1. ) Honsin Apparel Sdn Bhd v 1. ) South Malaysia Industries Berhad (WA-24NCC-269-05/2023)

HONSIN APPAREL SDN BHD [No. Syarikat: 197601002106 (28091-H)]

HIQ MEDIA (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD … PLAINTIF - [No. Syarikat: 199901020313 (495213-U)] PLAINTIF S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ

SOUTH MALAYSIA INDUSTRIES BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 196901000152 (8482-D)]

BINA MANAGEMENT (M) SDN BHD [No. Syarikat: 197901005880 (50164-V)]

LEOW THANG FONG (No. K/P: 510730-08-5721)

DATO' DR. ABDULLAH BIN SEPIEN (No. K/P: 461122-03-5175)

LATIFAH BINTI ABDUL LATIFF (No. K/P: 610603-10-5134)

DATO' ZAINUDDIN BIN YAHYA (No. K/P: 590218-03-5269)

DATO' SRI MOHD MOKHTAR BIN MOHD SHARIFF (No. K/P: 570817-10-6737) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 39)

This was the Plaintiffs’ application in Enclosure 39 (Amended Originating Summons) (“this Application”) in which the Plaintiffs, as shareholders of the 1st Defendant holding more S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 4 of 25 than 10% of its issued share capital, sought declaratory and mandatory reliefs to obtain the Record of Depositors (“ROD”) of the 1st Defendant for the purpose of convening an Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) under section 310(b) of the Companies Act 2016 (“CA 2016”).

The 1st Defendant refused the request on the basis that the Plaintiffs had allegedly contravened section 218(2) of the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 and Rule 15 of the Rules on Take-Overs, Mergers and Compulsory Acquisitions 2016, and lodged a complaint with the Securities Commission.

After hearing the parties, I allowed this Application in part, granting a declaration and consequential orders under section 314 of the Companies Act 2016. These are my grounds of decision. A]

The Plaintiffs are shareholders of the 1st Defendant, a public-listed company on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. The 2nd Defendant is the 1st Defendant’s share registrar. The 3rd to 7th Defendants are members of the 1st Defendant’s existing board of directors.

Collectively, the Plaintiffs hold more than 10% of the issued share capital of the 1st Defendant. By virtue of section 310(b) S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 5 of 25 of the CA 2016, they are entitled to requisition and, if necessary, convene a general meeting of the company.

On 18.4.2023, the Plaintiffs issued a notice of intention to move resolutions to remove and appoint directors at an Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) proposed for 31.5.2023. For the purpose of issuing the requisite notice of meeting and determining shareholders entitled to attend and vote, the Plaintiffs requested from the 1st and 2nd Defendants two Records of Depositors (“RODs”) of the 1st Defendant, namely, the first ROD as at 26.4.2023 (“ROD 1”), being the record date for despatch of the EGM notice, and the second ROD as at 17.5.2023 (“ROD 2”), being the record date for attendance and voting at the proposed EGM.

Following the Plaintiffs’ request, the 1st Defendant lodged a complaint with the Securities Commission Malaysia (“Securities Commission”) in late April or early May 2023, alleging that the Plaintiffs and certain related parties had acted in concert and thereby contravened section 218(2) of the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 and Rule 15 of the Rules on Take-Overs, Mergers and Compulsory Acquisitions

The complaint remained pending before the Securities Commission at the time of the hearing of this Application.

The 1st Defendant refused to furnish the requested RODs. It maintained that the Plaintiffs and certain related entities had breached section 218(2) of the Capital Markets and Services S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 6 of 25 Act 2007 (“CMSA 2007”) and Rule 15 of the Rules on Take-Overs, Mergers and Compulsory Acquisitions 2016 (“Take-Over Rules”). The Board asserted that the request for the RODs was part of an attempt to effect an unlawful takeover and that it was therefore justified in withholding the ROD in the interests of the company and its shareholders as a whole.

The Plaintiffs commenced this Application (Enclosure 39) seeking, inter alia: i) a declaration that they were entitled to the ROD as at 26.4.2023 and 17.5.2023; ii) mandatory orders to compel the 1st and 2nd Defendants (and, alternatively, the 3rd to 7th Defendants) to provide those RODs in hard and soft copies; and iii) further orders to enable a meeting of shareholders to be held pursuant to section 314 CA 2016 under the direction of the Court. B]

The Plaintiffs argued that under section 310(b) CA 2016, they were entitled as of right to convene an EGM, and that access to the RODs was necessary to identify shareholders and to S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 7 of 25 issue notices under section 316(2) CA 2016 and Article 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Constitution.

It was submitted that section 34(5) of the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991 (“SICDA 1991”) imposes a mandatory statutory obligation on the company to provide a copy of the ROD to any member upon payment of the prescribed fee, within the period stipulated in section 34(6). The section confers no discretion on the company to withhold the ROD or to inquire into the purpose for which it is sought.

The Plaintiffs relied on the decisions in Dato’ Sri Mak Hon Leong v. NWP Holdings Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 998 and Seacera Group Bhd v. Dato’ Tan Wei Lian & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 762 (“Seacera No. 1”), where the High Court affirmed shareholders’ statutory entitlement to obtain the ROD and to convene an EGM once the threshold under section 310(b) CA 2016 is met.

The Plaintiffs maintained that any allegation of breach of the CMSA 2007 is a matter solely for the Securities Commission, and that the 1st Defendant’s refusal amounted to a deliberate frustration of the shareholders’ statutory rights. C]

The Defendants submitted that the Plaintiffs’ request for the RODs was part of an attempt to take control of the 1st S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 8 of 25 Defendant without first making a mandatory general offer, contrary to section 218(2) CMSA 2007. It was argued that the Board had a fiduciary duty to safeguard the company’s interests and those of minority shareholders, and therefore properly withheld the RODs pending determination by the Securities Commission. The 1st Defendant relied, in particular, on the complaint it had lodged with the Securities Commission to justify its refusal.

The Defendants further contended that: i) the right under section 34(5) SICDA 1991 is not absolute and must be read purposively in light of the CMSA 2007 regime; ii) the request for a digital or “soft” copy of the RODs exceeded the scope of the section, which only envisages a paper copy; and iii) the Plaintiffs had not properly invoked section 314 CA 2016 since the preconditions for a Court-ordered meeting were not satisfied.

The Defendants also sought to distinguish Dato’ Sri Mak Hon Leong (supra) and Seacera No. 1 (supra), contending that those cases did not involve allegations of breaches of the CMSA 2007 or the Take-Over Rules. S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 9 of 25 D]

The principal issues before the Court were: i) whether the Plaintiffs were entitled under section 34 SICDA 1991 to the RODs as at 26.4.2023 and 17.5.2023; ii) whether the alleged breaches of the CMSA 2007 or the Take-Over Rules justified the 1st Defendant’s refusal to supply the RODs; and iii) whether this Court should exercise its power under section 314 CA 2016 to direct that an EGM be convened and give ancillary directions. E]

Section 310 CA 2016 provides: “A meeting of members may be convened by-

the Board; or

any member holding at least ten per centum of the issued share capital of a company or a lower percentage as specified in the constitution or if the company has no share capital, by at least five per centum in the number of the members. (own emphasis added) S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ

In Seacera No. 1 (supra) the Court held as follows: “[92] Every shareholder of a company has a right, subject to the statutory prescribed procedures and requirements, to call for an extraordinary general meeting of a company under our CA. A shareholder’s right to convene a general meeting under Section 310(b) of the CA is one of the key rights provided by law to shareholders to marshal all shareholders of a company together at an appointed date, place and time to provide the opportunity to the shareholders to deliberate and to resolve, if deem fit, on proposals properly tabled before them that may affect the directions of the company. It is an essential right to invoke the internal democratic process of the company.” (own emphasis added)

The Court in Dato’ Seri Mak (supra) took the same position as Seacara No. 1 and held as follows: [25] Also relevant is s 213(1) of the CA, which imposes a duty on directors of a company to exercise their powers in accordance with the CA, for a proper purpose and in good faith in the best interest of the company. Thus, I agree with the submission of learned counsel for the plaintiffs, that the directors of the defendant should facilitate the convening of the EGM, rather than impede or frustrate the meeting. There are sufficient examples of the granting of orders by courts for parties to furnish records of depositors, to ensure that meetings are able to be convened. These include Indian Corridor Sdn Bhd v Golden Plus S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 11 of 25 Holdings Bhd [2008] 3 MLJ 653; [2008] 5 CLJ 774 and Chong Mei Ling & Ors v Apft Bhd & Ors [2018] MLJU 1941; [2018] 1 LNS 2051.” (own emphasis added)

Upon fulfilment of the threshold requirement under section 310(b) CA 2016, which in the present case is not disputed, the shareholders’ statutory right to convene an extraordinary general meeting necessarily carries with it the correlative entitlement to obtain the Record of Depositors to facilitate the issuance of proper notice to members.

The rationale for requiring the ROD was succinctly articulated in Seacera Group Berhad v. Tan Wei Lian [2019] 1 LNS 1661 (“Seacera No. 2”): “[22] The ROD and the General Meeting Record of Depositors ("GMROD") serve different functions. The former is for the purpose of sending notices and the latter is for the purpose of determining who may attend, speak and vote at the EGM. The GMROD is a document issued and prepared by Bursa Malaysia three market days before the scheduled date of any general meeting of a listed company.” (own emphasis added)

Consistent with the above distinction, the obligation to furnish the ROD is governed by section 34(5) and (6) SICDA 1991, which state as follows: S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 12 of 25 “(5) Any member of an issuer or any other person may require the issuer to furnish him with a copy of the record of depositors, or of any part thereof, but only so far as it relates to the names, addresses, and the number of securities held, on payment in advance of one ringgit, or such lesser sum as the issuer may require, in respect of every hundred words or fractional part thereof required to be copied.

The copy of the record of depositors, or any part thereof, required under subsection (5) shall be supplied to the person who required such copy within a period of twenty-one days or within such longer period as the Commission considers reasonable in the circumstances, commencing from the day after the date of receipt of the request by the issuer.” (own emphasis added)

Hence, sections 34(5) and (6) SICDA provide in clear and mandatory terms that any member of an issuer may require the issuer to furnish him with a copy of the record of depositors upon payment of the prescribed fee. The subsection admits of no qualification. It is therefore not open to the company to refuse disclosure based on conjecture as to motive or on unproven allegations of regulatory breaches. This obligation is further reinforced by paragraph 7.16 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 13 of 25 Berhad, which requires a listed issuer to make the record of depositors available to its members and prohibits any additional restrictions or conditions beyond those permitted by law.

The Defendants’ argument that the Board was entitled to withhold the ROD pending investigation by the Securities Commission cannot stand. The CMSA 2007 does not confer on a company the power to suspend shareholders’ rights under the SICDA. Enforcement of section 218(2) CMSA 2007 rests exclusively with the Securities Commission, not with private litigants or company directors. Unless and until the Commission determines that a breach has occurred, the statutory rights of shareholders under the CA 2016 and the SICDA remain operative.

The Defendants urged that the Plaintiffs should first comply with the condition to make a mandatory general offer under section 218(2) CMSA 2007, or that the hearing of this Application be deferred; alternatively, that the Plaintiffs should not be furnished with the RODs pending the outcome of the 1st Defendant’s complaint to the Securities Commission. However, there was, in any event, no specific application before this Court by the Defendants to injunct or restrain the Plaintiffs in this manner, and I am not prepared to infer or impose such a restriction in the absence of a proper application supported by evidence. There was also no authority provided to support the Defendants’ contention. S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ

I am guided by the principle affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Shahidan Shafie v. Atlan Holdings Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 CLJ 587 and Lai Soon Onn v. Chew Fei Meng [2019] 2 MLJ 96. Both decisions arose from circumstances involving mandatory general offers and acquisition of corporate control under the CMSA 2007 and the Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and Mergers. In those cases, the Court of Appeal underscored that matters concerning compliance with the Take-Over Code and the regulation of control transactions fall within the statutory purview of the Securities Commission. The Court should not usurp or second-guess the Commission’s regulatory role. The same principle applies here, where the Defendants’ objections are premised on alleged non-compliance with Rule 15 of the Take-Over Code and section 218(2) CMSA 2007.

In Shahidan Shafie (supra) the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[26] It is our view that premised on the aforesaid provisions, it can be said that it is the intention of Parliament for the Securities Commission to be tasked to supervise, regulate, issue rulings from time to time and enforce the practices of companies bound by the SC Act 1993 and the Take-Over Code. The learned judge in the High Court in fact found that the only remedy available to the plaintiff was to complain to the Securities Commission about the conduct of the defendants and if the Securities Commission failed to act or makes a ruling unfavourable to the plaintiff, his only option was to apply to S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 15 of 25 the court for judicial review of the decision of the Securities Commission. In short, the plaintiff’s remedy was one of public law. ……. [28] As we have intimated earlier, in construing s. 153 we must take into consideration of other provisions in the SC Act to discern the context. Hence in doing so, we agree with learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiff’s right to sue can only exist when the Securities Commission had made a ruling. In the case before us, the Securities Commission must first make a ruling that the defendants had acquired control of Naluri in the context of the relevant law and was required to make the mandatory takeover offer to the shareholders of the Naluri. From the record of Appeal, it is undisputed that the Securities Commission was aware of the allegation of the defendants having “acquired control” of Naluri and had sought clarification from the Board of Directors of Naluri. The Securities Commission after considering Naluri’s clarification took no further action. As intimated above, the plaintiff should have sought a review of the Securities Commission decision in court. This he did not do. [29] If we were to adopt the interpretation of s. 153 of the SC Act of the plaintiff, it would amount to the court stepping into the shoes of the Securities Commission which is tasked to supervise and regulate the conduct of companies. As we have said earlier, that is not and cannot be the intention of Parliament. Our interpretation reconciles s. 153 with the other provisions in the SC Act and that is the private cause of action for breach of statutory duty is preserved to the extent only after the Securities Commission has made a specific ruling. This would avoid a situation where there would be two decisions, one of the court and S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 16 of 25 the other the Securities Commission. This scenario would bring uncertainty to the business world which must be avoided. Our interpretation allows only one decision at one time and that is the decision of the Securities Commission until the same is either set aside or substituted by the courts.” (own emphasis added)

Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Lai Soon Onn (supra) followed the above principle in Shahidan Shafie (supra) and held: “[42] Similarly, it is not for the courts to usurp the function of the market regulatory bodies in carrying out its objective as stipulated under the law. The functions of the SC are statutorily provided in s 15(1)(d) of the SCA, where it is tasked to regulate the take-over and mergers of companies. Section 217(4) of the CMSA provides that: The Commission shall administer the Code and may do all such things as may be necessary or expedient to give full effect to the provisions of this Division and the Code and without limiting the generality of the foregoing-

issue rulings —

to interpret this Division and the Code;

(ii) on the practice and conduct of persons involved in or affected by any take-over offer, merger or compulsory S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 17 of 25 acquisition, or in the course of any take-over, merger or compulsory acquisition; and

enquire into any matter relating to any take over offer, merger or compulsory acquisition whether potential or otherwise, and for this purpose, may issue public statements as the Commission thinks fit with respect thereto. [43] Gleaning through the provisions of the CMSA, it is the intention of the Act that the bodies established under the Act are regulatory bodies and it is not the function of the court to usurp their function nor to second guess their decisions. In R v International Stock Exchange ofUK and Ireland, ex parte Else Ltd; R v International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Ltd, ex parte Else (1982) Ltd and another; R v International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Ltd, ex parte Roberts [1993] 1 All ER 420; [1993] QB 534, Lord Bingham observed that ‘the court will not second guess the informed judgment of responsible regulators steeped in knowledge of their particular market’. This court applied the same principle in Shahidan Shafie in arriving at its decision when interpreting s 153 of the SCA. To interpret otherwise would result in a situation where there would be two decisions, one of the court and the other from the SC. That cannot be the position in law (refer to para 29 of Shahidan Shafie). The courts have shown a reluctance to interfere with the decision of regulatory bodies in carrying out its objective in the absence of mala fide or acting in excess of jurisdiction. A similar stance was taken by this court in Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad and also in Khiudin bin Mohd & Anor v Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd and S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 18 of 25 another application [2012] 6 MLJ 131 which had referred to various commonwealth jurisdictions, which demonstrated the attitude of the courts in reviewing the decision made by the regulators in different jurisdictions. Therefore, it is not within this court’s jurisdiction to interfere with the duties mandated to the market regulatory bodies in maintaining and promoting the interests of the public in dealing on the exchange and these bodies should be left to carry out its objective as stipulated under the Act. [44] Therefore, a person who has suffered loss or incurred damage may institute a civil action to recover the amount of the loss or damage after a contravention of any provision or any regulations made under the CMSA has been determined by the SC. It is not necessary for the courts to adjudicate whether there is a contravention of the Act before s 357(1) of the CMSA can be applied. All that is required is for the SC first to determine whether there was a contravention." (own emphasis added)

I therefore accept the Plaintiffs’ contention that they were entitled to obtain the RODs as at the two requested dates for the purpose of convening the proposed EGM. F]

The Defendants placed heavy reliance on Rule 15 of the Take-Over Rules, which prohibits a person acting in concert from appointing nominees to the board of an offeree company prior S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 19 of 25 to dispatch of an offer document. However, the invocation of that Rule presupposes an existing or impending takeover regulated by the Securities Commission. This Court was not invited, nor is it competent, to determine the existence of such a breach.

Moreover, to permit the company’s directors to unilaterally withhold the RODs on the ground of an alleged breach would allow them to defeat the shareholders’ statutory right under section 310(b) CA 2016. That approach is inconsistent with the reasoning in Dato’ Sri Mak Hon Leong (supra) and Seacera No. 1 (supra), which affirm that directors must facilitate rather than obstruct the exercise of shareholders’ rights to convene a meeting.

Even if the Securities Commission were subsequently to find a contravention of section 218(2) of the CMSA 2007, any concern raised by the 1st Defendant is neither immediate nor irreversible. The CMSA 2007 confers broad powers on the Securities Commission to issue remedial directions or take corrective action to restore matters to their original position. Accordingly, the 1st Defendant would not be prejudiced by the Plaintiffs to exercise their statutory rights pending any such determination.

This safeguard further justifies my decision to allow the Plaintiffs to exercise their statutory rights. S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 20 of 25 G]

It is not in dispute that this Court has the jurisdiction to grant the declaratory and mandatory reliefs sought. The real question, however, is whether that discretion should, in the circumstances of this case, be exercised, and if so, to what extent. As observed in Cepatwawasan Group Bhd v. Datuk Lo Fui Ming [2005] 2 MLJ 57 and Indian Corridor Sdn Bhd v. Golden Plus Holdings Bhd [2008] 3 MLJ 653, the Court’s discretion to grant such reliefs must be exercised judiciously, bearing in mind the statutory purpose of the right invoked and the need to prevent abuse or injustice.

In this regard, I did not find it necessary or appropriate to grant the wider and alternative reliefs sought in this Application for the following reasons: i) The requests for the RODs in digital or “softcopy” format exceeded the scope of section 34(5) SICDA 1991, which contemplates provision of a physical copy as supplied by Bursa Malaysia Depository Sdn Bhd. ii) The alternative prayers directed against the 3rd to 7th Defendants were likewise unnecessary, as the obligation to furnish the ROD rests solely on the issuer and its share registrar. S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 21 of 25 iii) The prayer for rectification of irregularities under section 582 CA 2016 was not applicable, since no procedural defect had arisen requiring the Court’s intervention. iv) I also declined to appoint independent chairpersons, scrutineers, or voting administrators as sought in prayer 7A, as there was no evidence of bias or impropriety justifying such supervision. v) Finally, the proposed date of 31.5.2023 for the EGM was replaced by a direction for a Court-convened meeting under section 314 CA 2016 within 50 days, to ensure fairness, practicality and orderly compliance with statutory timelines.

In view of the impasse between the parties and the refusal of the 1st Defendant-company to act, I therefore found it appropriate to invoke section 314 CA 2016 and direct that the EGM be convened under the Court’s supervision. This approach ensures procedural fairness and avoids further delay. The timeline of 50 days prescribed in the Order was considered reasonable, allowing adequate time for preparation and notice to all shareholders. H]

Accordingly, the following orders were substantially granted pursuant to my decision: S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 22 of 25 i) A declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the Record of Depositors of the 1st Defendant as at 26.4.2023 and as at 17.5.2023 for the purpose of the proposed EGM on 31.5.2023; ii) It is ordered that: a) An Extraordinary General Meeting of the 1st Defendant may be convened pursuant to section 314 of the Companies Act 2016, within 50 days from the date of this Order (“the Court-Convened Meeting”) for the purpose of considering and, if thought fit, passing the resolutions stated in the Plaintiffs’ Notice dated 18.4.2023. b) The 1st and 2nd Defendants shall, whether jointly or severally, furnish the Plaintiffs with the Record of Depositors of the 1st Defendant as at the next market day after the date of this Order, within 3 market days immediately thereafter, in hardcopy form as furnished by Bursa Malaysia Depository Sdn Bhd (BMDSB). c) The Notice of the Court-Convened Meeting may be issued by the Plaintiffs within 3 working days from the date of receipt of the Record of Depositors of the 1st Defendant as required under paragraph

(2)(b) above. S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 23 of 25 d) The 1st and 2nd Defendants shall, whether jointly or severally, furnish the Plaintiffs with the Record of Depositors of the 1st Defendant as at a date not less than 3 market days before the Court-Convened Meeting or any adjournment thereof, at a time not less than 48 hours before such meeting or adjourned meeting, in hardcopy form as furnished by BMDSB. iii) The 1st Defendant shall pay costs of RM30,000.00 to the Plaintiffs.

The other prayers in this Application were declined and hence this Application was allowed in part. Dated this 30th day of October, 2025 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, (COMMERCIAL DIVISION (NCC 3)) HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 24 of 25 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS : Alex Tan Chie Sian (Cheah Kha Mun together with him) Messrs Wong Kian Kheong D1-U5-01, Solaris Dutamas, No. 1, Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-62079475 Email: kl@wkk.com.my COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS : Gideon Tan (Yip Man Fei together with him) Messrs Gideon Tan Razali Zaini No. 812, 8th Floor, Block A, Kelana Square, 17, Jalan SS7/26 47301 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel: 03-78036866 Email: gtrz@gtrz.com.my LEGISLATION / RULES CITED Companies Act 2016 ▪ Section 310(b) ▪ Section 314 ▪ Section 316(2) ▪ Section 582 Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 ▪ Section 218(2) Rules on Take-Overs, Mergers and Compulsory Acquisitions 2016 ▪ Rule 15 S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ Page 25 of 25 Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 ▪ Section 218(2) Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991 ▪ Sections 34(5), (6) Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad ▪ Paragraph 7.16

Cepatwawasan Group Bhd v. Datuk Lo Fui Ming [2005] 2 MLJ 57

Dato’ Sri Mak Hon Leong v. NWP Holdings Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 998

Indian Corridor Sdn Bhd v. Golden Plus Holdings Bhd [2008] 3

Lai Soon Onn v. Chew Fei Meng [2019] 2 MLJ 96

Seacera Group Bhd v. Dato’ Tan Wei Lian & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 762

Seacera Group Berhad v. Tan Wei Lian [2019] 1 LNS 1661

Shahidan Shafie v. Atlan Holdings Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 CLJ 587 S/N ailcbhZGOUioe7lkco3jAQ