1. ) Golden Plus Holdings Berhad v 1. ) China Idea Development Limited (WA-22NCC-605-12/2020)

GOLDEN PLUS HOLDINGS BERHAD (Company No. 198401000555

GOLDEN PLUS CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (Company No. 199301030087

GOLDEN PLUS (BVI) PTE LTD (British Virgin Islands Company No. 126387)

SRI SERDANG SDN BHD (Company No. 197601000972 (26965-

D)) PARADIZE BAZAAR SDN BHD (Company No. 199501039962

VENICE HEIGHTS SDN. BHD. (Company No. 201401028069

HANPOPULAR SDN. BHD. (Company No. 201401028022 (1104108-P)) S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA

YANFULL INVESTMENTS LIMITED (Company No. 432136)

YANFULL (SHANGHAI) CO. LTD. (Company No. 913100006072589999) ... PLAINTIFFS

CHINA IDEA DEVELOPMENT LIMITED (Hong Kong Company No.: 1130588)

PACIFIC VICTOR INTERNATIONAL LTD (Hong Kong Company No.: 890052)

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF

TEH WEI KIAN (NRIC No.: 960531-43-5109)

TEH CHIAO EING, VALARIE (British Passport No.: GBR 548371510)

WU KWOK YING, MARIA (British Passport No.: GBR 548181044)

GOH SIN TIEN (NRIC No.: 500925-08-5335)

HUANG GUOQUAN (PRC Passport No.: EB7450450)

HUANG GUOYUAN (PRC Passport No.: E90189947)

YONG CHOOI LAN (NRIC No.: 690802-10-5332)

TAN SAY HAN (NRIC No.: 521023-08-5443) S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA

SHIU FAI FONG (NRIC No.: 640422-12-5248)

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF (CHINA WILL) ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Enclosure 712: 7th Defendant's Application for Stay of Execution INTRODUCTION [1] Before this court is an application by the 7th Defendant (“D7”) seeking a stay of execution of the Judgment delivered on 13.3.2025, together with the costs order made on 10.4.2025 (collectively, “the Judgment”), pending the final determination of D7's appeal to the Court of Appeal filed on 11.4.2025 (“the Appeal”). [2] The application is brought pursuant to Section 73 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and is supported by D7's Affidavit in Support affirmed on 21.4.2025 (Enclosure 713) and D7's Affidavit in Reply affirmed on 13.5.2025 (Enclosure 731). S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA [3] Having considered the comprehensive written and oral submissions of both parties, together with the authorities relied upon, I am satisfied that special circumstances exist in this case warranting the grant of a stay of execution. The application is therefore allowed in respect of minutes 4 to 11 of the Judgment, while the injunction orders in minutes 1, 2 and 3 shall remain in full force and effect. [4] These are my grounds for reaching this decision. BACKGROUND FACTS [5] On 13.3.2025, this Court delivered judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs against the Defendants, including D7, in respect of various claims arising from conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duties, and related causes of action stemming from a protracted commercial dispute. [6] The monetary relief awarded against the Defendants jointly and severally comprises: a) Special damages of RMB 166,102,428.00 (approximately MYR 100,046,980.54); b) General damages for payments under tenancy agreements: HKD 10,200,000.00 (approximately MYR 5,771,149.80); S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA c) General damages for legal fees defending winding-up proceedings: USD 50,535.01 (approximately MYR 221,873.96) and GBP 15,454.01 (approximately MYR 90,716.58); d) General damages for legal fees in related proceedings: MYR 346,810.00; e) General damages for replacement of title documents: MYR 42,399.90; f) Exemplary damages (calculated at 25% of compensatory damages): MYR 25,447,967.20; and g) Disbursements: MYR 1,181,257.56. [7] Against D7 specifically, costs were ordered in the sum of MYR 200,000.00. The aggregate judgment sum amounts to approximately MYR 133,349,195.54. [8] Following the delivery of the Judgment, on 11.4.2025, D7 filed his Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeal challenging the entirety of the Judgment. [9] On 17.4.2025, the Plaintiffs' solicitors issued a letter of demand to D7's solicitors, requiring payment within 14 days of MYR 1,181,257.56 (disbursements for which D7 is jointly and severally liable) and MYR 200,000.00 (costs awarded specifically against D7). S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA [10] In response, on 21.4.2025, D7 filed the present application (Enclosure 712) seeking a stay of execution pending the disposal of his Appeal. [11] D7 is a 75-year-old retiree who holds registered disabled person (OKU) status due to hearing impairment. In his supporting affidavits, he has deposed that he lacks the financial resources to satisfy the judgment sum. [12] The Plaintiffs have already commenced garnishee proceedings against D7, resulting in the freezing of his bank account containing approximately RM 11,547.18. RESPECTIVE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS The 7th Defendant's Submissions [13] D7 contends that special circumstances exist warranting the grant of a stay. His principal arguments may be summarised as follows. [14] First, D7 submits that the judgment sum is substantial and manifestly beyond his financial capacity to satisfy. As a 75- year-old retiree with a registered disability, he argues that enforcement would inevitably precipitate bankruptcy proceedings under Sections 8(1)(b) and 38 of the Insolvency Act 1967, causing irreparable harm not merely of a financial nature but extending to severe reputational, S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA physical, and emotional consequences given his advanced age and health condition. [15] Second, D7 contends that if execution proceeds unabated, his Appeal would be rendered nugatory. Should he be adjudicated bankrupt, he would lose the legal standing necessary to pursue the Appeal effectively, thereby nullifying his statutory right of appeal. [16] Third, D7 raises concerns regarding the recoverability of any sums paid should his Appeal ultimately succeed. He points to the existence of winding-up proceedings against the 1st Plaintiff (Petition No. WA-28NCC-425-05/2023) as evidence of financial instability within the Plaintiffs' group. Additionally, D7 has exhibited company searches and financial reports for the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Plaintiffs, which he submits demonstrate poor financial positions characterised by operating losses and substantial current liabilities. He argues that there exists a real and substantial risk that monies paid pursuant to the Judgment would be irrecoverable should he succeed on appeal. [17] Fourth, D7 submits that the balance of convenience favours granting a stay. The Plaintiffs would suffer no irreparable prejudice from a temporary stay pending appeal, as any delay in payment can be adequately compensated through interest on the judgment sum. Conversely, D7 would suffer severe and potentially irreversible consequences - including S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA bankruptcy and its attendant restrictions - if execution is not stayed. [18] Finally, D7 emphasises his willingness to expedite the hearing of his Appeal, demonstrating his bona fides and commitment to having the substantive issues determined with dispatch rather than using the stay application as a dilatory tactic. The Plaintiffs' Submissions [19] The Plaintiffs vigorously oppose D7's application, arguing that no special circumstances have been established. Their principal contentions are as follows. [20] First, the Plaintiffs submit that as a general rule applicable to monetary judgments, a successful litigant should not be deprived of the fruits of litigation unless special circumstances are demonstrated. They rely on established authorities including Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] MLJ 116 and the Federal Court decision in Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 for this proposition. [21] Second, the Plaintiffs contend that D7's alleged inability to satisfy the judgment sum does not constitute a special circumstance. They argue that D7's professed fear of bankruptcy proceedings could be eliminated simply by making payment of the judgment sum and costs as ordered. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA The Plaintiffs characterise D7's financial predicament as merely the natural and foreseeable consequence of an adverse judgment following a full trial on the merits. [22] Third, the Plaintiffs dispute D7's characterisation of their financial position. They assert that the Golden Plus group as a whole maintains financial solvency with substantial assets, and reject the suggestion that there is any real risk of non-recoverability. [23] Fourth, the Plaintiffs propose that if D7 harbours genuine concerns about recoverability, these concerns could be adequately addressed by D7 paying the judgment sum into a stakeholder account (specifically, the Plaintiffs' solicitors' account) pending the outcome of the Appeal. They submit that this mechanism would protect both parties' interests: if D7's Appeal fails, the judgment sum would be released to the Plaintiffs in satisfaction of the Judgment; if D7's Appeal succeeds, the funds would be available for return to him with accrued interest. [24] Finally, the Plaintiffs submit that the balance of convenience favours them. Having obtained judgment after lengthy and contested proceedings, they would be unjustly deprived of their hard-won litigation fruits without any substantial security from D7 if a stay were granted. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING STAY OF EXECUTION [25] The court's power to grant a stay of execution derives from Section 73 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. It is settled law that in respect of monetary judgments, a stay of execution will not ordinarily be granted unless the applicant demonstrates the existence of special circumstances warranting such extraordinary relief. [26] The leading authority remains Kosma Palm Oil Mill, where the Federal Court affirmed the principle established in Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] MLJ 116 that special circumstances must be shown before a stay will be granted in respect of a money judgment. [27] However, what constitutes “special circumstances” is not susceptible to rigid categorisation. As Ian Chin JC (as he then was) observed in Government of Malaysia v Datuk Haji Kadir Mohamad Mastan [1993] 3 MLJ 514 at p 521, a dictum endorsed by the Federal Court in Kosma Palm Oil Mill: “the list of factors constituting special circumstances is infinite and could grow with time.” Any attempt to limit the list or close a category would impose a fetter on the exercise of the court's discretion, making the discretion less of a discretion. Each case must be evaluated on its own particular facts and circumstances. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA [28] Importantly, the existence of an appeal alone does not constitute a special circumstance. If it did, every unsuccessful litigant could obtain a stay merely by filing a notice of appeal, thereby undermining the fundamental principle that successful litigants are entitled to enjoy the fruits of their judgment pending any appellate determination. [29] In determining whether special circumstances exist, the court must carefully weigh the competing interests and potential hardship to each party, conducting what has been termed a “balancing exercise.” As emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Ong Koh Hou v Da Land Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 4 CLJ 622, the court must consider the potential prejudice to both parties and assess where the balance of convenience properly lies. [30] Furthermore, in RHB Bank Berhad v Datuk Keramat Holding Berhad [2004] MLJU 308, the High Court confirmed that the balance of convenience is a relevant and material consideration in the exercise of discretion to grant or refuse a stay. This principle finds support in the comprehensive analysis undertaken by the Planning Appeal Board in Ang Sue Khoon v Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang [2016] 11 MLJ 516, where the Board conducted an extensive examination of the applicable principles for granting stays and concluded that the balance of convenience must be carefully weighed in determining whether special circumstances exist to warrant a stay. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT D7's Personal Circumstances and Financial Hardship [31] D7 is a 75-year-old retiree with registered disability status arising from hearing impairment. He has deposed, without contradiction, that he lacks regular income and subsists on limited personal savings supplemented by family support. The judgment sum of approximately MYR 133 million is manifestly beyond his means to satisfy. [32] If execution is permitted to proceed, D7 will inevitably face bankruptcy proceedings under Sections 8(1)(b) and 38 of the Insolvency Act 1967. This is not mere speculation or hypothetical theorising. As I have found earlier, the Plaintiffs have already initiated garnishee proceedings, and the paltry sum of RM 11,547.18 recovered thereby provides compelling empirical evidence of D7's financial inability to satisfy even a fraction of the judgment debt. [33] The Plaintiffs argue that D7's inability to pay and his apprehension of bankruptcy are not special circumstances but merely the natural consequences of an adverse judgment. They contend that if such factors were considered special circumstances, virtually every defendant facing a substantial monetary judgment could obtain a stay simply by pleading poverty, thereby eroding the principle that successful litigants should not be deprived of the fruits of their judgment. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA [34] I respectfully disagree with this characterisation. The question before the court is not whether D7's financial inability, viewed in isolation and abstraction, constitutes a special circumstance. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the totality of circumstances - including D7's personal situation, his financial hardship, his age, his disability, and the other factors identified - collectively amount to special circumstances when considered holistically. [35] D7's advanced age of 75 years is a material consideration. At this stage of life, the prospect of bankruptcy carries particularly severe consequences. Unlike a younger person who might have years to rebuild financial standing and reputation, an elderly individual faces profound and largely irreversible impacts. The stress and anxiety attendant upon bankruptcy proceedings can have serious adverse effects on physical and emotional health, especially for someone of D7's age. [36] Moreover, D7's registered disability status compounds these concerns. His hearing impairment affects his ability to participate effectively in legal and financial matters. The severe restrictions and disabilities imposed by bankruptcy would further limit his ability to manage his affairs and to mount an effective defense of his interests in the Appeal. [37] These personal circumstances distinguish D7's case from the ordinary scenario of a judgment debtor who simply lacks funds to pay. The convergence of advanced age, disability, S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA complete absence of financial resources, and the magnitude of the judgment debt creates a situation where enforcement would not merely inconvenience D7 or temporarily impair his finances, but would inflict catastrophic and irreversible harm upon him personally. Risk of Appeal Being Rendered Nugatory [38] A related but distinct consideration is whether D7's Appeal would be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted. In Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131, the Federal Court expressly recognised that this constitutes a relevant special circumstance. [39] If D7 is made bankrupt as a consequence of enforcement, several adverse legal consequences follow. His legal standing to prosecute the Appeal effectively would be compromised, if not eliminated entirely. More fundamentally, even if the Appeal ultimately succeeds, he would be unable to recover the judgment sum paid, as he would have no assets or means of restitution. [40] This is not a hypothetical or speculative concern. The threat of bankruptcy is immediate, real, and inevitable if execution proceeds. As I have found earlier, the Plaintiffs have already demonstrated their intention to enforce the judgment aggressively through garnishee proceedings. D7's financial circumstances admit of no doubt. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA [41] The Plaintiffs argue that D7 retains the theoretical ability to avoid bankruptcy by simply paying the judgment sum. However, this argument is circular and unpersuasive. To require D7 to pay a sum he demonstrably does not have - on pain of losing his right of appeal - would render the statutory right of appeal entirely illusory and nugatory in his case. [42] The purpose of permitting appeals is to ensure that justice is not only done but is manifestly seen to be done, and that errors (if any) in first-instance decisions may be corrected. The right of appeal would be rendered meaningless if a successful appellant cannot be restored to his original position because enforcement has rendered restitution impossible. Concerns Regarding Recoverability [43] D7 has raised concerns about his ability to recover any sums paid pursuant to the Judgment should his Appeal succeed. He points to the existence of winding-up proceedings against the 1st Plaintiff and financial difficulties evidenced by company searches and audited financial reports for multiple Plaintiff entities. [44] The Plaintiffs vigorously dispute this characterisation, asserting that the Golden Plus group as a whole remains financially solvent with substantial assets. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA [45] I need not resolve definitively the competing contentions regarding the Plaintiffs' financial health. What is material is that D7 has adduced evidence - in the form of the winding-up petition (Petition No. WA-28NCC-425-05/2023) and financial statements showing losses and substantial liabilities - raising a legitimate question about recoverability. [46] The multiplicity of jurisdictions involved further complicates potential recovery efforts. The Plaintiffs comprise entities incorporated in Malaysia, British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, and China. Notably, the British Virgin Islands and China are not reciprocating countries under Schedule 1 of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958. Should D7 succeed on appeal and seek to recover monies paid, he would face significant practical and legal obstacles in enforcing any judgment for restitution against Plaintiffs in non-reciprocating jurisdictions. [47] This concern is not merely theoretical. Given D7's advanced age, limited resources, and disability, the prospect of his having to pursue cross-border enforcement proceedings in multiple foreign jurisdictions is particularly daunting and may well prove impossible in practical terms. [48] The Court of Appeal in Renew Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors v ADM Ventures (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor and another appeal [2022] MLJU 1134 recognised at paragraph [37] that circumstances rendering recovery of a judgment debt paid “a near impossibility” may constitute special circumstances: S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA “However there may well be circumstances that would render recovery of a judgment debt paid a near impossibility because either the judgment creditors are many and scattered all over the world and mainly in a foreign state or that there is evidence that the judgment creditor is not able to repay as it is insolvent or near insolvent or already in liquidation or on the threshold of it or that there is a real likelihood and danger of dissipation of the judgment debt paid.” [49] In the present case, the combination of multiple foreign jurisdictions (some non-reciprocating), evidence of financial difficulties within the Plaintiffs' group, and the existence of winding-up proceedings against the 1st Plaintiff collectively give rise to legitimate concerns about the practical recoverability of any sums paid by D7 should he ultimately succeed on appeal. [50] In the present case, the combination of multiple foreign jurisdictions (some non-reciprocating), evidence of financial difficulties within the Plaintiffs' group, and the existence of winding-up proceedings against the 1st Plaintiff collectively give rise to legitimate concerns about the practical recoverability of any sums paid by D7 should he ultimately succeed on appeal. The Balance of Convenience [51] Having identified multiple factors that potentially constitute special circumstances, I must now weigh the balance of S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA convenience and assess the relative prejudice to each party. [52] The fundamental principle that successful litigants should not be deprived of the fruits of their judgment is an important consideration that must be given due weight. The Plaintiffs have successfully prosecuted their claims through a full trial on the merits and have obtained a favorable judgment. Prima facie, they are entitled to enforce that judgment without delay. [53] However, the very purpose of permitting appeals is to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, and that errors (if any) may be corrected on appellate review. The right of appeal would be rendered entirely nugatory if successful appellants cannot be restored to their original position because enforcement has made restitution impossible. [54] In weighing the competing interests, I find that the potential hardship to D7 if a stay is refused substantially outweighs the prejudice to the Plaintiffs if a stay is granted, for the following reasons. [55] If execution is not stayed and D7 is made bankrupt, he will suffer severe, immediate, and irreversible consequences. These include not only the financial disabilities and restrictions attendant upon bankruptcy, but also profound reputational harm and, given his advanced age and health S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA condition, significant adverse impacts on his physical and emotional wellbeing. Moreover, his Appeal would be rendered nugatory, as he would lose the legal capacity to prosecute it effectively and would be unable to recover any judgment sum paid even if ultimately successful. [56] Conversely, if a stay is granted, the Plaintiffs would face merely a temporary delay in enforcement pending appellate determination. Crucially, any such delay can be adequately compensated through interest on the judgment sum should D7's Appeal ultimately fail. The Plaintiffs would suffer no irreparable prejudice from a temporary postponement of execution. [57] The Plaintiffs' submission that they would be unjustly deprived of their litigation fruits must be balanced against D7's fundamental right to an effective appeal. This argument presupposes that the Judgment is correct and will inevitably be upheld on appeal - but that is precisely the question to be determined by the Court of Appeal. Until the Appeal is disposed of, the correctness of the Judgment remains an open question, and this court must ensure that both parties' rights are adequately protected. [58] The Plaintiffs' proposed stakeholder arrangement, while theoretically appealing, is entirely impracticable in light of D7's demonstrated lack of financial resources. To require D7 to pay funds he manifestly does not have would effectively deny him his statutory right of appeal, which S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA would be contrary to the interests of justice and the rule of law. [59] It is noteworthy that D7 has expressed willingness to expedite the hearing of his Appeal, which would minimise any delay in the Plaintiffs' ability to enforce the Judgment if the Appeal proves unsuccessful. This demonstrates D7's good faith and his genuine commitment to having the substantive issues resolved promptly rather than employing dilatory tactics. [60] Considering all these factors holistically, I am satisfied that the balance of convenience lies decisively in favour of granting a stay of execution in this case. Scope of the Stay [61] Having determined that special circumstances exist warranting a stay, I must consider the appropriate scope of such relief. [62] The Judgment contains multiple components, including injunctive relief (minutes 1, 2 and 3) as well as monetary relief (minutes 4 to 11) and the costs order made on 10.4.2025. [63] The considerations that warrant a stay in respect of monetary relief - D7's financial inability to pay, the risk of bankruptcy, and the potential for the Appeal to be rendered S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA nugatory - do not apply with equal force to the injunctive relief granted in the Judgment. [64] Injunctions operate in personam, requiring or restraining specific conduct. They do not give rise to the same concerns regarding financial capacity, bankruptcy, or recoverability that animate the grant of a stay in respect of monetary judgments. Moreover, allowing the injunctions to remain in force pending the Appeal serves to maintain the status quo and to preserve the subject matter of the litigation, which is a recognised objective of interlocutory relief. [65] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the appropriate scope of the stay is limited to minutes 4 to 11 of the Judgment (comprising the monetary relief) and the costs order made on 10.4.2025. The injunctive orders contained in minutes 1, 2 and 3 of the Judgment shall remain in full force and effect, as they do not give rise to the same concerns that warrant staying execution of the monetary components. CONCLUSION AND ORDER [66] For the comprehensive reasons articulated above, I find that special circumstances exist in this case warranting a stay of execution of the monetary aspects of the Judgment pending the final determination of D7's Appeal to the Court of Appeal. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA [67] The special circumstances comprise the following cumulative factors: a) D7's advanced age of 75 years, registered disability status, and manifest lack of financial resources; b) The inevitability of bankruptcy proceedings if execution proceeds, which would cause severe and irreversible harm given D7's personal circumstances; c) The real and substantial risk that D7's Appeal would be rendered nugatory if he is made bankrupt; d) Legitimate questions regarding recoverability in light of evidence concerning the Plaintiffs' financial position and the multiplicity of foreign jurisdictions involved, including non-reciprocating countries; and e) The balance of convenience, which favours granting a temporary stay given that the Plaintiffs can be adequately compensated through interest whereas D7 would suffer irreparable harm. [68] Accordingly, I make the following orders: a) D7's application in Enclosure 712 is allowed in respect of minutes 4 to 11 of the Judgment dated 13.3.2025 and the costs order made on 10.4.2025. S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA b) The execution of minutes 4 to 11 of the Judgment dated 13.3.2025 and the costs order made on 10.4.2025 shall be stayed pending the final determination of D7's appeal to the Court of Appeal. c) The injunctive orders contained in minutes 1, 2 and 3 of the Judgment dated 13.3.2025 shall remain in full force and effect and are not subject to any stay. d) Costs of this application shall follow the event of the Appeal. 13 November 2025 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA Counsel: For the Plaintiffs: P. Gananathan (with Shasha Chin Sim Cheng and Kaviscyna Balakrisnan) (Messrs Tommy Thomas) For the 7th Defendant: Rachel Ng Li Hui (with Eunice Wong Kai Xin) (Messrs Thomas Philip) S/N fcf04NON0qAdL5v3y1rwA