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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR GUAMAN SIVIL NO: CB-22NCVC-22-12/2021
CB-22NCvC-22-12/2021
High Court of Malaysia20 Jul 2022
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“een awarded with printing contracts in 1980. Thus, the gist of the respondents' case was that they had been wrongly identified as SYARIKAT WATAK BAHRU — a firm registered on January 7, 1980 under the Business Registration Ordinance 1956 (see Exhibit MM3 at page 28 of appeal record) and to whom the alleged corruption an”
“(a) under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 [Act 351], the Guardianship of Infants Ordinance of Sabah [Cap. 54] and the Guardianship of Infants Ordinance of Sarawak [Cap. 93];”
“(a) under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 [Act 351], the Guardianship of Infants Ordinance of Sabah [Cap. 54] and the Guardianship of Infants Ordinance of Sarawak [Cap. 93];”
“e originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 defendant against the plaintiff. The Court simply left the defendant to commence a separate action. It was only by virtue of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, s. 24(3) that enabled the defendant's counterclaim to be added to the plaintiff's suit. In so far as”
“(b) under the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 [Act 263] and the Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah [Ord. 7 of 1959]; S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25”
“[2013] 7 CLJ 533 di mana dijelaskan tentang kedudukan seksyen 7 Akta Perkongsian 1961 seperti berikut: "Every partner is the agent of his partners for the purpose of the business of the partnership (Partnership Act 1890 s. 5) (which is identical to s. 7 of our Partnership Act 1961 )... since every agent is the agent of”
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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR GUAMAN SIVIL NO: CB-22NCVC-22-12/2021
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JASMI BIN YUSOF
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KHALMA ROS BINTI KHOLI (NO. K/P: 651206-06-5176) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF
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MUHAMMAD OSMAN BIN KATERAN
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MOHAMED SAZALI BIN ABDUL AZIZ
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TETUAN SAZALI & LIM (dituntut sebagai satu firma) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 20/07/2022 16:28:30 CB-22NCvC-22-12/2021 Kand. 28 S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [1] Ini adalah permohonan Plaintif-plaintif untuk membatalkan penyata pembelaan Defendan Ketiga (Tetuan Sazali & Lim) dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan Ketiga. Alasan untuk pembatalan pembelaan Defendan Ketiga adalah tindakan Defendan Kedua di dalam menguruskan perjanjian yang melibatkan Plaintif-plaintif adalah mengikat Defendan Ketiga di bawah undang-undang perkongsian. [2] Defendan Ketiga yang bergantung kepada Akta Had Masa 1953 perlu dibatalkan disebabkannya ianya tidak diplidkan secara terperinci di dalam pernyataan pembelaan. Sementara itu, tuntutan balas Defendan Ketiga tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan bagi suatu tuntutan fitnah. Fakta kes berdasarkan writ dan penyata tuntutan serta affidavit sokongan Plaintif-Plaintif bagi permohonan pembatalan pembelaan dan tuntutan balas Defendan Ketiga [3] Pada 14.07.2009, Plaintif-Plaintif telah mengadakan perbincangan bahawa terdapat suatu tawaran untuk pembelian tanah sepuluh (10) ekar pada harga RM180,000.00 seekar. Plaintif-Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk membeli tanah-tanah tersebut. Defendan Kedua telah dilantik untuk mewakili Plaintif-plaintif sebagai peguamcara mereka di dalam urusan pembelian tanah tersebut. Plaintif-plaintif mendakwa bahawa mereka dimaklumkan oleh Defendan Kedua S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw bahawa terdapat 13 ekar tanah kesemuanya. Namun tiga (3) ekar lagi akan dibeli oleh pihak ketiga. [4] Semasa perjanjian jual-beli itu ditandatangani Plaintif-Plaintif ada bertanyakan berkenaan kewujudan nama Defendan Pertama sebagai pemilik bersama, Defendan Kedua memaklumkan bahawa Defendan Pertama adalah berkaitan dengan tiga (3) ekar tanah tersebut. [5] Plaintif-Plaintif telah membayar sepenuh harga pembelian penuh sepuluh (10) ekar tanah tersebut iaitu RM1,800,000.00. Natijah daripada perjanjian itu bahagian yang diperolehi oleh Plaintif-Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: Hartanah pertama - Plaintif Pertama ½ syer - Plaintif Kedua ½ syer Hartanah kedua - Plaintif Pertama 3/8 syer - Plaintif Kedua 2/8 syer - Defendan Pertama 3/8 syer [6] Pada 23.08.2021 Plaintif-plaintif telah menjualkan tanah tersebut kepada CLM Sdn. Bhd. dengan harga RM 1,165,867.00 bagi hartanah pertama dan RM1,834,133.00 bagi hartanah kedua. Defendan Pertama juga bersetuju untuk memindah milik bahagian 3/8 syer beliau. [7] Pertikaian timbul di dalam kes ini apabila Plaintif-plaintif melalui peguamcara mereka bagi perjanjian dengan CLM Sdn. Bhd. pada
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23.08.2021 mengetahui bahawa pada masa Plaintif-Plaintif membayar RM1,800,000.00 pada 14.7.2009 adalah bayaran bagi 13 ekar tanah dan bukannya 10 ekar. Ini bermakna bayaran untuk 3/8 ekar yang dimiliki syernya oleh Defendan Pertama adalah dibayar oleh Plaintif-plaintif. Defendan Pertama tidak mengeluarkan apa-apa bayaran untuk memperolehi 3/8 syer. Plaintif-plaintif menyatakan bahawa pindahan syer 3/8 kepada Defendan Pertama adalah tidak sah. [8] Plaintif-plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama adalah adik ipar kepada Defendan Kedua. Plaintif menyatakan telah berlaku frod oleh Defendan kedua. Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua telah berkonspirasi dalam penipuan terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam urusan jual beli tanah tersebut. Defendan Ketiga adalah bertanggungjawab dengan penipuan tersebut sebagai sebuah entiti firma guaman. Pembelaan Defendan Ketiga [9] Defendan Ketiga menyatakan bahawa segala terma-terma dalam perjanjian itu adalah di dalam pengetahuan Plaintif-plaintif. [10] Defendan Ketiga tidak mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan dengan dakwaan Plaintif-plaintif kepada Defendan Ketiga. Defendan Ketiga menyatakan segala tindakan Defendan Kedua yang dikatakan dilakukan adalah atas dasar kedudukan secara persendirian dan tiada kaitan dengan Defendan Ketiga. S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw Tuntutan balas oleh Defendan Ketiga adalah atas dasar pernyataan serta dakwaan Plaintif-plaintif tidak mencalarkan reputasi Defendan Ketiga sebagai firma guaman yang dihormati [11] Peguam Plaintif-plaintif yang bijaksana menyatakan bahawa permohonan dibuat di bawah A 18 k 19 (b), atau (c) atau (d) Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah (KKM) 2012 bagi pernyataan pembelaan Defendan Ketiga. Sementara bagi tuntutan balas Defendan Ketiga, Plaintif-plaintif bersandarkan kepada A 18 k 19 (a) KKM 2012. [12] Undang-undang berkenaan permohonan di bawah A 18 k 19 KKM 2012 telah mantap di bawah undang-undang. Suluh panduan berkenaan prinsip serta pemakaian telah dinyatakan di dalam kes-kes Mahkamah Atasan misalnya Mahkamah Agong di dalam kes Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v. United Malayan Banking Corporation [1993] 3 MLJ 36, [1993] 4 CLJ 7 dan Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1 yang tidak perlu diulangkan lagi di sini. [13] Apa yang jelas A. 18 k 19 KKM 2012 akan terpakai di dalam keadaan jelas dan nyata bahawa suatu tuntutan atau pembelaan tidak boleh dikekalkan (unsustainable). Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga telah mengambil perhatian bahawa alasan utama Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini adalah Defendan Ketiga sebagai seorang rakan kongsi tidak boleh melepaskan tanggungjawab beliau di atas segala tindakan yang dilakukan oleh Defendan Kedua. S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw [14] Di dalam kes ini Mahkamah tidak sewajarnya meneliti secara mendalam keterangan-keterangan bagi menyokong dakwaan Plaintif-Plaintif atau membantu pembelaan Defendan Ketiga. Apa yang perlu dilihat oleh Mahkamah ialah adakah terdapatnya pembelaan yang menghalang daripada A. 18 k 19 KKM 2012 di (c) dan (d) diberikan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah perlu melihat kepada peruntukan di bawah seksyen 7, 8, 9 dan 12 Akta Perkongsian 1961 bagi meneliti sama ada tanggungjawab rakan kongsi. Seksyen 7 Akta Perkongsian 1961 menyatakan seperti berikut: “7 Power of partner to bind firm Every partners is an agent of the firm and his other partners for the purpose of the business of the partnership; and the acts of every partner who does any act for carrying on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by the firm of which he is a member bind the firm and his partners, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the firm in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing either knows that he has no authority or does not know or believe him to be a partner.” [15] Adalah menarik untuk meneliti huraian seksyen 7 Akta Perkongsian 1961 ini yang dinyatakan di dalam buku Partnership Law In Malaysia oleh Dr. Samsar Kamar Latif, ILBS Reprint 2013 di halaman 39 seperti berikut: S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw “Where a partner has no actual authority to bind the firm, the fact of being a partner confers a prima facie authority to do so provided that three conditions are fulfilled:
i
the transaction must be within the scope of the kind of business carried on by the firm;
II
(ii) that transaction must be effected in the usual way;
III
(iii) the other party to the transaction must either know or believe that the person acting is a partner and must not know of his lack of authority. If a partner does not act in his capacity of an agent but as a principal on his own account, his act cannot be imputed to the partnership firm and he alone is liable for them even though the firm may have benefited by them.” [16] Bagi konteks perkongsian dalam syarikat guaman Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Datuk M Kayveas & Anor v. BAR Council [2013] 7 CLJ 533 di mana dijelaskan tentang kedudukan seksyen 7 Akta Perkongsian 1961 seperti berikut: "Every partner is the agent of his partners for the purpose of the business of the partnership (Partnership Act 1890 s. 5) (which is identical to s. 7 of our Partnership Act 1961 )... since every agent is the agent of all the others, the firm is liable when a partner in the S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw ordinary course of business gives an undertaking (Alliance Bank v. Tucker [1867] 17 LT 13) is negligent (Rew v. Lane (1856) 5 WR 110; Clarke v. Couchman [1885] 20 Law Journal 318), is guilty of fraud (Phosphate Sewage Co v. Hartmont [1877] 5 Ch D 394 at p. 433) or misconduct (Norton v. Cooper, Re Manby and Hawksford, ex parte Bittlestone [1856] 3 Sm & G 375)" (The Law, Practice and Conduct of Solicitors by Peter M K Bird and J Bruce Weir at p. 66). "In a partnership, an undertaking given by a partner in the course of practice binds all the partners.” [17] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga meneliti keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes CIMB Bank Bhd v. Lee Kim Kee & Ors and Another Appeal [2018] 9 CLJ 168 seperti berikut: “[50] We refer to s. 7 of the Partnership Act and the same is reproduced as follows:
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Power of partner to bind firm Every partner is an agent of the firm and his other partners for the purpose of the business of the partnership; and the acts of every partner who does any act for carrying on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by the firm of which he is a member bind the firm and his partners, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the firm in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing either knows that he has no authority or does not know or believe him to be a partner. S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw [51] Thus, we were of the view that a partnership does not ipso facto become liable for all of the liabilities of its partner. What Mr. Leong Sing Cheong did was definitely not within the scope and boundaries of the partnership of the firm and thus, the third party could not be made liable for that fraudulent transaction.” [18] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga mengambil perhatian keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam pemakaian seksyen 8 Akta Perkongsian 1961 di dalam kes Ahmad Hashim lwn. Tetuan Johari, Nasri & Tan [2012] 9 CLJ 285 seperti berikut: “[27] Seksyen 8 Akta Perkongsian 1961 (Akta 135) - Partnership Act 1961 (Act 135) menyatakan secara ringkas bahawa apa-apa tindakan (act) yang dibuat oleh firma responden defendan adalah mengikat (bind) Chye Ann Lee. Oleh yang demikian, Chye Ann Lee tidak boleh sewenang-wenangnya mengatakan bahawa beliau tidak tahu tentang kes perayu plaintif Ahmad bin Hashim di mana wang pampasan pengambilan tanah telah diselewengkan oleh firma responden defendan di mana beliau merupakan salah seorang daripada tiga orang rakan kongsi. [28] Seksyen 11 Akta Perkongsian 196 (Akta 135) - Partnership Act 1961 (Act 135) perlu dirujuk pada saat ini. Ianya berbunyi demikian:
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Liability of partners Every partner in a firm is liable jointly with the other partners for all debts and obligations of the firm incurred while he is a S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw partner; and after his death his estate is also severally liable in a due course of administration for such debts and obligations, so far as they remain unsatisfied but subject to the prior payment of his separate debts. [29] Apa yang dinyatakan oleh Hasan Lah JC (kini HMP) di dalam kes Michael Sim Hang Chuang v. Syarikat Sri Puspa & Ors (supra), di ms. 200 elok dirujuk: As far as the persons outside the partnership are concerned I agree with the views stated in the two cases just cited that they are entitled to act upon the assumption that the particulars in the Business Registry are correct unless and until they receive express notice to the contrary. Whatever agreement or arrangement made by the partners between themselves are merely an internal arrangement and they cannot bind the persons from outside the firm who are dealing with the firm and are relying on the Business Registry except in cases where those persons have been expressly informed of the changes by the firm or any one of the partners. It is important that the sanctity of business register in the Business Names Registry be upheld in the interest of business efficacy. [30] Wang pampasan pengambilan tanah telah diselewengkan oleh firma responden defendan di mana Chye Ann Lee adalah salah seorang rakan kongsi pada masa itu. Oleh yang demikian, Chye Ann Lee adalah "liable jointly" mengikut s. 11 Akta Perkongsian 1961 (Akta 135) - Partnership Act 1961 (Act 135).” S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw [19] Ini bermakna bagi seorang rakan kongsi di bawah Akta Perkongsian 1961 tindakan yang dilakukan oleh rakan kongsi yang lain tidak secara automatik akan menyebabkan rakan kongsi yang lain dipertanggungjawabkan. Pekongsi tersebut berkemungkinan boleh mengemukakan keterangan bagi menunjukkan bahawa beliau tidak mempunyai kaitan, pengetahuan atau membenarkan tindakan yang menyalahi undang-undang dilakukan oleh rakan kongsi beliau. Pada masa yang sama mahkamah juga perlu melihat apakah tindakan yang dilakukan oleh rakan kongsi beliau adalah sesuatu yang selaras dengan perniagaan dan aktiviti biasa yang dilakukan oleh syarikat perkongsian tersebut. Apa yang jelas ialah perkara-perkara tersebut boleh dijadikan pembelaan kepada pekongsi rakan kongsi di dalam satu perkongsian. [20] Di dalam kes ini Defendan Ketiga boleh menimbulkan pembelaan-pembelaan sedemikian bagi memutuskan kebertanggungjawaban beliau terhadap tindakan-tindakan Defendan Kedua. Pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan Ketiga di dalam kes ini bukanlah satu yang tidak langsung mempunyai asas. Apa yang lebih jelas ialah mahkamah masih belum membuat dapatan sama ada Defendan Kedua telah melakukan frod terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif. Oleh itu bagaimana pihak Defendan Ketiga boleh dikatakan terlibat di dalam salah laku Defendan Kedua berkaitan dengan frod yang masih belum diputuskan oleh mahkamah. S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw [21] Akhirnya mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan Plaintif-Plaintif untuk mengenepikan pembelaan pihak Defendan Ketiga di dalam kes ini adalah ditolak dengan kos. Tuntutan Balas Defendan Ketiga [22] Di dalam kes ini Defendan Ketiga semasa memfailkan pembelaan telah turut mengemukakan tuntutan balas. Dalam konteks ini mahkamah perlu mengambil perhatian bahawa tuntutan balas adalah sesuatu tuntutan yang boleh berdiri sendiri tanpa berkaitan dengan tuntutan utama Plaintif-Plaintif kepada Defendan Ketiga. Dalam erti kata lain Defendan Ketiga boleh memfailkan tuntutan lain terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif dan tidak bergantung kepada tuntutan yang sedia ada di mahkamah. Hakikat tuntutan balas ini telah dinyatakan di dalam kes Permodalan Plantations Sdn Bhd v. Rachuta Sdn Bhd [1985] CLJ Rep 242 seperti berikut: “What then is a counterclaim? A counterclaim on the other hand is also a cross-claim which a defendant has against a plaintiff but in respect of which the defendant can bring a separate action against the plaintiff if he wishes to do so. Thus, to all intents and purposes a counterclaim is a separate and independent action by the defendant, which the law allows to be joined to the plaintiff's action in order to avoid multiplicity or circuity of suits. Like set-off, a counterclaim is also the creation of Statutes. At common law the Court has no power to allow an action by a plaintiff to be met by a cross-claim of the S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw defendant against the plaintiff. The Court simply left the defendant to commence a separate action. It was only by virtue of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, s. 24(3) that enabled the defendant's counterclaim to be added to the plaintiff's suit. In so far as our law is concerned, a counterclaim is governed by the provisions of O. 15 r. 2 which we have already set out earlier. It is, therefore, clear that a counterclaim is wider than a defence of set-off and that whilst the former is a separate action by a defendant against a plaintiff the latter is essentially a defence, although a defendant is entitled to add it as a counterclaim. Being a defence to a plaintiff's action, the matter sought to be set-off must essentially be connected with or form part of the matter upon which the plaintiff's action is founded.” [23] Pada amnya tindakan tuntutan fitnah dibuat bagi melindungi nama baik mana-mana pihak yang telah tercela ekoran daripada kenyataan atau penyataan yang dibuat oleh seseorang. Ia adalah bagi melindungi maruah dan nama baik seseorang. Bagi membuktikan satu tindakan di bawah fitnah perkara-perkara berikut perlu ditunjukkan iaitu:
a
penyataan tersebut adalah suatu fitnah;
b
penyataan tersebut merujuk kepada Plaintif; dan
c
penyataan tersebut telah disiarkan. [24] Di dalam kes ini Defendan Ketiga menyatakan bahawa ekoran daripada tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap beliau ia telah mencemarkan nama baik syarikat guaman Defendan Ketiga yang telah dikenali di S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw seluruh negeri Pahang terutamanya. Ia telah menjejaskan pandangan orang ramai terhadap syarikat guaman Defendan Ketiga. Apa yang jelas ialah tindakan tuntutan balas ini adalah dibuat ekoran daripada tuntutan yang dibuat oleh Plaintif-Plaintif. Defendan Ketiga menyatakan bahawa tuntutan tersebut telah merupakan suatu fitnah kepada Defendan Ketiga. Mahkamah mendapati di dalam affidavit jawapan Defendan Ketiga dan pliding iaitu penyata tuntutan balas Defendan Ketiga tiada dinyatakan bahawa selain daripada kenyataan di dalam penyatan tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif, Plaintif-Plaintif ada menerbitkan atau menyiarkan penyataan-penyataan fitnah kepada pihak ketiga. Ini bermakna fitnah tersebut adalah semata-mata berdasarkan kepada tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif kepada Defendan Ketiga. [25] Persoalannya adakah pihak Defendan Ketiga mempunyai kausa tindakan terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif bagi tindakan fitnah yang hanya berdasarkan kepada kenyataan-kenyataan yang dibuat oleh Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam prosiding di mahkamah. Jika ini berlaku maka ia akan menghalang mana-mana Plaintif atau Defendan daripada mengutarakan apa-apa fakta di dalam sesuatu tindakan terhadap mana-mana pihak yang boleh dikategorikan sebagai fitnah. Hal ini akan menyebabkan pihak-pihak tidak dapat mengemukakan fakta-fakta sepenuhnya di dalam sesuatu tuntutan sivil kerana dibimbangi ianya akan mengundang kepada tindakan pihak lawan di bawah tuntutan fitnah. Mahkamah berpendapat ini tidak sewajarnya berlaku disebabkan ia akan menjejaskan hak pihak-pihak di dalam sesuatu prosiding di mahkamah. S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw [26] Ini adalah disebabkan pihak yang ingin mempertikaikan penyataan-penyataan Plaintif di dalam penyataan tuntutan atau Defendan di dalam penyataan pembelaan boleh menyanggah penyataan-penyataan tersebut di dalam pliding atau melalui saksi-saksi semasa perbicaraan kelak. Dalam erti kata lain adalah tidak wajar untuk pihak menggunakan fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan di dalam pliding untuk menjadi asas kepada suatu tindakan fitnah. Ini ditambah pula salah satu daripada elemen bagi tindakan fitnah ialah penerbitan atau penyiaran (publication). Dalam konteks ini mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Pullman and Another v. Walter Hill & Co., Limited. [1891] 1 Q.B. 524 di mana Lord Esher M.R. menyatakan seperti berikut: “The first question is, whether, assuming the letter to contain defamatory matter, there has been a publication of it. What is the meaning of "publication"? The making known the defamatory matter after it has been written to some person other than the person of whom it is written. If the statement is sent straight to the person of whom it is written, there is no publication of it; for you cannot publish a libel of a man to himself. If there was no publication, the question whether the occasion was privileged does not arise. If a letter is not communicated to any one but the person to whom it is written, there is no publication of it. And, if the writer of a letter locks it up in his own desk, and a thief comes and breaks open the desk and takes away the letter and makes it contents known, I should say that would not be a publication. If the writer of a letter shews it to his own clerk in order that the clerk may copy it for him, is that a publication of the letter? Certainly it is shewing it to a third person; the writer cannot say to the person to whom the S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw letter is addressed, "I have shewn it to you and to no one else." I cannot, therefore, feel any doubt that, if the writer of a letter shews it to any person other than the person to whom it is written, he publishes it. If he wishes not to publish it, he must, so far as he possibly can, keep it to himself, or he must send it himself straight to the person to whom it is written. There was, therefore, in this case a publication to the type-writer.” [27] Ini telah dinyatakan juga oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 MLJ 720 seperti berikut: “[31] In other words, the plaintiff must prove three elements of the tort of defamation, which are:
a
the plaintiff must show that the statement bears defamatory imputations;
b
the statement must refer to or reflect upon the plaintiff’s reputation; and
c
the statement must have been published to a third person by the defendant.” [28] Di dalam kes Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] A.C. 116 Mahkamah Pertuanan (House of Lords) menyatakan seperti berikut: “My Lords, it is an essential element of the cause of action for defamation that the words complained of should be published "of S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw the plaintiff." If the words are not so published, the plaintiff is not defamed and cannot have any right to ask that the defendant should be held responsible to him in respect of them.” [29] Pada masa yang sama mahkamah juga meneliti keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang menyatakan bahawa penyataan-penyataan yang dinyatakan di dalam dokumen mahkamah boleh menjadi asas kepada tindakan fitnah. Ini dinyatakan di dalam kes Tan Sri Dato' Seri Halim bin Mohammad v Syed Ahmad bin Tun (Dr) Syed Nasir & Anor [2013] 8 MLJ 348, mahkamah telah menolak pembelaan Defendan Kedua berkaitan dengan keistimewaan mutlak. Ini dapat dilihat di halaman 372 seperti berikut: “[85] As regards the position in Malaysia, a fair and contemporaneous report of proceedings publicly heard before any court is absolutely privileged. [86] Hence having regard to the authorities discussed above the provisions relied by the second defendant did not in any way assist the second defendant in her defence as the case at hand did not concern an open court hearing. The publication of the alleged defamatory statements to the media did not attract any privilege. As had been illustrated earlier in the case of Smith v Haris the court had drawn the distinction between a writ of summons filed in the registry and a hearing in open court. The said court had also made a distinction between a document prepared for and filed but not deployed as part of the judicial process. S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw [87] That being the position this court had no choice but reject the second defendant's defence of absolute privilege as there is no privilege attached to the alleged defamatory statements.” [30] Kes Tan Sri Dato' Seri Halim bin Mohammad v Syed Ahmad bin Tun (Dr) Syed Nasir & Anor tersebut berdasarkan kepada fakta tersendiri yang terdapat di halaman 356 seperti berikut: “[20] The first plaintiff claimed that on 7 June 2007 at about 3pm the defendants through their solicitors Messrs Azian & Co had caused to be filed a purported claim by way of a writ and statement of claim against the first plaintiff and six others at the Kuala Lumpur High Court Registry (at pp 1–35 of bundle B). After filing the unsealed writ and SOC the defendants' had through their Solicitors Messrs Azian & Co caused to publish and or to make available and or had authorised their solicitors to publish and or make available copies of the unsealed writ and SOC to Berita Harian, Harian Metro, Utusan Malaysia, The Sun, Bernama, TV3 and other members of the news media ('alleged defamatory statements'). A copy of the same was as annexed as Appendix 'A' to the first plaintiff's writ and SOC (bundle A1). [21] The contents of the alleged defamatory statements were reported by BERNAMA at about 4pm or thereabout on 7 June 2007 and were broadcasted by TV3 in its 8pm Buletin Utama news programme and repeated in its Nightline news programme. The contents of the alleged defamatory statements were published by Berita Harian (p 47 of bundle 'B'), Harian Metro (p 48 S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw of bundle 'B'), Utusan Malaysia (p 46 of bundle 'B') and The Sun (p 49 of bundle 'B') the next day, 8 June 2007. At the time the alleged defamatory statements were published and or made available to the newsmen the same had not been sealed by the said Registry of the Kuala Lumpur High Court.” [31] Sebaliknya di dalam kes ini tiada sebarang keterangan seperti yang dinyatakan di atas yang menunjukkan bahawa kenyataan yang dikatakan fitnah di dalam penyataan tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif telah dikemukakan kepada pihak ketiga ataupun disiarkan dalam apa-apa media cetak atau sosial. Oleh itu fakta kes di dalam kes ini perlu dibezakan dengan fakta dalam kes Tan Sri Dato' Seri Halim bin Mohammad v Syed Ahmad bin Tun (Dr) Syed Nasir & Anor (supra). [32] Mahkamah juga meneliti kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226. Di dalam kes tersebut satu permohonan di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi (KMT) untuk pembatalan tindakan fitnah. Di mahkamah Tinggi mahkamah telah memberikan perintah bahawa pembelaan Defendan dibatalkan di bawah A. 18 k 19 KMT dan penghakiman interlokutori telah dimasukkan. Fakta kes yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan menunjukkan seperti berikut: “During the hearing in Chambers, Mr. Abraham, counsel for the appellants, raised a preliminary objection that the respondents' counsel did not make any submission that the Statement of S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw Defence was scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, and that although three grounds were raised in the Summons, the respondents' application was argued solely on the basis that the Statement of Defence disclosed no Defence. In the circumstances, the court should not look at the affidavits in deciding whether the appellants' pleading disclosed no Defence. It is not clear from the appeal records whether the objection of Mr. Abraham was upheld when the learned Judge dismissed the respondents' application in the first instance. It is equally not clear whether the objection was overruled when the Order-in-Chambers was reversed after arguments in open court. Be that as it may, we are satisfied on perusing the appeal records that both in Chambers and open court the respondents' application to strike out the Defence proceeded entirely on the basis that the Statement of Defence did not disclose any Defence under order 18 rule 19(1)(a) R.H.C. although the respondents' Summons and paragraph 12 of Sheikh Abdullah's second affidavit did mention the defence of beneficial ownership as scandalous, frivolous and vexatious.” [33] YA Hakim Mohd Azmi Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan berkenaan dengan permohonan di bawah A. 18 k 19 KMT di dalam kes yang melibatkan tuntutan fitnah dan gantirugi seperti berikut: “Coming back to the present appeal, in their Statement of Claim the respondents alleged that the two offending articles entitled "PROBE ON MILLION $ SCANDAL" and "UNREGISTERED FIRM GOT $900,000/- PRINTING JOBS" which appeared in August 19 S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw and 21, 1982 issues of the Malay Mailwere printed falsely and maliciously by the appellants. The articles reported corruption and irregularities in the award of ten printing contracts worth about $900,000/- in 1980 by the Government Printers to SYARIKAT WATAK BARU — the former name of first respondent company before it was changed to its present name Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn. Bhd. in June 1982 (see Exhibit "MM 12"). The ten printing contracts were in fact awarded to a partnership of Azizah and Yong Liew Wah which was trading under a similar name — SYARIKAT WATAK BAHRU. It should be noted that the only difference in the two names is in the spelling of BARU and BAHRU. In effect Syarikat Watak Baru (the former name of first respondent company) was incorporated as a limited company in 1981 (see Exhibit MM11 at page 123 of appeal record) and as such it could not have been awarded with printing contracts in 1980. Thus, the gist of the respondents' case was that they had been wrongly identified as SYARIKAT WATAK BAHRU — a firm registered on January 7, 1980 under the Business Registration Ordinance 1956 (see Exhibit MM3 at page 28 of appeal record) and to whom the alleged corruption and irregularities ought to have been referred by the Malay Mail. By their Statement of Defence as amended, the appellants raised three defences — (1) justification, (2) fair comment, and (3) that the first respondent company (formerly known as SYARIKAT WATAK BARU) were the beneficial owners of SYARIKAT WATAK BAHRU firm. By affidavit evidence the respondents through Sheikh Abdullah totally denied having any connection whatsoever with the partnership of Azizah and Yong. The learned Judge agreed and came to the following conclusion S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw after dealing with the affidavit evidence and the documents annexed thereto:— "As I have already stated above, it has already been established conclusively that the first plaintiff is not and has never been the beneficial owner of Syarikat Watak Bahru. As for their defence of justification and fair comment, I could not agree with them more on this that such defences are sustainable if they had succeeded in establishing that the first plaintiff is the beneficial owner of Syarikat Watak Bahru. Since they had failed to do so, I consider that the defences raised are attempts to cloud the real issues in this case and to unnecessarily delay and prolong the proceedings of this suit." On the principle governing the application to strike out pleadings under order 18 rule 19(1) (a) R.H.C., we are of the opinion that the learned Judge erred in law in ordering the appellants' defence to be struck out. In our view the appellants have raised triable issues of fact and these issues can only be fairly resolved by evidence viva voce at a trial and not merely by affidavit evidence. In this particular case it is quite impossible to hold conclusively on mere affidavit evidence and documents annexed thereto that the appellants could not possibly prove that the first respondent company is traceable beneficially or legally to the firm of SYARIKAT WATAK BAHRU in which Azizah Haji Osman and Yong Liew Wah are partners. The distinct legal entity between SYARIKAT WATAK BARU (the former name of first respondent company) and the partnership of SYARIKAT WATAK BAHRU S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw disclosed by documents attached to affidavits cannot by itself deprive the appellants from any defence of beneficial ownership. It is too premature to say whether the appellants would be allowed to lift the corporate veil of first respondent company and even if they were allowed to do so, it is mere conjecture at this stage whether they would find any connection between the partnership and first respondent company. After all both Azizah and Yong have not given any evidence, and the similarity in the name of the limited company and the partnership can be a double-edged weapon depending on the evidence to be adduced particularly when the name SYARIKAT WATAK BARU was changed only a few months before the publication of the offending articles. Further, as acknowledged by the learned Judge justification and fair comment are not sham defences if the defence of beneficial ownership can be proved. Datuk Ibrahim, the former Director-General of Government Printers has been charged for corruption and he too may have something to say on the issue of beneficial ownership apart from Azizah and Yong. The five respondents should also be open to cross-examination on that issue of fact. In the circumstances we find that the order striking out the whole Statement of Defence should be set aside. The original Order-in-Chambers dismissing the respondents' application should be restored and the case should proceed to trial. We would therefore allow this appeal with costs both here and in the court below. The deposit should be refunded to the appellants.” [34] Penelitian kepada kes ini menunjukkan bahawa bagi tuntutan yang melibatkan fitnah ia tidak sesuai untuk dibatalkan pembelaannya S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw semata-mata berdasarkan kepada affidavit-affidavit dan pliding yang dikemukakan. Mahkamah memerlukan keterangan saksi-saksi untuk memutuskannya. Mahkamah berpendapat ini juga terpakai dalam konteks tuntutan yang difailkan oleh pihak Defendan Ketiga terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif. Namun fakta di dalam kes New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor (supra) perlu dibezakan dengan kes ini. Ini adalah disebabkan dalam kes tersebut ia melibatkan penyiaran penyataan yang berunsur fitnah tersebut di dalam surat khabar nasional. Sebaliknya kes ini hanya melibatkan dokumen yang berkaitan di mahkamah. [35] Pada masa yang sama mahkamah juga mengambil perhatian berkenaan peruntukan undang-undang yang mempunyai hubungan terus dengan pelaporan prosiding mahkamah. Ini terdapat di dalam Akta Prosiding Kehakiman (Pengawalseliaan Laporan) 1962 yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 2 Interpretation In this Act- "domestic proceedings" means proceedings-
a
under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 [Act 351], the
b
under the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 [Act 263] and the Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of
c
under the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 [Act 34]; and *(d) under section 12 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 [Act 164], other than proceedings for the enforcement of an order made under the provisions of law mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b), or for the variation of any requirement for the payment of money contained in an order made under the said provisions, or in an order made or confirmed under the Act mentioned in paragraph (c); "judicial proceedings" includes a proceeding before any court, tribunal or person having by law power to hear, receive and examine evidence on oath. 3 Restriction on publication of reports It shall not be lawful for the proprietor, editor or publisher of a newspaper or periodical to print or publish, or cause or procure to be printed or published-
a
in relation to any judicial proceedings any indecent matter or indecent medical, surgical or physiological details being matter or details the publication of which would be calculated to injure public morals; and
b
(i) in relation to any judicial proceedings for dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights; or
II
(ii) in relation to any domestic proceedings, any particulars other than the following, that is to say-
i
(I) the names, addresses and occupations of the parties and witnesses;
II
the grounds of the application or a concise statement of the charges, the defences and counter charges in support of which evidence has been given;
III
submissions on any point of law arising in the courts of the proceedings and decision of the court thereon; and
IV
the judgment of the court and any observations made by the court in giving it: Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be held to permit the publication of anything contrary to the provisions of paragraph (a). 4 Penalty Any person acting in contravention of this Act shall in respect of each offence be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four months or to a fine not exceeding one thousand ringgit or to both.” [36] Undang-undang ini boleh menjadi seri teladan dalam melaporkan prosiding kehakiman bagi mengelakkan perlanggaran kepada peruntukan-peruntukan di bawah Akta tersebut. Di samping ia juga dapat memastikan segala prosiding mahkamah dilaporkan dengan S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw tepat dan tidak menjejaskan pihak-pihak yang sedang terlibat di dalam sesuatu perbicaraan. [37] Akhirnya, di dalam kes ini mahkamah berpendapat setelah meneliti affidavit-affidavit dan hujahan kedua-dua pihak, permohonan Plaintif-Plaintif untuk membatalkan tuntutan balas Defendan Ketiga adalah dibenarkan dengan kos. Bertarikh: 20hb. Julai 2022 (ROSLAN MAT NOR) PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Plaintif-Plaintif Aanthan a/l Ragawan Tetuan Ananth & Associates Kuala Lumpur S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw Bagi Pihak Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua Rozilan Abdul Rahman Tetuan Rozilan & Aribah Ahmad Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur Bagi Pihak Defendan Ketiga Ahmad Zahid Abu Hashim Tetuan Ahmad Zahid Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur S/N I9cq8kfffk2R4tOoDdNMsw
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