[3] In that case, Eusofee Abdoolcader J (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Federal Court quoted with approval the following 3 expression by Goulding J in Re Reed (a debtor) [1979] 2 All ER 22 at page 25: “…the duties of an appellate court in such a matter as this are, in my judgment , confined to those normally exercisable where the lower court has a discretion, that is to say, we are not justified in setting aside or varying an order supply because we may think we might have come to a different conclusion ourselves on similar material. We can only interfere if either we can see that the court below has applied a wrong principle, or has taken into account matters that are in law irrelevant, or has excluded matters that it ought to have taken into account, or otherwise that no court, properly instructing itself in the law, could have come to the conclusion which in fact was arrived at.” [4] In the case before us, we are not persuaded that the learned judge had exercised his discretion on a wrong principle and should have been exercised in a contrary way or that his refusal to grant an adjournment had occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The learned judge had given his reasons for refusing to allow the adjournment, which in our view were all valid reasons. [5] We refer in particular to paragraph 61 of the Grounds of Judgment where the learned judge said: “This is so notwithstanding that the application is supported by the defence. Section 259(1) of the CPC makes it abundantly clear that the discretion is vested with the court alone. The 4 prosecution cannot choose to institute multiple charges and then to choose to adjourn them just because they take the view that one case ought to conclude first before another begins. The courts cannot be utilised as a mere repository for criminal cases.” [6] Further, the learned judge had made it clear to the parties that he was prepared to accommodate the parties’ schedule where necessary so as not to result in a situation where the prosecution and the defence find themselves having to be present in both the SRC trial and the Tanore trial on the same day or week. [7] On top of that, the learned judge had given the parties the liberty to apply where necessary for the dates to be vacated for the SRC trial to continue once the Tanore trial has started. [8] For all these reasons, we are of the view that it is not a fit and proper case for appellate intervention. In the circumstances the appeals are dismissed. The decision of the High Court is affirmed. ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated: 5 August 2019 5 For the Appellant: Muhammad Shafee Abdullah (Rahmat Hazlan, Muhammad Farhan Shafee and Syahirah Hanapiah with him) of Messrs Shafee & Co. For the Respondent: Tommy Thomas, Attorney General (Ahmad Akram and Izzat Fauzan, Deputy Public Prosecutors, with him) of the Attorney General’s Chambers.