In their book entitled “Tort”, Sweet & Maxwell’s Textbook Series, Paula Giliker and Silas Beckwith, the learned authors, wrote as follows on Lord Atkin’s “neighbour principle”: “2-008 In 1932, the House of Lords decided the famous case of Donoghue v Stevenson. The facts of the case have 10 become legendary, although it shoud be noted that, because the case was decided by the House of Lords on a point of law and was then settled before going to trial, these facts were never actually proved. … 15 At first sight, it seemed that the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson had simply added yet another category to the separate instances of negligence recognized by the law. What has become significant about the case, however, is Lord Atkin’s analysis of the law and his 20 subsequent formulation of a general principle for determining the existence of a duty of care. This is what Lord Atkin said: “… in English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty 25 of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence … is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any 30 moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of 185 law arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. 5 You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by 10 my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.” 15 Lord Atkin’s general principle contained two elements. First, there was the element of “reasonable foreseeability”. Thus, a duty of care would be owed where the defendant ought reasonably to foresee that this failure to take care may cause injury to 20 another. (This, of course, is the same as what Brett M.R. had said in Heaven v Pender.) The second element was the test of “neighbourhood” – a duty of care would be owed only where the claimant was “closely and directly” affected by the defendant’s 25 conduct. Brett, M.R.’s simple test of foreseeability of harm, therefore, became qualified by the additional need to show, as Lord Atkin put it, a degree of “proximity” between the claimant and the defendant, not in the sense of physical proximity, but in the 30 sense of “close and direct relations”. Lord Atkin’s general test of foreseeability plus “proximity”, then, gave the courts a basis on which the existence of a duty of care could be decided in all cases. It allowed them to view negligence as a tort in 35 186 its own right, capable of being developed to meet any new factual situation which arose. It is important, however, not to overestimate the significance of Lord Atkin’s general principle. It has already been noted that, in modern times, it is recognized 5 that this principle alone fails to provide a workable solution to the problem of imposing a duty of care. The principle suffers from a number of fundamental flaws. First, although Lord Atkin speaks of “acts or omissions”, we shall see that the law treats liability for acts very 10 differently from liability for omissions. Secondly, as the law has developed, it has become clear that, besides identifying the defendant’s “neighbour”, it is also necessary to identify the type of loss which the “neighbour” is likely to suffer (or, in other words, the type 15 of interest which the claimant is seeking to use the law to protect) before any decision can be made about whether to impose o duty of care. Lord Atkin’s words, spoken in the context of personal injury caused by a defective product, gave little indication of the degree of “proximity” 20 which would be required in other factual situations. We shall see that, especially where other types of harm are in issue, the courts, for policy reasons, have had to say that a far greater degree of “proximity” is required in some situations than in others. In Donoghue v 25 Stevenson, Lord Atkin observed: There will no doubt arise cases where it will be difficult to determine whether the contemplated relationship is so close that the duty arises. 30 Such prescience, it will be seen, was all too accurate. The second step: applying the general principle 187 2-009 Without Lord Atkin’s “neighbour principle”, the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson would simply have been another isolated example of negligence liability.” What is the 1st defendant’s proven case?