1. ) Francis Xavier Nathan v 1. ) Cha Ti @ Cheah Tai (WA-11BNCvC-86-12/2023)

FRANCIS XAVIER NATHAN [NRIC No: 610610-06-5281]

THABONITHI DEVI A/PMC REGUPATHY [NRIC No: 631224-10-7300] … APPELLANTS

CHA TI @ CHEAH TAI [NRIC No: 481208-08-6449]

CHEAH PEI CHIH [NRIC No: 820415-10-5634] … RESPONDENTS GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT [1] On 15.5.2024 this Court had allowed the Appellants appeal with costs of RM5,000. The decision of the Magistrate’s Court was set aside, and the Respondents were ordered to return the RM75,000 that they had paid to the Appellants as a deposit for the purchase of a townhouse bearing the postal address No. 109A, Jalan Sri Hartamas 17, Sri Hartamas, 50480 Kuala Lumpur (the property). The Magistrate’s Court 21/09/2024 15:34:49 WA-11BNCvC-86-12/2023 Kand. 13 had ruled that the Respondents were entitled to their deposit back upon the termination of the sale and purchase agreement (SPA) for the property. [2] Over five months later since the decision of this Court, the Respondents filed an appeal on 30.8.2024 against the said decision by this Court. The appeal is clearly out of time. Nevertheless, below are the grounds for this Court’s judgment. The claim at the Magistrate’s Court [3] The parties are addressed in this Court’s decision as they were at trial before the Magistrate’s Court. The Plaintiffs filed the suit before the Magistrate’s Court for the return of the deposit paid to the Defendants. The Magistrate’s Court had allowed it. That order was reversed by this Court after deliberation of the Defendants’ appeal before this Court. The evidence [4] The factual matrix as per the Appeal Records is as follows:

The Plaintiffs had signed a Letter of Intent to Purchase the property on 22.5.2021, where the Plaintiffs paid the Defendants an early deposit of RM22,500.00, which is 3% of the entire deposit required.

The Plaintiffs’ request for a loan concerning the purchase of property was approved by Public Bank Berhad (the Bank). An offer letter dated 6.8.2021 was issued by the Bank was acknowledged receipt on 10.9.2021 by the Plaintiffs.

On 15.11.2021 the Plaintiffs’ solicitor received a letter from the Insolvency Department dated 11.11.2021 that confirmed that the Defendants were the beneficial owner of the property and that the initial purchaser of the property had duly settled the purchase price in full. The Insolvency Department confirmed that it had no objections to the transfer of the property by way of Deed of Assignment, as title to the property had yet to be issued.

The SPA was executed on 19.11.2021 by the Plaintiffs and the Defendants whereby the Defendants agreed to sell, and the Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the property at the selling price of RM750,000.00 where the terms and agreements of the sale were enclosed within the SPA.

A condition precedent was incorporated in recital (q) of the SPA that stated: “This Agreement is conditional upon the Purchasers obtaining the written confirmation from the Liquidator that the Vendors are the current owners of the Property, the full purchase price has been paid to the Developer, the Property is free from encumbrances and other confirmations pursuant to Section 22D(4) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) (Amendment) Act 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the

The Plaintiffs then paid the remaining deposit of RM52,500.00 to the Defendants after signing the SPA. Thus, the deposit was paid in full by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants who had received the sum as stated in clauses 1.1 (a) and (b) of the SPA. The amount was RM75,000. The mode of the Plaintiffs’ purchase of the property was also incorporated in the SPA, namely recital (r) of the SPA that stated: “The Purchasers are desirous of taking a loan (hereinafter referred to as “the Loan”) from a bank or financial institutions (hereinafter referred to as the “Purchasers’ Financier”) to assist in the purchase of the Property.”

On 27.12.2021 the Bank’s solicitors which had also acted for the Plaintiff requested from the Defendants’ solicitors all the necessary documents for the Bank to process the Plaintiff’s loan.

On 6.1.2022 the Defendants’ solicitors reminded the Plaintiffs’ solicitors that there was no Deed of Receipt and Reassignment by Citibank (the financier from the previous purchaser) as it had closed this file a long time back. The Defendants’ solicitors invited the Plaintiffs’ solicitors to bring to the attention of the Bank the statutory declaration of the previous purchaser that affirmed the loan had been repaid and the property was to be reassigned which was forwarded by the Defendants’ solicitors to the Plaintiffs’ solicitor on the date of the execution of the SPA – 19.2.2021

As the Bank was agreeable to receive a Letter of Awareness cum Consent/Indemnity in the absence of the Deed of Receipt and Reassignment (DRR) – evident by its email of 29.3.2022, the Defendants’ solicitors had forwarded the same together with the Defendants’ statutory declarations to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors on 20.4.2022 which was acknowledged receipt by the latter on 21.4.2022. The Plaintiffs’ solicitor was also informed that the Defendants had agreed to a one-month extension for the receipt of the balance of the purchase price.

On 22.6.2022 the Bank wrote to the Second Plaintiff which confirmed the Bank’s refusal to finance the Plaintiffs’ purchase of the property due to the “unavailability of vital security documents that were required from the vendor’s represented solicitors. Failure of which has brought uncertainty of the security to be charged to the bank.”

On 15.7.2022 the Plaintiffs’ solicitors notified the Defendants’ solicitors that the Bank could not proceed with the release of the financing due to the unavailability of vital documents. It was alleged that the Defendants had failed to furnish them in accordance to the SPA. The Plaintiffs terminated the SPA in accordance to clause 14 of the SPA. They had sought the return of the RM75,0000 deposit paid. Clause 14 is as follows: “If for any reasons whatsoever due to no fault of both parties hereto the Deed of Assignment of the Property In favour of the Purchasers is void, invalid, unenforceable and/or cannot be perfected where all remedial actions have been exhausted or If the Purchasers' Financier falls refuses or is unable to disburse the Loan due to the undone DRR or any reasons attributable to the undone DRR, then notwithstanding any of the provision herein contained, the Purchasers shall be entitled to rescind this Agreement by notice in writing to the Vendors and the Vendors shall on notification forthwith refund free of interest to the Purchasers all moneys paid by the Purchasers to the Vendors towards the Purchase Price whereupon this Agreement shall terminate and be of no further effect. The Vendors shall not in any way be responsible for the Purchasers' legal conveyancing's costs incurred.

On 15.8.2022 the Plaintiffs’ solicitor demanded for the return of the RM75,000 deposit paid, failing which legal actions would be commenced against the Defendants.

The Defendants’ solicitors responded to the notice of demand in their letter of 22.8.2022 sent to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors vide email on 23.8.2022 that reiterated:

The Defendants’ solicitors had informed the Plaintiffs of the absence of the DRR from Citibank on 21.8.2021 before the preparation and execution of the SPA

The Defendants’ solicitors had forwarded to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors Citibank’s notification letter and the former purchaser’s statutory declaration affirmed on 25.9.2021 on 7.1.2022

The deposit will not be refunded as it was forfeitable, but the Defendants had agreed to give a reasonable extension of one month to pay the balance of RM675,000

A whole chain of correspondence ensued on the termination of the SPA and the return of the RM75,000 deposit paid.

The Defendants had still refused to pay the deposited sum of RM75,000.00 to the Plaintiffs. The Defendants claimed that they did not contribute to any actions which led to the eventual termination of the SPA dated 19.11.2021. They had instead stated that it was the Plaintiffs who had wrongfully terminated the SPA by invoking Clause 14 negligently. According to the Defendants, this act by the Plaintiffs also conveniently released their responsibility to pay the total sum of RM675,000.00 to the Defendants. They had opined that it was the Plaintiffs who had breached the terms of the SPA by failing to complete the payment for the purchase of the property amounting to RM675,000.00. Thus, the Defendants believed it was right that they are entitled to the deposited sum of RM75,000.00 The findings by the Magistrates’ Court [5] The Magistrate’s Court found that the Plaintiffs had not breached the SPA when they failed to obtain a loan from the Bank or failed to pay the balance of the purchase price for the property because they had already terminated the SPA. Following the termination under Clause 14 of the SPA, the Plaintiffs then were released from the contractual obligations under the SPA which were no longer binding on the parties. The Magistrate’s Court found that the Plaintiffs were right in terminating the SPA as the Defendants had failed to provide the documents required for the financing from the Bank. [6] The Magistrate’s Court thus ordered for the return of the RM75,000 deposit paid by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants being satisfied that the Plaintiffs had proven their claim on a balance of probabilities. Submission at the High Court [7] In summary, the Defendants’ main contention was premised on the fact that the Magistrate’s Court had failed to take into consideration the essence of the SPA. The Defendants argued that there was only one condition precedent to the SPA which was recital (q) which was the written confirmation from the Liquidator that the Defendants were the current owners of the Property with the full purchase price settled by the Defendants to the developer and that the property was free from encumbrances and other confirmations. [8] As the condition precedent was fulfilled, it was not even a triable issue at trial before the Magistrate Court. Thus, the Defendants submitted that the Magistrates Court was wrong in arriving at its conclusion as when that one condition precedent was fulfilled, the Plaintiffs were under the contractual obligation to pay the balance purchase price of RM675,000. The Liquidator’s Letter of Confirmation received by the Plaintiffs on 24.12.2021 made the SPA unconditional and thus the Plaintiffs, bounded by the terms of the SPA, must pay. In having failed to do so, the Plaintiffs were in breach of the SPA. The Defendants complained that the Magistrates Court had failed to take this fact and the evidence into consideration in concluding how it did. [9] This Court heard the arguments by the Defendants that the Plaintiff had no basis to have relied on Clause 14 of the SPA that provided: “If for any reason whatsoever due to no fault of both parties hereto the Deed of Assignment of the Property in favour of the Purchasers to void, invalid, unenforceable and/or cannot be perfected where all remedial actions have been exhausted or if the Purchasers’ Financier fails, refuse or is unable to disburse the Loan due to the undone DRR or any reasons attributable to the undone DRR, then notwithstanding any provision herein contained, the Purchasers shall be entitled to rescind this Agreement by notice in writing to the Vendors and the Vendors shall be entitled to rescind this Agreement by notice in writing to the Vendors and the Vendors shall on notification forthwith refund free of interest to the Purchasers all sums of money paid by the Purchasers to the Vendors toward the Purchase Price whereupon this Agreement shall terminate and be of no further effect. The Vendors shall not in any way be responsible for the Purchasers’ legal conveyancing costs incurred.” [10] The Bank’s letter dated 22.6.2022 informed the Plaintiffs that it was unable to proceed with the loan financing because of the unavailability of vital security required from the Defendants’ solicitors. The Defendants invited this Court to the evidence adduced at trial which showed the Bank had written to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors via email on 29.3.2022 that requested for a Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity as a replacement to the Undone Deed of Receipt Reassignment. [11] In response the Defendants through their solicitors acceded to the Bank’s request and forwarded the said Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity dated 1.4.2022 to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors on 21.4.2022. It was the Plaintiffs’ solicitors that had failed to forward the same to the Bank. As a result of this, the Bank could not proceed to process the Plaintiffs’ loan. The Plaintiffs’ witness, the lawyer from the firm of solicitors hired by the Plaintiffs confirmed during his testimony that they did not forward the said Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity to the Bank for processing. [12] The Defendants argued that the Magistrates’ Court had failed to understand the contents of the Bank’s letter of 22.6.2022 that actually referred to the said Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity dated 1.4.2022 which had been forwarded by the Defendants’ solicitors to the Plaintiffs’. It was submitted that the error on the part of the Magistrates’ Court was that it had failed to appreciate the fact that it was the Plaintiffs’ solicitors who had failed to forward the said Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity that was in their custody and possession to the Bank. Therefore, the Defendants implored this Court to correct the finding that the negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs’ solicitors did not entitle them to terminate the SPA under Clause 14. Therefore, the Defendants submitted that they did not need to return the sum of RM75,000. [13] For this appeal, the Plaintiffs responded that the required documents were not forwarded by the Defendants and thus they were correct in invoking their entitlement under Clause 14 because according to the Plaintiffs that had resulted in an automatic breach of the SPA. The Plaintiffs maintained that the Magistrates’ Court was correct to find that they were entitled to return the deposited sum of RM75,000.00 and that the failure of the Defendants to return the deposited sum of RM75,000.00 amounted to a breach of the SPA by the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs stated that in the process of securing the transaction of the sale of the property, the Defendants had failed, refused, and/or neglected to provide the necessary documents that were needed by the Bank to affirm their security and assets before approving the loan.

The Plaintiffs contended that the effect of the absence/non-production by the Defendants of the relevant documents, led to the Bank issuing a notice to the Plaintiffs informing them that the loan could not be granted due to the failure of the Defendants in providing the documents. This Court’s findings [14] Upon a closer examination of the SPA, this Court found that there was only one condition precedent and that was indeed the Defendants to obtain the Developer’s Confirmation at the Defendants’ own cost and expenses within six months from the date of the SPA which gave the Defendants until 19.5.2022. This condition precedent is located at clause 5.1: “The parties hereto expressly agree that the sale and purchase herein are conditional upon the Developer’s Confirmation being obtained by the Purchasers at the Purchaser’s own cost and expenses within six (6) months from the date of this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “the Conditional Period”.) [15] Clauses 5.2 and 5.3 stipulated the obligations in the event the Liquidator imposed any conditions or terms to the sale and assignment of the Property on the Vendors. Clause 5.4 confirmed the agreement between the parties that the SPA shall become unconditional and fully enforceable as to all its terms and conditions on the date of receipt by the Plaintiffs’ solicitors of the Developer Confirmation or the documents that evidenced the complete compliance and satisfaction by the Defendants of all the conditions in the Developer’s Confirmation (whichever came later). [16] Clause 5.5 provided that in the event the Developer’s Confirmation was not obtained then the Plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the SPA and the Defendants shall refund the deposit paid free of interest. [17] This Court observed that the SPA incorporated the history of the owners of the property and the Deeds of Assignments that accompanied it due to the title having been issued. The initial purchaser bought the property on 30.8.1984 from the Developer who went into liquidation. A Deed of Assignment from Citibank showed all rights title and interests were assigned to it. It was subsequently sold to the one Daisy Solomon (referred to as the previous purchaser in this Court’s grounds of judgment) on 22.5.1986. There was a DRR dated 7.9.1990 to show that the first loan had fully been settled. A Deed of Assignment on 18.9.1990 confirmed that all the rights were assigned to the previous purchaser. The previous purchaser then executed a loan facility with Citibank and executed a Deed of Assignment dated 20.9.1990 to assign all her rights to Citibank. On 22.10.1992 the previous purchaser sold the property to the Defendants. Although the previous purchaser had settled her loan before September 1996, the DRR was not done. By Deed of Assignment dated 2.9.1986 the previous purchaser assigned all her rights to the Defendants. The Defendants procured a loan to CIMB and assigned their rights to the property to CIMB on 16.9.1996. [18] The Defendants had repaid CIMB and by DRR dated 30.5.2007, CIMB had re-assigned absolutely to the Defendants all the rights title, and interest in and to the property. The Property at the time of the SPA was not assigned to any banks or financial institutions and was free from all encumbrances. These were all embodied in the SPA. At the date of the SPA, the separate issue document of title/strata title of the property had yet to be issued by the relevant authority. [19] The evidence chronicled above showed that the whole dispute arose when the Bank had decided to refuse to grant the Plaintiffs financing for the property. According to the Bank, it was due to the failure to provide the requisite documents that brought uncertainty of the security to be charged to the Bank. [20] The fact that the Defendants had fulfilled this condition precedent was undisputed. This Court found that the Magistrate’s Court had completely failed to consider this when it concluded the case and ruled for the Plaintiffs, similar to the case of Lee Nyan Hon & Bros Sdn Bhd v Metro Charm Sdn Bhd [2009] 6 MLJ 1 where it was ruled that the trial judge did not conduct a proper evaluation of evidence. [21] The Plaintiffs had relied on and built their case on the Bank’s letter of 22.6.2022 that specifically stated why it was unable to proceed with the Second Plaintiff’s loan financing at the release stage. It was this: “Main reason for cessation of release progress being unavailability of vital security documents that were required from vendor’s represented solicitors. Failure to which has brought uncertainty of the security to be charged to the bank.” [22] However, it was very clear that the Defendants’ solicitors had forwarded the required documents to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors for their onward transmission to the Bank. This Court found that evidence showed the Defendants’ had forwarded the said documents to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors. As per the evidence from the Appeal Records iterated above, pursuant to the Bank’s email for a Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity as a replacement document to the DRR, the Defendants’ solicitors forwarded the said document which was dated 1.4.2022 to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors on 21.4.2022. [23] Whether the Plaintiffs’ solicitor thereafter had forwarded to the Bank the same, the Magistrate’s Court did not conclude whether the documents were indeed forwarded by the Plaintiffs’ solicitors to the Bank. It found: “Dalam hal ini, semasa pemeriksaan balas dan pemeriksaan semula, walaupun SPI mengesahkan bahawa dokumen tambahan tersebut telah dikemukakan kepada Public Bank namun, tiada Salinan surat iringan tersebut dimasukkan dalam ikatan dokumen di Mahkamah. Keterangan SP3 juga tidak dapat menyokong keterangan SP1 kerana apabila ditanya semasa pemeriksaan balas sama ada dokumen-dokumen tersebut telah diterima oleh Public Bank, SP3 menjawab tidak ingat.” [24] After scrutiny of the Appeal Records, this Court found that on a balance of probabilities, no evidence proved the Plaintiffs’ solicitors had forwarded the same to the Bank. The Plaintiffs did not challenge the averment that the Bank had never received the Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity dated 1.4.2022 for the Bank’s further processing. The Plaintiffs’ solicitor (PW1) confirmed that there was nothing before the trial court to show that the Plaintiffs’ solicitors had forwarded the said Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity to the Bank and likewise nothing to show that the Bank had acknowledged its receipt. [25] It is a finding of fact by this Court that the blame for the non-delivery and/or non-furnishing of the said Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity ought not to be placed upon the Defendants nor their solicitors. This Court finds that if there was any fault to be placed for the said non-delivery and/or non-furnishing to the Bank, evidence shows on a balance of probabilities that it ought to have been on the Plaintiffs’ solicitors. This court referenced the decision in SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 CLJ 177; [2016] 1 MLJ 464 where the Federal Court laid out important principles concerning termination and the requirement for clarity in contractual obligations. It was emphasized that: "The question of valid termination turns upon whether or not there was in fact a valid reason at the time of termination and not on whether or not the terminating party (subjectively) knew or believed there to be one" (para 23-24). Therefore, on a balance of probabilities the Plaintiffs had failed to show that they had a basis to rely on clause 14 of the SPA. [26] On the opposite, it was the Plaintiffs who had breached the SPA by failing to satisfy their contractual obligation to pay the balance sum of RM675,000 within the time stipulated. Whatever it was, this Court held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the return of the RM75,000 deposit paid to the Defendants. [27] This Court found that there was an unfortunate error on the part of the Magistrate’s Court when it failed to understand that the Bank had referred to the Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity, which had been in the possession of the Plaintiffs' solicitors. The Magistrate’s Court’s grounds of judgment at paras 26 to 32 reasoned that it was due to the absence of the DRR and the SPA of the previous transactions. It went on to state that even if the documents were forwarded to the Bank, they were for consideration purposes only and did not guarantee the release of the loan to the Plaintiffs. This Court found that the Magistrate’s Court had missed the point of contention, as it took into account irrelevant considerations and failed to give due weight to the relevant considerations. See Director of Forests & Anor v Mau Kam Tong & Mau Kim Siong (the executors of the estate of Mau Ming, deceased) & Anor and another appeal [2010] 3 MLJ 509, which was cited in the submissions of the Plaintiffs both before the Magistrate’s Court and before this Court. The Plaintiffs had contended that the Bank's refusal to finance was due to the Defendants' solicitors. Hence, it was on this basis that the Plaintiffs invoked clause 14 of the SPA to terminate it. [28] The Court of Appeal’s case of Nor Azlina Abdul Aziz v Expert Project Management Sdn Bhd [2017] 3 CLJ 58 was referred to by the Defendants where in that case, non-compliance with the condition precedent resulted in the contract automatically discharged. The Court of Appeal had interfered with the decision of the trial judge when it was found that there were some misapprehensions of pleadings, there was a misdirection on the facts and the law when evaluating the facts and evidence adduced, and that the trial judge was plainly wrong in his decision. The Court of Appeal illustrated that ascertaining whether the trial judge was wrong depended on the agreement's construction. [29] This Court found that the trial judge had misunderstood that the condition precedent had been fulfilled and was not a triable issue. There were some misapprehensions too on the issue of the required vital documents requested by the Bank to be furnished by the Defendants’ solicitors. [30] An examination of the Plaintiffs’ pleadings further confirmed that the issue to supply the previous SPAs between the initial purchaser and the developer was never pleaded. It was not disputed either by the Plaintiffs. It was raised for the very first time at trial. As upheld by the Federal Court in Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Berhad [2018] 1 CLJ 415; [2018] 2 MLJ 292 at p428: “It is settled law that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded. Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Berhad [2015] 6 MLJ 1, State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1985] 1 LNS 117; [1986] 1 <LJ 490, Veronica Lee Ha Ling & Ors v Maxisegar Sdn Bhd [2009] 6 CLJ 232. In Lee Ah Chor v Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 667; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 239 it was held that where a vital issue was not raised in the pleadings, it could not be allowed to be granted and to succeed on appeal. A decision based on an issue which was not raised by the parties in their pleadings is liable to be set aside: Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 1 CLJ 1113; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 330; [1990] 2 MLJ 152. In The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 LNS 178; [1974] 1 MLJ 157 the Federal Court set aside the judgment of the trial judge as it was decided on an issue not raised on the pleadings. In that case, the trial judge erred in concluding that the pleadings included a claim for breach of contract as well as a claim for libel.” [31] Therefore, as it was plainly wrong for the Magistrate’s Court to consider that the vital security documents included the previous SPA and the DRR in para 28 of its grounds of judgment, this Court deemed it warranted an appellate interference. The Bank was unambiguous in its request for the Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity in the absence of the DRR. The subpoenaed witness from the Bank PW3 had given oral testimony in contradiction to the Bank’s written correspondence (inclusive of email of 22.3.2022). [32] Furthermore, the Magistrate’s Court had considered the DRR which was no longer an issue. To have delved further into whether the Bank would have or would have not granted the release of the loan to the Plaintiffs was erroneous and amounted to a misdirection by the Magistrate’s Court. See the Court of Appeal’s case of Ho Hup Construction Company Bhd v Woo Thin Choy [2015] 9 CLJ 709 where the court's reliance on the plaintiff’s annual accounts of 2009 as binding and conclusive evidence of the plaintiff’s lack of further interest in USD2.5M was determined to be misplaced and incorrect, the appellate court held that on the hard evidence before the court, the balance of probabilities was tilted against the defendant and the court had misdirected itself on that issue. The learned trial judge's reliance on the statement in the plaintiff's annual accounts for 2009 as binding or conclusive against the plaintiff's further or continuing interest in those monies was wholly misplaced. [33] The evident fact was that the Bank did not receive the said Letter of Awareness Cum Indemnity that was in the custody of the Plaintiffs’ solicitors. The Plaintiffs therefore could not benefit by terminating the SPA and seeking the return of the RM750,000 deposit paid. [34] To righten the position, this Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the Magistrate’s Court. In concluding that the Magistrate’s Court’s decision was plainly wrong as there was misappreciation of the facts, see the Federal Court’s decision in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2004] 6 AMR 781; and in Azman bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 1; [2012] 6 CLJ

The RM75,000 deposit was ordered to be returned to the Defendants. Costs of RM5,000 was awarded to the Defendants to be paid by the Plaintiffs. DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 2024 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA