Five Star Heritage Sdn Bhd v XXXX (02(f)-8-02/2023(P))

FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PEGUAM NEGARA MALAYSIA … [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-621-10/2021 Antara Peguam Negara Malaysia … Perayu Dan

Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

HLA Toon Toolseram Maung Aung Thou 06/12/2023 14:10:52 02(f)-8-02/2023(P) Kand. 40

Moong BA

Moung Ban Chowi

Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden-Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016] Antara

Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

HLA Toon Toolseram Maung Aung Thou

Moong BA

Moung Ban Chowi

Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon-Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh

Ho Choon Teik … Responden-Responden (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-6-02/2023(P)

FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

MOUNG BAN CHOWI …

HO CHOON TEIK … RESPONDEN- [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-02(IM)(NCvC)(W)-2553-10/2021 Antara

Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

HLA Toon Toolseram Maung Aung Thou

Moong BA

Moung Ban Chowi … Perayu – Perayu

Dan Nai Ninn Sararaksh

Ho Choon Teik … Responden-Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014] Antara

Nai Ninn Sararaksh

Ho Choon Teik … Plaintif-Plaintif Dan

Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

HLA Toon Toolseram Maung Aung Thou

Moong BA

Moung Ban Chowi … Defendan-Defendan (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-7-02/2023(P)

FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … HO CHOON TEIK … [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-609-10/2021 Antara Ho Choon Teik … Perayu Dan

Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

HLA Toon Toolseram

Maung Aung Thou

Moong Ba

Moung Ban Chowi

Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden-Responden Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan Semakan Bagi Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016 Antara

Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

HLA Toon Toolseram

Maung Aung Thou

Moong Ba

Moung Ban Chowi

Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon-Pemohon

Dan

Peguam Negara Malaysia Nai Ninn Sararaksh

Ho Choon Teik … Responden-Responden (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-8-02/2023(P)

FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … NAI NINN SARARAKSH … [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-602-10/2021 Antara Nai Ninn Sararaksh … Perayu Dan

Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

HLA Toon Toolseram

Maung Aung Thou

Moong Ba

Moung Ban Chowi

Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden-Responden Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan Semakan Bagi Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016 Antara

Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W)

HLA Toon Toolseram

Maung Aung Thou

Moong Ba

Moung Ban Chowi

Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon-Pemohon Dan

Peguam Negara Malaysia

Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No.K/P: 400324-07-5301)

Ho Choon Teik (No.K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden-Responden] CORUM: MARY LIM THIAM SUAN, FCJ NORDIN BIN HASSAN, FCJ ABDUL KARIM BIN ABDUL JALIL, FCJ JUDGMENT OF THE COURT [1] The central issue in these 4 appeals concerns the interpretation and understanding of the Attorney General’s consent obtained under Section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359]. [2] Of the four appeals, three appeals arose from the judicial review proceedings [JR proceedings] while the fourth appeal arose from proceedings related to Originating Summons No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 [OS 1128]. We heard all four appeals together. After full consideration of the submissions, reasonings of the Courts below and the records of appeal, we unanimously allowed the appeals. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] Both the JR proceedings and OS 1128 arose from these salient facts. Vide a trust indenture dated 30.5.1845, on behalf of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the East India Company created a Burmese-Siamese Trust over a plot of land known as Lot 104 in Georgetown subject to terms and conditions as found in the indenture [the Trust]. On Lot 104 was/is a temple serving the Burmese and Siamese communities living on the island of Penang, and their successors in the said Trust. Expressly, the Trust was “for the management of the affairs of their Temple”. Four trustees, two from each community, were originally appointed to manage the affairs of the temple [Trustees]. Amongst those terms and conditions was that the trustees had no “right, power or authority whatsoever” to “grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer, convert or otherwise alienate the said piece of Ground or any part or parcel thereof”. The trust land “shall remain, continue for the benefit of the Burmese and Siamese Community of Prince of Wales Island and its Dependencies from henceforth forever”. [4] Despite those express terms and conditions, on 16.4.1994, the Trustees entered into a written agreement to inter alia, partition Lot 104 between the two communities. Lot 104 thus became Lots 2102 and 2103 and an order of Court dated 19.10.1994 [OS No: 24-665-1994 in the HC Penang] was secured to seal that agreement. The effect of that division left the temple remaining on the land held and still held by the Siamese trustees [Lot 2102]. The Burmese trustees continued to hold Lot 2103. [5] On 3.10.2002, funds which had been hitherto collected from the temple amounting to over RM3,778,523.73 were equally divided between the two communities. Again, another order of Court was secured to endorse the division of funds [OS No: 24-1209-2002]. Effectively, this left the original trust now standing as two separate trusts, one for the Siamese community in respect of Lot 2102 and the other for the Burmese community in respect of Lot 2103. For this purpose, the Attorney General’s consent was obtained on 1.6.2000. The High Court viewed this consent, referred to as the “1st Consent” as confirming the partition of the original Lot 104 into Lots 2102 and 2103 and that the original trust had been terminated. We will have more to say on this shortly. [6] Following this Court order of 3.10.2002, the trustees for the Burmese community [Penang Burmese Trustees] executed a new trust deed dated 31.7.2006 [Trust Deed]. Amongst its many terms were these: i. Subject to clause 7 of the Trust Deed, that the Penang Burmese Trustees shall have no power to sell the Penang Burmese Trust Property or any part thereof or mortgage the same or to create a charge to any third party thereon; ii.

Nai Ninn filed his defence and also counterclaim, claiming that he was the owner of the premises and was not obliged to deliver vacant possession as Lot 10029 was part of a charitable trust created under the 1845 Indenture; and that the developer’s ownership of Lot 10029 was questionable. This case was subsequently transferred to the High Court. [9] Meanwhile, vide OS 1128 filed in 2014, Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik challenged the validity of the Court order dated 31.10.2007, that because Lots 10029 and 10030 are part of a public charitable trust, the AG’s consent under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] must first be secured before the order may be secured. Since there was none, the order was invalid and must be set aside ex debito justitiae. We understand Nai Ninn Sararaksh, of Siamese descent, lives on Lot 10029. In OS 1128, Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik have sued the developers as well as the Penang Burmese Trustees. [10] Although OS 1128 was filed in 2014, both Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik themselves did not procure the AG’s consent to file the action until 31.5.2016. In fact, Ho Choon Teik was not even a party to OS 1128 when it was filed. Armed with the AG’s consent, Ho Choon Teik then intervened and was added as the 2nd plaintiff to OS 1128. [11] Together with the developer and the Vice-Chairman of the Penang Burmese Association, the Penang Burmese Trustees filed the JR proceedings seeking to quash the AG’s consent dated 31.5.2016. The JR proceedings were filed on 30.8.2016. Decisions of the High Court [12] It is quite clear that the parties were fully aware of the two sets of proceedings. Unfortunately, the JR proceedings and OS 1128 were heard before different judges, and disposed of at different times. There does not appear to be any effort to consolidate the actions. This would have greatly assisted better use of time and resources, be it of the Court, counsel or the parties themselves. Each component share in that responsibility in the administration of justice; and every effort ought to have been made, especially in order to obviate any inconsistent decisions, as happened in these appeals. [13] Insofar as OS 1128 was concerned, on 24.11.2017, the High Court allowed the claim and set aside the joint-venture agreement; holding that the agreement was unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect. At the same time, the High Court held that the division of Lot 2103 into Lots 10029 and 10030 was similarly unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect; that the subsequent registration of these subdivided lots to the developer and the Penang Burmese Trustees was also null and void. Further, the High Court set aside the order of the High Court dated 31.10.2007. Injunctive orders were also issued, effectively restraining the joint-venture agreement and the registration of the subdivided lots of Lot 2103. [14] The JR proceedings took a longer time to be disposed of; aggravated by the appeals involved. Initially, leave was refused by the High Court on the basis that the AG’s consent was not reviewable or justiciable. That decision was upheld on appeal. On 12.12.2018, the Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal and ordered the substantive application to be heard on its merits. [15] On 29.9.2021, the High Court in the JR proceedings allowed the application and quashed the AG’s consent. In addition, the High Court held that the Trust Deed of 31.7.2006 was a private trust; and that all the earlier orders granted by the Court, namely orders dated 19.10.1994, 3.10.2002 and 31.10.2007 are valid and binding. Decisions of the Court of Appeal [16] Both parties appealed against those respective decisions. Thankfully, the appeals were heard by the same panel at the Court of Appeal. On 15.6.2022, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals in respect of the JR proceedings whereas the decision of the High Court in respect of OS 1128 was allowed in part. OUR DECISION [17] On 30.1.2023, this Court granted leave on the following 3 questions of law: i. Whether the consent of the Attorney General can be retrospective in light of the clear wordings and pre-requisites stated in Section 9(1) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 and the mandatory nature of Section 9(2) of the same Act and the decisions of the High Court in the cases of Ledchumanan Nagappan v R. Nadarajah & 2 Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 253 and Subramaniam Vallan & Anor v Dr. S. Sivasundaram & Ors [2016] 1 LNS 675 and whether such consent goes to jurisdiction? ii. In the light of the decision of the High Court which held that the subdivision of the original trust land should stay; that the land partitioned and given to the Burmese be vested in the remaining Burmese Trustee and as the beneficiaries of the Burmese Trust are ascertained or ascertainable individuals as held in Re Endacott [1959] 2 All ER 562, should the Burmese Trust be construed as a private trust or a public trust and whether the construction of a trust instrument and the original intention of the settlor under such circumstances, a question of law or a question of fact? iii. If a donor’s dominant intent is to restrict the charitable gift to the exact purpose specified in the Trust Instrument and for no other purpose, is the Court at liberty to presume that the donor still evinced a general charitable intent and effectuate the donor’s intent by applying the cy-prés doctrine to that gift? [18] From the submissions, grounds of decisions and the records of appeal, we were clear that the determination of the first issue was sufficient to dispose of all four appeals. [19] As indicated earlier, this Court had already opined that the decision of the AG under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] is justiciable and thereby reviewable by the Court. Further authorities may be gleaned from the decision in Peguam Negara Malaysia v Chin Chee Kow and another appeal [2019] 3 MLJ 443; that the AG’s power to grant or refuse consent is not absolute and is always subject to limits as prescribed in the statute itself. [20] Section 9 states as follows:

(a) asserting any interest or right in the trust property;

(b) removing any trustee;

(c) appointing a new trustee;

(d) vesting any property in a trustee;

(e) directing accounts and inquiries;

(f) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;

(g) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged, charged or exchanged;

(h) settling a scheme; and

(i) obtaining such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.

According to the Court of Appeal, the expression- “… the Attorney General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Attorney General, may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public” (emphasis added) in s 9(1) of the GPA indicates to us that what is far more important in keeping with the rationale behind the written consent of the AG is that no frivolous action or suit is to be commenced or continued to completion without the AG having applied his mind to the action and having consented to it. If the action or suit has commenced already, then it is not to be continued, as would be a case where a second person is joined as a party to the action or suit, without the written consent of the AG. [86] As the AG has no issue with that and was fully aware of the action that had been commenced, it would be pedantic and pointless to labour further on the point at which the consent in writing was given. There was also no application filed by the defendants to strike out the OS before the written consent of the AG was obtained. [23] In separate grounds written in respect of the JR proceedings, the Court of Appeal found that the AG did not act in bad faith when granting consent dated 31.5.2016; that it was important that “the AG did not take any partisan stand on the issues, but left it to the parties to persuade the Court”. The Court of Appeal further found that it was not legally wrong for the AG’s consent to be given as one of the issues which required probing was “how, why and when that a charitable trust for religious purpose could be turned into a purported private trust, no less with a commercial pursuit”. Consequently, the Court of Appeal found that there was “no good reason to review his decision”. [24] Amongst the many roles and duties of the Attorney General, an office constituted under Article 145 of the Federal Constitution, is the role and responsibility as custodian of the public interest; particularly in the matter of public, religious, social or charitable trusts. Such trusts are set up for the benefit of the larger sector of society and it is the AG’s duty to ensure that the intent of the relevant trusts is adhered to and safeguarded. [25] Some deliberations to this effect may be found in the decision of Chin Chee Kow (as the Secretary of Persatuan Kebajikan dan Amal Liam Hood Thong Chor Seng Thuan) v Peguam Negara Malaysia [2021] 5 MLJ 303. There, the Court of Appeal correctly explained the intention of Parliament in enacting section 9 of Act 359; that it is to empower the AG in the protection of charitable trusts from abuse and to prevent proceedings affecting the charity funds from unnecessary waste of such funds. [26] Similar views may be found in the earlier cases of Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor v Cheah Kee Wee & 15 Ors [1934] 1 MLJ 212; Haji Abdullah & Ors v Ibrahim & Ors [1965] 2 MLJ 189; and Lee Eng Teh & Ors v Teh Thiang Seong & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 42. [27] In Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor, Whitley J cited and adopted Eldon LC's observations made in Attorney General v Green 1 Jacob & Walker 303, that it is the duty of the Court to take care that as little expense as possible should be incurred by the charity estate. Courts are reminded that safeguards are emplaced through section 9 [then under section 18 of the FMS Chapter 17, the precursor to Act 359] in order to prevent abuse, and to prevent proceedings against charitable trusts from being instituted too frequently for no other reason than because it is known that costs will be payable out of charity funds. In Lee Eng Teh & Ors, Gill J explained the consequences of non-compliance, that “…but for the consent of the Attorney General or his being made a party to the action, the present action would not be maintainable”. [28] The failure to comply with the mandatory requirements in section 9 renders any action or suit instituted not maintainable. In these appeals, not only was OS 1128 filed before the written consent of the AG was obtained, the written consent when finally obtained, is also clearly outside the terms prescribed by section 9. This is quite aside from the fact that both Nai Ninn and Ho did not meet its mandatory requirements. [29] The significance of non-compliance with the requirements in section 9 was explained in Ledchumanan Nagappan v R Nadarajah & 2 Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 253. There, the plaintiff who was seeking certain declaratory orders from the Court concerning the affairs of the Subramanian Temple at Batu Caves including an injunction to stop the celebration of Thaipusam at that Temple failed to obtain the prior written consent of the AG before instituting his action. The application was dismissed when the learned Judge found inter alia that there was a “total failure to comply with the three preliminary requirements” under that provision. Although not named as a party, the AG’s representative had attended Court to express the view that the action should not be allowed to proceed since there was non-compliance of the requirements, namely there must be in existence of at least two persons having an interest, the prior written consent of the AG, and the suit itself being brought in the name of the AG. The Court agreed and was of the view that “it would not be necessary to say anymore”, on that point. [30] We agree with those principles and the approach. Sections 9(1) and

(i) satu perintah mengepikan pendaftaran nama-nama Defendan-Defendan sebagai pemilik Lot 10029 dan Lot 10030 secara ex debito justitiae atas alasan ketiadaan bidang kuasa dan ketiadaan kebenaran Peguam Negara di bawah Seksyen 9 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956;

(1) When a winding up order has been made or an interim liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms as the Court imposes. [44] Section 471(1) uses the words “proceeded with or commenced”. This indicates that the power to grant leave to sue wound up companies is not limited to fresh actions or proceedings [“commenced”] but extends to the instance where actions or proceedings have already commenced [“proceeded with”]. In the latter, these actions may now proceed, carry on or be continued; or “meneruskan”. Again, these words do not appear in section 9(1) in which case, the AG’s consent of 31.5.2016 is without legal power or is outside the terms of section 9(1); and is thus invalid. [45] In addition, the Court of Appeal has overlooked the presence of section 9(2) which reminds the importance of compliance with the requirements of section 9(1): No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with that subsection. [emphasis added] [46] Section 9(2) reiterates the mandatory requirement of securing written consent before institution of a suit. Since OS 1128 was instituted before AG’s consent under section 9(1) was obtained, it is not “in conformity with that subsection”. While the AG has discretion on the matter of consent, it is with regard the grant, refusal or imposition of terms or conditions to such request for consent. The consent at all times must however, relate to a suit or proceeding which is yet to be instituted, and not to one which has already been instituted. In the latter case, the AG’s consent is in respect of whether the applicants for consent may be joined as a party to that suit already filed. We must add that in the latter case of joinder of party(s), the institution of that suit must, in the first place, have complied with the terms of section 9(1). In the case of OS 1128, no written consent was secured before it was instituted; aggravating the position yet further. [47] We do not find the High Court decision of Lee Chick Yet v Chen Siew Hee [1977] 2 MLJ 218 of assistance. Bearing in mind that it was a first-instance decision where the learned Judge opined that the Court could direct compliance of section 9 within a certain time period instead of striking out the whole action, that argument is flawed. Not only does it run contrary to the plain and unambiguous terms of section 9(1), but as pointed out earlier, the Penang Burmese Trustees similarly ought to have been given the same option. [48] The respondents had urged this Court to apply the principle of nunc pro tunc. With due respect, we decline to do so. [49] The principle is generally applied to cases involving court decisions, where the court seeks to correct their records on clerical errors. Black’s Law Dictionary explains the term as follows: ‘Now for then’ having retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power the court entered a nunc pro tunc order to correct a clerical error in the record. Acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be done; nunc pro tunc nearly described inherent powers of court to make the court records to speak the truth. [emphasis added] [50] That does not arise here at all. See also Kok Song Kong v BSP Co Sdn Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 440: In the light of our conclusion that on the facts of the present case we are able to hold that the suit was instituted on 18 April 1984, it may strictly be unnecessary for us to say or do anything further; but out of caution we will direct that the writ be resealed nunc pro tunc, that is to say, with the date, 18 April 1984, which it ought to have borne in the first place. We do this in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction which the court has over its officers, not under any of the provisions of the rules. Where the rights of a party are threatened by an act or default of an officer of the court, the court clearly has such a power to correct the matter. [emphasis added] [51] No error prevails in the Court records for any correction; the only error lies in the impugned consent for the reasons we have already explained. [52] Before we leave this issue, we feel compelled to deal with a point made at paragraph 4 of the grounds of decision in respect of appeal on OS

There, the Court of Appeal found that the written consent of the AG had been obtained in relation to the order dated 19.10.1994. We have poured through the records and we cannot find any consent to this effect. [53] There are only 2 consents issued by the AG, the 2nd consent dated 31.5.2016, the impugned consent has already been dealt with. The other consent, the first, is dated 1.6.2000 and it reads as follows: AKTA PROSIDING KERAJAAN 1956

(i)

(a) Bahawa pelantikan Dr. Ko Ko Win, U Khema Wuntha, Cheah Boo Eng dan Ong Ba Nee yang beralamat di Dhammikarama Burmese Buddhist Temple, No. 24 Lorong Burma, 10250 Pulau Pinang sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang pada 22 Februari 1998 menggantikan Maung Boon Khan dan Hia Toon Toolseram disahkan oleh Mahkamah;

(b) Bahawa harta yang terletak di Lot 2103, Georgetown Seksyen 4, No. H.S.

(D) 528, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang diletakhak atas nama Dr. Ko Ko Win, U Khema Wuntha, Cheah Boo Eng dan Ong Ba Nee sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang;

(a) Bahawa pelantikan Prabandh Sanasen dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau yang beralamat di Chaiya Mangalaram Buddhist Temple, No. 17, Lorong Burma, 10250 Pulau Pinang sebagai Pemegang Amanah tambahan Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang dalam Mesyuarat Agung Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang pada 6 September 1998 disahkan oleh Mahkamah;

(b) Bahawa harta yang terletak di Lot 2102, Georgetown, Seksyen 4, No. H.S.

(D) 527, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang diletakhak atas nama Prabandh Sanasen dan Songkeram @ Sungkaram a/l Apau dan atas nama Pemegang Amanah yang sedia ada iaitu Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchap dan Sook Buranakol sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang;

(a) Bahawa akaun terakhir Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma disahkan dan harta amanah termasuk wang tunai dalam Simpanan Tetap dalam akaun bank diserahkan kepada Pemegang Amanah kedua-dua tanah yang berkenaan iaitu Lot 2103 kepada Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma dan Lot 2102 kepada Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai;

(b) Bahawa Wong Hoong Keat, Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma di Pulau Pinang dilepaskan sebagai Penerima Amanah tersebut;

(v) Lain-lain relif yang difikirkan patut dan suaimanfaat oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini. Bertarikh pada 1 haribulan Jun 2000. [54] With this consent, an order of Court dated 3.10.2002 was obtained granting orders which essentially dealt with the appointment of trustees and the vesting of Lots 2102 and 2103 on the appropriate trustees: ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN

bahawa Wong Hoong Keat, sebagai Penerima yang dilantik melalui Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi, Pulau Pinang bertarikh 14.12.1973, dilepaskan sebagai Penerima daripada mengutip segala sewa dan hasil (pendapatan) untuk harta amanah mengenai Amanah-amanah dalam suatu Dokumen Amanah menerusi Geran No. 2655 bertarikh 30.05.1845;

bahawa nama-nama Maung Boon Khan (K/P: A3103868) Hla Toon Toolseram (K/P: 3465236) dan Sook Buranakol (K/P 4083456) dibatalkan dan dikeluarkan daripada geran mengenai hakmilik tanah yang dikenali sebagai Geran No: 61389, Lot 2102, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang (dahulu di kenali sebagai H.S.(D) 527, Lot 2102, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang) dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau (No KPT: 450515-02-5097) digantikan dan diletakhakkan sebagai Pemegang amanah;

bahawa nama-nama Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchapan (K/P: 2190061) dan Sook Buranakol (K/P: 4083456), simati, dibatalkan dan dikeluarkan daripada geran mengenai hakmilik tanah yang dikenali sebagai Geran No: 61390, Lot 2103, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang (dahulu di kenali sebagai H.S.(D) 528, Lot 2103, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang)

bahawa akaun dalam Afidavit bertarikh 19.09.2002 oleh Penerima Harta Amanah Komuniti Thai-Burma di Pulau Pinang, En. Wong Hoong Keat, disahkan dan diluluskan dan daripada wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Juta Tujuh Ratus Tujuh Puluh Lapan Ribu Lima Ratus Dua Puluh Tiga dan Sen Tujuh Puluh Tiga (RM3,778,523.73) Sahaja dalam pengangan pihak Penerima setakat 30.6.2002, pihak Penerima diperintahkan:-

(i) membayar wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Satu Juta Lapan Ratus Lapan Puluh Sembilan Ribu Dua Ratus Enam Puluh Satu dan Sen Lapan Puluh Enam (RM1,889,261.86) Sahaja kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates, Peguambela dan Peguamcara, Pulan Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak dan untuk membayar bersama-sama kepada Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchapan (K/P:2190061) dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau (KPT: 450515-02-5097) sebagai Pemegang-pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang; dan

Bahawa pihak Penerima hendaklah memberi suatu akaun terakhir daripada 01.07.2002 sehingga 31.10.2002 dan selepas menolak peruntukkan untuk kos, perbelanjaan dan lain-lain bayaran yang patut, membahagikan serisama wang-wang yang dalam pegangannya dan membayar setengahnya (1/2) kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates, Peguamcara dan Peguambela, Pulau Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak Pemegang-pemegang amanah Thai dan setengah (1/2) yang bakinya kepada, Tetuan G. Raju and Company, Peguamcara dan Peguambela untuk dan bagi pihak Pemegang-pemegang Amanah Burma.

Kos yang dipersetujui sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Puluh Ribu (RM30,000.00) Sahaja diperuntukkan daripada tabung Amanah tersebut dan pihak Penerima hendaklah membayar wang sebanyak RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan G. Raju and Company, RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates dan RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan Pregrave & Mathews sebagai peguamcara-peguamcara untuk pihak-pihak dalam perkara ini masing-masing; dan 7. Bahawa Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah, Pulau Pinang hendaklah mendaftarkan perintah-perintah yang dibuat dalam perkara ini dalam geran-geran masing-masing. Bertarikh pada 3 haribulan Oktober 2002 [55] There is no mention, whether in the first consent or in this Court order of the splitting of Lot 104. This is hardly surprising since Lot 104 had already been split as far back as 19.10.1994:

Bahawa harta amanah Thai Burmesa yang terletak di Lot No. 104 Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang dibahagikan mengikut pelan ukuran No. CAB/11/C/PG/92-P1 bertarikh 26 haribulan Ogos, 1993 danPerjanjian untuk Pecah Milik bertarikh 16 haribulan April, 1994 dan Perjanjian Untuk Pengurusan Bersama ke atas Tanah Perkuburan bertarikh 16 haribulan April, 1994 dan bahagian yang ditanda “1” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut didaftarkan dan diletakhak atas nama Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai dan bahagian yang ditanda “2” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut didaftarkan dan diletakhak atas nama Pemegang Amanah

Tanah Perkuburan yang terletak di bahagian yang bertanda “1” dan “2” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut diurus bersama oleh Pemegang-Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai dan Burma;

Encik Chuah Ah Bah dari Jurukur Chuah & Rakan, seorang jurukur tanah berlesen dilantik untuk memohon bagi pecah lot dan pembahagian keatas harta amanah tersebut; dan

Kos untuk permohonan ini dibayar dari kumpulan wang amanah. Bertarikh pada 19 haribulan Oktober, 1994. [56] For this “split” of Lot 104, there does not appear to be any consent from the AG, of any description, for what we see is a most critical departure from the 1845 Indenture. Conclusion [57] For the above reasons, we find for the purposes of section 9 of Act 359, the learned AG has no discretion to give consent after a suit has already been instituted. Worse when the application for consent is only made by a single person and not two or more persons. To say otherwise would defeat the ‘filter’ mechanism in the statute and the protective role that the AG plays as custodian of the public interest. [58] In the circumstances, the impugned consent of 31.5.2016 is invalid and is liable to be quashed. The High Court had rightly granted the orders sought in the JR proceedings. Question 1 is thus answered in the negative. [59] In view of our answer to Question 1, and since OS 1128 was instituted without the consent of the AG, that OS is incompetent and not maintainable. We therefore do not see the need to answer questions 2 and 3. [60] The appeals in relation to the JR proceedings are thus allowed and the decisions of the Court of Appeal dated 15.6.2022 are set aside and the decision of the High Court is reinstated. In respect of the appeal in relation to OS 1128, the appeal is allowed and the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court are set aside. [61] There is no order as to costs. Dated: 5 December 2023 Signed (MARY LIM THIAM SUAN) Federal Court Judge Malaysia Counsel/Solicitors For the appellant Civil Appeal No. 01(f)-3-02/2023(P), No. 02(f)-6- 02/2023(P), No. 02(f)-7-02/2023(P), No.02(f)-8-02/2023(P): Karin Lim, A. Suppiah, Julinder Daliwal & Alisa Lim Wei Zhen Aznil Naziah Juli & Praba Peguambela dan Peguamcara Suite 2-05 Tingkat 2 Bangunan Wisma Pantai Jalan Kampong Gajah 12200 Butterworth For the respondent Civil Appeal No.01(f)-3-02/2023(P): SFC Shamsul Bolhassan, SFC Mohammad Al-Saifi Hj. Hashim, SFC Nurul Farhana Khalid, FC Nor Aqilah Abdul Halim & FC Nur Syazwani Abdul Aziz Bahagian Guaman Jabatan Peguam Negara No. 45, Persiaran Perdana Presint 4 For the respondent Civil Appeal No. 02(f)-6-02/2023(P) & No. 02(f)-7-02/2023(P): T. Gunalan Seelan, Balwant Singh Purba, Eng Yuh Pei & Tan Shin Yi Messrs. Balwant Singh & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 20-B (Ground Floor) Lebuh Penang 10200 Pulau Pinang For the respondent Civil Appeal No.02(f)-8-02/2023(P): T. Gunalan Seelan, Ong Ken-Jeen & Lee Min Yau Messrs. Vello & Associates Peguam Bela dan Peguamcara No. 105, Anson Road 10400 Penang