Fnc Corporate Plt v Ezham Bin Abd Wahid (JA-23NCvC-15-10/2022)

FNC CORPORATE PLT

FIRDAUS AMMAMI BIN FAUZEE (NRIC NO. : 920528-11-6047) …PLAINTIFFS AND EZHAM BIN ABD WAHID (NRIC NO. : 831101-06-5987) …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 20/01/2026 14:50:22

This is a claim in defamation brought by the Plaintiffs against the Defendant. The complaint centres on a series of messages alleged to have been published by the Defendant in one or more Telegram messaging groups and on Facebook, relating to the Plaintiffs’ conduct in managing commissions for takaful agents.

In essence, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant, who was said to be a former agent of the 1st Plaintiff, became dissatisfied when his commissions were withheld and thereafter embarked upon an online campaign containing defamatory allegations against the Plaintiffs. The Defendant denies that he was ever an agent of the 1st Plaintiff, denies authorship and/or responsibility for the impugned online postings, and disputes that the Plaintiffs have suffered the losses claimed.

The full trial was heard over several days from 6 to 8 October 2025. The Plaintiffs called three witnesses, while the Defendant likewise called three witnesses. This Court now delivers its grounds of decision following that trial.

The 1st Plaintiff is a limited liability partnership carrying on business as a takaful agency and is one of the agencies for Takaful Ikhlas Family Berhad (“Takaful Ikhlas”). The 2nd Plaintiff is associated with the 1st Plaintiff’s management and operations. The Defendant is an individual whose office address is at 35A, Jalan Sentral 2, Taman Nusa Sentral, 79100 Nusajaya, Johor.

On 19 October 2022 the Plaintiffs commenced this action by way of writ and statement of claim. A default judgment was subsequently entered against the Defendant on 8 January 2023, followed by an order on assessment on 25 May 2023 whereby the Defendant was ordered, inter alia, to pay a sum of RM300,000.00.

Garnishee proceedings were then taken out which resulted in the Defendant’s bank account being frozen. The Defendant applied to set aside the default judgment. By an order dated 25 July 2024 the default judgment and the consequential orders were set aside and the matter was directed to proceed to a full trial. Plaintiffs’ claim

In their Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs plead that the Defendant had, at all material times, been engaged as an agent of the 1st Plaintiff pursuant to an Agent’s Contract Agreement, under which he was entitled to receive commission for business generated for Takaful Ikhlas.

It is further pleaded that the Defendant breached several fundamental terms of the Agent’s Contract by, among others, selling insurance products other than takaful. As a result, the management of the 1st Plaintiff decided to suspend and/or withhold the payment of the Defendant’s commission pending an investigation into the alleged breaches.

The Plaintiffs allege that, following the withholding of the commission, on or about 31 March 2022 and on subsequent dates, the Defendant published, in a Telegram group known as “Go FNC” (later said to have been renamed “Go Haji Kita Setable” and “Borak Santai FNC”), a series of messages which are pleaded as the impugned words (“the Impugned Words”). The Telegram group is said to have had approximately 62 members, many of whom were agents of the 1st Plaintiff.

The alleged Impugned Words, set out in paragraphs 10.1–10.11 of the Statement of Claim and reproduced in the Plaintiffs’ witness statements and submissions, include, in substance, assertions that –

the 1st Plaintiff withheld the Defendant’s commission based on “personal interest” and without proper justification;

the 1st Plaintiff misused or “took” the agents’ customer database to promote other products;

the 2nd Plaintiff failed to respond or to resolve issues raised by agents;

the management of the 1st Plaintiff was incompetent, and

there was a suggestion that complaints could or would be made to Bank Negara.

The Plaintiffs further plead that, as a result of the Defendant’s postings, other members of the Telegram group then made additional comments of a defamatory nature (described as the “second set” of impugned words), criticising the 1st Plaintiff and the 2nd Plaintiff’s character, including alleged hypocrisy in religious matters and unfair treatment of agents. These are pleaded in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim and elaborated in the witness statements, particularly of SP1 and SP2.

It is averred that the Impugned Words and the second set of words referred to and were understood to refer to the 1st Plaintiff (under the name “FNC Corporate PLT / FNC”) and to the 2nd Plaintiff (who is said to have been referred to as “Firdaus” or “founder FNC aka Fauzi” and by reference to his status as “Haji”).

The Plaintiffs plead that the natural and/or ordinary meanings of the Impugned Words, as set out in paragraph 18 of the Statement of Claim and repeated in their written submissions, include that the 1st Plaintiff does not care about the welfare of its agents, has acted irresponsibly in withholding commissions, has financial difficulties, and has mismanaged its business; and that the 2nd Plaintiff is insincere, hypocritical in practising religion, has low moral values and has committed misconduct that could be reported to Bank Negara.

The Plaintiffs allege that the publication of the Impugned Words and the second set of comments caused reputational damage and financial loss, including loss of existing and potential agents and a reduction in the 1st Plaintiff’s monthly revenue after March 2022.

The Plaintiffs seek the following reliefs –

an injunction to restrain the Defendant from further publishing the Impugned Words or similar statements;

an order directing the Defendant to delete or cause to be deleted the Impugned Words;

general damages;

special damages of RM648,000.00 and RM240,000.00;

aggravated and exemplary damages;

interest and costs. Defendant’s case as per the pleadings

In his pleadings and in the Defendant’s Summary of Case, the Defendant’s position may be summarised as follows –

He is not and has never been an agent of the 1st Plaintiff for the purpose of selling takaful products or receiving commissions;

He has no relationship with the Plaintiffs that would entitle him to commission from them;

His Telegram account is a shared account with his wife and he has no control over, nor is he responsible for, postings by other persons in any group;

He denies publishing the Impugned Words or causing others to publish the second set of words; and

He denies receiving the Plaintiffs’ letter of demand and contends that any losses suffered by the 1st Plaintiff are not attributable to him.

The Defendant therefore prays that the Plaintiffs’ claim be dismissed with costs.

Based on enclosure 67, the following facts are recorded as agreed between the parties –

the address at 35A, Jalan Sentral 2, Taman Nusa Sentral, 79100 Nusa Jaya, Johor, is the office address of the Defendant; and

the 1st Plaintiff is a company engaged in the takaful business and is one of the agencies of a company known as Takaful Ikhlas Family Berhad.

Based on Enclosure 59, (Isu-Isu Yang Perlu Dibicarakan), the issues for this Court’s determination may be summarised as follows –

Issue 1 : Publication and identity of the publisher

whether the Defendant was, at all material times, working or acting as an agent of the 1st Plaintiff;

(ii) whether the Defendant entered into an agreement with the 1st Plaintiff;

(iii) whether the Defendant received commission from the 1st Plaintiff;

(iv) whether the impugned words relate, inter alia, to the non-payment of commission to the Defendant;

whether the Telegram account used to publish the Impugned Words was owned or controlled by the

(vi) whether the Defendant is liable for the second set of impugned words published by other participants in the Telegram group.

Issue 2 : Publication to third parties Whether the Impugned Words and/or the second set of words were in fact published and communicated to third parties.

Issue 3 : Reference to the Plaintiffs Whether the Impugned Words and the second set of words refer to the 1st Plaintiff and/or the 2nd Plaintiff.

Issue 4 : Defamatory nature Whether the Impugned Words and the second set of words are defamatory of the 1st Plaintiff and/or the 2nd Plaintiff.

Issue 5 : Meaning If the answer to Issue (d) is in the affirmative, whether the words bear the natural and/or implied meanings pleaded in paragraph 18 of the Statement of Claim.

Issue 6 : Relief Whether, in light of the Court’s findings on Issues (a)-(e), the Plaintiffs are entitled to the remedies and damages claimed, including the special damages of RM648,000.00 and RM240,000.00.

As to the law and related jurisprudence, the present action is one in civil defamation. In Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315, the court specified three essential elements to establish defamation. It is not in dispute that, for such a claim to succeed, the Plaintiffs must establish, on a balance of probabilities that –

the Defendant published the impugned words;

the words were referable to the Plaintiffs; and

in their natural and ordinary meaning or by necessary implication, the words are defamatory of the Plaintiffs.

As the Federal Court held in Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142b, once a plaintiff proves these elements, a prima facie case of defamation is established and the burden shifts to the defendant to raise any available defences. The critical question in this case, however is whether the Plaintiffs have proven the first element - namely, that the Defendant published the impugned words

It is also a well-established principle that in the defamation suit, the burden is always on the plaintiff to prove that the defamatory words were “published of and concerning” him. (see : Libel and Slander textbook by Carter-Ruck (4th Ed p 131), as cited by the Court of Appeal in Chong Swee Huat & Anor v Lim Shian Ghee (t/a L & G

In Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239, Lord Donovan stated that – “It is always for the plaintiff to prove that the defamatory words were published of and concerning him. The onus is firmly upon him, and if he does not discharge it he has no cause of action”.

In the context of online publications, the same burden applies. The Plaintiffs must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the account or profile in question belongs to the Defendant, or that he is otherwise legally responsible for the publication.

As to the application of a rebuttable presumption under section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950 (“EA 1950”) in a defamation suit, based on the authorities referred to by the parties, this Court summarises the following propositions –

section 114A(2) EA 1950 permits a rebuttable presumption that the registered owner of an online account (such as a blog or website) is the publisher of the impugned content;

The presumption does not itself impute liability or guilt; it simply alters the normal course of proof so that the presumed publisher must explain why he is not responsible;

No one can be found liable in a civil claim on the basis of section 114A(2) EA 1950 standing alone, unless there is a total failure of rebuttal; and

In Tong Seak Kan & Anor v. Loke Ah Kin & Anor [2014] 6 CLJ 904, the presumption operated only after independent confirmation from service providers (Telekom Malaysia/TM Net) that the defendant was the registered subscriber of the blogs in question;

However, as will be seen, this case does not reach the stage where the statutory presumption can be properly invoked. (see : Wan Ji Wan Hussin v. PP [2023] 1 LNS 2145, Peguam Negara Malaysia v Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 652 and Tong Seak Kan & Anor v. Loke Ah Kin & Anor [2014] 6 CLJ 904).

Against this backdrop, this is this Court’s analysis and findings. Issue (a)(i), (ii) and (iii) Whether the Defendant was an agent, had an agreement and received commission

The first three sub-issues under Issue 1 concern whether the Defendant was working or acting as an agent of the 1st Plaintiff, whether he entered into any agreement with the 1st Plaintiff and whether he received commission from the 1st Plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs’ case is that the Defendant acted as an agent under an Agent’s Contract Agreement and that his commission was withheld following alleged breaches, notably selling non-takaful insurance. SP1 and SP2 both testified that the Defendant had been treated as an agent and that he was part of the 1st Plaintiff’s team, evidenced, among others, by his participation in events and promotional activities.

The Defendant, on the other hand, denied being an agent and said he had merely discussed a potential business development arrangement which did not materialise, and that the formal agency contract was in another person’s name.

In this Court’s view, based on the evidence before this Court, it is safe to conclude that the Defendant had some form of business association with the 1st Plaintiff and its agents. This is evidenced by his attendance at FNC activities, his presence in their community and his acceptance that his phone and/or accounts were used by his wife for FNC-related matters.

Nevertheless, this Court is also of the view that whether the Defendant was a formal “agent” or a “proxy” is not a real issue for determination in this defamation claim. It may explain his alleged motive or the context of the dispute over commission, but the core requirement remains whether he can be shown to be the publisher of the impugned messages.

In light of the foregoing analysis, this Court therefore makes no conclusive finding on Issues 1(i), (ii) and (iii) and proceed on the basis that these issues are largely background to the real controversy on publication and identity. Issue 1(iv) Whether the Impugned Words relate to the non-payment of commission to the Defendant

Issue 1(iv) concerns whether the Impugned Words, on their face, relate to the alleged non-payment of commission to the Defendant.

From the Plaintiffs’ pleadings and the witness statements of SP1 and SP2, it is clear that the gravamen of the Telegram postings is a complaint that FNC (the 1st Plaintiff) had withheld payments which the author of the messages claimed to be “komisen” or sums due from the 1st Plaintiff. The words pleaded and relied on in evidence repeatedly refer to the suspension or non-payment of such sums and to alleged unfairness or “pilih kasih” in the treatment of the relevant agent. SP3’s evidence also confirms that he understood the discussions in the groups to be centred around a dispute about payments/commission said to be owed by the 1st Plaintiff.

The Defendant disputes that any commission was in law payable to him personally, and maintains that he was not an agent of the 1st Plaintiff. That, to my mind, however, goes to Issues 1(i)-(iii) (formal agency, agreement and entitlement) rather than to the narrower question under Issue 1(iv), which is simply whether the subject-matter of the Impugned Words relates, inter alia, to the non-payment of commission.

On the totality of the evidence, this Court is satisfied that, whoever may ultimately be found to have authored them, the Impugned Words do, in substance, concern an allegation that the 1st Plaintiff wrongfully withheld commission or payments said to be due from it. This Court therefore answers Issue 1(iv) in the affirmative, while noting that this finding does not resolve the separate question whether the Defendant was the person entitled to such commission or the author of the postings. Issue 1 (v) Whether the Telegram account belonged to the Defendant

Issue 1(v) deals with whether the Telegram account used to publish the impugned words (“Ezham FNC”) was owned or controlled by the Defendant.

The Plaintiffs’ position can be summarised as below –

SP2 testified that he stored the Defendant’s number in his phone as “Ezham FNC” and that the messages displayed in the screenshots emanated from this contact; and

SP1 and SP2 relied on the Defendant’s presence at FNC events and in FNC corporate attire as corroborating his identity as “Ezham FNC”.

In this Court’s assessment, this Court is facing difficulties with the Plaintiffs’ evidence.

First, there are significant gaps in the evidence adduced by the

as emphasised by the Defendant in his written submissions, neither the pleadings nor the Joint Bundle disclose the phone number or e-mail address associated with the “Ezham FNC” Telegram account;

SP2 accepted in cross-examination that “Ezham FNC” was a label he himself saved in his phone and that there is no independent evidence linking that saved contact to the Defendant’s actual Telegram account;

there is no list of members of the relevant Telegram groups (Go FNC, Go Haji Kita Setable, Borak Santai FNC) before the Court;

the screenshots of the chats in the bundles are undated, a point the Defendant also stressed; and

SP2 himself agreed that the dates of publication do not appear on the screenshots filed.

Second, the Defendant's evidence provides an alternative explanation which the Plaintiffs have not rebutted –

the Defendant accepted that his Telegram account is tied to his phone number 019-696 9961 but stated that his wife used that account to participate in an FNC-related group called “FNC World”, not in the groups “Go FNC”, “Go Haji Kita Setable” or “Borak Santai FNC” which are the subject of this action;

the Defendant consistently denied being a member or administrator of those groups and denied knowledge of the specific chats relied on by the Plaintiffs; and

the Defendant highlighted that another witness, SD1 (Farhan), also had grievances with the Plaintiffs and admitted posting complaints on social media, yet denied ever being in the Telegram groups relied on by the Plaintiffs. He explained that anyone could register a Telegram account under the name “Mohamad Farhan”, or that another user may simply have saved some number under that name.

Accordingly, this Court is of the view that, the Plaintiffs’ evidence does not go beyond SP2’s personal assumption that “Ezham FNC” refers to the Defendant. There is no independent corroboration, such as provider records, platform confirmation, or technical data which can link the disputed Telegram handle with the Defendant’s phone number or registered account. This is different from the situation in Tong Seak Kan, where service provider confirmation was available.

In this Court’s judgment, it is important to distinguish between –

(a)(i) proving that the Defendant is associated with FNC and had a dispute over commission, which to my mind what the Plaintiffs have shown.

(ii) The Plaintiffs placed considerable emphasis on documentary evidence comprising photographs of the Defendant at FNC events wearing corporate attire (Bundle A, pages 71-78), a Memorandum of Agreement for business development (Bundle C, page 2), and a Letter of Demand dated 21 January 2021 signed by the Defendant (Bundle A, page 198). This Court accepts that these documents establish that the Defendant had some form of association with the 1st Plaintiff's business ecosystem. However, association is not publication. The photographs show the Defendant's physical presence at events; they do not prove that he authored the electronic messages posted in the Telegram groups. The Memorandum of Agreement, even if valid as between the parties, does not establish control over the 'Ezham FNC' Telegram account. The Letter of Demand, though signed by the Defendant, relates to a payment dispute and not to the authorship of online postings. In short, this documentary evidence, while circumstantially suggestive of the Defendant's involvement with FNC, falls short of the 'irresistible conclusion' required to identify the Defendant as the publisher of the specific impugned words; and

proving that the specific messages in the specific Telegram groups were sent from an account controlled by the Defendant - which remains unproven on the present record.

Therefore, applying the principle from Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd, that the onus of proving publication lies firmly on the plaintiff, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not discharged their burden of proving that the 'Ezham FNC' account is in fact the Defendant's account, or that he controlled it at the material time. In cases where the identity of the publisher is disputed, and the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the court must be satisfied that there is an "irresistible conclusion" that the defendant published the words. (see : Stanislaus J Vincent Cross v. Ganesan Vyramutoo & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 263). The circumstances must form a chain so comprehensive that there is no escaping the conclusion that the defendant, and no one else, committed the tort. On the evidence before me, that standard has not been met.

In light of this finding on Issue 1(v), this Court holds that the Plaintiffs cannot succeed in establishing that the Defendant is the publisher of the Impugned Words. The case therefore fails at a threshold stage. This conclusion is supported by the recent decision in Chua Chin Soon v Wong Yew Choong [2025] AMEJ 0099, where the High Court held that the burden of proving publication lies on the party alleging it, and failure to adduce direct or circumstantial evidence to prove membership in a Telegram group is fatal to the claim.

Issue 1(vi) Liability for the “second set” of words

Issue 1(vi) concerns whether the Defendant can be held liable for the second set of impugned words posted by other participants in the Telegram groups.

The Plaintiffs’ case is that the Defendant, by initiating the complaints in the groups, instigated or encouraged others to publish further defamatory remarks about the Plaintiffs. SP1 and SP2 perceive a causal sequence that the Defendant complains about withheld commission, others then add comments criticising the Plaintiffs’ integrity and management.

To this Court’s mind, the difficulty for the Plaintiffs is twofold –

first, as already found, they have not proved that the Defendant himself was the author of the initial messages; and

second, there is no direct evidence that the Defendant instructed, encouraged or otherwise induced the other participants to make the “second set” of statements.

Even if one assumes that the Defendant was present in the groups, the evidence shows that at least one other disgruntled former agent (Farhan) had his own reasons to complain and admitted making “venting” posts on social media arising from his personal dissatisfaction, not at the Defendant’s behest.

The Plaintiffs relied on GS Realty Sdn Bhd v. Lee Kong Seng [2018] 1 LNS 2167 for the proposition that a defendant may be held liable for defamatory statements published by third parties on a platform controlled by the defendant. In that case, however, the High Court found as a fact that the defendant was the owner of the Facebook page in question, was well aware of the third-party postings, did not remove them despite requests, and was entirely recalcitrant about it. The present case is distinguishable on its facts. Here, the Plaintiffs have not first established that the Defendant was the owner or administrator of the Telegram groups 'Go FNC', 'Go Haji Kita Setable' or 'Borak Santai FNC'. Without that foundational finding, the principle in GS Realty cannot be invoked to impose derivative liability for the comments of others.

In these circumstances and bearing in mind the burden on the Plaintiffs, this Court finds that Issue 1(vi) must also be answered in the negative. The Plaintiffs have not shown, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendant is legally responsible for the second set of impugned words.

The Plaintiffs in their submissions sought to rely on section 114A EA 1950 to support the inference that the Defendant was the “publisher” of the online material. The Defendant responded by relying on Wan Ji, Mkini and Tong Seak Kan.

As already summarised, these authorities make clear that section 114A –

is intended to address the mischief of internet anonymity by allowing a presumption that the registered owner of an account is the publisher;

is rebuttable and does not by itself determine liability; and

generally requires some evidence that the person against whom the presumption is invoked is in fact the registered owner or subscriber of the relevant online account.

In Tong Seak Kan, for example, the presumption was triggered only after confirmation by Telekom Malaysia and TM Net that the defendant was the registered subscriber of the blogs concerned.

The approach of this Court is consistent with the principle articulated by the Court of Appeal in Wendy Tan Lee Peng Pentadbir Kepada Harta Pusaka Tan Ewe Kwang, Si Mati & Ors v. Ng Hoo Kui & Anor [2018] 1 LNS 1980, where it was held that it is only 'where there are no or insufficient facts or evidence from which a fair inference may be drawn that a court should turn to presumptions as a last resort to resolve the dispute'. Presumptions under the Evidence Act are not a substitute for proof; they are an aid to be resorted to when primary evidence is unavailable or equivocal, not when the party bearing the burden has simply failed to discharge it.

The Plaintiffs also referred to YB Dato' Hj Husam Hj Musa v. Mohd Faisal Rohban Ahmad [2015] 1 CLJ 787. That case does not assist the Plaintiffs as the facts are materially different. In any event, the principle remains that section 114A requires some foundational evidence connecting the defendant to the online publication before the presumption can be invoked.

In the present case, there is no such third-party confirmation. The Plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence from Telegram any telecommunications company or the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission to show that the “Ezham FNC” account is registered to the Defendant.

At its highest, the Plaintiffs’ case on identity rests on SP2’s own naming of a contact as “Ezham FNC” and his belief that this contact belongs to the Defendant. That belief, without more, to my understanding is insufficient to invoke the statutory presumption contemplated in section 114A as explained in Wan Ji Wan Hussin, Mkini and Tong Seak Kan.

This Court therefore holds that section 114A EA 1950 does not assist the Plaintiffs on the facts of this case. The burden of proving identity and publication remains squarely on the Plaintiffs and for the reasons already given, that burden has not been discharged.

The Plaintiffs also sought to invoke section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, urging this Court to draw an adverse inference from the Defendant's failure to produce his Telegram account for inspection and his decision not to call his wife to testify despite the assertion that the account was shared with her. While section 114(g) permits the Court to presume that evidence which could be but is not produced would, if produced be unfavourable to the person withholding it, this presumption can only operate once a foundation has been laid by primary evidence. The burden of proving that the Defendant was the publisher of the impugned words rested throughout on the Plaintiffs. Having found that this primary burden was not discharged by positive evidence linking the 'Ezham FNC' account to the Defendant, the question of adverse inference does not arise. One cannot infer that withheld evidence would prove a case that the adduced evidence has failed to establish. Issues 2 and 3 Publication to third parties and reference to the Plaintiffs

Although the action already fails for want of proof on Issue 1, this Court addresses Issues 2 and 3 briefly.

On Issue 2 (publication to third parties), the evidence of SP3 (Alif) is that he was a member of the groups known as “Go FNC”, “Go Haji Kita Setable” and “Borak Santai FNC”, and that he personally saw the impugned messages and subsequent comments.

On this evidence, this Court would have been prepared to accept that the messages, whoever authored them, were indeed seen by other members and thereby “published” to third parties.

As regards Facebook, however, SP2 candidly acknowledged in cross-examination that the alleged defamatory Facebook posts themselves were not exhibited in the bundles and that no screenshots of those posts were tendered in evidence. This Court therefore finds that any allegation of publication on Facebook is not made out.

On Issue 3 (reference to the Plaintiffs), there is little real dispute that the words, taken at face value, did refer to the 1st Plaintiff (by name, “FNC Corporate PLT / FNC”) and to the 2nd Plaintiff (referred to as “Firdaus”, “founder FNC” and by reference to his status as “Haji”).

If the publication and identity otherwise made out, this Court would have held that the words clearly identified the Plaintiffs. Issues 4 and 5 Whether the words are defamatory and their meaning

Similar to issues 2 and 3, although not strictly necessary for the disposal of this case, this Court states it views briefly.

The gist of the words complained of is that –

the 1st Plaintiff withheld commissions on personal grounds and without justification, that it misused or “took” agents’ customer databases;

it was irresponsible and incompetent in managing agents’ affairs; and

the 2nd Plaintiff as the face of FNC and a person of religious standing, behaved hypocritically and unfairly.

The test for whether words are defamatory is whether they "tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally". (see : Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237; Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd v Lim Guan Eng [2015] 6 MLJ 113). In this Court considered view, such allegations, if proven to have been published by or at the instance of the Defendant, would plainly be defamatory of both Plaintiffs. They impute dishonesty, mismanagement and lack of integrity to the 1st Plaintiff and hypocrisy and low moral character to the 2nd Plaintiff. The natural and ordinary meanings pleaded in paragraph 18 of the Statement of Claim are in substance, sustainable.

This Court therefore would have answered Issues 4 and 5 in the Plaintiffs’ favour, subject always to proof of authorship and publication.

Having found that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish the threshold element of publication, it follows that the Defendant's pleaded defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege do not arise for determination. As explained in paragraphs 21-24 above, the burden to establish defences only shifts to a Defendant once the Plaintiff has first discharged its burden of proving that the impugned words were published by the defendant and were defamatory of the plaintiff. Issue 6 Relief and damages

Since this Court has found that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Defendant was the publisher of the impugned messages, Issue 6 does not arise for determination. Nonetheless, this Court makes two observations.

First, the Plaintiffs claim substantial special damages of RM648,000.00 and RM240,000.00. It is trite law that special damages must be strictly pleaded and strictly proved. (see : Big Man Management Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2025] 5 MLJ 290). Unlike general damages, which the law presumes to flow from defamation, special damages represent actual pecuniary loss and require the plaintiff to demonstrate a causal link between the defamatory publication and the specific financial loss claimed. The Plaintiffs relied principally on income summaries showing a decline in the 1st Plaintiff's revenue after March 2022.

However, there is no detailed breakdown demonstrating that the alleged decline is causally linked to the impugned publications as opposed to other market or business factors. Indeed, SP1 acknowledged during cross-examination that the 1st Plaintiff's revenue actually increased by approximately RM20,000.00 in July 2022, which was after the alleged publications. This further undermines any claim of causal connection between the impugned words and the alleged loss.

Second, even if liability had been established, on the evidence before this Court, this Court would have been slow to award special damages in the full amounts claimed. The more appropriate course would likely have been to award general damages to reflect the injury to reputation among a relatively limited community of agents and customers, rather than the much larger figures advanced.

In light of the foregoing analysis, this Court reiterates that in a defamation action, the plaintiff must first satisfy the threshold requirement that the defendant published the words complained of ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff. If that burden is not discharged, the action is bound to fail.

In this case, while this Court accepts that the words complained of, if proven, are defamatory of the Plaintiffs and that they were indeed published to members of certain Telegram groups, the critical link between those words and the Defendant as their publisher has not been satisfactorily proved on a balance of probabilities.

The Plaintiffs’ case on identity rests principally on SP2’s own labelling of a contact as “Ezham FNC” and his belief that it refers to the Defendant. There is no independent corroboration from service providers or platform operators, no member lists, and the screenshots themselves are undated. Section 114A EA 1950 cannot be stretched to fill these evidential gaps on the facts of this case as they stand.

In the circumstances, this Court holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish the first and fundamental element of their claim, namely that the Defendant published the impugned words.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs of RM40,000.00 subject to the allocator. Dated : 11 December 2025 -sgd-Dr Noradura binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Solicitor for the Plaintiffs : : Bharathi a/p Sinnathamby Messrs. Bharathi & Associates Solicitor for the Defendant : : Amalia Marsita binti Hamdan Messrs. Amalia Rose Masuri The Law Office