1. ) chua yee kuan (BA-33-74-02/2019)

This is an appeal filed by the Petitioner Husband (PH) against the decision of this Court dated 24.6.2025 which allowed the Petitioner Wife’s (PW) application to vary a Consent Order dated 18.2.2019 in relation to guardianship, custody care and control and terms of access of the child of the marriage (Child).

These are the reasons for my decision.

The marriage between the Petitioner Husband (PH) and Petitioner Wife (PW) was dissolved on 18.2.2019 pursuant to a Joint Petition wherein both parties were granted joint guardianship, custody care and control of the only child of the marriage. Their child, a daughter was born on 28.1.2016 and is now 9 years old. Pursuant to the consent order the Child was to primarily reside with the PW in Malaysia with reasonable access accorded to the PW.

It is not in dispute that prior to the consent order being recorded, the parties and the Child had taken up residence in Australia since 2017 up until 2018. After the Decree Nisi was granted, the Child remained in Malaysia with the PH under his sole custody care and control. However, the PW regularly returned to Malaysia and when she is in Australia she contacts the Child daily via video calls.

Both parties remarried shortly after the dissolution of the marriage but the PH has since divorced his second wife. The PW’s present husband is an Australian citizen.

The PW contends that there have been material changes in the circumstances surrounding the Child’s life during the period the Child was under the care of the PH. These changes, according to the PW have adversely impacted the Child and are not conducive to the Child’s welfare. In light of these concerns, the PW has been left with no alternative but to bring the present application before this Court in order to remedy the situation.

The PW is now seeking for inter alia the following reliefs:

Sole guardianship, custody care and control of the Child, whereby the Child shall reside with her in

(ii) PH shall have supervised access to the Child both in Australia and Malaysia as well as access via daily video calls; and

(iii) PH shall pay a sum of AUD1,500 as monthly maintenance for the Child.

At the hearing of this Notice of Application, learned counsel appearing for both the PW and the PH informed the Court that the parties had, through discussions, managed to resolve the majority of matters in dispute. However, two (2) principal issues remained outstanding which could not be settled amicably between them. The first pertained to the question of whether sole guardianship of the Child ought to be given to the PW. The second concerned the determination of the appropriate time as to when the Child should be permitted to relocate with the PW to Australia. The Parties’ Arguments 9. The PW has assured the Court that her intention to relocate the Child to Australia with her is genuine and aimed only at ensuring the Child’s safety and welfare is protected. She asserts that the Child will greatly benefit with the move as she will be the one in charge and managing the Child’s well being and upbringing. In line with that the PW is seeking sole guardianship custody care and control of the Child as it is practical and ensures that she is able to make decisions in regard to managing the Child’s day to day life smoothly without any hindrance.

The PW has further contended that the PH’s relationship with the Child will not be affected as he can have liberal access to the Child in Australia and in Malaysia when the Child comes back for holidays. The PH can still keep in touch with the Child through daily calls.

The PW wants to have exclusive guardianship custody care and control of the Child as she finds that the PH has neglected the Child’s welfare and best interest while she was under his care. Firstly, she has alleged that the PH had compromised the Child’s education asserting that there have been occasions when the PH was unable to pay school fees and this resulted in the Child being barred from attending school. Since then it has been left to the PW to pay the monthly school fees.

The PW alleges that the PH does not prioritize the Child’s education and this is seen in his lackadaisical attitude towards her attendance at school whereby she is frequently absent from school, late to classes and picked up early under his care. The school teachers have informed the PW that as a result of all the absences, the Child faces issues with executive functioning, self regulation skills and social behaviour so much so that it was recommended for the Child to be referred to a psychologist in order to be assessed and to determine how to handle her issues for the future.

What is concerning to the PW is that the PH has not provided any suggestions as to how he intends to manage his finances in order to ensure that the Child’s education and daily expenses are paid for as well as how he plans to reimburse the PW for all the payments that she has been bearing for the sake of the Child.

The PW has set out in detail a series of complaints concerning what she describes as the PH’s unsatisfactory care and upbringing of the Child during the period when the Child was under his sole care. According to the PW, these incidents collectively reflect poor parenting on the part of the PH and demonstrates conduct that is not consistent with the Child’s best interest or welfare.

She alleges that the PH has been derelict in his fatherly responsibilities and this has exposed the Child to unnecessary hardship and detriment. In particular the PW contends that the PH frequently left the Child in the care of the PW’s mother rather than attending to her himself and on occasions even failed to pick the Child up after school. She further asserts that the PH did not monitor or supervise her school work and failed to regulate her screen time properly resulting in her sleeping late into the night and being unable to wake up on time and consequently missing school, which the PW submits has had a negative effect on the Child’s academic progress and overall wellbeing.

The PW has further expressed grave concern for the safety and welfare of the Child should she continue to remain under the care of the PH. Her apprehension arises from the PH’s precarious financial circumstances, particularly in relation to his business undertakings. The extent of his indebtedness, according to the PW, is so severe that it has compelled him to resort to questionable and unlawful measures in an attempt to evade his creditors. It was alleged that the PH had altered the colour of his vehicle and affixed a false registration number plate so as to prevent the bank from locating and repossessing the said vehicle and to avoid detection by debt collectors.

The PW has drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that the PH has deliberately failed to disclose his residential address in all the affidavits filed in the instant application in order to avoid his location from being detected by his creditors.

What is most serious is that she has found out that there have been posts by third parties on social media regarding the PH’s failure to deliver goods and make payment and she still receives notices from third parties regarding the PH’s outstanding bills. The PW has alleged that loan sharks have visited the company premises and threats regarding the safety of the PH’s children have been made by his creditors.

Based on the above it was contended that the PH’s financial irresponsibility has negatively affected the welfare and best interest of the Child. It has put the Child at real risk and her safety in danger if she continues to remain under his care. It left the PW with no alternative but to assume full care and control of the Child in order to shield her any harm and to ensure that she can live in a safe and stable environment.

The PW asserts that she is in a financially better position to provide for the Child and she highlights that she has already taken over sole responsibility for meeting the Child’s educational costs as well as her day-to-day living expenses, thereby demonstrating her ability and commitment to ensuring that the Child’s needs are adequately met.

The PW assures the Court that she is fully capable of providing the Child with a stable, secure and nurturing lifestyle in Australia, one which will better support the Child’s growth, education and overall well being. She asserts that the Child is comfortable with her new husband as they have been married since the Child was three years old. They have kept in close contact and the husband has been involved in assisting her with caring for the Child. He has affirmed an affidavit confirming his willingness to be there for her and to support her in every way for the future.

The PH on the other hand maintains that the order dated 18.2.2019 is in the nature of a consent order and as such orders made by mutual consent must rarely be disturbed.

In this regard, he reminds the Court to take cognisance of the express terms of the Consent Order, whereby it was clearly agreed that the Child was to reside with the PW in Malaysia unless otherwise mutually agreed in writing by the parties.

The PH further contends that the allegations of irresponsibility levelled against him are unfounded and unjust and, in his view, rather ironic since it was the PW who had unilaterally chosen to relocate to Australia to pursue personal ambitions leaving the Child behind in Malaysia at a very tender age. The PH asserts that he was happy and willingly to bear the full weight of dual parental responsibilities when the PW left for Australia and he feels he has discharged those responsibilities and obligations diligently and to the best of his ability. He considers it unfair and hypocritical that the PW now very conveniently wants to take over and to be involved in the Child’s life when she had removed herself from the Child’s daily life when she most needed her back then when she was two years old but now wants to attack him on every aspect of his parenting.

The PH insists that the relocation to Australia in the next few months as intended by the PW is a drastic change involving a complete shift in environment and it is more likely to destabilise the Child’s emotional state and sense of security.

Worse still it would effectively sever his bond with the Child and she will be in danger of losing her connection with her step sister, teachers, school environment, friends and extended paternal family all of whom have been her tried and trusted support system prior to this. The PH believes that such a sudden and profound disruption is likely to heighten the risk of emotional distress, insecurity and disorientation rather than promote the Child’s welfare and stability.

In spite of all the above, the PH has contended that he is agreeable and not going to stand in the way of the Child being relocated to Australia but feels that it should only be in two years time when the Child is older and has completed her primary education. In his view the extra time left to him and to the Child to gradually accept their eventual separation> By then she would be slightly older and mature to handle the transition to a different country, life and environment. Decision of the Court 28. The Court Order in this matter was as a result of mutual agreement between the parties, entered into voluntarily and in full understanding of tis terms and implications. As a general rule, consent orders even in divorce matters must rarely be disturbed unless there are exceptional circumstances and that too clearly stated in the affidavit to warrant the intervention of the Court for the benefit of the Child (Lau Hui Seng v Wong Chou Yong [2008] 5 MLJ 846). Therefore, the Court must approach the application with caution as the terms of the Court Order that were previously consented to by both parties was not a trivial matter.

Nevertheless, this Court is empowered to vary a consent order, a power which is not altogether unfettered. It is well established that Sections 96 and 97 of the LRA 1976 confers the Court with the power to vary orders for custody and maintenance on the grounds of misrepresentation, mistake of fact or where there has been material change in circumstances.

Section 96 and 97 LRA read as follows: “96 Power for court to vary orders for custody or maintenance The court may at any time and from time to time vary, or may rescind, any order for the custody or maintenance of a child on the application of any interested person, where it is satisfied that the order was based on any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any material change in the circumstances. The court may at any time and from time to time vary the terms of any agreement relating to the custody or maintenance of a child, whether made before or after the appointed date, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any such agreement, where it is satisfied that it is reasonable and for the welfare of the child so to do.”.

The main ground relied upon by the PW through this application is that there is a material change in circumstances pertaining to the Child’s life.

The “change in circumstances” spoken of in the abovementioned provisions requires there to be a material change and not simply any change. In Sivajothi K Suppiah v Kunathasan Chelliah [2006] 5 CLJ 318 Azahar Mohamed JC (as he then was) held as follows: “The section says any “material change” and not simply “change”. There is no ambiguity whatsoever. It means a change in an essential part. In considering whether there has been any “material change” within the meaning of this section regard must be had to all the relevant circumstances, including, in the context of the present case, the judgment of Faiza Tamby Chik J. On a proper construction, the requirement in this section does impose a legal obligation on the defendant to prove on the balance of probability that there had been a material change in the circumstances as at 24 August 2001. There is no requirement at all for the plaintiff to disprove anything.” (Emphasis added)

I find it relevant and important especially for the purposes of this case before me to also refer to the decision in Jane Dripin v Charan Jit Singh Santokh Singh [2019] 1 LNS 55 where it was held: “[19] Material Change in Circumstances: (a) The legal definition of material change in circumstances is not cast in stone. It is ultimately dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No one case is similar to the other. Generally material change in circumstances is something that alters the conditions of the child’s life significantly enough that it may change the court’s decision as to what is in the child’s best interests. Black’s Law Dictionary 10th Edition, Thomson Reuters, 2014 definition of: Change in Circumstances: A modification of the physical, emotional, or financial condition of one or both parents used to show the need to modify a custody or support order especially an involuntary occurrence that had it been known at the time of the divorce decree, would have resulted in the court’s issuing a different decree... also termed material change in circumstances... Material: Relating to or involving some logical connection with the consequential facts of such a significant or essential nature that knowledge of item would affect a person’s decision making... In Bruce v. Odham Pres Lt [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712. Scott LJ said: “The word material means necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. While in Poon Kng Siang & Anor v. Tan Ah Kang & Anor [1992] 1 SLR 562 at 568, Per Warren LH Khoo J: Material in this context, does not mean decisive or conclusive. What is required is that the applicant should make full and frank disclosure of all facts and matters which could or would reasonably be considered by the judge in deciding whether to grant the application. He has in general to put his case fairly before the court. This is all trite in law”. (b) The essential elements of a “material change of circumstances” involve a significant alteration of the situation surrounding the child within the custodial scheme ordered by the court which changes occurring had caused an adverse condition for the welfare of the child and should not be continued. The change in circumstances jeopardises the health, safety and welfare of the child warranting a new custody order from the court.”

In determining the present application this Court must also take into account the time lapse between the recording of the Consent Order in 2019 and the subsequent filing of Encl 27 The passage of time is a material consideration and its significance has been clearly explained in the case of Gisela Getrude Abe v Tan Wee Kiat [1986] CLJ (Rep) 133 as follows: “In our opinion, when an application is made to the court to vary an existing order for maintenance, the proper approach is to start from the original order and see what changes financial or otherwise, have taken place since that date including any changes which the court is required to have regard to under s. 78 of the Act as well as any increase or decrease in the means of either of the parties to the marriage and make adjustments roughly in proportion to the changes, if that is possible.”.

In view of the authorities cited above, the duty falls on the PW to prove on a balance of probabilities that there exists a material change of circumstances which warrants this Court to exercise its powers to vary the terms of the Consent Order dated 18.2.2019.

The pivotal issue for the Court’s determination would be whether it is in the best interest and for the welfare of the Child to leave Malaysia and reside with her biological mother in Australia at the earliest opportunity as sought by the PW or whether such relocation should be deferred until the year 2028 as urged by the PH. Has there been a material change in the Child’s life since the making of the Consent Order such as would justify this Court to vary the terms of that order without further delay. Interview with Parties and Child 37. Before arriving at any decision on this application, I had conducted interviews with both parties as well as with the Child herself.

During my interview with the PW, she informed me that she is fully prepared and financially capable of taking care of the Child should she be permitted to relocate the Child to Australia with her. She argued that she has always maintained a close and loving relationship with the Child even when she had to remain in Australia. She frequently returned to Malaysia to see and be with the Child. She emphasized that she has completely taken over caring for and managing the Child since December 2024 due to her concerns for the safety and well being of the Child while under the PH’s care and now wishes to continue looking after the Child by bringing her to live with her in Australia.

She emphasised that she is financially secure, being the proprietor of a thriving skin care business based in Australia which not only provides her with stability but also affords her the flexibility to balance her work commitments with her parental responsibilities. The PW expressed her strong belief that the Child would enjoy a healthier, more comfortable, and overall more nurturing environment being close to her in Australia where she would have the opportunity to pursue her education as well as live in a stable family unit. The PW further highlighted that the Child has always shared and continues to enjoy a warm and affectionate relationship with her husband, who has been a consistent figure in the Child’s life since she was three years old. She believes the Child stands to benefit from being part of their family unit and from the love, care and guidance that both she and her husband are committed to providing for her.

She assures the Court that she will comply with all conditions imposed by this Court if she is given sole guardianship custody and control of the Child including any undertaking to be given.

During my interview with the PH he confided that while he had no objections in principle to the Child eventually residing with her mother in Australia, he nevertheless was deeply concerned about the implications of losing his guardianship rights over the Child. His fear is that, if sole guardianship together with full custody care and control were to be vested exclusively with the PW, he would effectively be excluded and erased from the Child’s life and he would be deprived of having any meaningful role as her biological father. Hence he urged the Court to ensure that his legal rights and his role as the Child’s father be preserved.

In addition, the PH reiterated his preference that the relocation should only take place in 2028, two years from now. He explained that this deferment would give him the necessary time to emotionally prepare himself with parting with the Child since he had been her primary caregiver throughout the past nine years. He felt that the two years given to him would also allow the Child to complete her primary schooling in Malaysia and by then she would be 11 years old and more mature in transitioning to a new life in Australia. The Child too would benefit from this intervening period as it would give her the opportunity to prepare for the move and to say her goodbyes to her extended family, friends, teachers and the familiar environment she has been used to while growing up.

I also personally interviewed the Child. She is 9 years old and I found her to be intelligent, well mannered and cheerful. Throughout the interview she was polite and respectful. It was immediately apparent to me that she loves both her father and mother very much. She understood why she was brought to court to see me. When I asked her for her views, she, expressed candidly without any hesitation her wish to live with her mother and to relocate to Australia. She told me she enjoys spending time with her mother doing activities together. She is excited at the prospect of living with her mother and stepfather and looking forward to going to school in Australia.

When I asked her about her father, the Child responded with affection telling me that she intends to keep in close contact with him and would return frequently to Malaysia and spend the school holidays with him.

I was satisfied the Child had expressed to me her own independent opinion and wishes to me free from any influence or pressure from either parent. While I am mindful that a Child of 9 years may not be expected to make decisions of this nature on her own, I was still of the view that her expressed wishes and preferences are both relevant and significant considerations which I ought and should take into account in determining which arrangement will best serve her welfare and best interest in the future. In the circumstances I am firmly of the opinion that due weight should be accorded to her wishes in the process of reaching my conclusion.

In any event I did not lose sight of the fact that the paramount consideration for this Court must be the welfare of the child as expressly provided under section 97 LRA 1976. The meaning and scope of the term “welfare of the child” has been considered in numerous cases. In Tan Siew Kee v Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS 77 the Court explained the expression in the following terms: “The expression ‘welfare’ is to be taken in its widest sense. It means the general well-being of the child and all aspects of his upbringing, religious, moral as well as physical. His happiness, comfort and security also go to make up his well-being. A loving parent with a stable home is conductive to the attainment of such well-being. It is not to be measured in monetary terms.”

The Federal Court in Sean O’Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722 further elaborated on the concept of welfare in this context holding as followings: “[53] According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn, reissue (Mackay edition), para 443 the term “welfare principle” is a set of factors used when ‘a court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child or the administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising from it, the child’s property or the application of any income arising from it, the child’s welfare must be the court’s paramount consideration”. In the English Children’s Act 1989, under the heading ‘welfare of the child’ is a set of factors that must be taken into account when deciding on such cases. These are for example: the wishes of the child; his feelings, his age, his sex and his background and the capabilities of the parties involved. Thus, this term “welfare principle” relates to certain factors to be considered and their priority during deliberation in such cases.”.

I understand and sympathize with the PH’s position and feelings. However, the Court’s primary duty above all else is to carefully and objectively determine whether the relocation to Australia is in the best interest and welfare of the Child.

What I find considerably important which has influenced my decision, is that the Child will be in Australia under the full care and supervision of her mother, whereas in Malaysia she has not consistently received such attention. The PW will be in a better position to care and be a hands on mother to the Child due to her flexible work conditions.

The PH, due to his business and work commitments is often unavailable and unable to dedicate sufficient time to the Child. He has himself acknowledged that the Child had on numerous occasions in the past had to skip school, been late for classes and at times even left waiting because he forgot to collect her. This in my view demonstrates a lack of prioritization of the Child’s education which has negatively impacted her school attendance. This is clearly not in the best interest of the Child. A change in custody arrangements is necessary to secure the stability, guidance and consistent involvement that the Child needs for her formative years.

By contrast the PW who works from home is in a far better position to devote consistent attention to the Child’s education and emotional well being. I am of the opinion that a change in custody arrangements is necessary to secure the stability, security and consistent guidance that the Child requires during these formative years. In this regard I am of the view that the PW is the parent who can best provide security and stability in the Child’s upbringing. I find support for this conclusion in the case of Leong Sam Moy v Low Chee Thiam [1997] 2 CLJ SUPP 212 where the Learned Judge emphasized as follows: “(1) …In an application for custody and guardianship of children of tender years, the welfare of those children transcends all other consideration. The Court shall have regard to the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child, considered in the light of his or her age and understanding. Access is the basic right of the child rather than the parent. The Court must also consider whether the welfare of the child is prompted by access or the reverse and decide accordingly. And the Court will, normally, favour the parent who will best maintain stability. Regard must also be had to s. 11 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1962. The capacity of the parent, including his or her capacity to have an affectionate and loving relationship with the child is also important.”

I am of the view that the Child’s educational progress is an integral and important aspect of her growth and development and to be well placed in her future to secure job opportunities. I find that the PW has fulfilled all the requirements of being the more stable, reliable, financially able and nurturing parent. She will be a steady influence and is more than capable of fostering a loving and affectionate bond with the Child.

I do not agree with the PH’s concern that the Child needs more time to bid farewell to her friends and school. Children are inherently adaptable and resilient. The relocation will not disrupt her development but instead will broaden her experiences. Moreover, she will have her mother’s constant guidance to help her navigate the transition in every step of the way. The PH has nothing to worry about as the Child will be in the care of her biological mother and not any stranger.

In any event Australia is not too far away, only a five hour flight away. The PH can always visit her there and since the maternal grandparents reside in Malaysia, the PW and the Child will likely return frequently to Malaysia thus allowing the PH to have ample opportunities to maintain contact and access to the Child.

The PH ought to put aside his personal reasons for delaying the relocation as there appear to stem more from his own sense of loss rather than a genuine concern for the Child’s welfare. While his feelings are understandable, the Court cannot ignore that his objections are largely motivated by his wish to keep her longer with him in Malaysia. It is not an objectionable reason but it cannot outweigh the paramount consideration of the welfare of the Child. This position finds support in the case of Mahabir Prasad v Mahabir Prasad [ 1981] 1 CLJ Rep 182 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “In short the learned judge given the overriding consideration of the welfare of the children uppermost in his mind. That, we think, is the correct approach. We would state categorically that there must be first and paramount consideration and other considerations must be subordinate. The mere desire of a parent to have his children must be subordinate to the consideration of the welfare of the children, can be effective only if it coincides with their welfare.”

The relocation would, in the view of this Court have far more positive advantages than disadvantages for the Child. In Australia, she will be living in a stable home with her mother and stepfather, where she will be assured of love, care, attention and educational opportunities that will only benefit her for her future well being and development.

Another important factor which the Court considers material is that the Child, being a girl is on the threshold of adolescence. She requires the guidance of her mother in managing the physical and emotional changes that comes with puberty. As she navigates into adolescence matters such as the onset of menstruation, bodily changes and the challenges of growing into womanhood are best understood and supported by a mother. No father, no matter how devoted can substitute for this particular time in a Child’s life.

As held in the case of Yong May Inn v Sia Kuan Seng [1970] 1 MLJ 281: “the custody care and control of the three girls, in that case, was given to the mother because they have a right to their mother’s love and affection and no one can do what a mother can do for her children. The children are all girls, and although they don’t have to remain in the custody and care of their mother, they are bound to feel freer in her company than in the company of their father and more particularly when one of them is reaching an age when she may need the advise of her mother most.”

I must however hasten to recognize that the PH as the father plays a vital and unique role in shaping the Child as much as the mother. The presence of the father in the Child’s life cannot be understated. In Elaine Lee Ming Li v Ng Yew Ming [2022] MLJU 2379) the Learned Judge explained the role of a father as follows: [20] It was crucial to bear in mind the role that a father has in ensuring that the child is raised in a nourishing environment. This was highlighted in the Singapore case of APE v. APF [2015] SGHC 17, where reference was made by Tan Siong Thye J to the article Contact and Domestic Violence - The Experts' Court Report [2000] Fam Law 615 by Claire, Sturge and Danya Glaser, which provided an analysis of the role of the father to his child: The findings are that the position in law that parental involvement on both sides is indeed in the best interests of the child. In a paper commissioned by the Official Solicitor, Claire, Sturge and Danya Glaser," Contact and Domestic Violence - The Experts' Court Report" [2000] Fam Law 615 ("The Experts' Court Report") at pp 616-617, the authors comment that: Contact with fathers, as opposed to other family members or people with whom the child has a significant relationship, brings the following, in particular, to bear, although the general principles remain the same: • the father's unique role in the creation of the child; • the sharing of 50% of his or her genetic material; • the history of his or her conception and the parental relationship; • the consequent importance of the father in the child's sense of identity and value; • the role modelling a father can provide of the father's and male contribution to parenting and the rearing of children which will have relevance to the child's concepts of parental role models and his or her own choices about choosing partners and the sort of family life he or she aims to create.” Conclusion 60. In the circumstances it is my finding that the PW has discharged her burden of proof on a balance of probabilities that there is a material change in the circumstances which makes it necessary for this Court to vary the earlier consent order. In doing so I have endeavoured to strike a fair and reasonable balance in coming to my decision to ensure that the Child’s welfare and best interests takes precedence over and above personal preferences of either parents.

The PW and PH shall have shared guardianship of the Child while sole custody care and control is given to the PW.

The PH shall have unsupervised reasonable access to the Child, both in Australia and in Malaysia.

The PH shall give his consent for the Child to relocate to Australia as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made.

The PW’s application in Encl 27 is hereby allowed on the terms stated aforesaid. Dated 26 September 2025. (JULIE LACK) Judge High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan (SELANGOR) Counsel for the Petitioner Husband: Niki Lim with Wilson Tan (Messrs Tam Yuen Hung & Co.) Counsel for the Petitioner Wife: Ong Chin Siong with Lydia Wong (Messrs Susan, Siong & Rita)