1. ) Dirk Johann Quinten v Yeoh Teen Eam (BA-22NCvC-468-11/2024)

DIRK JOHANN QUINTEN … PLAINTIFFS [JERMAN PASSPORT NO. : C4K504PHV]

SIMONE QUINTEN [JERMAN PASSPORT NO. : C4K53NJ4Y]

WOLGANG ALBERT DORNER [JERMAN PASSPORT NO. : CGFX12JPC]

HEIDRUN GERTRUD DORNER [JERMAN PASSPORT NO. : CGFX12PR5] AND YEOH TEEN EAM … DEFENDANT [IDENTITY CARD NO. : 590405-07-6023] (Doing Business as a Sole Proprietor Under the Name and Style of Retirement Planners & Consultants) [Busienss No. : 201503239308 (002466794-D)] 24/07/2025 16:09:39 BA-22NCvC-468-11/2024 Kand. 147 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 4 - Mareva Injunction) A.

This application involves a Mareva Injunction to prevent the defendant from disposing of assets valued at RM1,387,400.00 related to a breach of contract in Retirement Planners and Consultants (RPC). B.

The plaintiffs obtained the Mareva Injunction pursuant to an Ex Parte Order dated 29 November 2024, against the defendant.

On 15.5.2025, this Court granted the inter partes order for the Mareva Injunction with costs. Dissatisfied with the decision, the defendant appealed. C.

The Plaintiffs are German citizens who, in 2022, joined the investment programme operated by the defendant known as Retirement Planners and Consultants, and were appointed as member distributors of the defendant’s range of food and beverage products, all of which are sold overseas.

The defendant is a sole proprietor operating under the name and style of Retirement Planners and Consultants (Business No.: 201503239308 (002466794-D)) (“RPC”). The defendant offers business consultancy, retirement planning and advisory services, as well as investment planning services.

From the trades in RPC, the defendant earned Direct Sales Profit (DSP) and Referral Commission (RC) for the plaintiff's monthly payments, as shown in the monthly statements uploaded on the defendant’s website.

The plaintiffs admitted that they have withdrawn part of their total DSP and RC amounting to RM559,944.00.

On or about 03.05.2024 and/or 04.05.2024, the Plaintiffs provided the Defendant with one month's written notice to fully withdraw their trading amounts along with all outstanding DSP and RC, and to terminate the Contracts pursuant to clause 7 of their Contracts.

The defendants acknowledged the withdrawal and termination of the first and second plaintiffs on 9.5.2024. The withdrawal and termination of the third and fourth plaintiffs were acknowledged on 21.5.2024. Both documents can be found in Exhibit F of the Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 5) on pages 177 and 180.

Upon the defendant's failure to pay the trading amounts, including all outstanding DSP and RC of RM1,387,400.00, within the stipulated period, the plaintiffs filed this suit on 18 November 2024. D.

In Menk Sdn Bhd v Joerg Hugo Schmidt [2009] 4 CLJ 795, the Court of Appeal, when determining the legal position to grant the remedy of Mareva injunction, stated the following: [18] It is thus now quite established that, in order to succeed in a Mareva injunction application, a plaintiff must establish: i. a good arguable case; ii. that the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction; and iii. that the assets were being disposed intentionally or have the effect of stultifying any judgment in favour of the plaintiff (Aspatra Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd & Anor [1987] 2 CLJ 377; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 50; Ace King Pte Ltd v. Circus Americano Ltd & Ors [1984] CLJU 104; [1984] 1 LNS 104; [1985] 2 MLJ 75; Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v. United Engineers (Malaysia) [1984] 2 CLJ 319 (Rep); [1984] 2 CLJ 56; [1984] 2 MLJ 143: Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v. Wong Koi [1989] 1 CLJ 22 (Rep); [1989] 2 CLJ 93; [1989] 2 MLJ 153). E.

The relevant issues for this Court to decide are as follows-

Whether the plaintiffs have a good arguable case against the defendant;

(ii) Whether the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction; and

(iii) Whether there was a real risk of dissipation of the defendant’s assets before judgment. F. ANALYSIS AND FINDING Issue 1: Whether the plaintiffs have a good arguable case against the defendant

In deciding this issue, I am guided by the case Menk Sdn Bhd v Joerg Hugo Schmidt, (supra), where the Court of Appeal stated: [26] To arrive at a finding that a case is arguable, let alone a good arguable case, a judge hearing a Mareva injunction application must assess the available evidence beforehand. Unless that is done, the presiding judge will be unable to decide whether the applicant has a fair chance of obtaining judgment, if the matter were to go for trial (Biasamas Sdn Bhd & 3 Ors v. Kan Yan Heng [1998] 4 CLJ 754). In Ninemia Maritime Corp v. Trave Schiffahrthesellshaft mbH & Co. [1983] 1 MLJ 1412 Mustill J (QBD) had occasion to state: That the judge hearing a Mareva application is not only entitled but bound to make some assessment of the plaintiff's chance of success at the trial is, I believe, not open to dispute.

It is acknowledged that the relationship between the parties is governed by the Retirement Planners & Consultants (RPC) Membership Application Form and Contract, as detailed in Exhibit C of the affidavit supporting Dirk Johann Quinten.

Based on the RPC, there are three types of income created by RPC for the plaintiffs as member distributors to enjoy, which are –

Direct Sales Profit (DSP);

(ii) Referral Commission (RC); and

(iii) Group Sales Incentive (GSI).

The material terms and conditions of the contracts between the parties related to the member distributor are as follows -

If the Member Distributor introduces a new distributor for RPC, as a reward, RPC will pay the Member Distributor 1% Referral Commission (RC) based on the monthly purchases/sales of the new distributor. But if any member distributor ceases to be a distributor or becomes an inactive distributor, no such payment shall be paid to him/her.

If the Member Distributor total monthly personal group sales is RM50,000.00 and above, the Member Distributor may get Group Sales Rebate of 4% based on his/her monthly personal purchases. If the member distributor total monthly purchases is less than RM50,000, he or she may be entitled for a rebate of 2% only.

RPC hereby agrees to contribute 1% of the Member Distributor’s monthly purchases towards the RPC Dialysis Charity Fund for establishing RPC Dialysis Centres for the poor and less fortunate. However, the management of the RPC Charity Fund will be entirely at the discretion of RPC’s management and/or the appointed Board of Trustees, and an independent auditor will audit the accounts.

According to the plaintiffs, they have paid the defendant the sum of RM900,000.00, which was intended for the defendant to purchase local food and beverage products to be sold to third parties overseas on behalf of the plaintiffs. The payments were made from 22 March 2020 until 30 January 2023, with the total trading made by each respective plaintiff as follows-

RM400,000.00 paid by the first plaintiff;

RM100,000.00 paid by the second plaintiff;

RM200,000.00 paid by the third plaintiff; and

RM200,000.00 paid by the fourth plaintiff.

The proof of the payment made by the plaintiffs to the defendant under the RPC is supported by Exhibits D and E in the first plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support of Enclosure 4.

According to the plaintiffs, the cause of action against the Defendant is for breach of clause 7 of the contract. Clause 7 is very clear. Once the Plaintiffs have given the Defendant one month's advance written notice to terminate the Contracts, the Defendant must pay the Plaintiffs their trading amounts, along with all outstanding DSP and RC, within that one month.

The plaintiff contends that the words ‘all dues’ in clause 7 of the contracts refer to the plaintiff’s trading capital of RM900,000, together with all unpaid DSP and RC. Upon termination, there no longer exists any relationship, contractual or otherwise, between the parties that would entitle the defendant to retain the trading capital funded by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff is relying on the case of Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 1 and submits that to show a good arguable case, it is sufficient for the Plaintiffs to show that “on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that they will obtain judgment against the appellants”. They need not show that they have a case so strong as to warrant summary judgment nor even a strong prima facie case.

Conversely, the defendant maintained that he did not receive any notice from the plaintiffs pursuant to clauses 7 and 11 of the RPC. According to the defendant, the plaintiffs failed to take necessary steps to terminate the Member Distributor of RPC. He also argued that there is no provision within the RPC requiring the defendant to return the money paid by the plaintiff as business capital. Consequently, the defendant is free to utilise the money for the business, and the plaintiffs will earn profit based on the percentage outlined in the RPC.

The defendant states the purpose of RPC in the RPC document, which is included in Exhibit B of Enclosure 5, as follows – In view of rising costs of living amid high inflation rate, depreciation of the Ringgit, economic slowdown, etc, the objectives of RPC is to create opportunities for people to increase their income and maximise their economic growth potential by growing their wealth at a much faster rate to beat inflation and be able to retire comfortably regardless of age and achieve financial freedom. In order to achieve this goal, RPC creates opportunities for people to be appointed as distributors for their range of food and beverages products.

This Court refers to the terms and conditions for becoming a member distributor of RPC, which can be found in Exhibit B of Enclosure 5. Clause 2 of RPC states as follows – In line with the objectives of RPC, everyone who wishes to be appointed as a Member Distributor must apply to be appointed as one by filling up the Member Distributorship Form and sign the Member Distributor Agreement.

25.

The Supreme Court in Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241, held the following - “At an interlocutory proceeding for an injunction, the court is not called upon nor is it desirable for the court to decide finally on the rights of the parties but the court must be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried. The court is not justified in embarking upon anything resembling the trial of the action upon conflicting affidavits nor to evaluate the strength of either party’s case.”

Having assessed the submissions made by both parties regarding the RPC terms and the parties' rights concerning the effect of terminating their membership, and guided by the principle in Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors (supra), it is the considered view of this Court that the plaintiffs have a good arguable case against the defendant. Issue 2: Whether the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction.

The ex parte Mareva injunction order was granted on 29.11.2024. The defendant was ordered to disclose the defendant’s assets within the jurisdiction in accordance with paragraphs B.6 and 7 of the said ex-parte order.

However, the defendant has neither complied nor attempted to comply with the said order. Consequently, the plaintiff seeks leave to commence committal proceedings against the defendant.

Although the defendant failed to submit an affidavit of disclosure of assets within the jurisdiction, this Court finds that the defendant indeed owns assets within the jurisdiction of this Court. The basis for this finding is as follows-

The defendant maintains a bank account under RETIREMENT PLANNERS & CONSULTANTS, Maybank Account No. 514356532438, as shown in Exhibit H of Enclosure 25. The investment fund is deposited into this account by the plaintiffs.

The land search on the land and transfer documents in Exhibit A of Enclosure 25 shows that prior to 12.12.2024, the defendant was the registered owner of the land held under GM2609 Lot 2443 Mukim Tanjong Besar, Daerah Lipis. Issue 3: Whether there was a real risk of dissipation of the defendant’s assets before judgment.

The main purpose of granting a Mareva injunction is to protect existing assets and prevent the defendant from dissipating assets outside the court's jurisdiction before a judgment is made.

In considering this issue, this Court is guided by the principle in Menk Sdn Bhd v Joerg Hugo Schmidt [2008] 3 MLRA 423, which held that - [31] Inexplicably, apart from the above excerpt, nothing was discussed about the danger of disposal of the assets defeating a judgment, a requirement that must be established as laid down by the Aspatra Sdn Bhd case. It is trite law that in order to succeed in a Mareva injunction application, dissipation of assets per se is incomplete unless the applicant also successfully establishes the fact that the dissipation are preemptive acts that would lead to an intentional stultifying of any judgment that may be obtained. The two ingredients must go hand in hand.

I also cite the case of S&F International Ltd v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] CLJ Rep 280, where the Federal Court stated that – The English Court of Appeal has also held in Campbell Mussells & Ors. v. Thompson & Anor., The Times, 30 May 1984 that a Mareva injunction was never intended to put a plaintiff in the position of a secured creditor and every case had to be dealt with on its own merits.

In brief, this Court must be satisfied that there is a real danger of the defendant dissipating his property before the judgment, in which the particular relevant facts must be affirmed in the plaintiffs’ affidavit.

The plaintiff averred that the Mareva injunction is to restrain the Defendant from dealing with all his assets, including all his money and immovable property, and is not limited to the RM900,000.00 trading amount, and the DSP and RC due and owing to the Plaintiffs, or the money in the Defendant’s RPC business.

The defendant submits that the plaintiffs, including all members of RPC, are aware that the RPC funds will be transferred to China. The defendant further averred that if he had acted in bad faith in transferring the funds from Malaysia overseas and in avoiding payment to the RPC members, he would not have informed them of his decision. The defendant invites this Court to examine the messages between him and the first defendant at Exhibit Y of the defendant’s affidavit in reply, and to interpret the message within its context.

Upon reading Exhibit Y of the defendant’s affidavit in reply, I find that it consists of only one page of a WhatsApp message between the first plaintiff and the defendant. It is unlikely to support the defendant's contention.

Furthermore, in Rebuttal Affidavit (Enclosure 41) the first plaintiff states as follows –

Having known of the ex parte Mareva Injunction, the defendant did not take steps to comply with the said Order or take steps to file an appearance in this Suit. Instead, the defendant acted in defiance of the said Order by dissipating his asset in the form of a piece of land held under Title No. GM 2609, Lot No, 2443, Mukim Tanjong Besar, District Lipis, State of Phanag (Land) by transferring his land to third parties on 12.12.2024.

In support of the alleged dissipation, the plaintiff pr a copy of the title search on the defendant’s land conducted on 3.1.2025, which shows that the land was sold and transferred by the defendant to Then Kong Yong, Liang Kah Choo, and Cheah Chee Kwong for the sum of RM900,000.

This Court finds that the disposal of the defendant’s land took place after the ex parte order of Mareva Injunction dated 29.11.2024 issued by this Court. The plaintiff has provided compelling evidence of both a genuine risk and the defendant's act of dissipation of assets prior to judgment. G.

Based on the reasons above, this Court allowed the plaintiff’s application for Enclosure 4 with costs. Dated: 24th July 2025. Signed HAZIZAH KASSIM Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya (NCvC 10) At Shah Alam, Selangor 1 For the Plaintiffs : Jeremy Khalif dan Olivia Lee Messrs Khalif Isaac Lee (Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur) 2 For the Defendant : Muhammed Zahid Hazim bin Kasim Messrs Yeoh & Partners (Petaling Jaya, Selangor)