1. ) Falconer Chester Hall (UK) Limited v 1. ) Lfe Engineering Sdn Bhd (WA-22C-80-10/2019)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR CIVIL SUIT NO. WA-22C-80-10/2019

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(ii) alternatively, that the damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court deems fit;

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(iii) cost; and

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(iv) such further and other relief this Honourable Court deems fit. [7] The Second Defendant counterclaimed for the following against the Plaintiff:

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(ii) a declaration pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of the Architects Act 1967 that the Plaintiffs are barred from claiming fees, disbursement or other consideration;

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(iii) a declaration that the Second Plaintiff did not provide any services to any parties and the invoices issued by the Second Plaintiff are null and void under the Architects Act 1967 and the Service Tax Act 1975; S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA

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(iv) a declaration that the deed of novation dated 30.08.2016 entered into by the First Plaintiff, Second Plaintiff, First Defendant and Second Defendant are null and void;

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(vi) interest;

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(vii) costs. [8] The First Defendant counterclaimed the following from the Second Defendant:

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(ii) an order that SCSB do forthwith pay to LFE Engineering all sums due or found to be due from LFE Engineering to the Plaintiffs in the present proceedings;

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(iii) interest; S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA

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(iv) costs;

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(ii) Ar. Ahmad Farid bin Baharuddin (PW2), a director of RSP Architects Sdn Bhd. [12] The First Defendant called the following witnesses:

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(ii) Ar. Khoo Peng Lim (DW2), a director of KW Associate Architects Sdn Bhd as the First Defendant’s expert witness on the valuation of the costs of works; [13] The Second Defendant called the following witnesses:

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(ii) Asia binti Hj. Mohamed (DW4), group chief executive of human and shared services department of the Second Defendant; and

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(ii) Mohamad Ngadi bin Leber (DW5), former chief executive officer of Shapadu Properties Sdn Bhd which is a related company of the Second Defendant. [14] I also appointed Sr. Dainna binti Baharuddin (CW1), a director of Basar & Harun Sdn Bhd as the court appointed expert witness on the valuation of the costs of works. [15] After the close of the trial, the parties simultaneously furnished their respective closing written submissions in chief followed by their respective closing submissions in reply. Oral submissions of counsel and clarifications were held on 1 July 2022. S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [16] I thereafter deferred my decision to deliberate on the arguments put forth by them. [17] Now having duly considered all the evidence adduced as well as submissions and arguments advanced by the parties, I give my decision below together with the supporting grounds. Background Facts [18] The Second Defendant is the developer of the proposed SCSB City Village Development Project in Precinct 2, Putrajaya (“Project”). [19] In early 2014, the group executive director, Dato’ Rosthman Ibrahim of the Second Defendant met PW1 of the First Plaintiff to provide architectural consultancy services for the Project. The Second Defendant represented to the First Plaintiff that the estimated total construction costs of the Project is RM350,000,000.00. [20] Since the First Plaintiff is a foreign architect, the Second Defendant requested the First Plaintiff to incorporate a Malaysian branch as well as collaborate with a Malaysian registered architect. S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [21] The First Plaintiff acceded to the Second Defendant’s request and the Second Defendant hence by a letter of appointment dated 4 February 2014 (“Contract”) appointed the First Plaintiff to provide consultancy architectural services for the Project. The Contract is reproduced below: S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [22] Consequently, the First Plaintiff further set up the Second Plaintiff on 5 June 2014 as well as entered into a collaboration agreement with RSP Architects Sdn Bhd (“RSPA”) on 18 February 2014. [23] The Plaintiffs thereafter on 30 November 2014 entered into a deed of novation and variation with the Second Defendant (“Deed”). The Deed is reproduced below: S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [24] As the provision of the architectural consultancy services progressed on a fast track basis, the Plaintiffs issued their fee note no. 001 dated 26 May 2014 amounting to RM878,267.04 and fee note no. 002 dated 5 December 2014 amounting to RM482,752.98 which were both duly paid by the Second Defendant. [25] The Second Plaintiff through RSPA accordingly obtained the development approval order from Putrajaya Corporation. [26] Thereafter between 2014 and 2017, the Plaintiffs carried out value engineering and re-design services to increase floor space but reduce total construction costs of the Project at the request of the Second Defendant. [27] In the meanwhile, the Second Defendant by a letter of appointment dated 15 January 2016 appointed the First Defendant as the project management consultant of the project and the Plaintiffs were accordingly informed that the First Defendant would manage and coordinate with all consultants of the Project for an on behalf of the Second Defendant. [28] Subsequently by a novation agreement dated 30 August 2016 made between the Plaintiffs, First Defendant and Second Defendant (“Novation Agreement”), the First Defendant would assume all responsibilities of the Second Defendant under the Contract. The Novation Agreement is reproduced below: S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [29] The Plaintiffs later on 31 May 2017 before the submission of application for building plan approval to Putrajaya Corporation were served with a stop work order not to proceed with further provision of architectural consultancy services of the Project. [30] As the result, the Plaintiffs issued its fee note no. 019 dated 8 May 2019 amounting to RM2,779,320.58 and fee note no. 020 of the same date amounting to RM83,769.70 totalling to RM2,863,090.28. [31] Since the Defendants failed, neglected or refused to pay the Plaintiffs the sum of RM2,863,090.28 as invoiced, the Plaintiffs therefore instituted this suit. Findings of the Court Proper Parties to the Contract [32] It is not in dispute that the Contract was initially entered into between the Second Defendant and the First Plaintiff followed by the Deed that substituted the First Plaintiff with the Plaintiffs. S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [33] Additionally, it is also not in dispute that by the Novation Agreement, the Contract and Deed have been novated from the Second Defendant to the First Defendant. [34] In the premises and based on clauses 16 to 18 of the Novation Agreement, I find and hold that the obligation to pay the Plaintiffs in respect of the architectural consultancy services rendered for the Project lies with the First Defendant. In other words, the privity of contract is between the Plaintiffs and the First Defendant. There is no longer any privity of contract between the Plaintiffs and the Second Defendant; see Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd v Dynaforce Corporation Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 533 and University of Malaya (University Malaya Medical Centre) v FBSM CTech Sdn Bhd [2018] 8 CLJ 71 Nevertheless based on clause 15 (b) of the Novation Agreement, the Second Defendant shall indemnify the First Defendant for any unpaid fees in respect of the Plaintiffs’ architectural consultancy services rendered for the Project prior to the effective date of the Novation Agreement on 30 August 2016. Effect of Plaintiffs as Unregistered Architects [35] The Plaintiffs contended that they are entitled to be paid for the architectural consultancy services rendered notwithstanding the statutory provisions in ss. 7 and 7A of the Architects Act 1967 (“AA”). In this respect, the Plaintiffs submitted the services rendered by the Plaintiffs do S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA not fall under the ambit of s. 7(c) of the AA because the Plaintiffs collaborated with RSPA which is a locally registered architect and sanctioned by the Defendants in the Novation Agreement. In the premises, the Plaintiffs, particularly the First Plaintiff had been the main design consultant. [36] Furthermore, the Plaintiffs submitted that since the Defendants are at all material times aware and had acquiesced to the Plaintiffs albeit unregistered under the AA but collaborated with RSPA, the Defendants must accordingly be estopped from relying on the statutory provisions of the AA following Owen Sim Liang Khui v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd & Anor [1996] 4 CLJ 716 FC. [37] The Defendants refuted and contended that the Plaintiffs having been unregistered under the AA plainly ran foul of the statutory requirements and cannot consequently be paid following Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak [2004] 2 MLJ 414 CA affirming The Government of Sarawak v Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd [2000] 7 CLJ 228 and Luxor Holdings Sdn Bhd v Hainal-Konyi

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(1) In this Act unless the context otherwise requires - "Architect" means a person registered under subsection 10(2); "architectural consultancy practice" means a sole proprietorship, partnership or body corporate incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, providing architectural consultancy services and is registered by the Board under section 7A or 7B; "architectural consultancy services" means the provision of architectural consultancy advice and services pertaining to all or any of the following:

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(ii) bearing any other word whatsoever in any language which may reasonably be construed to imply that he is an Architect;

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(1) Subject to this section and such conditions as the Board may think fit to impose, the Board may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, approve the registration as an Architect of any foreign architect who is a consultant to a project, wholly financed by a foreign government or implemented under any form of arrangement with the Government of Malaysia. [39] There have to-date been numerous cases that concerned unregistered architect(s) and/or engineer(s) who claimed for unpaid fees for construction consultancy services rendered. Many concerned only unregistered local architects/engineers. However in The Government of Sarawak v Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd (supra) that involved an unregistered company jointly owned and managed by the collaboration of an unregistered foreign architect and an unregistered local engineer, Ian HC Chin J held as follows: “If SMI and PU or SM and Abdullah Mohd Noor had claimed for the professional fees they would not be entitled since they are not registered under the relevant acts. Why, then, should the claimant be entitled to claim for the same fees under the name of the claimant when not only SMI and PU but SM and Abdullah Mohd Noor and the claimant were not registered to practice under the relevant Acts? That was the result of the decision of the two arbitrators when they sought to justify their decision by saying that the claimant was not performing but providing for the services. It is precisely that a corporate entity like the claimant cannot by themselves perform the services since such can only be performed by individuals that s. 7A was enacted to prevent the claimant from saying that they did not but someone else performed the services. If the argument of the two arbitrators can be upheld it would mean that a corporate entity need never apply for the approval to practise while allowing unregistered persons to practise under its umbrella. This would render s. 7A completely useless… … S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA The works of an architect can also be glimpsed from the laws or by-laws governing the construction of a building. Under s. 8 of the Sarawak Building Ordinance 1994, plans and specifications must be submitted for the approval of the local authority before any person can erect any building. Under bylaw 1(2) of the building by-laws, the plan drawing or calculation must be submitted by a qualified person which is the architect registered under the Architects Act. With that understanding of the meaning of that phrase I turn to the decision of Ong Teong Pin v Sim Kwan Meng & Anor. In that case a design consultant was engaged by a principal consultant to provide an overall image of a proposed hotel, the functional arrangement of the various parts of the hotel building and also the functional arrangement of its operation aspect. The design consultant worked on the design concept in Singapore but presented and explained the same to the developer of the hotel in Miri, Sarawak. That was the work as far as the design consultant was concerned with the principal consultant following it up, like working out the detail plans and submitting the same for approval. The design consultant was paid RM80,000 out of RM220,000. To a claim for the balance, one of the defence was that the contract providing for the services is illegal being in violation of s. 7(1)(c) of the Architect Act 1967. The court there held, upon those facts, that the work of the design consultant was "mainly the preparation of design drawings" and that such work is not within the meaning of "services rendered as an "Architect"." Thus, the court there held that s. 7(1)(c) does not apply and allowed the recovery of the balance. I respectfully decline to follow that decision because an architect's work includes putting up design concept drawings as set out in the summary (4), supra. It is, not only part and parcel, but, in fact an essential part of an architect's work because it is from the concept design that the sketch design materialises so as to enable planning approval to be applied for under the building ordinance and building by-laws. Without a concept of the building, which is formed after taking instructions from the proponent of the building, you have nothing to work on or to develop it further. In this regard BEP Akitek (PTE) v Pontiac Land Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR 251 is more to the point and it supports the contention that assuming that the claimant had merely undertaken to provide the professional services which were done by registered professionals, nevertheless the fees are not recoverable.” (emphasis added) This decision is affirmed on appeal in Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak (supra) where Rahmah Hussain JCA held as follows: S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA “Having examined the arguments by both parties and given them our anxious consideration, it is our unanimous decision, that the learned Judge in setting aside the Arbitrators' Award had not interfered with the findings of fact by the Arbitrators. Instead, we are satisfied that he had come to the right conclusion when he said as follows: (at page 72 of the Appeal Record - Part A & B) "This fact makes the finding of the two arbitrators that the CSA does not require the Claimant to practise or carry on business or take up employment as architects, engineers or quantity surveyors completely untenable since it was their own pleading and therefore their case that the Claimant was formed 'to undertake the consultation work for the design and supervision of the Project'. That is a serious failure to analyse and appraise material and relevant evidence which, following the decision of Sharikat Pemborong Pertanian & Perumahan, justifies the setting aside of the award". Section 7A of the relevant Acts of Parliament clearly provides that only a body corporate which has a permit from the relevant governing professional bodies can recover "in any court any fee, charge or remuneration for any professional advice or services." Furthermore the prohibition against recovery of fees by an unregistered Engineer, Architect and Quantity Surveyor providing professional services and advice under Sections 7 and 7A is further strengthened by the provisions of Section 34 of the Architects Act, 1967, and Section 25 of both the Registration of Engineers Act, 1967 and the Quantity Surveyors Act, 1967 which impose penal sanction on those who breached this prohibition. [See: B/A p.14.] Section 34 of the Architects Act, 1967 provides:- "34(1) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Act or any rules made thereunder shall be guilty of an offence and where no penalty is expressly provided, shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both.

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(2) If a body corporate contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Act or any rules made thereunder, every director, manager, secretary or other similar officer thereof shall be guilty of the same offence and be liable to the same penalty as the body corporate is guilty of and liable to, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, consent or connivance or was not attributable to any neglect on his part." (Similar provisions are found in Section 25 of both the Quantity Surveyors Act, 1967 and the Registration of Engineers Act, 1967). We are also in total agreement with the learned Judge's finding on the decision of the two Arbitrators - when they sought to justify their decision by saying that the claimant S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA was not performing but providing (emphasis added) for the services. This is what the learned Judge said: (at page 72 Appeal Record - Part A & B) "It is precisely that a corporate entity like the Claimant cannot by themselves perform the services since such can only be performed by individuals that s 7A was enacted to prevent the Claimant from saying that they did not but someone else perform the services. If the argument of the two arbitrators can be upheld it would mean that a corporate entity need never apply for the approval to practise while allowing unregistered persons to practise under its umbrella. This would render s 7A completely useless." … Further, we are also of the same view that such an award by the Arbitrators is clearly against the statutory provisions and the public policy which the enactment of such laws aims to achieve, i.e. to regulate the professions involved and to protect the public from unqualified and unregistered Engineers, Architects or Quantity Surveyors.” (emphasis added) [40] I have recently held as follows in Iris Corporation Berhad v S & J Partners Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 LNS 299 on the provision of consultancy engineering services pursuant to the collaboration of a related unregistered engineering entity with another registered engineering entity: “[28] It is axiomatic that every case is heavily and sensitively dependent upon its own facts in issue. [29] This case is similar to the Sami Mousawi case in that the contracting party that performs the consultancy services is an unregistered entity. However, the alter egos in the Sami Mousawi case are both unregistered individuals whereas the alter ego, LSC in this case who performed part of the consultancy services is a registered professional engineer. [30] From the evidence adduced before me, I am nonetheless satisfied and find that both LSC and the directors of LC knew that LSC, probably for tax purposes, desired to utilize SJP to carry out the civil and structural engineering services for the Project but LSC would act as the submitting qualified person required by the relevant bye-laws. Otherwise, it is inexplicable why SC Consultant is not the contracting party with LC in the first instance. S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [31] The applicable law, to wit, s. 7A of the REA as interpreted in the Sami Mousawi case is strict. Hence SJP being an unregistered entity is not entitled to recover any remuneration and this in my view includes fees, disbursements and service tax too. [32] In the circumstances, I find and hold that SJP is not entitled to any remuneration for engineering consultancy services rendered to IC pursuant to the Contract in relation to the Project.” (emphasis added) [41] The facts here are that the Plaintiffs who are both unregistered under the AA collaborated with RSPA which is a registered architect body corporate firm under the AA to provide the Project architectural consultancy services initially for the Second Defendant but which were subsequently novated to the First Defendant. It is not in dispute that the First Plaintiff is a qualified practising architect in the United Kingdom who substantially carried out the planning and architectural design of the Project over there. However, RSPA carried out the requisite submission for approval of the Project by the local authority. Both these services rendered by the First Plaintiff and RSPA respectively are architectural consultancy services as defined in s. 2 of the AA. [42] As to the requirement for registration under the AA for the provision of architectural consultancy services by a foreign architect, PW2 who is a registered architect testified as follows: MM Would you agree that by this collaboration with RSP, alright, that FCH UK will circumvent the requirement for registration with the board of architects? S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA Well, I won't say they circumvent the requirement but and we’ve done so many projects with foreign architects and of course, unless they are registered locally they needed to collaborate with us, with the local architect. MM So the way to go around that is to collaborate with the local architect. That is a must, yes, correct. Is there a requirement to be sanctioned by the board of architects or LAM, the collaboration? Well, My Lord, as mentioned just now and I think we have spoken about this, if you are not registered and if any architect or anybody or any firm who are not registered locally would not be able to submit plans. So the LAM would not discourage any form of collaboration between the local architect and foreign architects because it has been done in the past. And it has been going on for a long time. So it is still, we are still doing that, we’re still continuing so they do not discourage any client appointing any foreign architects to do their proposal, their job, their design and so forth. As long as if you want it built, you need to have a local architect to submit the plans and go through the process. So we are not just an architect of submission, we have to be involved from the design process all the way until the completion of the project and so forth, My Lord. Alright. But does the board require at least to be informed of the collaboration? No, they don’t need to be informed. No need to be informed. Any guidelines on this on collaboration by the board? As far as I know, there is no specific guidelines, My Lord. S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA I see but that is the prevalent practice as you say. Yes, correct. Alright, thank you. Additionally DW2 who is a board member of the Board of Architects testified as follows: Five questions. Now, I’ve got one question, which I need the, possibly the opinion of Sr Kamarudin. Because from your CV, I noticed that you’re a member of the Board of Quantity Surveyors Malaysia (BQSM), in a board member and also in the Board of Architects Malaysia. Because there is no witness coming from the Board of Architects, so, I would like to ask this question. But this is more relating to the Board of Architects. Now, in this case here, we have a foreign architect, that’s not registered. But at the same time, cooperating with a registered architect. What is the board’s view on this? The submission architect must be local. Alright. It’s compulsory a local architect. Then what about the other architect then? The other architects – S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA Is it, is there a breach of a requirements of the board? This is quite a prevalent practice in Malaysia, right? The board somehow seems to have sanctioned it. Yes. Is that right? Yes, correct. [43] It is therefore apparent that the collaborative practice involving foreign unregistered architects working jointly with local registered architects on Malaysian projects is not uncommon. This collaborative practice seems to be tacitly sanctioned by the Board of Architects; hence there is no reported case of prosecution instituted against the unregistered architect pursuant to s. 34 of the AA. [44] Accordingly, the Plaintiffs contended that the provisions in ss. 2, 7 and 7A of the AA seek to regulate and prohibit those unqualified persons who purport to be registered architects. In other words, qualified but unregistered architects particularly those who work in collaboration with registered architects do not contravene or violate those provisions of the AA. [45] This contention is refuted by the Defendants who strenuously maintained that it is plain from ss. 2, 7 and 7A of the AA that any person who provides consultancy architectural services must be registered under the AA. S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [46] In my view, the rival contentions boil down to the construction or interpretation of the statute and the relevant principles are found in the case of Tebin Mostapa v Hulba-Danyal Balia & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 561 FC wherein Vernon Ong FCJ held as follows: “[30] In our opinion, the rules governing statutory interpretation may be summarized as follows. First, in construing a statute effect must be given to the object and intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. Accordingly, the duty of the Court is limited to interpreting the words used by the Legislature and to give effect to the words used by it. The Court will not read words into a statute unless clear reason for it is to be found in the statute itself. Therefore, in construing any statute, the Court will look at the words in the statute and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the statute. Second, if, however the words employed are not clear, then the Court may adopt the purposive approach in construing the meaning of the words used. Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 provides for a purposive approach in the interpretation of statutes. Therefore, where the words of a statute are unambiguous, plain and clear, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. The statute should be construed as a whole and the words used in a section must be given their plain grammatical meaning. It is not the province of the Court to add or subtract any word; the duty of the Court is limited to interpreting the words used by the legislature and it has no power to fill in the gaps disclosed. Even if the words in a statute may be ambiguous, the power and duty of the Court "to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited." Third, the relevant provisions of an enactment must be read in accordance with the legislative purpose and applies especially where the literal meaning is clear and reflects the purposes of the enactment. This is done by reference to the words used in the provision; where it becomes necessary to consider every word in each section and give its widest significance. An interpretation which would advance the object and purpose of the enactment must be the prime consideration of the Court, so as to give full meaning and effect to it in the achievement to the declared objective. As such, in taking a purposive approach, the Court is prepared to look at much extraneous materials that bears on the background against which the legislation was enacted. It follows that a statute has to be read in the correct context and that as such the Court is permitted to read additional words into a statutory provision where clear reasons for doing so are to be found in the statute itself.” (emphasis added) S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA [47] My task here in construing and interpreting ss. 2, 7 and 7A of the AA has been facilitated by the case of The Government of Sarawak v Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd (supra) and affirmed on appeal in Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak (supra) and in which I am bound by the latter due to stare decisis. Although the cases there and here are not identical in terms of the nature of the consultancy services provided, I find that the critical facts are indistinguishable in that they involve the unregistered entity who has worked in collaboration with registered entity(ies) in the project suing for unpaid fees. I therefore agree with and adopt the findings in The Government of Sarawak v Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd (supra) and Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak (supra) that an unregistered architect is not entitled to sue in the court of law for recovery of any remuneration whatsoever as plainly provided in s. 7(1)(c) of the AA whether construed literally and/or purposively. [48] In the premises, I find and hold that both Plaintiffs are not entitled to be remunerated as claimed by them here whether based on the Contract, Deed and Novation Agreement or quantum meruit. [49] In so finding, I am aware that the Plaintiffs alluded to that s. 7(1)(c) of the AA is different pre and post The Government of Sarawak v Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd (supra) because of legislative amendment; thus the resultant effect of The Government of Sarawak v Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd (supra) is inapplicable here. I have in this regard carefully reviewed them but find that the later did not alter or change the earlier provision as so judicially interpreted so as to permit S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA unregistered architects to provide architectural consultancy, services in Malaysia. Additionally, I also could not accept the Plaintiffs argument that s. 7(1)(c) of the AA has been designed to only prohibit unregistered and unqualified but not unregistered foreign qualified architects to provide architectural consultancy services because this is evidently neither expressly so stated nor implicitly contemplated by the AA on my reading of it. [50] I am also mindful of the attitude taken by the Board of Architects in not sanctioning unregistered foreign architects working in collaboration with registered local architects in Malaysia as seen in paragraphs [42] and [43] above. However, I hold that this cannot override the true interpretation of the statute as judicially pronounced in The Government of Sarawak v Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd (supra) and Sami Mousawi-Utama Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak (supra). [51] By reason that the consultancy services of foreign architects are often inevitably required particularly in design concept and aesthetics as I see it, there must preferably be a provision in the AA to enable them to be registered to practice either individually or in collaboration with local registered architects, say by way of expanding s. 10A of the AA to include all Malaysian projects beyond those projects wholly financed by a foreign government or implemented under any form of arrangement with the Government of Malaysia only as presently enacted. Otherwise foreign architects practice here in Malaysia at their own peril. S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA Resultant Consequences of the Plaintiffs’ Non-Registration as Architects [52] In view of my finding on the Plaintiffs’ disentitlement to claim in paragraph [48] above, it follows that it is unnecessary for me to assess the fair quantum of remuneration payable to the Plaintiffs by the First Defendant whether based on milestones or time costs. [53] By virtue of the plain and strict provision of s.7(1)(c) read with s. of the AA, I further hold that the doctrine of proportionality based on public policy considerations enunciated in the English case Patel v Mirza [2017] 1 All ER 191 as alluded to by the Plaintiffs to afford them some fair renumeration is unsustainable. It would in my view otherwise be a “backdoor” way to get around the statutory prohibition. [54] Be that as it may, the Second Defendant contended that the Contract is illegal and thus void by virtue of non-registration of the Plaintiffs under the AA. In consequence, the Second Defendant counterclaimed for the return of its remuneration previously made to the Plaintiffs amounting to of RM1,428,133.52 based on a mistake of law. [55] In this respect, I firstly do not find that the Second Defendant adduced any evidence to cogently demonstrate that it was indeed mistaken on the law at all material times. It seems to me to be an S/N OytrKaiyTEa8HmqRd0/kRA afterthought after the Plaintiffs launched this suit against the Second Defendant. This is because it was the Second Defendant at the time of making the Contract that requested the First Plaintiff to set up a Malaysian branch and collaborate with a local registered architect. [56] That notwithstanding, it is provided as follows in s. 24 of the Contracts Act 1950 (“CA”):