1. ) Ignasius Bria (Akuan Lisan) (AA-45SOM-3-09/2024)

IGNASIUS BRIA (ORAL ADMISSION) (PASPORT NO.: - ) 15

RINA (ORAL ADMISSION) (PASPORT NO.: - ) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 20 Introduction [1]. At the heart of criminal justice lies a fundamental truth that sentencing must be proportionate, thoughtful and humane. It must weigh not only the gravity of the offence but also the offender’s intent, circumstances, and potential for rehabilitation. This case presents such a 25 balance. The accused Ignasius Bria, Donatus Klau, and Rina all pleaded guilty to harbouring three undocumented migrants under Section 26H of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 (ATIPSOM Act 2007). However, the facts reveal the accused have no profit motive, no organised smuggling, and no criminal record, only a 30 humanitarian impulse. This judgment explains why a custodial term of one S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw year strikes the correct balance between public interest, fairness to the individual, and the prudent use of public funds through facilitating prompt deportation of the accused. The Charge 35 [2]. The accused were charged with an offence punishable under Section 26H of the ATIPSOM 2007, which states: “Any person who conceals or harbours, or prevents, hinders or interferes with the arrest of any person knowing or having reason to believe that such person is— 40

a smuggled migrant; or

a person who has committed or is planning or is likely to commit an act of smuggling of migrants, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also 45 be liable to a fine or to both.” [3]. The offence is listed in the First Schedule of the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA), which is indicative of the public interest and seriousness attached to such cases. 50 Facts of the Case [4]. On 16 May 2024 at approximately 3:00 a.m., the complainant Inspector Shahrul Armie, and a team from D3 ATIPSOM Bukit Aman raided a house at No. 373, Sungai Batu Parit 8, 34900 Pantai Remis, Perak. At the scene, they apprehended the first accused, Ignasius Bria, 55 outside the house. Upon entering the premises, they found the other two accused, Donatus Klau and Rina, along with four other individuals. S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw [5]. Upon inspection, it was discovered that three of the individuals, Defrosa Sitohang, Erlin, and Ocan, were undocumented migrants from Indonesia. The accused were arrested at first under Section 26A of 60 ATIPSOM 2007 for suspicion of smuggling activities, and the migrants were detained under Section 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1959/63 without valid documentation. [6]. The investigation revealed that the house had been rented by Donatus Klau since September 2023. He lived there with his wife, Rina 65 (the third accused), and his younger brother. The migrants had contacted a smuggler known as Marcell to facilitate their illegal return to Indonesia, each paying RM1,500 to Marcell. Marcell had arranged their transportation to the house via e-hailing services. [7]. The said smuggler known as Marcell, who is still at large, directed 70 the migrants into the house with the assistance of the first accused. [8]. At the Identification parades, the migrant identified and confirmed all 3 accused as persons provided shelter to them. [9]. Regarding the migrants, two of them had arrived only hours before the raid; the third migrant was a pregnant woman in her seventh month 75 and had been living in the house for approximately three weeks. [10]. These were the facts of the case as narrated by the prosecution in the “fakta kes” marked as Exhibit P4 and some were elicited from the court’s questioning of the accused before sentencing and the same were confirmed by the prosecution. 80 S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw Mitigating Circumstances [11]. During mitigation, each accused submitted their personal and other extenuating factors that reduce the moral blameworthiness or seriousness of a criminal offence as reasons for leniency in sentencing. Ignasius Bria 85 explained he is the sole breadwinner for his family, with a five-month-old infant, a school-going sibling, and a 60-year-old father requiring financial support. Donatus Klau who is the husband of Rina submitted that his father had suffered a stroke and required full-time care; he also has a young child and a mother with recurring health issues. All 3 accused 90 stated they had no intention of breaking the law and had merely responded to a request by Marcell. Rina stated that she was misled by Marcell into participating in the offence. [12]. All three accused have no prior criminal records and cooperated fully with the authorities from the outset. They asserted that they had no 95 financial motivation to commit the offence. They merely offered the migrant temporary shelter and provided basic assistance, such as food and water, with no gain. They further emphasised had no idea that they were committing an offence in their willingness to accommodate a pregnant migrant out of compassion. The other 2 were brought in on the 100 instruction of Marcell just hours before the raid by the team from D3 ATIPSOM Bukit Aman. The accused acknowledged that their conduct was misguided but pleaded for the Court’s leniency based on their personal circumstances and lack of malicious intent. Prosecution’s argument for a deterrent sentence 105 [13]. The prosecution cited the first three cases referred to below to advocate for a deterrent sentence: S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw a) In PP lwn. So Chin Chong & Yang Lain [2022] 1 LNS 34; [2022] AMEJ 0016, 9 migrants were harboured in a house. The accused pleaded guilty early. Though there is no mention 110 of how long the exact duration of harbouring but their active role and presence with the migrants indicated awareness of wrongdoing. The High Court emphasised public interest and found their actions serious and deliberate, thus sentencing the accused to 30 months to 3 years imprisonment. 115 b) In PP v. Bentara Muhammad Hassan [2020] 1 LNS 1468; [2020] MLJU 1572, the accused harboured 2 undocumented Indonesian migrants in a house used as a temporary shelter before illegal departure. Though the duration of the stay was not lengthy, the Court found the accused played an active role 120 in intentionally facilitating smuggling. He knew or had reason to believe it was illegal. He was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. c) In PP lwn. Musriadi [2020] 1 LNS 188; [2020] AMEJ 0128; [2020] MLJU 264; [2020] MLRHU 176, the accused 125 harboured one migrant for a short period, collected RM900 for transport to a coastal point for illegal exit. He admitted knowing the migrant’s purpose. His role was facilitative and commercial, despite pleading guilty. The High Court found his awareness and also directly benefiting from his action, thus 130 sentencing him to 2 years' imprisonment. d) In PP v. Soleh Ahmad Habes Ahmad & Anor [2025] CLJU 378; [2025] MLJU 455, the case involved 18 migrants and two separate premises rented specifically for smuggling purposes, the High Court imposed three years and 30 months 135 S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw imprisonment respectively. There, the accused were part of a more structured operation and there was clear evidence of coordination and organisation for illegal transit. [14]. This Court finds that while those cases concern similar offences, 140 they differ materially in several respects as indicated here: a) First, the present case involves a lower number of migrants, only three. b) Second, there is no evidence that the accused here profited significantly. Unlike in Musriadi (supra), where money 145 changed hands directly for the purposes of smuggling. The accused in this case received no payments. c) Third, and most critically, except for the accused guilty plea the intention to commit the offence wilfully cannot for certain be gathered, from the fact that one of the migrants was heavily 150 pregnant and the accused accommodated her stay, and the other was apprehended just within hours they were there. This distinguishes the present matter from the cases cited by the prosecution, as the accused here acted partially out of humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 155 d) During the questioning of the accused by the court before sentencing these were the evidence gathered from them: i. that the house that they were staying in belonged to a palm oil plantation boss; ii. that one of the accused rented it, although no formal lease 160 or tenancy document was executed; S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw iii. that the house was managed by a person named Liew Thor Tet, who permitted one of the accused (referred to as “John”) to stay there; iv. that the accused were instructed by Marcell to house the 165 migrants, and they did not fully understand the legal implications; v. the accused only sheltered a pregnant woman needing help, and the other two migrants had just arrived, showing they did not realise their actions were legally wrong; and 170 vi. that the accused claimed that they only provided temporary shelter at the direction of another person, Marcel, who remains at large. [15]. While the prosecution advocates a deterrent sentence, the present 175 case is distinguishable. The accused sheltered only three migrants received no profit, acted out of compassion, and lacked clear criminal intent. These facts place their culpability on a significantly lower scale, warranting a proportionate sentence rather than a purely deterrent approach. 180 Principles in Sentencing [16]. The sentencing jurisdiction of this Court is well established. It is a settled rule that each case must be decided based on its own facts and merits, as no two cases are ever exactly alike. At the core of this case lies the principle that identical sentences should not be imposed where the 185 circumstances differ. The discretionary powers given to a sentencing court are not unlimited, they must be exercised judiciously and within the S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw boundaries set by statute and case law. This principle is clearly illustrated in the often-cited case of PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256; [1976] CLJU 102; [1976] 1 MLRH 23, where the Court stressed that sentencing 190 must reflect both the nature of the crime and the character of the offender. Variations in sentencing are expected due to human judgment, as long as they stay within acceptable limits. His Lordship Hashim Yeop A. Sani in Loo Choon Fatt (supra) expressed this in the following words: “In respect of sentencing there can be only general guidelines. 195 No two cases can have exactly the same facts to the minutest detail. Facts do differ from case to case and ultimately each case has to be decided on its own merits. In practice sentences do differ not only from case to case but also from court to court. All things being equal these variations are inevitable if only because 200 of the human element involved. But, of course, there must be limits to permissible variations.” [17]. In Bachik Abdul Rahman v. PP [2004] 2 CLJ 572; [2004] 1 MLRA 323; [2004] 2 MLJ 534; [2004] 3 AMR 429, the Court of Appeal held that 205 while an early guilty plea is generally deserving of a sentencing discount, typically around one-third, such a reduction is not automatic. The Court retains the discretion to withhold the discount where the offence is particularly grave, where aggravating factors are present, or where the public interest requires a stronger message of deterrence. Conversely, I 210 would further state that the Court may exercise leniency where the guilty plea bears significant mitigating weight and where special circumstances exist, as in the present case. The overall effect of a guilty plea must always be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances. His Lordship Augustine Paul JCA in Bachik Abdul Rahman (supra) stated: 215 S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw “ The position in law is that it is generally accepted that an accused person should be given credit or discount for pleading guilty (see Sau Soo Kim v. PP [1975] CLJU 158; [1975] 1 LNS 158; [1975] 2 MLJ 134; PP v. Sulaiman Ahmad [1992] 4 CLJ 2283; [1992] 3 CLJ 447 (Rep); [1993] 1 MLJ 74; PP v. Ravindran 220 & Ors [1992] CLJU 47; [1992] 1 LNS 47; [1993] 1 MLJ 45). The discount that is given is normally a reduction of the sentence by about a third of what would otherwise have been imposed (see Mohamad Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v. PP [1987] 2 CLJ 405; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 209; PP v. Muhari Mohd Jani & Anor 225 [1999] 8 CLJ 430; Christopher Khoo Ewe Cheng v. PP [1998] 3 CLJ 705). However, this is not a strict rule as the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to grant any discount in an appropriate case (see Zaidon Shariff v. PP [1996] 4 CLJ 441; Lee Say & Ors v. PP [1985] 2 CLJ 155; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 230 683). Its application in favour of an accused depends on the facts and circumstances of each case (see Wong Kai Chuen Philip v. PP [1990] CLJU 146; [1990] 1 LNS 146; [1991] 1 MLJ 321). Thus, as lucidly explained by Charles JA in Leigh Nicholas Donnelly v. R [1997] 91 A Crim R 550 at p. 554: 235 A court's attitude towards the fact of a plea of guilty is expected to act as an encouragement to enter such a plea. The issue with which the court is to be concerned is what weight should be given to it in the 240 circumstances.” [18]. The severity and scale of an offence are important factors in determining the appropriate sentence. This is particularly relevant in offences under section 26H of ATIPSOM 2007, which, while serious, are 245 distinct in gravity and nature from more aggravated offences such as S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw trafficking under section 13 of the same Act. Section 13 of ATIPSOM 2007, provides: “13. Any person, who traffics in persons not being a child, for the purpose of exploitation, by one or more of the following means:

threat;

use of force or other forms of coercion;

abduction;

fraud;

deception;

abuse of power;

abuse of the position of vulnerability of a person to an act of trafficking in persons; or

the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to obtain the consent of a person having control over the trafficked person, 260 commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than three years but not exceeding twenty years, and shall also be liable to fine” Section 13 targets trafficking in persons for exploitation through means 265 such as threats, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, and abuse of vulnerability. These are deliberate and exploitative acts that amount to grave violations of human rights. Accordingly, Parliament has prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence of three years, extendable to twenty years, along with liability to fines, to reflect the seriousness and intentional 270 harm involved. In contrast, Section 26H deals with acts like harbouring or aiding smuggled migrants, which generally do not involve the profit-driven exploitation or coercive elements found in Section 13 offences. Hence, the sentences under Section 26H are discretionary, with a maximum of ten years and no prescribed minimum term, allowing courts the discretion 275 to assess punishment in line with the offender’s role, intent, and the S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw specific circumstances of the case. The law thus rightly distinguishes between the aggravated nature of trafficking and the relatively less culpable conduct of smuggling-related harbouring. [19]. This distinction was further affirmed in PP v. Nik Haniff Nik Hasain 280 & Anor [2018] 7 AMR 613; [2018] LNS 1170; [2018] MLJU 1104, where Ahmad Bache J described migrant smuggling as a national security offence, not a mere regulatory breach. However, that case involved aggravating factors similar to section 13 trafficking cases. His Lordship referenced Kwong Tuck Choy & Anor v PP [2013] 1 LNS 1440 and 285 Chang Chai Choi v PP [2013] 7 CLJ 166, where section 13 convictions led to 7–8 years’ imprisonment. In contrast, the present case involves a charge under section 26H with significantly milder facts: the accused pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, played no part in an organised syndicate, did not profit, and acted partially out of humanitarian concern, 290 particularly in housing a heavily pregnant migrant. These mitigating features place the offence on the lower spectrum of culpability under section 26H, justifying a more considered and proportionate sentence [20]. The role and conduct of the accused are equally relevant. In PP v. Musriadi (supra), although the offence involved only a single migrant and 295 no prior record, the Court still imposed a custodial sentence due to his role in facilitating transportation and his own admission being a police reserve (‘polis bantuan’), that he knew the purpose was unlawful. The Court held that even when an accused is involved in a limited or minor role if accompanied by conscious participation, it attracts serious penal 300 consequences. This is not the situation in the present case. S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw [21]. It is a settled principle that while Parliament may prescribe maximum penalties for offences, it leaves it to the Court to determine the appropriate sentence within that range, based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. As observed in PP v Leonard Glenn Francis [1989] 1 CLJ 305 972; [1989] 2 MLJ 158, by Edgar Joseph Jr J: “the law does not fix the sentence for a particular crime but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the Court to decide what is the appropriate sentence in the particular circumstances of each case.” 310 This discretion ensures that sentencing is not mechanical but fact-sensitive. [22]. In R v Ball (1951) 35 Cr App R 164, Hilbery J similarly emphasised that not only must the punishment fit the crime, but the sentence must also 315 fit the offender. His Lordship stated: “Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. 320 Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe.” [23]. The Courts must carefully consider factors such as whether the 325 accused is a first-time offender, acted under duress or necessity, or played a passive or reluctant role. As reiterated in Mohamed Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v PP [1988] 1 MLJ 167; [1987] 1 MLRA 43 and PP v Ravindran & Ors [1993] 1 MLJ 45; [1992] 4 MLRH 303; [1992] CLJU S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw 47, the Court must assess the totality of circumstances: the gravity of the 330 offence, facts of commission, mitigating factors, and prevailing sentencing trends. A longer custodial sentence, even for deterrence, must not be imposed unless warranted by the facts. [24]. Public interest remains the paramount consideration, but it is best served when the offender is rehabilitated towards honest living, rather 335 than merely subjected to harsh punishment. In PP v Nazarudin Ahmad & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 9; [1993] 2 CLJ 543, this point was reiterated as follows: "The first and third accused are young, and they are first offenders. In such, circumstances, the Court should consider 340 how the length of time spent in prison would affect their own lives and society after they have completed serving the sentence. Sometimes public interest may itself demand that a shorter term of imprisonment is desirable as a long imprisonment term may create more problems to the society as the prisoner would have 345 more difficulties in readjusting himself to family and community life on completion of this prison term." [25]. In this context, Sugumaran Kannan v PP [2007] 3 MLJ 121; [2006] 1 LNS 203, acts as a reminder that sentencing must be individualised, 350 noting that precedents serve only as guides and that an offender must be punished solely for his own wrongdoing, and not as a scapegoat for broader public sentiment. These were the words of Justice Jeffrey Tan (as he then was) in Sugumaran Kannan (supra) stating: “'The point is that there will be sentences at both the lower and 355 higher end of the range of sentences for any one given offence, and precedents on sentences only serve as guides on the norm. S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw Ultimately, it remains, that each sentence must be individually assessed. It was just not fair to point to a similar term of imprisonment in a different case to justify the sentence. It was 360 also not fair to hold the high incidence of robbery as a factor against the appellant. Suffice it to say, that the appellant could only be punished for his own wrong.” [26]. Sentencing, by its nature, involves judicial discretion aimed at 365 balancing public interest and individual justice, as expressed in Tan Sri Abdul Rahim Mohd Noor v PP [2001] 4 CLJ 9; [2001] 3 AMR 3253; [2001] 3 MLJ 1; [2001] 1 MLRA 646; by Justice Shaik Daud JCA, in this words: “It cannot be gainsaid that the most onerous function of any court 370 is to decide the appropriate sentence in any criminal case. In deciding the appropriate sentence, a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. In that context the interest of justice should no doubt take into account the interest of the offender. But it is often 375 forgotten that the interest of justice must also include the interest of the community. In assessing sentence, the court should balance the interest of the offender with the interest of the victim and strike a balance, not, of course forgetting that the interest of the public should be of the uppermost consideration.” 380 (underlined is emphasised) [27]. Thus, the Court must always impose a sentence that is fair, individualised, and proportionate, reflecting not only the crime but the 385 offender’s particular culpability, while ensuring the wider public good is protected. S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw [28]. Courts have also emphasised that sentencing trends, while useful for consistency, are not binding templates. In PP v. Bentara Muhammad Hassan (supra) and PP v. So Chin Chong & Ors (supra), sentences of 390 30 months to three years were imposed for cases involving many migrants and organised activities. The courts also stressed that numbers alone should not guide sentencing. Instead, judges must look at the facts of each case, especially where there is no profit or no clear criminal motive involved. The courts have noted that quantitative comparisons must give 395 way to qualitative analysis, especially where there is the absence of profit and clear criminal motive. In short, qualitative analysis must prevail over mere quantitative comparisons. [29]. In the present case, the accused were first-time offenders, without prior records, and were not part of any organised migrant smuggling 400 network. They received no substantial financial benefit and acted upon the request of another individual called Marcell, whose whereabouts are unknown. Two of the migrants were harboured only for a few hours before the raid by the authorities and the third was a pregnant woman, who was housed out of compassion. These facts place their culpability on the lower 405 end of the spectrum, thus justifying a sentence that is firm but not excessive, and tailored to the actual role and intent of the accused. [30]. Lastly, it is crucial to strike a balance between deterrence and rehabilitation. In PP v. Leonard Glenn Francis (supra), the Court held that punishment should not only respond to public outrage but also allow 410 room for the offender to reform. This is what His Lordship Edgar Joseph JR J said in the case: “The first and foremost consideration of punishment is the public interest. The object of punishing crime is not only to punish the S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw offender but also to deter others. Public interest is best served if 415 the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. The law does not therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the Court to decide what is the appropriate sentence in the particular circumstances of each case.” 420 (underlined is emphasised) [31]. Therefore, while custodial sentences are often warranted in smuggling, the Court acknowledges the seriousness of offences under Section 26H ATIPSOM 2007. However, this must be evaluated alongside 425 the factual nuances of the case, including these factors as seen in the present case: a) The limited role of the accused. b) The absence of criminal antecedents. c) The lack of financial motive. 430 d) The presence of strong humanitarian considerations. e) The accused’s early plea of guilt and being cooperative throughout the proceedings. [32]. A custodial sentence that acknowledges wrongdoing yet enables 435 the offender to reflect, rehabilitate, and reintegrate is consistent with the restorative aims of sentencing. This Court is satisfied that the ends of justice are served by a custodial term that balances public interest with individual mitigation. [33]. In considering the cases and principles above, the Court also notes 440 that public interest extends to the prudent use of public funds. Prolonged S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw imprisonment of foreign offenders for non-violent crimes unnecessarily burdens public resources, which could be better utilised for the country rather than being spent on maintaining foreign prisoners in prison. In such cases, deportation should be preferred over lengthy incarceration. Given 445 that the Appellant’s offences were non-violent, the Court finds it appropriate to impose a less severe custodial sentence, thereby reducing the burden on public funds and facilitating the Appellant’s prompt repatriation. This was considered by Justice Wong Teck Meng in Sumirah v PP [2016] MLJU 1297; [2016] 1 LNS 1561, where he said this: 450 “This Court agrees with the SCJ that public interest must be the main consideration and it must be balanced up with the mitigating factors of the Appellant. However, in addition, this Court is convinced that the interest of the public must also include the consideration of the costs that our country has to bear to maintain 455 the Appellant in the prison as such expenses were derived from the public fund. Such public fund could be put to better use for the country instead of being spent on the maintenance of the foreign prisoners in the prison. As such, a prolonged imprisonment must not be preferred on foreign prisoners who 460 had committed non-violent offences and they should be deported back to their country as fast as possible. In this instant case, the offences committed by the Appellant were not violent offences and as such a less severe punishment should be preferred against her.” 465 Conclusion [34]. The Court finds that the accused are not career criminals, nor do they pose an ongoing threat to national security. Their acts, though wrong, S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw arose from poverty, family obligations, and misguided compassion under 470 another’s influence. Though the Court must send a clear message of deterrence, it also recognises the need for proportionate justice. The accused did not profit, the migrants were briefly sheltered, and there was no organised smuggling activity. Accordingly, each accused is sentenced to one (1) year’s imprisonment, commencing from the date of arrest, 16 475 May 2024. Upon completion, they shall be deported immediately. This sentence fairly balances deterrence, individual mitigation, and the public interest. Date: 2 May 2025 480 Moses Susayan MOSES SUSAYAN Judicial Commissioner High Court in Malaya 485 at Ipoh, Perak Counsel: For the prosecution Nur Amanina binti Zulkefli 490 Federal Counsel Prosecution Unit Perak Legal Advisor Offices Ipoh, Perak 495 S/N 4kdh6CihgUyFaHAAwhvAlw (Notice: This Grounds of Decision is subject to official editorial revision) Headnotes CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentence – Mitigation – Offence under s. 26H Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 – 500 Harbouring of three undocumented Indonesian migrants – Early plea of guilty – First-time offenders – No financial gain – action motivated by humanitarian grounds – Whether deterrent sentence necessary – Whether public interest must outweigh personal mitigating factors – Importance of balancing punishment with rehabilitation – Whether Court 505 may impose reduced custodial term considering the absence of organised smuggling and need to reduce the burden on public funds – Whether deportation preferable to prolonged incarceration – Whether sentence must fit both crime and offender – Whether Court must exercise sentencing discretion judiciously – Whether one-year imprisonment fair 510 and proportionate – Whether sentence adequately meets public interest, fairness, and restorative justice principles. 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