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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA APPEAL SUIT NO.: BA-12BCY-1-01/2025
BA-12BCY-1-01/2025
High Court of Malaysia29 Sept 2025
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“erred to the Plaintiffs: Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239; Le Mercier’s Fine Furnishings Pte Ltd & Anor v Italcomm (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 CLJ 590; Knupffer v London Express Newspapers Ltd [1944] AC 116; David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234. On the record, identification was vague and diffuse, pointin”
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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA APPEAL SUIT NO.: BA-12BCY-1-01/2025
1
HO THAM MOI
2
LEE HONG KEOW (NRIC NO. 570516-08-5784) …APPELLANTS AND TAY YU YAA (NRIC NO. 860503-23-5582) …RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT
1
This is an appeal by the Appellants (the Plaintiffs below) against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge at Petaling Jaya dated 10 January 2025, dismissing the Plaintiffs’ defamation claim after full trial. For consistency, the parties shall be referred to as they were in the Sessions Court.
2
The 1st Plaintiff and the 2nd Plaintiff (his wife) are business partners in PNS Enterprise Perkongsian Berhad, distributors of Amway products who had attained the “Diamond” status.
3
The 1st Plaintiff and the 2nd Plaintiff (his wife) are business partners in PNS Enterprise Perkongsian Berhad, distributors of Amway products who had attained the “Diamond” status.
4
The Defendant married the Plaintiffs’ eldest son on 23 December 2012 and is therefore their daughter-in-law.
5
The Defendant maintained a Facebook account under the name “Xiao You”. On 30 January 2022 she published a post (in Mandarin), which she later removed on 2 February 2022.
6
On 29 March 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a Writ and Statement of Claim against the Defendant, alleging that the said post contained defamatory statements directed at them. The Plaintiffs’ reliefs sought included, inter alia: a cease-and-desist order, a compliance declaration, a public apology, general damages, aggravated and exemplary damages, interest, and costs.
7
The Plaintiffs complain of fifteen statements made by the Defendant, their daughter-in-law, on her Facebook page. The Sessions Court held that the statements, although harsh, were not defamatory in law.
8
It is trite that an appellate court will only interfere with findings of fact where the trial court’s decision is plainly wrong for want of or improper judicial appreciation of the evidence: UEM Group Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 785; Azman Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 CLJ 573; Lee Ing Chin & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 19.
9
The Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving: (i) the words are defamatory; (ii) the words refer to the Plaintiffs; and (iii) the words were published to a third party: Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad Nawawi & Ors v Dato' Seri Hj Ahmad Said [2015] 7 CLJ 180;
388
Lim Guan Eng v Datuk Tan Teik Cheng & Anor [2025] CLJU The burden then shifts to the Defendant to establish any defence (such as fair comment or qualified privilege): Ng Hong Chai & Anor v Public Bank Bhd; Khor Liang Khek & Anor (Third Parties) [2011] 7 CLJ 498; Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315; Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45.
10
It is undisputed that the post was made through the Defendant’s Facebook account and was accessible to her contacts, thereby communicated to third parties. Publication was therefore established. But this alone is insufficient; the other elements must also be satisfied.
11
No names of either Plaintiff were expressly mentioned. The post referred instead to “Puan Lee,” “two old people,” “Esther Lee,” “Tommy Ho,” and “the two-faced man of Amway.” The Plaintiffs admitted their belief that the words referred to them was based only on their personal perception, without any third-party testimony linking the post specifically to them. The 2nd Plaintiff failed to point to any passage referring to her.
12
The objective test is whether a reasonable reader, with knowledge of relevant facts, would conclude that the words referred to the Plaintiffs: Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239; Le Mercier’s Fine Furnishings Pte Ltd & Anor v Italcomm (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 CLJ 590; Knupffer v London Express Newspapers Ltd [1944] AC 116; David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234. On the record, identification was vague and diffuse, pointing to a class of persons rather than the Plaintiffs. This element (ii) was not proved. Defamatory Meaning and Context 13. The question for this Court is whether the words, in their natural and ordinary meaning, would lower the Plaintiffs in the estimation of right-thinking members of society.
14
The fifteen statements complained of are as follows:
1
“Petikan ‘Puan Lee’ telah menyedarkan saya tentang keperitan yang saya alami sekian lama ini …”
2
“Dua orang tua kata tak tahu kenapa saya berasa tidak puas terhadap mereka, jadi saya pun mengingatkan kembali dua orang tua kalian sedikit demi sedikit …”
3
“Masa itu sudah pilih lot hujung 18x25, penjual tawarkan 250 ribu, tapi ditolak oleh dua orang tua ini. Akhirnya dua orang tua ini berpakat dengan anak lelaki mereka (suami saya), kata beli rumah yang suami saya mampu membayar ansuran (akhirnya membeli rumah tengah), hakikatnya dua orang tua ini tak nak masukkan nama saya ke dalam geran rumah ini.”
4
“Dua orang tua ini juga suruh saya berhentikan permohonan pinjaman perumahan kepada bank, tapi tidak menyatakan sebab, hanya kata mereka ada ejen untuk menguruskannya. Tak tahu apalah ejen dewa itu, pinjaman hanya meluluskan harga rumah tetapi tidak termasuk 4k+ punya MxTx, akhirnya 4k+ ini saya kena bayar dengan duit saya sendiri.”
5
“Di sini saya ingin ingatkan dua orang tua ini, jangan ingat sudah bayar fi guaman SPA saja sudah boleh bercakap kuat kepada sedunia bahawa rumah itu kamu yang belikan, dan mahukan kami bersyukur kepada kalian. Minta dua orang tua kalian berfikir sebelum komen, rumah itu kalian keluarkan duit untuk belikan untuk suami saya, saya tidak ada kongsi, tapi akhirnya orang yang bayar fi pemprosesan itu saya.”
6
“Malah bayaran terkemudian pun dua orang tua mengakui tidak pernah membayar belanja ini kepada bank, tapi sebaliknya mengejek saya kenapa tidak minta dengan mereka. Ya tuhan … kamu ingat kalian ini orang baik-baik kah?”
7
“Nak tanya dua orang tua, takkan tak payah bayar ibu saya kalau ibu saya yang jaga anak? Percumakah kalau orang sendiri yang jagakan?”
8
“Kalau tiada penjagaan oleh ibu saya, nak tanya dua orang tua ini tahu tak berapa banyak belanja untuk penjagaan anak di luar sana? Atau kalian berasa ia munasabah untuk bayar orang luar dan orang sendiri pula tak payah bayar satu sen pun? Saya memang hairan apakah mentaliti kalian.”
9
“Kalian dimarahi oleh anak lelaki kalian pula kalian kata saya yang jahatkan anak lelaki kamu, kata saya yang suruh dia memarahi kamu. Hello … ini kali pertamakah kalian dimarahi anak lelaki kamu? Saya yang suruh? Minta kalian berhati-hati apabila komen.”
10
“Lepas dimarahi anak lelaki, tak puas hati cari anak lelaki ke- 3 gengster dan menangis, akhirnya, anak lelaki ke-3 gengster pula menjadi gila mabuk dan datang marah dan meludah pada saya. Kata saya mengugut abang dia (suami saya) dengan rumah itu, nak tanya dua orang tua kalian, adakah kalian cerita betul-betul dengan anak lelaki ke-3 gengster sebelum suruh dia datang buat kecoh?”
11
“Ya tuhan … ya tuhan … masa beli rumah kata kali terakhir, kemudian lepas beli kereta pun kata kali terakhir, kenapa pula sekarang datang pula rancangan pembinaan semula (Macam mana pun saya tak boleh tahan dan berancang untuk pindah keluar).”
12
“Saya tak pernah peduli bagaimana keluarga kalian buat kecoh, gaduh macam mana, saya tak akan bertanya. Tapi dua orang tua kalian pula asyik hendak melibatkan saya, malah kini melampau sehingga biarkan anak lelaki ke-3 gengster datang memarahi saya, malah berteriak pada anak lelaki saya di hadapan saya.”
13
“Malam itu saya terus menelefon kalian, kalian pun dapat dengar suara anak lelaki ke-3 gengster, tapi kalian langsung tiada niat hendak melarang anak lelaki ke-3 gengster. Atau dalam hati kamu kamu berasa seronok sama seperti anak lelaki sulung kamu, sebab ada orang tampil untuk kalian? Keluarga kalian nak gila, sila ke tempat lain, malah berteriak pada anak lelaki saya di hadapan saya! Takkan inilah ajaran keluarga kalian?”
14
“Mencari alasan untuk kesalahan sendiri, mencari alasan untuk kelakuan salah sendiri, mencari alasan untuk ketidakbertanggungjawaban sendiri, ini satu contoh biasa keluarga kamu.”
15
“Lelaki talam dua muka Amway.”
15
Although each statement has been pleaded individually, they must also be read together and in their full context. The postings were made on the Defendant’s Facebook page in the midst of an acrimonious family relationship. They carry a tone of sarcasm, complaint, and emotional venting. Taken both individually and cumulatively, the words are not statements of verifiable fact but expressions of resentment and frustration, which explains why the Sessions Court treated them as non-defamatory.
16
It is undisputed that the words were published on Facebook, the medium alone does not make them defamatory. The Court must evaluate their meaning in context. A reasonable Facebook reader, familiar with the personal nature of such postings, would understand them as part of a family quarrel rather than as factual allegations of dishonesty or corruption.
17
Individually, the words are insulting and unkind: references to “dua orang tua”, “lelaki talam dua muka”, and “keluarga kalian nak gila” are abusive but plainly rhetorical. Even the more pointed complaints of “berpakat” (conspired) and instigating a “gengster” son, when read in context, are hyperbolic expressions of resentment.
18
Even when the statements are read cumulatively, they still fall short of defamatory meaning. Collectively, the postings appear as a continuous outpouring of dissatisfaction within a domestic quarrel, not a deliberate attack on the Plaintiffs’ reputation in the wider community. Reading the post as a whole and in context, the Court finds it to be an expression of personal frustration regarding family matters, not a statement calculated to injure the Plaintiffs’ reputation in their trade or profession: Sivabalan P Asapathy v The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [2010] 7 CLJ 885; Soh Chun Seng v CTOS-emr Sdn Bhd [2004] 5 CLJ 46; Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45. There was no evidence that the Defendant’s followers posted disparaging comments about the Plaintiffs, nor that their Amway standing was affected. Thus, element was likewise not proved.
19
I also apply the principle of appellate restraint. As the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 made clear, an appellate court must be slow to interfere with the findings of fact and evaluative conclusions of a trial court unless they are plainly wrong or based on erroneous principles. The learned Sessions Court Judge had the benefit of assessing the evidence and was correct in concluding that the words did not meet the legal threshold for defamation. No misdirection of law or manifest error is shown that would justify intervention.
20
The law protects reputation, not hurt feelings. Courts must be cautious not to convert every insult exchanged on social media during family disputes into actionable defamation.
21
Given that two essential elements of defamation failed, the Sessions Court’s dismissal of the claim was correct in law. The decision shows no misdirection or misappreciation of evidence. There is no basis for appellate interference.
22
Since the Plaintiffs’ case fails at the prima facie stage, it is unnecessary to examine the defences of fair comment and qualified privilege.
23
For the reasons above, I affirm the decision of the Sessions Court. The impugned Facebook postings, though harsh and regrettable, were venting of feelings in a domestic quarrel and do not amount to actionable defamation.
24
The appeal is dismissed. Costs are awarded to the Defendant in the sum of RM5,000.00 subject to allocatur. Dated 6 November 2025 -sgd-DATO’ ANITA BINTI HARUN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN To the parties’ solicitors: For the Appellant : Tan Jun Sheng (Messrs SS Ng & Lim) For the Respondent : Aw Shi Qin (Messrs Foo Hiap Siong & Co)
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