Ivan Gerard Khoo Boon Hoe v Basil Chandrakanth A. Joseph (WA-12ANCvC-151-11/2025)

IVAN GERARD KHOO BOON HOE (No. K/P: 740630-14-5321)

CHIA YU CHEE (No. K/P: 730126-12-5197)

MUNDZIR BIN ABDUL LATIF (No. K/P: 820319-08-6613) …PERAYU-PERAYU DAN BASIL CHANDRAKANTH A. JOSEPH (NO. K/P: 820502-14-5589) (b/s IMF ENTERTAINMENT (NO. PENDAFTARAN: 002550546-U) ….RESPONDEN 15/07/2026 14:48:40 WA-12ANCvC-151-11/2025 Kand. 20 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This is an appeal against an assessment of damages.

The law is settled that an appellate court does not interfere merely because it would have arrived at a different figure. Interference is justified only where:

(a) the trial judge acted upon a wrong principle of law;

(b) misapprehended the evidence;

(c) took into account irrelevant matters;

(d) failed to take into account relevant matters; or

(e) arrived at an award that is wholly erroneous.

The burden therefore lies on the Appellants to demonstrate a reversible error in the assessment exercise itself.

The Appellant’s appeal based on several grounds, namely –

(A) Ground 1: Plaintiff failed to prove that 1,000 persons would have attended the Festival

This is the principal ground.

The Appellants contend that the learned Sessions Judge erred in relying on a projected attendance figure of 1,000 persons.

At first glance, the criticism appears attractive.

However, upon closer scrutiny, it is not the function of an assessment court to require mathematical certainty.

The Sessions Judge found as a fact that:

(a) the Carlsberg sponsorship included marketing support intended to attract 1,000 attendees;

(b) this was the target upon which the sponsorship arrangement was premised;

(c) the Defendants themselves were partners in IMF Entertainment and were fully aware of that target;

(d) the sponsorship was subsequently terminated as a consequence of the wrongful conduct already determined by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had already determined liability on all pleaded causes of action. The assessment court was therefore concerned only with quantification of the resulting loss.

The learned Sessions Judge was entitled to treat the 1,000- person target as part of the factual matrix upon which the sponsorship was procured and to assess the Plaintiff's lost commercial opportunity accordingly.

The fact that the figure represented a projection does not automatically render it inadmissible for purposes of expectation-loss assessment.

Commercial expectation loss frequently involves forward-looking estimates.

The question is whether there was an evidential basis for the estimate.

In my view there was.

Accordingly, Ground 1 should fail.

(B) GROUND 2: The Judge allegedly relied upon speculation

This ground substantially overlaps with Ground 1.

The Sessions Court Judge did not simply assume a figure.

She undertook a calculation based upon evidence accepted at the assessment hearing.

The Grounds record findings that:

(a) approximately 30% of attendees would purchase accommodation-and-ticket packages;

(b) profit from such purchasers was RM400 each;

(c) profit from ticket purchasers was RM308 each;

(d) average beer consumption was six cans per attendee;

(e) profit margin per can sold was RM9.20.

More importantly, the Sessions Court Judge expressly recorded that these aspects of the Plaintiff's evidence were not effectively challenged.

Whether another court might have adopted a more conservative approach is not the test.

The question is whether the assessment was without evidential foundation.

It was not.

Ground 2 should therefore fail.

(C) GROUND 3: Loss of profits was not strictly proved

The Appellants rely heavily on the principle that special damages and loss of profits must be strictly proved.

With respect, this ground conflates two distinct concepts.

The award under challenge is principally one of expectation loss and general damages flowing from established tortious wrongdoing.

The Sessions Court Judge expressly relied upon principles of compensatory damages and expectation loss recognised by the authorities cited before her.

The Plaintiff was not required to prove future profits with scientific precision.

The law requires a reasonable evidential basis.

The assessment exercise necessarily involved estimation because the wrongful conduct prevented the commercial venture from proceeding under the conditions originally contemplated.

Once liability for the destruction of the sponsorship arrangement had been conclusively established, the Court was entitled to assess the resulting loss on a reasonable basis.

Ground 3 should fail.

(D) GROUND 4: The Judge failed to consider that only approximately 300 attendees actually attended

In my respectful view, the Grounds demonstrate the contrary.

The Sessions Court Judge expressly recognised that approximately 300 attendees attended the Festival and utilised that figure in calculating the shortfall against the intended attendance target.

The criticism therefore attacks not a failure to consider the evidence, but rather the weight accorded to it.

Weight is primarily a matter for the assessment court.

No appellate error has been demonstrated.

Ground 4 should fail.

(E) GROUND 5: The award is excessive

The final question is whether RM330,140 was so excessive as to warrant appellate intervention.

The figure was derived from:

(a) loss relating to accommodation and ticket packages;

(b) loss relating to ticket sales;

(c) loss relating to beverage sales;

(d) loss of commercial opportunity flowing from the cancellation of sponsorship.

The amount is certainly substantial.

However, substantiality alone is not a ground for appellate intervention.

The Court must be satisfied that the figure is wholly erroneous.

Having examined the reasoning process adopted by the Sessions Judge, I am unable to conclude that the award falls outside the permissible range available on the evidence before the court.

Ground 5 should therefore fail.

The award of RM20,000 aggravated damages was separately justified by the Sessions Court Judge on the basis that:

(a) the Appellants had blackmailed the Plaintiff during the dissolution negotiations;

(b) subsequently caused the sponsorship cancellation through the impugned email;

(c) the conduct involved dishonesty and oppressive behaviour already established through the Court of Appeal judgment.

The award of RM20,000 cannot be regarded as excessive or plainly wrong.

There is therefore no basis for appellate interference.

After considering the Memorandum of Appeal, the written submissions of the parties, the Sessions Court Judge's Grounds of Judgment and the applicable appellate principles, I am not satisfied that the Appellants have demonstrated any error of law, error of principle, misapprehension of evidence or wholly erroneous estimate sufficient to justify appellate intervention.

The learned Sessions Court Judge correctly directed herself that liability had already been conclusively determined by the Court of Appeal and confined her inquiry to the quantification of the Plaintiff's loss. The assessment undertaken was grounded on evidence accepted by the court and reflected a reasoned exercise of judicial discretion.

Accordingly, the appeal ought to be dismissed and the Orders of the Sessions Court dated 28 October 2025 affirmed in their entirety. Dated: 15th July 2026 …………………………………………….. (YA PUAN MAHAZAN BINTI MAT TAIB) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Counsel for The Appellants : Alex Keong Messrs. Alex Keong & Co. (Ampang) Advocates & Solicitors Counsel for The Respondent : Khabir Dhillon Messrs. Khabir Dhillon (Petaling Jaya) Advocates & Solicitors