities. [9] This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have the necessary locus standi under the established exceptions in law, that the 1972 Agreement is a valid and enforceable contract of sale, and that the Plaintiffs’ rights as purchasers in continuous possession insulate their claim against the defence of limitation. Consequently, the Plaintiffs' claim is allowed, and the Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed with costs. [10] In arriving at this decision, this Court has subjected the entirety of the evidence—both oral and documentary—to maximum judicial evaluation and visual appreciation. Mindful of the appellate principles enunciated by the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin v Lee Ing Chin [2004] 2 MLRA 1 (quoted by the court in Yeng Chong Realty Bhd v Edward Stanislaus De Silva & Ors [2025] 2 MLJ 214 cited by the Defendant) and Cergas Tegas Sdn Bhd v SAP Holdings Bhd [ 2013] 8 CLJ 745, this Court has had the distinct, inestimable advantage of observing the demeanour, candour, and partisanship of the witnesses in the box. This Court finds the testimonies of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses to be inherently consistent, credible, and wholly corroborated by the contemporaneous documentary trail. Conversely, the Defendants’ witnesses offered narratives that were repeatedly contradicted by the factual matrix on the ground, rendering their defence inherently improbable. A. The Issue of Locus Standi [11] The 1st to 6th Defendants mounted a formidable threshold objection, arguing that since no letters of administration had been extracted for the estate of Haji Saad, the Plaintiffs lack the legal capacity to sue. The Defendants relied heavily on Section 59 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 and authorities such as Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1977] 4 CLJ 393, positing that beneficiaries possess no transmissible estate capable of supporting litigation. [12] The Defendants forcefully argued that the Plaintiffs were legally incompetent to maintain this action as they were 'legal strangers' to the estate. Relying on Dato' Ramesh Rajaratnam v Datin Zaleha Abd Rahman & Ors [2014] 5 CLJ 669 and Amir Hamzah Amir v Normadiah Osman [2024] MLRHU 1603, the Defendants contended that no beneficiary possesses a legal or equitable title in an unadministered estate prior to the issuance of letters of administration. They further asserted that the Plaintiffs ought to have utilised the specific procedural mechanism under Order 15 Rule 6A of the Rules of Court 2012 to appoint a representative for the estate, as demonstrated in Poraviappan Arunasalam Pillay v Periasamy [2015] 4 MLRA 275. [13] While it is a trite and cardinal rule that only a legally appointed personal representative may generally sue on behalf of an estate, this rule is not absolute. The Federal Court in Al-Rashidy Kassim & Ors v Rosman Roslan [2007] 3 CLJ 361 carved out a crucial exception, holding that beneficiaries possess "at least an equity in the estate" entitling them to commence legal action when "special circumstances" exist, specifically to protect and preserve the assets of the estate from imminent loss or dissipation. [14] This Court also accepts the Plaintiffs’ submission that the reliance on Dato' Ramesh Rajaratnam (supra) is incomplete as it ignores the crucial second limb of the Federal Court’s ruling in Al-Rashidy (supra). The Federal Court explicitly held that beneficiaries "have at least an equity in the estate of the deceased to entitle them to seek a declaratory judgment". [15] This Court finds that the factual matrix of the present case falls squarely within the Al-Rashidy (supra) exception. The Plaintiffs did not institute this action for personal gain or to enforce a newly minted contract. They acted in direct response to the events of January 2023, when the Defendants unequivocally threatened their possession and physically encroached upon the land to clear it for construction. The Plaintiffs had to act swiftly to seek injunctive and declaratory reliefs to preserve the status quo of the estate's assets. To hold that they must wait for the extraction of letters of administration while bulldozers raze their ancestral land would be an affront to the very equitable principles Al-Rashidy (supra) sought to protect. Therefore, it is clear that the Al-Rashidy exception applies precisely because the Plaintiffs are acting to protect and preserve the estate's assets from imminent threat, bypassing the strict necessity of Order 15 Rule 6A in these limited circumstances of preservation. Thus, the Defendants' objection on locus standi is dismissed. B. The Validity of the Shariah Court Faraid Order and Lineage Documents [16] During cross-examination, the Defendants mounted a collateral attack on the Plaintiffs’ lineage and their status as lawful beneficiaries. The Defendants highlighted typographical and clerical errors in the Perintah Mahkamah Syariah (Faraid Order) dated 13 March 2024—such as the erroneous use of "Bin" instead of "Binti" and the omission of certain names—as well as statutory corrections made by the National Registration Department (JPN) on the relevant death certificates. The Defendants contended that these discrepancies render the Faraid Order defective and incapable of conferring locus standi. [17] This Court finds the Defendants’ contentions in this regard to be entirely devoid of merit. The errors highlighted in the Faraid Order are manifestly minor clerical mistakes (kesilapan menaip) that do not alter the substantive familial lineage of the Plaintiffs. More fundamentally, it is a trite principle of law that this Civil High Court possesses no jurisdiction to collaterally review, impeach, or invalidate a distribution order issued by a competent Shariah Court. As correctly submitted by the Plaintiffs, unless and until the said Faraid Order is formally challenged and set aside within the Shariah Court system itself, it remains a valid, binding, and conclusive legal document confirming the Plaintiffs' status as the lawful beneficiaries of the estate. C. The Admissibility and Validity of the 1972 Agreement [18] The bedrock of the Plaintiffs' claim is the 1972 Agreement. The Defendants vehemently challenged its admissibility and legal effect, arguing that it was merely a disguised loan or a sham transaction, and highlighted that the original makers were deceased and could not verify the thumbprints. [19] The Court approaches this document through the lens of Sections 73A and 90 of the Evidence Act 1950. The document is undisputedly over 50 years old and was produced from the 1st Plaintiff's proper custody, which the 1st Plaintiff had safeguarded since Haji Saad's passing. Applying the principles elucidated by KC Vohrah J in Ghazali bin Ariffin v Ahmad bin Bakar [1992] 1 MLJ 282, this Court finds that the 1972 Agreement bears an "honest face" and a "ring of truth". [20] The Defendants' attempt to re-characterise the clear, written terms of the agreement as a "friendly loan" or a security mechanism offends the parol evidence rule under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950. The document speaks for itself. It explicitly stipulates a purchase price of RM800.00, acknowledges the receipt of RM600.00, and explicitly grants the purchaser the right to enter and cultivate the land immediately. The collateral fact that a lien-holder’s caveat was mistakenly entered in 1978 instead of a private caveat does not alter the substantive nature of the 1972 sale transaction. It is legally impermissible for the Defendants to import extrinsic narratives to contradict the plain and literal meaning of a valid contract. [21] As mentioned earlier, the Defendants weaponised the fact that on 6 November 1978, the 1st Plaintiff entered a lien-holder’s caveat (Form 19D) on the said Land rather than a private caveat (Form 19B). The Defendants argued that a lien-holder’s caveat is strictly a statutory security for a loan, not a sale transaction. To estop the Plaintiffs from claiming this was a mere mistake, the Defendants invoked the parol evidence rule under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950. Relying on authorities such as Datuk Tan Leng Teck v Sarjana Sdn Bhd [1997] 4 MLJ 329 and GQP Sdn Bhd v Constant View Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLRA 483, they argued that oral evidence cannot be admitted to contradict, vary, or reinterpret the clear documentary record of the caveat to turn a 'loan' into a 'sale'. [22] This Court is not persuaded by the Defendants' rigid application of the Evidence Act to defeat an equitable claim. This Court accepts the Plaintiffs’ evidence that the 1st Plaintiff, an unrepresented layperson, lodged the lien-holder’s caveat under the mistaken belief that it offered perpetual protection for their rights under the 1972 Agreement, unlike a private caveat, which naturally expires. The parol evidence rule does not operate in a vacuum to legitimise an absurdity. The underlying substance of the transaction is undeniably a sale, as evidenced by the 1972 Agreement itself and the Plaintiffs' uninterrupted occupation and agricultural harvesting over the ensuing 50 years. Equity looks to the intent rather than the form, and a technical error in the type of caveat lodged does not extinguish the genuine equitable interest created by the 1972 Agreement. [23] The Defendants mounted a secondary attack on the 1972 Agreement, arguing that mere age does not confer legal validity. Relying on Nadarajan a/l T Kuppusamy & Anor v Foo Pang Lui & Ors [2020] 9 MLJ 67 and Pembinaan Kota Laksamana v Damansara Realty [2016] 8 CLJ 462, they submitted that while Section 90 of the Evidence Act 1950 presumes the signature and execution of a document over 30 years old, it does not presume its legality, enforceability, or capacity. They further argued that Section 73A of the Evidence Act 1950 is merely a hearsay exception and cannot validate an otherwise void agreement. The Defendants urged this Court to find "suspicious features" in the document, such as inadequate consideration and the lack of subsequent transfer steps, which they argue rebuts the presumption of validity. [24] This Court finds that the Defendants' attempt to sever the presumption of execution from the factual reality of this case is artificial. While it is true that Section 90 does not automatically cure a legally void contract, the substantive validity of the 1972 Agreement is corroborated by the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct of the parties. The Plaintiffs did not merely rely on a piece of paper; they entered the land, cleared it, harvested the crops, and paid quit rent for half a century without protest from the vendors or the Defendants. These are not the hallmarks of a sham or a suspicious document, but rather the concrete manifestation of a genuine sale agreement being performed on the ground. [25] The Plaintiffs' assertion of beneficial ownership is not merely based on physical occupation but is also incontrovertibly supported by voluminous documentary evidence of quit rent (cukai tanah) and drainage tax (cukai parit dan tali air) receipts dating back decades. As observed in Nadarajan (supra), the continuous payment of land taxes by a party in occupation is a powerful indicator of their status as beneficial owners rather than precarious occupiers or mere borrowers. It is utterly absurd to suggest, as the Defendants imply through their "loan" narrative, that a mere lender would persistently pay the annual statutory taxes on the collateral property for over 50 years while the true owners remained completely silent. [26] Beyond the continuous payment of quit rent, the Plaintiffs’ assertion of an absolute sale is irrefutably cemented by their physical possession of the original Issue Document of Title (IDT) to the said Land since 1972. The Defendants, in their very own Counterclaim, explicitly prayed for the "return of the original Issue Document of Title", thereby formally admitting that their ancestors had indeed surrendered the original title deed to Haji Saad. [27] In land transactions, the voluntary surrender and permanent retention of the original title deed by the transacting party is the ultimate hallmark of a finalised sale. It defies all commercial logic, human behaviour, and common sense that a 'borrower' in a mere friendly loan would permanently surrender their original title deed to a 'lender' and never seek its return for over five decades. This fact, together with the facts that the Plaintiffs had been occupying, harvesting and cultivating the said Land and paying the land taxes, conclusively extinguishes the Defendants' desperate attempt to re-characterise the 1972 Agreement as a loan. D. Limitations and the Doctrine of Laches [28] The most heavily contested issue is whether the Plaintiffs’ claim is statute-barred. The Defendants assert that an action to recover land under Section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 must be brought within 12 years, arguing that time began to run either in 1972, or at the latest, when the Defendants registered their title in 2006. Under their calculation, the Plaintiffs are decades out of time and guilty of acquiescence and laches. [29] In a nutshell, the Defendants sought to strictly enforce Section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953, arguing that an action to recover land must be brought within 12 years, with the clock starting either in 1972 or upon the Defendants' registration of title in 2006. Citing AmBank (M) Bhd v Abdul Aziz Hassan & Ors [2009] 4 MLRA 458, the Defendants correctly highlighted that Malaysian law does not recognise a 'discoverability rule' for the recovery of land. Consequently, they argued the Plaintiffs were guilty of extreme laches, having delayed for up to 51 years, and that such an avalanche of time inevitably prejudices the Defendants. [30] This Court rejects the Defendants' mathematical application of the Limitation Act to these specific facts. Equity aids the vigilant, and the Plaintiffs' vigilance was demonstrated through their continuous, uninterrupted physical possession of the said Land. It is a well-established equitable principle, enunciated in Williams v Greatrex [1957] 1 WLR 31 and adopted by our apex courts on numerous occasions, that the defence of laches or limitation does not operate against a purchaser who has paid the purchase price (or a substantial part thereof) and has been let into possession. [31] By paying RM600.00 out of the RM800.00 purchase price and entering into possession to cultivate the land, Haji Saad acquired a profound equitable interest. The vendors and their successors-in-title (the Defendants) held the legal title as bare trustees for the purchaser. Because the Plaintiffs were in undisturbed possession, time did not begin to run against them until there was an unequivocal threat to their equitable rights. [32] The evidence is crystalline: the first clear, unequivocal threat to the Plaintiffs' rights occurred on 4 January 2023, when the 2nd Defendant demanded the return of the land. Filing the suit, a mere two months later in March 2023, demonstrates that there was no inordinate delay or laches on the part of the Plaintiffs. [33] This Court also finds the Defendants' calculation of limitation legally flawed in the context of a purchaser in possession. The Plaintiffs' continuous physical possession operates as a shield against the statute of limitations. As affirmed by the Federal Court in Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32, time only begins to run from the date of an "unequivocal threat" to, or infringement of, the purchaser's right. The 2006 registration of title by the Defendants, while a formal act, was done without notice to or physical disturbance of the Plaintiffs. Because the Plaintiffs remained in undisturbed possession, the first true, unequivocal threat to their rights only manifested on 4 January 2023, when the 2nd Defendant demanded the return of the physical land. Therefore, the suit filed in March 2023 is well within the limitation period. [34] Furthermore, the Defendants' reliance on Sections 9 and 10 of the Limitation Act 1953 is legally misconceived because it ignores the statutory exception for trust property. As this Court has established that the Defendants hold the said Land as bare trustees (or constructive trustees) for the Plaintiffs, Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 is the operative provision. Section 22(1) expressly provides that no period of limitation prescribed by the Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust to recover trust property from the trustee. As applied in the recent High Court decisions of Nadarajan (supra) and Hamdiah bt Ahmad & Anor v Pembangunan Tanah dan Perumahan Sdn Bhd [2020] 12 MLJ 786, once a vendor receives the full purchase price (or the agreed portion thereof, rendering the balance conditional upon the vendor's own administrative acts) and surrenders possession, a bare trust is created, and the statute of limitations ceases to run against the purchaser's claim for specific performance. [35] The Defendants vehemently submitted that the Plaintiffs are precluded from relying on the concept of a 'bare trust' or 'constructive trust' to defeat the statute of limitations because the word "trust" or "equity" was purportedly not expressly pleaded in the Statement of Claim. [36] This Court is thoroughly mindful of the trite legal principle that parties are strictly bound by their pleadings (as eloquently enunciated by Abdul Malik Ishak JCA in the Court of Appeal decision of Projek Lebuh Raya Utara-Selatan Sdn Bhd v Kim Seng Enterprise (Kedah) Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 360). However, the Defendants' objection in this regard is fundamentally misconceived. The cardinal rule of pleadings, as codified in Order 18 Rule 7(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, is that a party must plead material facts, not the evidence or the law. This principle was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Muniandy a/l Thamba Kaundan & Anor v Development & Commercial Bank Bhd & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 374, which established that a party is not required to plead legal conclusions or labels, as it is for the court to apply the appropriate law to the pleaded facts. The Plaintiffs here meticulously pleaded the material facts: the execution of the 1972 Agreement, the payment of the RM600.00 consideration, and their continuous, uninterrupted possession of the said Land. Once these material facts are pleaded and proven, a constructive trust arises by operation of law. The Plaintiffs were under no procedural obligation to explicitly plead the legal label of a 'trust' for this Court to apply the equitable exception under Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act. E. The Nemo Dat Rule and Capacity to Sell [37] The Defendants strongly contended that the 1972 Agreement was void ab initio due to a fundamental lack of capacity. Relying on the maxim nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what he does not have) and citing Federal Court authorities such as Sia Hiong Tee & Ors v Chong Su Kong & Ors [2015] 8 CLJ 1173 and Md Kamis b Yakob v Ismail b Abdullah [1995] 2 CLJ 238, the Defendants argued that because the vendors in 1972 were mere beneficiaries of an unadministered estate, they possessed no legal title to transfer. Thus, any purported sale by a non-proprietor is a legal nullity incapable of creating registrable interests. [38] This argument, while theoretically sound in the context of an outright transfer of an existing registered title, fails to appreciate the conditional nature of the 1972 Agreement. This Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that the 1972 transaction was a valid equitable contract for a future interest. A meticulous reading of the agreement reveals that the parties were fully aware that the title was not ready for transfer. This is evidenced by Clause 1(g), which expressly stipulates that the balance purchase price of RM200.00 is payable only "apabila selesai di-perbuat kuasa" (when the administration is completed, and the name is ready to be changed). [39] Equity permits a beneficiary to enter into a contract to sell a future expectancy. Once the estate is administered and the vendor finally acquires legal title, the vendor is bound in equity to perfect the purchaser's title. The fact that the vendors did not have the registered title in 1972 does not invalidate the contractual obligations that crystallised once the Defendants finally administered the estate and acquired the title in 2006. F. Estoppel against the Defendants [40] While the Defendants zealously accused the Plaintiffs of laches, it is, in fact, the Defendants who are barred by the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence. The Defendants and their predecessors completely abandoned the said Land for nearly half a century. They never demanded that the Plaintiffs vacate the land, nor did they object to the Plaintiffs' having erected structures or harvested rubber on it since 1972. [41] This finding of overwhelming acquiescence and abandonment by the Defendants is not merely a legal inference; it is a concrete fact established by the fatal admissions of the 1st Defendant (SD1) himself during cross-examination. SD1 candidly admitted to this Court that he had absolutely no prior knowledge of the existence of the said Land (Lot 8796), nor had he ever visited, maintained, or exercised any proprietary rights over it, until he was recently informed of its existence by the late Ahmad bin Awang Kechik shortly before this litigation commenced. [42] This candid admission shatters the core of the Defendants' narrative. It proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Defendants and their predecessors had completely abandoned the said Land to the Plaintiffs for half a century, tacitly recognising the finality of the 1972 sale. For the Defendants to suddenly emerge after 51 years of complete ignorance and non-participation, seeking to unjustly enrich themselves by reclaiming fully cultivated land based on a bare registered title, is the very definition of unconscionable conduct which equity strictly forbids. [43] As held in Hamdiah bt Ahmad (supra), a registered proprietor's failure to assert their rights or explain their abandonment of a claim to land for over 40 years amounts to acquiescence. The Defendants cannot, after 51 years of complete silence and having benefited from the RM600.00 paid to their ancestors, suddenly invoke their strict legal rights to unjustly enrich themselves. Equity will not permit the Defendants to approbate and reprobate. They are consequently estopped from reclaiming possession of the said Land or denying the Plaintiffs' equitable title. Also, this fact again confirms and collaborates that the 1972 Agreement was intended as a sale, not a loan. G. Indefeasibility of Title [44] The Defendants raised a formidable defence of indefeasibility under Section 340 of the National Land Code (NLC), arguing that their registered title acquired in 2006 is absolute. Relying on Teh Bee v K. Maruthamuthu [1977] 2 MLJ 7, they asserted that registration defeats all prior unregistered interests. Furthermore, citing cases such as Ong Chat Pang v Valliappa Chettiar [1971] 1 MLJ 224 and Yeong Ah Chee v Lee Chong Hai [1994] 3 CLJ 20, the Defendants argued that a vendor becomes a bare trustee for the purchaser only upon execution of a valid transfer and full payment of the purchase price. Since RM200 remained unpaid, they argued the constructive trust never crystallised. [45] This Court rejects that proposition on the basis of the specific terms of the 1972 Agreement. Clause 1(g) expressly states that the RM200 balance was only payable "apabila selesai di-perbuat kuasa"—meaning upon the completion of the estate administration and when the vendors were ready to transfer the name. Since the Defendants never initiated this transfer process to Haji Saad, the Plaintiffs were never in breach of their payment obligations. [46] Applying the long-standing equitable principles enunciated in Lysaght v Edwards [1876] 2 Ch D 499, (and adopted numerous times in our apex court’s decision like Samuel Naik Siang Ting v. Public Bank Berhad [2015] 5 MLRA 665), the moment a valid contract for sale is executed, the vendor becomes in equity a constructive trustee for the purchaser. The fact that the 1972 vendors lacked complete legal title at the time of execution does not render the contract a nullity; it operated as a valid agreement for a future interest. Once the Defendants finally acquired the registered title in 2006, the constructive trust immediately attached to the land, rendering them bare trustees for the Plaintiffs. Section 340 of the NLC does not protect a registered proprietor who holds the land on a constructive trust from fulfilling their equitable obligations to a purchaser in continuous possession. [47] Even if the Defendants seek absolute sanctuary under Section 340(1) of the NLC by claiming there is no pleaded fraud to trigger Section 340(2), their title remains vulnerable under Section 340(4)(b) of the NLC. This provision expressly states that nothing in the section shall prejudice or prevent the determination of any title or interest "by operation of law". [48] As enunciated in Ong Chat Pang (supra) and affirmed by the Federal Court in Krishnadas Achutan Nair v Maniyam Samykano [1996] 2 MLRA 194 (quoted by the court in Hamidah bt Ahmad (supra) cited by the Defendant), the phrase 'operation of law' is a generic term deliberately used by the legislature to grant relief in cases where "contractual or conscientious obligations (importing a breach of duty to which equity has attached its sanction) are undertaken by or imposed on the registered proprietor either at law or in equity". By obtaining the registered title in 2006 as beneficiaries of the original vendors, the Defendants inherited the conscientious and equitable obligations created by their predecessors via the 1972 Agreement. Consequently, their registered title is defeasible by operation of law to the extent necessary to satisfy the constructive trust held in favour of the Plaintiffs. [49] Furthermore, the Defendants’ reliance on the absolute shield of indefeasibility fails on another fundamental Torrens principle: the distinction between a purchaser for value and a mere volunteer. It is an undisputed fact that the 1st to 6th Defendants acquired their registered titles in 2006 not by purchasing the said Land for valuable consideration, but by way of inheritance and transmission under the Probate and Administration Act 1959. [50] As beneficiaries, the Defendants are legally classified as 'volunteers' in equity. As affirmed by the appellate courts in He-Con Sdn Bhd v Bulyah Ishak & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 271 and the Federal Court in Samuel Naik Siang Ting v. Public Bank Berhad [2015] 5 MLRA 665, a volunteer merely steps into the shoes of the deceased. A volunteer takes the property subject to all existing equities, encumbrances, and constructive trusts created by their predecessors. Consequently, the Defendants cannot invoke the protective proviso of Section 340(3) of the NLC—which is strictly reserved for bona fide purchasers for value without notice—to defeat the Plaintiffs' prior equitable interest. H. Entitlement to Specific Performance [51] As a final fallback, the Defendants argued that specific performance should be refused pursuant to Section 20(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act 1950, contending that the 1972 Agreement is uncertain and that damages would be an adequate remedy. Furthermore, they argued that specific performance is unenforceable against an estate that was fully administered and distributed in 2003. [52] This Court rejects both contentions. Land is inherently unique, and damages can never adequately compensate a party for the loss of ancestral agricultural land which their family has continuously possessed, cleared, and cultivated for over half a century. As for the supposed impossibility of performance, the fact that the estate was fully administered and the land was registered in the names of the 1st to 6th Defendants in 2006 does not render specific performance impossible; rather, it makes it entirely executable. The Defendants, as the current registered proprietors, now possess the exact legal capacity required to execute the memorandum of transfer (Form 14A) to fulfil the constructive trust. [53] In a final, desperate attempt to resist the equitable remedy, the Defendants invoked Section 30(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act 1950, arguing that the 1972 Agreement is hopelessly vague, incomplete, and conditional, thereby rendering it legally incapable of specific performance. [54] This Court has rigorously scrutinised the four corners of the 1972 Agreement and finds absolutely no such uncertainty. The instrument is remarkably precise for a village contract of its era. It clearly identifies the contracting parties, precisely describes the subject matter (Lot 1777, now GM 4309, encompassing 2 relung 380 jemba), states the exact purchase price of RM800.00, acknowledges the RM600.00 deposit paid, and unambiguously stipulates exactly when the balance RM200.00 is to be settled—namely, "apabila selesai di-perbuat kuasa" (upon the completion of the administration of the estate). The terms are crystal clear, unconditional, and entirely capable of being specifically enforced by this Court without requiring any external guesswork. I. The Role of the 7th Defendant Land Administrator of Yan District (Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Yan) [55] For completeness, this Court must address the position of the 7th Defendant, the Land Administrator of Yan District (Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Yan). The 7th Defendant is a nominal but necessary party to these proceedings, joined specifically to ensure that the orders of this Court can be effectively registered and enforced. [56] Having found that the Plaintiffs are entirely entitled to the specific performance of the 1972 Agreement, this Court is empowered under Section 417 of the National Land Code to direct the registrar or the land administrator to do all such things as may be necessary to give effect to any judgment or order given in respect of land. Therefore, to prevent any further delay or recalcitrance by the 1st to 6th Defendants in executing the transfer, an ancillary order under Section 417 must be made directing the 7th Defendant to rectify the register and effect the transfer of the said Land to the estate of Haji Saad, namely, the Plaintiffs in this case. Conclusion [57] This Court is driven to the inescapable conclusion that the 1972 Agreement is a valid and binding contract. The Plaintiffs, as beneficiaries protecting the estate, have the standing to enforce it. Their continuous possession effectively neutralised the statute of limitations until the Defendants’ aggressive actions in 2023. [58] Accordingly, this Court makes the following orders:

(a) The Plaintiffs' claim is allowed against the 1st to 6th Defendants. The 1st to 6th Defendants are ordered to pay costs of RM25,000.00 to the Plaintiffs. There shall be no order as to costs against the 7th Defendant, as they are a nominal party to these proceedings.

(b) The 1st to 6th Defendants’ Counterclaim—specifically their prayers seeking vacant possession of the said Land, the removal of the lien-holder’s caveat, and the return of the original issue document of title—is wholly dismissed with costs.

(c) The 1st to 6th Defendants are ordered to specifically perform the Surat Perjanjian Jual Tanah Kebun Getah (the 1972 Agreement) dated 20 June 1972 and execute the memorandum of transfer (Form 14A) and all other necessary instruments to effect the transfer of the said Land to Haji Saad bin Haji Haron.

(d) In the event the 1st to 6th Defendants fail, neglect, or refuse to execute the said transfer instruments within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, the senior assistant registrar or deputy registrar of the High Court is hereby authorised and empowered to sign and execute the said instruments on their behalf.

(e) Pursuant to Section 417 of the National Land Code and having regard to the 7th Defendant's pleadings submitting to the Court's jurisdiction, the 7th Defendant, the Land Administrator of Yan District (Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Yan) is hereby ordered to accept, register, and give full effect to the transfer of the said Land to Haji Saad bin Haji Haron (No. K/P: 1818851) upon presentation of the duly executed instruments.

(f) A declaration is granted that the 1st to 6th Defendants hold the said Land on trust for Haji Saad bin Haji Haron until the transfer is fully executed.

(g) The Plaintiffs shall pay to the 1st to 6th Defendants the sum of RM200.00 as the balance purchase price within fourteen

(h) An injunction is granted restraining the 1st to 6th Defendants, their agents, or servants from trespassing, clearing, or erecting any structures on the said Land until the name of Haji Saad bin Haji Haron is successfully registered as the owner of the said Land. Dated: 28th April, 2026 -------------------------------------------------------------------- YA. Dr. Hj. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Solicitor : Noorlaili bt Aziz & Ang Khoon Cheong For the Plaintiffs Messrs. Laili & Co Solicitor : Nurul Shahida Binti Mohd Shukeri For the 1st – 6th Defendants & Rafidi bin Mohamad Messrs. Shamsudin Bahari & Rafidi Solicitor : Nurul Liyana Binti Mohamd Nasir For the 7th Defendant State Legal Advisor Office Table of Authorities Cases Al-Rashidy Kassim & Ors v Rosman Roslan [2007] 3 CLJ 361 AmBank (M) Bhd v Abdul Aziz Hassan & Ors [2009] 4 MLRA 458 Amir Hamzah Amir v Normadiah Osman [2024] MLRHU 1603 Cergas Tegas Sdn Bhd v SAP Holdings Bhd [ 2013] 8 CLJ 745 Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1977] 4 CLJ 393 Dato' Ramesh Rajaratnam v Datin Zaleha Abd Rahman & Ors [2014] 5 CLJ 669 Datuk Tan Leng Teck v Sarjana Sdn Bhd [1997] 4 MLJ 329 Gan Yook Chin v Lee Ing Chin [2004] 2 MLRA 1 Ghazali bin Ariffin v Ahmad bin Bakar [1992] 1 MLJ 282 GQP Sdn Bhd v Constant View Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLRA 483 Hamdiah bt Ahmad & Anor v Pembangunan Tanah dan Perumahan Sdn Bhd [2020] 12 MLJ 786 He-Con Sdn Bhd v Bulyah Ishak & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 271 Krishnadas Achutan Nair v Maniyam Samykano [1996] 2 MLRA 194 Lysaght v Edwards [1876] 2 Ch D 499 Md Kamis b Yakob v Ismail b Abdullah [1995] 2 CLJ 238 Muniandy a/l Thamba Kaundan & Anor v Development & Commercial Bank Bhd & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 374 Nadarajan a/l T Kuppusamy & Anor v Foo Pang Lui & Ors [2020] 9 MLJ 67 Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32 Ong Chat Pang v Valliappa Chettiar [1971] 1 MLJ 224 Pembinaan Kota Laksamana v Damansara Realty [2016] 8 CLJ 462 Poraviappan Arunasalam Pillay v Periasamy [2015] 4 MLRA 275 Projek Lebuh Raya Utara-Selatan Sdn Bhd v Kim Seng Enterprise (Kedah) Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 360 Samuel Naik Siang Ting v. Public Bank Berhad [2015] 5 MLRA 665 Sia Hiong Tee & Ors v Chong Su Kong & Ors [2015] 8 CLJ 1173 Teh Bee v K. Maruthamuthu [1977] 2 MLJ 7 Williams v Greatrex [1957] 1 WLR 31 Yeong Ah Chee v Lee Chong Hai [1994] 3 CLJ 20 Statutes Evidence Act 1950 Limitation Act 1953 National Land Code Probate and Administration Act 1959 Rules of Court 2012 Specific Relief Act 1950