1. ) Fazli Bin Suboh v 1. ) Dr. Fatimah Bt Ahmad Fauzi (21NCVC-88-12/2015)

1.

NUR DAMIA LUTFIAH BINTI FAZLI (a child suing through Fazli bin Suboh his father and legal representative) ... APPELLANTS AND TETUAN ZAILAN & CO ... RESPONDENT

By the Notice of Appeal to the Judge In Chambers dated 20.8.2024, the appellants appealed against the decision of the learned Deputy Registrar (‘DR’) made on 12.8.2024 in deciding that costs for the sum of RM396,177.00 as claimed by the respondent in the Notis Penetapan Kos dated 12.12.2023 (encl. 132) was allowed in its entirety with costs of proceedings in the sum of RM1,000.00, subject to the allocatur fee.

After having considered the documents in the Core Bundles and Supplemental Bundle (encls. 167 - 172) and the written 19/09/2025 07:54:11 21NCVC-88-12/2015 Kand. 191 submissions by the parties (encls. 177, 178, 180 and 181), I had dismissed the appeal.

Dissatisfied, the appellants are intent on pursuing their right of appeal to the final stage. These are my full grounds for the decision.

The respondent’s counsel had prepared a detailed chronology of events in respect of the ground work and the getting up undertaken by them from 29.1.2013 to 5.11.2021 for –

Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Suit No. 21NCvC-88- 12/2015 between Fazli bin Suboh & 3 Others v Dr Fatimah bt Ahmad Fauzi & 4 Others; and

Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. W-01(NCVC)-61- 01/2020 between Dr Fatimah bt Ahmad Fauzi & 4 Others v Fazli bin Suboh & 3 Others as enclosed in ANNEXURE A in the Outline Submission (encl. 177).

Basically, the respondent had represented the appellants in a medical negligence suit at the High Court and in the appeal to the Court of Appeal [see Fazli bin Suboh & Ors v Dr Fatimah bt Ahmad Fauzi & Ors [2020] MLJU 2652 (HC)]. The outcome at both courts were in the appellants’ favour.

Messrs. PS Ranjan & Co (‘PSR’) appeared as co-counsel throughout the proceedings.

Upon conclusion of the matter, the respondent issued Tax Invoice No. ZC006584 dated 7.9.2021 to the appellants for the sum of RM383,269.90 (‘Invoice’).

The Invoice was objected by the appellants. The respondent was then directed to file a Bill of Costs to be taxed by the Court vide the Court Order dated 5.10.2023 and 9.11.2023.

The Bill of Costs with notation of the appellant’s objections was filed on 9.1.2024 (encl. 134). During the case management (‘CM’) on 10.1.2024, the DR was informed that the appellant’s objections pertain to – “… keseluruhan bagi item A iaitu Penyediaan di Mahkamah Tinggi, Penyediaan Mahkamah Rayuan dan Penyediaan Pasca Mahkamah Rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi iaitu berjumlah RM300,000.00 dan Cukai Perkhidmatan & Jualan berjumlah RM18,000.00 Bagi Item B iaitu Perbelanjaan Hangus Mahkamah Tinggi, Perbelanjaan Lain Mahkamah Tinggi, Perbelanjaan Tetuan PS Ranjan, Perbelanjaan Hangus Mahkamah Rayuan dan Perbelanjaan Hangus Pasca Rayuan berjumlah RM78,177.00 tidak dipertikai dan diterima. …”.

At the next CM on 17.7.2024, the DR sought clarification regarding the Court Order dated 5.10.2023 and 9.11.2023 and the difference in the amount as stated in the Invoice and in the total sum for Parts (A) and (B) in the Bill of Costs. As regards the latter enquiry, the Notes of Proceeding (‘NoP’) shows that: “PP: Tiada isu tentang perbezaan tersebut. Kami hanya bantah getting up - item A bil kos. 3. SST 6% - bawah undang-undang mana? ZC: Akta SST. Terpakai kepada semua firma guaman. PP: Tiada bantahan atas jumlah tersebut tertakluk kepada bukti ia telah dibayar.”.

On 12.8.2024, the DR gave her decision as follows: “Lamp. 132 merupakan taksiran kos untuk bil yang dikeluarkan oleh Tetuan Zailan & Co. (ZC) kepada anak guamnya iaitu Plaintif-Plaintif (PP) dan taksiran ini dijalankan berdasarkan

MT bertarikh 5.10.2023 dalam Saman Pemula WA-17D-24-2021 (SP). Lanjutan daripada Perintah tersebut, ZC telah memfailkan bil kos (Lamp. 133) dan PP mengesahkan hanya membantah jumlah getting-up seperti yang ditandakan di Lamp. 134. Untuk rekod, terdapat perbezaan jumlah dalam bil kos (RM396,177.00) berbanding jumlah dalam invois ZC no. ZC006584 bertarikh 7.9.2021 yang perlu ditaksirkan (RM383,269.00) namun peguamcara PP pada tarikh yang lepas telah mengesahkan tiada bantahan tentang perbezaan tersebut. Antara isu-isu yang dibangkitkan:

Sama ada A. 59 k. 16 atau A 59 k. 17 yang terpakai untuk mentaksirkan bil kos ZC. Dalam hal ini, bil kos ZC adalah berkenaan kos yang perlu dibayar oleh anak guam (PP) kepada peguamnya (ZC). Oleh itu, A. 59 k. 17 adalah terpakai.

Sama ada jumlah dalam invois ZC adalah satu jumlah yang munasabah. Dalam hal ini, untuk menentukan sama ada jumlah yang dibilkan oleh ZC adalah munasabah atau tidak, Mahkamah perlu terlebih dahulu menentukan sama ada terdapatnya persetujuan PP sama ada secara nyata atau tersirat (expressed or implied) berkenaan kos yang dikenakan oleh TZC. Isu berkenaan persetujuan ini juga telah dibangkitkan dalam SP dan penelitian Mahkamah ke atas kertas-kausa yang telah difailkan dalam SP tersebut mendapati PP menyatakan tidak pernah bersetuju dengan invois ZC yang mana kini ditaksirkan oleh Mahkamah ini dan hanya mengetahui mengenainya apabila ia diemelkan oleh ZC pada 8.9.2021. Namun bukti menunjukkan sebaliknya bahawa PP telah bersetuju dengan bayaran kos guaman sebanyak 30% (Whatsapp bertarikh 6.10.2021). Malah permohonan PP untuk membatalkan (expunged) perenggan 8.2 (berkenaan persetujuan PP) Afidavit Jawapan Zailanalhuddin bin Kamaruddin yang diikrarkan pada 14.12.2021 juga telah ditolak oleh YA Dato’ Ahmad Kamal pada 8.3.2023. Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan alasan ringkas di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan dengan adanya persetujuan PP tersebut, maka kos yang dituntut oleh ZC secara keseluruhannya termasuk getting-up adalah satu jumlah yang munasabah menurut A.59 k. 17(3) KKM 2012 dan oleh itu, dibenarkan. …”.

From the NoP, I had observed that there were attempts by the parties for an amicable settlement but it did not yield any results. As the amount being disputed following the taxation of costs by the DR was not much, I gave a further opportunity for the parties to resolve their differences. Unfortunately, the parties were unable to come to an agreement on the matter. The Statutory Provisions

The respondent submitted that the relevant statutory provisions for the Bill of Costs in this case are, inter alia, as follows: O. 59, r. 17 of the RC 2012: “Costs payable to a solicitor by his own client (O. 59, r. 17)

(1) This Rule is in amplification and not in derogation of the procedure set out in the Legal Profession Act 1976.

On the determination of a solicitor's bill to his own client (except a bill with respect to non-contentious business and a bill payable pursuant s. 5 of the Legal Aid Act 1971), all costs shall be allowed except in so far as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred.

For the purpose of paragraph (1), all costs incurred with the express or implied approval of the client shall be conclusively presumed to have been reasonably incurred and, where the amount thereof has been expressly or impliedly approved by the client, to have been reasonable in amount.

In paragraph (3), references to the client shall be construed:

if the client at the material time a mentally disordered person within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2001 and was represented by a person acting as litigation representative, as references to that person acting, where necessary, with the authority of the Court; and

if the client was at the material time a minor and represented by a person acting as litigation representative, as references to that person.”. By way of comparison, O. 59, r. 16 of the RC 2012 provides that: “Basis of assessment (O. 59, r. 16)

(1) In assessing the costs payable in relation to any item, the Court shall have regard to all relevant circumstances, and in particular to —

the complexity of the item or of the cause or matter in which it arises and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved;

the skill, specialized knowledge and responsibility required of, and the time and labour expended by, the solicitor or counsel;

the number and importance of the documents, however brief, prepared or perused;

the place and circumstances in which the business involved is transacted;

the importance of the cause or matter to the client;

where money or property is involved, its amount or value;

any other fees and allowances payable to the solicitor or counsel in respect of other items in the same cause or matter, but only where work done in relation to those items has reduced the work which would otherwise have been necessary in relation to the item in question.

Subject to the other provisions of these Rules, the amount of costs which any party are entitled to recover is the amount allowed after determination of costs on the standard basis where —

an order is made that the costs of one party to proceedings be paid by another party to those proceedings;

an order is made for the payment of costs out of any fund; or

no order for costs is required, unless it appears to the Court to be appropriate to order costs to be determined on the indemnity basis.

On an assessment of costs on the standard basis, there shall be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred and any doubts which the Court may have as to whether the costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount shall be resolved in favour of the paying party; and in these Rules, the term “the standard basis”, in relation to the determination of costs, shall be construed accordingly.

On a determination of costs on the indemnity basis, all costs shall be allowed except in so far as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred and any doubts which the Court may have as to whether the costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount shall be resolved in favour of the receiving party; and in these Rules, the term “the indemnity basis”, in relation to the determination of costs, shall be construed accordingly.

Where the Court makes an order for costs without indicating the basis of determination of costs or an order that costs be determined on any basis other than the standard basis or the indemnity basis, the costs shall be determined on the standard basis.

Notwithstanding paragraphs (2) to (4), if any action is brought in the High Court, which would have been within the jurisdiction of a Subordinate Court, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any more costs than he would have been entitled to if the proceedings had been brought in a Subordinate Court, unless in any such action a Judge certifies that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the High Court.”. Sections 121 and 126 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 [Act 166]: “Where remuneration of advocate and solicitor not subject of agreement

(1) Where the remuneration of an advocate and solicitor in respect of contentious business done by him is not the subject of an agreement made pursuant to section 116, the solicitor’s bill of costs may at the option of the advocate and solicitor either contain detailed items or be for a gross sum: Provided that—

at any time before service upon him of a writ or other originating process for the recovery of costs included in a gross sum bill and before the expiration of three months from the date of the delivery to him of the bill, the party chargeable therewith may require the advocate and solicitor to deliver to him in lieu of the cost a bill containing detailed items, and the gross sum bill shall thereupon be of no effect;

where an action is commenced on a gross sum bill, the Court shall, if so requested by the party chargeable therewith before the expiration of one month from the service on that party of the writ or other originating process, order that the bill shall be taxed;

if a gross sum bill is referred to taxation, whether under this section or otherwise, nothing in this section shall prejudice any rules of court with respect to taxation and the advocate and solicitor shall furnish the taxing officer with such details of any of the costs covered by the bill as the taxing officer may require.

Subsection (1) shall not apply to fees paid to advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel.” “An order for taxation of costs to be made within 6 months of delivery of bill of costs

(1) An order for the taxation of a bill of costs delivered by any advocate and solicitor may be obtained by a petition as a matter of course by the party chargeable therewith, or by any person liable to pay the cost either to the party chargeable or to the advocate and solicitor, at any time within six months from the delivery of the bill, or, by the advocate and solicitor after the expiration of one calendar month, and within a year from, the delivery.

The order shall contain such directions and conditions as the court thinks proper, and any party aggrieved by any order of Court may apply by summons in chambers that the same may be amended or varied or set aside.

In any case where an advocate and solicitor and his client consent to taxation of a solicitor’s bill the Registrar may proceed to tax the bill notwithstanding that there is no order therefor.”. Rule 11 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978: “11. Fees for litigious or contentious matters In determining the amount of fee for litigious or contentious matters involving representation of a client in Court, it is proper to take into consideration –

the time, labour and skill required;

the novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

whether acceptance of the particular employment will preclude his appearance for others of which he has a reasonable expectation;

the customary charges of the profession for similar services;

the amount in controversy;

the benefit resulting to the client for the services;

the character of the employment - whether casual or for an established client; and

the special position or seniority of the particularly advocate and solicitor.”.

In Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v ASM Development (Kl) Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 1340, I said the following: “[18] The procedure governing these appeals, which are against the decisions of the DR to a Judge in Chambers, is provided in O. 56, r. 1 of the RoC

It is trite that the principles for such appeals are similar to those governing an appeal from a trial on merits from the High Court to the Court of Appeal (see Milik Perusahaan Sdn Bhd & Anor v Kembang Masyur Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 MLJ 6). [19] It is further settled law that the “plainly wrong” test is applicable in determining whether appellate intervention is warranted in appeals of this nature. In Yaw Fun Fun (pemilik tunggal perniagaan yang dikenali sebagai Perniagaan Smart Power Land) v Ketua Polis Daerah Gombak & Ors [2020] MLJU 2316; [2020] AMEJ 1795, this Court had referred to cases of high authority, including the decisions of the Court of Appeal in MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 4 CLJ 665; Lee Chee Keong v. Fadason Hodlings Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2017] 7 CLJ 295, where useful guidance was given as to the application of this test. [20] Drawing upon the legal principles as elucidated in those cases, in this case, ASM has to convince this Court that the DR was plainly wrong in arriving at her decision in the sense that she has so fundamentally misdirected herself; there being no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the affidavit evidence, or where the acceptance or rejection of the evidence is not founded on good reasons, and no reasonable Registrar could have reached that conclusion. It is only then that this Court would be justified to intervene so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice.”.

The “plainly wrong” test was similarly applied in the instant appeal. Grounds of Appeal

In paragraph 10 of the appellant’s Written Submission (encl. 178), the grounds of appeal were stated as follows: “a. Sama ada kandungan Bil Kos Defendan adalah bertindih (overlapping) dengan perkhidmatan guaman yang diberikan oleh Tetuan PS Ranjan & Co sebagai kaunsel (co-counsel)? b. Sama ada fi perkhidmatan guaman yang dituntut oleh Defendan terlampau tinggi dan tidak munasabah? c. Sama ada bil kos defendan tidak mendedahkan “itemised bill” untuk perkhidmatan-perkhidmatan yang diberikan? d. Sama ada bil yang dituntut oleh Defendan sebagai yuran perkhidmatan guaman tidak berlandaskan di sisi undang-undang menurut Aturan 59 Kaedah 16 (Discretionary Cost)?”.

However, based on the NoP and the DR’s broad grounds of decision, the appellants counsel confirmed that the objection pertains to only Part A in the Bill of Costs on the professional fees or getting up and the only issues which arose during the hearing before the DR was whether –

O. 59, r. 16 or O. 59, r. 17 of the RC 2012 should apply in this case; and

the amount stated in the Bill of Costs was reasonable or otherwise. Analysis & Decision of the Court 1st Ground: Whether O. 59, r. 16 or O. 59, r. 17 of the RC 2012 should apply

In encl. 178, the appellants cited the decision in Azman bin Karim & Anor v Hasa Arkitek Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] MLJU 2190 to illustrate a case where O. 59, r. 16 of the RC 2012 was applied and the plaintiff was represented by an experienced solicitor as opposed to the instant case where it was contended that “… tiada peguam yang berpengalaman mewakili firma Defendan untuk mengendalikan kes ini. Oleh sebab itu, pihak defendan terpaksa melantik firma ko kaunsel Tetuan PS Ranjan & Co untuk mengendalikan kes ini. Dalam pada itu, soalan yang timbul di sini adalah, perlukah pihak Defendan menuntut bayaran guaman separuh daripada bil yang dikeluarkan oleh Tetuan PS Ranjan & Co?”.

Based on the above excerpt, it is apparent that the appellants’ grievance was on the need to appoint PSR as counsel and the amount being claimed by the respondent as professional fees rather than on which provision of the RC 2012 that applies.

As the matter which came up before the DR was costs payable by the appellants to their solicitors and a determination had to be made on the respondent’s Bill of Costs, the DR was not plainly wrong in deciding that O. 59, r. 17 of the RC 2012 applies. 2nd Ground: Whether the amount stated in the Bill of Costs was reasonable

One of the main issues which was raised by the appellants was whether the 1st Plaintiff (‘P1’) had agreed to a fixed percentage of 30% of the award of damages shall be paid to the respondent as professional fees. If this is so, the appellants argued that the sum which should be paid to the respondent is only RM924,125.11 being 30% of RM3,080,417.02 and the amount which the appellants should receive is RM2,156,291.91 instead of RM2,053,523.22, which the appellants have received. According to the appellants, a sum of RM102,768.69 should be “returned” by the respondent to them.

The DR’s reasoning was that “Namun bukti menunjukkan sebaliknya bahawa PP telah bersetuju dengan bayaran kos guaman sebanyak 30% (Whatsapp bertarikh 6.10.2021). Malah permohonan PP untuk membatalkan (expunged) perenggan 8.2 (berkenaan persetujuan PP) Afidavit Jawapan Zailanalhuddin bin Kamaruddin yang diikrarkan pada 14.12.2021 juga telah ditolak oleh YA Dato’ Ahmad Kamal pada 8.3.2023.”.

The appellants’ application (encl. 9 in O.S. No. WA-17D-24- 2021) which was mentioned in the DR’s decision was for expungement of paragraphs 8.2, 10.1, 10.2, 15, 18 and 19 in the respondent’s affidavit in reply (encl. 8 in the same O.S.) as follows: “8.2. P1 juga telah membuat satu video viral dengan mengesahkan persetujuan yuran guaman tersebut. …

10.1. Sebelum perlantikan firma saya, P1 dan Umi telah memilih firma lain seperti Tetuan Sharif & Khoo, untuk mewakili mereka. Akan tetapi, firma tersebut tidak mahu atau berniat untuk menjalankan kes mereka berdasarkan atas beberapa sebab seperti faktor kos untuk menjalankan kes P1 dan P2. …

10.2. Selepas perlantikan firma ZC dan semasa perbicaraan kes P1 dan P2 di Mahkamah Tinggi, P1 telah sekali lagi melantik firma-firma lain untuk mengambilalih kes mereka ini. Akan tetapi, firma-firma tersebut enggan menbayar kos dan yuran ZC dan PSR bagi kerja-kerja yang telah dilakukan. …

Perenggan 20 diakui setakat mana penerimaan surat bertarikh 9.9.2021. Dengan menyerahkan suratnya kepada pihak-pihak ketiga adalah jelas bahawa beliau adalah “mentally unstable”. dengan sengaja mendesak kami untuk menyerahkan fail guaman ZC dimana beliau tidak berhak di sisi undang-undang untuk berbuat demikian. ZC berhak untuk menolak fi dan kos guaman seperti yang di persetujui. PSR juga tahu mengenai tingkah laku P1 ini. …

Adalah jelas bahawa P1 adalah seorang yang tidak jujur dan pembuat masalah (“trouble maker”). Dari tarikh perlantikan sehingga penyelesaian perbicaraan, P1 telah mengusik / mengganggu kerja ZC dan PRS dengan melantik firma – firma lain untuk mengambil alih kes ini daripadaZC dan PSR. Malahannya, percubaan P1 gagal kerana “lebih cepat bertindak daripada berfikir”.

Daripada kelihatan tomahan-tomahan P1 (dan bukan Umi) adalah jelas ibarat “ayam putih terbang siang” bahawa, beliau, sebenarnya berhasrat membawa tuntutan kecuaian terhadap ZC dan bukan untuk mencabar bil guaman ZC dan PSR di bawah LPA.”. Among the prayers in the O.S. was for the respondent to be directed to prepare a detailed Bill of Costs based on the Invoice.

It is observed that, in response to the respondent’s averment (encl. 13 in the O.S.) that there was an agreement on the payment of legal fees and costs being 30% contingency fee based on the award that will be made by the court, P1 had denied the said averment and affirmed, among others, that the appointment of PSR as co-counsel was made without P1’s consent. However, the correspondence in exhibit “ZC-1” (encl. 8 in the O.S.) shows that P1 was copied in some of the letters and was aware of the role of the co-counsel and no objections were raised at the material time. In fact, P1 made a video recording that the legal fees were fixed at 30% of the judgment sum.

I have perused the Whatsapp message (‘WA’) dated 6.10.2021 wherein P1 stated that: “Nk jadi mudah? Buat lah pemotongan mengikut perjanjian asal 30%.. lebih potongan dari 30% kita tgk susah yg dapat nanti... hakim pun dah teliti bil2 yg dirujuk melalui emel… Berani ambil lebih, sendiri tanggung akibatnya …”.

In my considered view, the DR did not err in her decision as the WA clearly shows that P1 has unequivocally agreed that 30% of the award shall be deducted as the solicitors’ professional fees.

As regards the other submissions by the appellants, namely –

there is an overlap in the legal services rendered by the respondent and PSR, the respondent’s Bill of Costs was prepared according to actual work done (see Perusahaan Petanda Bintang Sdn Bhd v Asbir, Hira Singh & Co [1995] 2 MLJ 455) and the respondent had produced the documents to support this fact. The appellants have chosen to challenge only the respondent’s Bill of Costs and did not apply for taxation of both the Invoice and PSR’s bill;

the quantum of professional fees claimed by the respondent is too high and unreasonable, it was undisputed that the appellants’ medical negligence claim was complex, unique and of high value which requires specialisation in the field of medical negligence. The supporting documents and ANNEXURE A in encl. further illustrate the getting up for the claim involved, among others, meticulous planning and drafting, and securing expert witnesses and obtaining their reports. The team of solicitors secured a favourable outcome for the appellants at the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The respondent had to obtain the relevant documents and had borne the costs of litigation because the appellants could not afford to commence the suit. In the course of proceedings, P1 attempted to replace the respondent’s and PSR’s services with other solicitors. As regards the sum of RM18,000.00 for Sales and Service Tax, the receipt produced by the respondent establishes that the sum paid by the respondent to the Customs Department was RM21,404.41;

the Bill of Costs does not contain an itemised bill for the services rendered, nevertheless all the supporting documents were produced by the respondent for the DR to scrutinise; and

the amount claimed by the respondent is contrary to O. 59, r. 16 of the RC 2012, the legal principle as stipulated in O. 59, r. 17(2) is that all costs shall be allowed except in so far as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred (see too, sub-rr. (3) and (4) and the case of Farah Ahmed Naji Al-Sahhaf v. Dato Rozi Lee Weng Seng & Ors [2022] MLRHU 3044). There is no evidence by the appellants to oppose or challenge that the respondent’s legal fees are unreasonable. Merely tabulating the amounts as per the Invoice and PSR’s bill in paragraph 33 of encl. 178 is insufficient. The DR did not find any item in the Bill of Costs which was of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred. There is no valid reason for me to hold otherwise.

In the final analysis, I was unable to say that the DR had erred in any way in arriving at her decision. Conclusion

Premised on the abovesaid considerations, the appeal was dismissed with costs of RM2,500.00, subject to allocatur. Dated: 17.9.2025 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Solicitors for the Appellants : Selvamary a/p Muniandy (Donald a/l Selvam with her) Messrs. Selvam Shanmugam & Partners Solicitors for the Respondent : Loganathan a/l Gunasagaram (Mohd Nashriq Bin Zailanalhuddin with him) Messrs. Zailan & Co