EU Yeok Siew v Raja Ira Benazir Binti Raja Ahmad Azizan (WA-22NCC-370-06/2025)

The 2nd Defendant D2 filed a notice of application dated 1.12.2025 in Enclosure 55 to strike out the Plaintiffs claim. The striking out application is made under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012.

On 7.1.2026, I allowed striking out application in Enclosure 55. Here are the grounds of my decision. The 2nd

The grounds for striking out as stated in Enclosure 55 reads : 4) Plaintif-Plaintif telah pada 21.8.2025 merekodkan satu Penghakiman Persetujuan dengan Defendan Pertama, yang menyelesaikan secara penuh, muktamad dan menyeluruh segala tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap Defendan Pertama. Penghakiman Persetujuan tersebut menegaskan bahawa tiada lagi apa-apa liabiliti, tuntutan, atau relif yang kekal terhadap Defendan Pertama dalam tindakan ini. 5) Penghakiman Persetujuan tersebut merupakan perkembangan fakta yang material, relevan, dan substantif, kerana ia secara langsung melupuskan punca tindakan yang sama yang sebelum ini di gantungkan terhadap kedua - dua Defendan. Tambahan pula, Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif-konspirasi . Sekiranya salah satu pihak kononnya berkonspirasi telah di lepaskan sepenuhnya melalui suatu Penghakiman Persetujuan, tuduhan konspirasi tersebut tidak lagi boleh di kekalkan dari segi undang-undang. 6) Adalah bertentangan dengan undang-undang bagi Plaintif-Plaintif untuk menyelesaikan sepenuhnya dengan salah satu pengkomplot (conspirator), namun mengekalkan tuntutan terhadap pihak yang lain seolah - olah wujud konspirasi unilateral, yang merupakan suatu yang bercanggah. Ini mewujudkan ketidakselarasan undang-undang yang ketara dan ketidakadilan yang jelas, kerana premis konspirasi memerlukan tindakan bersama bukan satu pihak sahaja. 7) Di sisi undang-undang, prinsip berkaitan joint tortfeasors seperti yang di nyatakan di dalam kes Duck v Mayeu [1892] 2 QB 511 adalah terpakai. Sekiranya Plaintif-Plaintif mendakwa bahawa Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua merupakan tortfeasor bersama atas punca tindakan yang sama, pelepasan dan penyelesaian penuh terhadap salah satu tortfeasor bersama tersebut membawa kesan undang-undang bahawa liabiliti terhadap tortfeasor bersama yang lain turut di lupuskan. Ini kerana liabiliti mereka adalah bersifat bersama dan tidak boleh di pecahkan. Plaintif-Plaintif tidak boleh, setelah memilih untuk melepaskan salah seorang tortfeasor bersama melalui Penghakiman Persetujuan, mengekalkan tindakan terhadap tortfeasor bersama yang lain berdasarkan punca tindakan yang sama. 8) Tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif meneruskan tuntutan terhadap Defendan Kedua setelah melupuskan punca tindakan yang sama melalui Penghakiman Persetujuan adalah bertentangan dengan prinsip undang-undang yang mantap, termasuk res judicata, isu estoppel, serta merupakan suatu bentuk penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah (abuse of process). Plaintif-Plaintif tidak boleh, setelah mengesahkan dan menerima penyelesaian penuh dan melepaskan salah satu pihak yang di katakan berkonspirasi tetapi menuntut relief yang sama terhadap pihak lain sebagai sandaran (backup) sekiranya penyelesaian mereka dengan Defendan Pertama gagal. Pendekatan ini adalah tidak adil, manipulatif, dan tidak di sokong oleh undang-undang. 9) Penyelesaian Plaintif-Plaintif dengan Defendan Pertama menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah memilih untuk menerima manfaat daripada penyelesaian tersebut serta mengiktiraf bahawa pertikaian substantif telah di lupuskan. Setelah Plaintif-Plaintif sendiri memilih untuk menamatkan dan menggugurkan punca tindakan secara keseluruhan terhadap Defendan Pertama, asas untuk mengekalkan tuntutan yang sama terhadap Defendan Kedua turut hilang dan tidak lagi wujud secara undang-undang. 10) Berdasarkan keadaan tersebut, Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif kini gagal mendedahkan sebarang punca tindakan yang wajar, munasabah, atau berasaskan undang-undang terhadap Defendan Kedua. Kedudukan Plaintif-Plaintif, melepaskan salah satu pihak kononnya berkonspirasi tetapi mengekalkan tindakan terhadap pihak yang lain, memecahkan dan menggugurkan keseluruhan struktur dakwaan konspirasi dalam tuntutan mereka. Punca tindakan yang sama telah di lupuskan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif sendiri melalui suatu penghakiman yang muktamad. 11) Meneruskan prosiding ini hanya terhadap Defendan Kedua dalam keadaan punca tindakan telah di lupuskan dan / atau berasakan pada konspirasi adalah suatu tindakan yang opresif, berniat jahat (malicious), tidak berasas, dan penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. Ia jelas menunjukkan Plaintif-Plaintif cuba mengekalkan Defendan Kedua Defendan Pertama tidak berhasil adalah suatu tindakan yang tidak adil, tidak munasabah, dan tidak boleh di benarkan. 16) Tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif ini merupakan cubaan mendapatkan manfaat Plaintif-Plaintif tidak boleh menikmati penyelesaian penuh terhadap Defendan Pertama sambil mengekalkan tuntutan yang sama terhadap Defendan Kedua. 19) Oleh itu, tindakan ini patut dan wajar di batalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (1) (a) dan / atau (b) dan / atau (c) dan / atau (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana : a) ia tidak mendedahkan punca tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Defendan Kedua memandangkan punca tindakan telah di lupuskan melalui Penghakiman Persetujuan; b) ia bersifat menaikkan prejudis dan menyusahkan Defendan Kedua, dalam keadaan tiada lagi isu substantif yang wujud; c) ia adalah bersifat vexatious dan opresif, kerana Plaintif-Plaintif cuba mengekalkan tuntutan yang pada hakikatnya telah terhapus; dan d) ia merupakan penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah yang nyata, kerana tindakan ini tidak lagi memenuhi apa-apa tujuan perundangan yang sah selain menekan Defendan Kedua secara tidak wajar. The law on striking out

Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC 2012 is settled. It is only in a plain and obvious case that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule. This summary procedure should only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim is on the face of it obviously unsustainable. It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action. (See the Supreme Court decision in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36).

The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claim is frivolous or vexatious. The court is not concerned at this stage with the merits of the claim. So long as the pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by the judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out.

In Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v British - American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606 at 612, the Supreme Court remarked that the lower court should have scrutinized the evidence in order to decide whether the action was bound to fail. The Supreme Court said that an action can be summarily disposed if there is an absence of conflict of material evidence or of conflict of affidavits on material points. So that seemingly triable or difficult issues could be readily decided in such a way as to lead to the conclusion that the action was bound to fail.

In a suit involving complex questions of law but where the essential facts are not in dispute, the complexity of the questions of law should not be a reason for refusing relief under Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC 2012. If satisfied that the questions of law are unarguable, the court is not law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer to understan Khairy Jamaluddin v [2013] 4 MLJ 173 at 182).

Applying these legal principles, it is my finding that action against D2 is obviously unsustainable in view of the consent judgment dated 21.8.2025, and the settlement thereunder between the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant.

to trial. This is therefore a plain and obvious case for striking out. Here is my explanation. The consent settlement between the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant 40) Based on the above, Yeok [1st Plaintiff] and Kenny [2nd Plaintiff] pleads that Raja Ira [1st Defendant] and Teng Hui [2nd Defendant] had conspired and / or acted in concert through unlawful means, by procuring and / or enticing and / or fraudulently misrepresenting to Yeok and Kenny to invest monies in the Investment Scheme, and further receiving monies from Yeok and Kenny, which resulted in loss and damage to Yeok and Kenny and / or depriving Yeok and Kenny of their Balance Principal Investment Amount respectively. It is hereby adjudged by consent on this day with admission as to liability by the 1st Defendant that : 1) the 1st Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiffs the sum of RM 1,100,000.00 forthwith; 2) the Plaintiffs shall, after the 1st Defendant having entered into a consent judgment in Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Suit No. WA - 22 NCvC - 674 - 10 / A herein, withdraw this action against the 1st Defendant without liberty to file afresh; 3) the Plaintiffs shall only file execution proceedings against the 1st Defendant in the event the 1st Judgment fails or if minute 12 (b) of the Suit 674 Consent Judgment is not complied with; 4) nd Defendant in this action shall not be affected and / or extinguished by this Consent Judgment;

This is legally determinative. It is not merely procedural or collateral, The cause of action and therefore operates as an accord and satisfaction, automatically discharging D2.

T action against D2 is inextricably tied to the very allegations resolved by the consent settlement between the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant. Once one party to the alleged conspiracy is no longer a defendant, the claim collapses for want of substratum.

By their own election, the Plaintiffs have released one of the alleged conspirators from liability. In law, that election carries unavoidable consequences. ith the 1st Defendant has :

extinguished the common cause of action relied upon against both Defendants;

rendered the conspiracy claim legally impossible to sustain; and

converted the continuation of proceedings against D2 into an abuse of process.

The Plaintiffs are now attempting to retain D2 as a contingency defendant, in the event their settlement with the 1st Defendant does not ultimately yield the recovery they desire. Such litigation conduct is impermissible and in violation of established legal principle. The continuation of this action against D2, after the Plaintiffs have compromised with the 1st Defendant, constitutes an abuse of the process of the court. The release rule in Duck v Mayeu

The release rule in respect of a joint tortfeasor is stated in Duck v Mayeu [1892] 2 QB 511, and applies to the present facts.

In Duck v Mayeu, the English Court of Appeal held that where a plaintiff releases one joint tortfeasor, it operates as a discharge of the other joint tortfeasor. release granted to one joint tortfeasor, or to one joint debtor, operates as a discharge of the other joint tortfeasor, or the other joint debtor, the reason being that the cause of action, which is one and indivisible, having been released, all persons otherwise liable thereto are consequently released.

The entire cause of action is extinguished. The plaintiff is thus barred from maintaining the same claim against the remaining alleged tortfeasor.

This is not a technical or procedural rule. It is a principle grounded in fairness, legal consistency, and the prevention of abuse of judicial process. A plaintiff cannot both affirm and destroy the same cause of action.

Once the Plaintiffs elected to compromise and release the 1st Defendant, they removed the legal foundation of their claim. There is nothing left upon which the suit against D2 can stand.

T 2 arises from the same alleged wrong which formed the basis of the claim against the 1st Defendant. By releasing the 1st Defendant through the consent settlement, the Plaintiffs have extinguished the indivisible cause of action. To permit continuation against D2 would offend the settled common law principle.

A similar situation may be seen in Dato Abdullah bin Ahmad & Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2001] MLJU 638.

In that case, Dato Abdullah took a facility from BBMB. He pledged shares as security for the facility. He failed to repay the sums owing. BBMB sold the shares to Dato Azizuddin.

Dato Abdullah then filed the 1st suit (D1 - 22 - 2101 - 90). In the 1st suit, he named BBMB and Dato Azizuddin as defendants. Dato Abdullah alleged that BBMB conspired and colluded with Dato Azizuddin to deprive him of the shares and to cheat him.

Dato Azizuddin (defendant in the 1st suit) then filed a 2nd suit (D3 - 22 - 1178 - 92). In gist, Dato Azizuddin sought various reliefs to cause the share purchase to be effectuated and for dividends on the shares to be channelled to him. Dato Abdullah was named as a defendant.

Dato Abdullah then settled the 1st suit with BBMB. As a result of the settlement, the 1st suit was withdrawn against BBMB. However, Dato Abdullah maintained his allegations of conspiracy and collusion against Dato Zainuddin.

The High Court held that Dato Abdullah By effecting the settlement against BBMB, the entire allegation of conspiracy and collusion would fall : vide the 1st suit and the counterclaim by BBMB in that suit has been withdrawn and settled respectively on 4 April 1997. Hence, what is clear is that BBMB is no longer a party to these proceedings. I would think the same goes for their claim that BBMB colluded with the Ahmad Azizuddin group and acted with an intention to cheat so as to deprive the Abdullah group of the benefit of the said shares. I cannot see how a charge of collusion in a suit can stand when one of the two persons who are parties to the alleged understanding or conspiracy is no longer a party to the suit. Since BBMB has now ceased to be party, I would think that the charge of collusion and acting with an intention to cheat against BBMB and the Ahmad Azizuddin group can no longer be pursued by the Abdullah group. For the charge of collusion and acting with an intention to cheat, the Abdullah group would have to prove that there was an arrangement between BBMB and the Ahmad Azizuddin group to plan and prepare an unlawful or harmful act, namely -

that BBMB will secretly sell and the Ahmad Azizuddin group will secretly buy the said shares;

(ii) that BBMB and the Ahmad Azizuddin group are hostile towards the Abdullah group; and

(iii) that BBMB and the Ahmad Azizuddin group have conspired to injure the Abdullah group by depriving the same of the said shares and that they have done so with an intention to cheat. With BBMB now no longer a party, I cannot see how the charge of collusion can now remain an issue. It is my view that the substratum of the claim by the Abdullah group against BBMB and the Ahmad Azizuddin group evaporated the moment BBMB ceased to be a party to these proceedings.

A similar position was observed by the Privy Council in Village Cay Marina Ltd v Acland and others (1996) 52 WIR 238. There, a claim for conspiracy was brought against several purported tortfeasors, including for alleged conspiracy. Prior to the claim being filed, the plaintiffs had executed a release agreement with VCM, the receiver.

The plaintiffs then sued the receiver and several other parties, alleging conspiracy. The Privy Council, agreeing with the trial judge, held that the release would extinguish the cause of action for conspiracy against the remaining alleged conspirators : The next question is whether the discharge, release and extinguishment - conspirators and joint tortfeasors (Barclays, Mr Acland, Landac and Rhyto). For guidance on the answer to that question, I invoke the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Duck v Mayeu [1892] 2 QB 511. There, A L Smith LJ said (at page 513) : release granted to one joint tortfeasor, or to one joint debtor, operates as a discharge of the other joint tortfeasor, or the other joint debtor, the reason being that the cause of action, which is one and indivisible, having been released, all persons otherwise liable thereto are consequently released. In the present case, we are not confronted with a covenant not to sue a joint tortfeasor or a joint debtor. The VCM - receiver release is a positive and unequivocal release and discharge of the receiver from all legal liability to VCM. The VCM - receiver release therefore has the legal effect of releasing and - conspirators and joint tortfeasors (Barclays, Mr Acland, Landac and Rhyto) from all legal liabilities in respect of the alleged fraud and conspiracy and has the legal effect of extinguishing all rights of action which VCM may have had against the alleged co - conspirators in respect of the alleged fraud and conspiracy. The releases and discharges of the respondents thus render it unnecessary to determine whether the respondents in fact committed any tort against VCM before the execution of the VCM -

The Plaintiffs cannot approbate and reprobate by settling with one alleged conspirator, while continuing to litigate the same cause of action against another. (See the Court of Appeal cases of Kelana Megah Development Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Another Appeal [2016] 8 CLJ 804 at 814 - 815; Cheah Theam Kheng v City Centre Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) & other appeals [2012] 2 CLJ 16; [2012] 1 MLJ 761 at 791; Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Irham Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 1 CLJ 491; [2011] 1 MLJ 752 at 778 - 779). The conspiracy claim is legally unsustainable

A conspiracy requires two or more persons acting with a common design. Conspiracy, by definition, requires at least two conspirators acting pursuant to a common design.

Once the Plaintiffs executed a release of the 1st Defendant, there ceased to exist :- (a) any co - conspirator; (b) any combination; (c) any actionable conspiracy; and (d) any factual or legal basis for a conspiracy claim.

A conspiracy claim against a single remaining defendant is legally cannot be salvaged by amendment.

A case on point is & Ors [2013] MLRHU 421, which addressed the effect of a consent settlement on a conspiracy claim against alleged joint tortfeasors. There, the High Court considered a conspiracy claim brought against multiple defendants where the plaintiff had entered into a consent order compromising its claims.

In MBF Holdings, the High Court addressed the legal consequence of releasing one alleged conspirator. The court concluded that the plaintiff s cause of action ceased to exist and is extinguished as against the remaining defendants. The plaintiff is therefore estopped from bringing the claims against the remaining defendants.

The High Court said : [55] Salmon J in Cutler v MacPhail [1962] 2 All ER 292 said : The points raised on release are extremely interesting and by no means easy. The principle is quite plain, that if there is a release of one joint torfeasor, the cause of action against all the other joint tortfeasors is extinguished; on the other hand, if there is merely an agreement not to sue one of several joint tortfeasors, the cause of action does not die and the other tortfeasors can properly be sued. [56] In Gladman Commercial Properties v. Fisher Hargreaves Proctor [2013] EWHC 25 (Ch) Justice Arnold referred to Clerk & Lindsell on Torts which states at para 31 - 16 : The general rule at common law is that where there is a joint cause of action against two or more persons, a discharge as against one of them operates as a discharge against all. If accord be made with one joint tortfeasor and satisfaction accepted, or if he be released, all others are discharged. [57] Justice Arnold explained in his judgment that the rationale : ... for the rule given by AL Smith LJ in Duck v. Mayeu [1892] 2 QB 511 at 513 : the cause of action, which is one and indivisible, having been released, all persons otherwise liable thereto are consequently released . In other words, joint tortfeasors are liable in respect of the same tort. Thus joint tortfeasance creates a form of accessory liability for parties who do not personally commit the tortious act. The rule also has the advantage of avoiding a claim for contribution by an unreleased joint tortfeasor against a released tortfeasor if the former is subsequently sued by the claimant who settled with the latter. [58] On the true construction of the terms of the Consent Order the purpose and the intent of the parties compromising the claims was to release and settle all the claims against each other and to achieve finality of the claims between the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant to the 3rd Defendants. The release of the 1st Defendant - the 3rd Defendant means the release of all the co - conspirators as joint tortfeasors. The full satisfaction of the loss claimed by the payment of the Settlement Sum means that no further loss to be claimed from the concurrent tortfeasors for the loss of the Taylors Shares. The release and discharge of one tortfeasor by way of compromise, accord and satisfaction releases all other joint tortfeasors. Therefore, the answer to Question (2) is also in the affirmative. Accordingly consequent upon the 2009 Consent Order and the Solicitor's Letter, the Plaintiff s cause of action and / or relief sought in this action cease to exist and are extinguished as against the Remaining Defendants. The Plaintiff s are therefore estopped or otherwise precluded from bringing the claims and / or relief as against the Defendants.

Applying the above to the present case :

First, the Plaintiffs themselves plead that the Defendants acted pursuant to a single alleged conspiracy, causing injury and loss to the Plaintiffs. This squarely attracts the doctrine of joint tortfeasance as explained in MBF Holdings.

Second, the Plaintiffs entered into a consent judgment as a full and final settlement of their claims against the 1st Defendant, with quantified relief. As held in MBF Holdings, once the court construes a consent order as achieving finality in respect of the loss, the conspiracy cause of action is extinguished in law. submission

According to the Plaintiffs, the 1st Defendant has not made any payment to them to satisfy the consent judgment. This is because the 1st Defendant suit 674 was delayed as a result of a private caveat that is lodged by an unrelated third party on her Bangsar property. The plaintiff in Suit 674 has since applied to remove the private caveat.

The Plaintiffs submit that there remains a reasonable cause of action against D2, notwithstanding their entry into the consent settlement with the 1st Defendant, for the following reasons :

The 1st Defendant has not made any payment to the Plaintiffs to satisfy the consent judgment;

Even if the consent settlement is satisfied (which it is not at this point in time), the consent judgment is not intended to fix a full measure of loss suffered by the Plaintiffs for these reasons :

The sum to be satisfied by the 1st Defendant pursuant to the consent settlement is RM 1,100,000, which is less than the sum of RM 1,225,000 claimed by the Plaintiffs in the statement of claim;

(ii) If the 1st Defendant wholly satisfies the agreed sum of RM 1,100,000 pursuant to the consent judgment, the Plaintiffs are still allowed to pursue the balance sum of RM 125,000 against D2;

(iii) Paragraph 4 of the consent judgment has expressly stated that nst the 2nd Defendant in this action shall not be affected and / or extinguished by this

I disagree. First, the release rule (reflected in the case of Duck v Mayeu) operates as a matter of the law. Such legal consequence cannot be overridden by paragraph 4 of the consent judgment. Parties cannot, by agreement, preserve a cause of action that is legally non - existent.

Thus, th invocation of paragraph 4 of the consent judgment is misconceived. T the application of the release rule. The Plaintiffs cannot avoid the operation of the release rule by pointing to an alleged reservation of rights.

Second, the Plaintiffs are still allowed to pursue a balance sum of RM 125,000 against D2 is an afterthought. At a case will withdraw the action against the 2nd Defendant pending settlement payment by the 1st Defendant.

There was no mention that the action will be pursued against D2 for a balance sum of RM 125,000. Clearly they intended to discontinue the action against D2 upon receiving payment from the 1st Defendant. They are simply using the paltry sum of RM 125,000 as an excuse to keep D2 as a contingency defendant.

That this is an afterthought is evident from the prayers in the statement of claim, which reads :

Wherefore, Yeok [1st Plaintiff] claims the following :

51.1 A declaration that the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for damages of RM 575,000.00;

51.2 An order that the Defendants pay damages of RM 575,000.00 to Yeok; and 51.3 Alternatively, an order for restitution against the Defendants for unjust enrichment.

Wherefore, Kenny [2nd Plaintiff] claims the following :

52.1 A declaration that the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for damages of RM 650,000.00;

52.2 An order that the Defendants pay damages of RM 650,000.00 to Kenny; and 52.3 Alternatively, an order for restitution against the Defendants for unjust enrichment;

RM 1,225,000 as such. Instead, the 1st Plaintiff is claiming a sum of RM 575,000 against both Defendants jointly and severally. While the 2nd Plaintiff is claiming a sum of RM 650,000 against both Defendants jointly and severally. Incidentally, the 1st Plaintiff and the 2nd Plaintiff are siblings.

Under the terms of the consent judgment, the 1st Defendant is to pay to the Plaintiffs the sum of RM 1,100,000. It is not stated how this sum of RM 1,100,000 shall be apportioned between the 1st Plaintiff and the 2nd Plaintiff respectively.

It is unclear who would pursue the balance sum of RM 125,000 against D2. Would it be the 1st Plaintiff or the 2nd Plaintiff? I think the reality of the situation is that payment of the settlement sum of RM 1,100,000 by the 1st Defendant would end this entire action. There would be no residual claim maintained against D2.

- satisfaction of the consent settlement conflates enforcement risk with legal viability. The statement of claim remains defective irrespective of whether any payment has been made by the 1st Defendant.

Any breach of the consent judgment i.e. non - payment of the settlement sum, does not allow the Plaintiffs to re - litigate this matter. In this regard, the liability of the 1st Defendant has already been established. admission as to liability by the 1st Defendant The Plaintiffs can only premise their action on the breach of the consent judgment.

The Plaintiffs keep D2 on the hook, supposedly because they have yet to receive payment of the settlement sum from the 1st Defendant, is mischievous. The effect of the consent settlement is to bring the cause of action to an end, leaving only rights of enforcement under the consent judgment. If the 1st Defendant fails to pay, the Plaintiffs will have to file execution proceedings against the 1st Defendant paragraph 3 of the consent judgment) to recover the settlement sum.

purported preservation of the action against D2 is an attempt to convert a binding consent settlement into a recovery strategy. Making D2 as a contingency defendant, in the event the 1st Defendant does not satisfy the terms of the consent judgment, is legally impermissible. Conclusion

For the reasons above, I allowed striking out application in Enclosure 55. I awarded costs of RM 10,000 to D2. Dated 9 February 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Elizabeth Lau Yuen Jin, Hugo Ng Yong Zheng and Hazel Siau Ju Shuen (Messrs. Elizabeth Lau) for the Plaintiffs Bhavanash Sharma a/l Gurchan Singh and Gheetal Kaur a/p Joginder Singh (Messrs. Bhavanash Sharma) for the 2nd Defendant Case reference 1. Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36 2. Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v British - American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606 3. [2013] 4 MLJ 173 4. Duck v Mayeu [1892] 2 QB 511 5. Dato Abdullah bin Ahmad & Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2001] MLJU 638 6. Village Cay Marina Ltd v Acland and others (1996) 52 WIR 238 7. Kelana Megah Development Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Another Appeal [2016] 8 CLJ 804 8. Cheah Theam Kheng v City Centre Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) & other appeals [2012] 2 CLJ 16; [2012] 1 MLJ 761 9. Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Irham Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 1 CLJ 491; [2011] 1 MLJ 752 10. [2013] MLRHU 421 Legislation reference 1. Order 18 rule 19 (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012