In other words, the High Court order still stands, and the developer is compelled to demolish the unfinished building within six months." THE ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL [9] In this appeal, it was argued that the Learned JC had erred in holding that the impugned statements were not defamatory of the Appellants. It was argued that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used meant and were understood to mean that the Appellants, amongst others deliberately built an illegal building, had acted in breach of a Court order for more than a decade, were in contempt of Court, guilty of criminal offences warranting imprisonment, lacked integrity and did not respect the rule of law, obstructed the administration of justice and eroded public confidence in the judiciary and were irresponsible and rogue developers. [10] Next it was also argued that the Learned JC erred in law and misdirected himself in holding that the words used were not defamatory by wrongly relying on Dr Shaari Isa & Anor v Tan Sri Harris Mohd Salleh [2020] 4 CLJ 40, to require the appellants to plead and prove the defamatory meaning of each individual word or sentence, instead of considering the statement as a whole. [11] In respect of the defence of justification, the Appellant also took the position that the Learned JC erred in holding that the defence of justification and fair comments were available to the Respondent as the Respondent had failed to properly particularize the defences of justification and fair comment as required under Order 78 rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 (the pleadings point). [12] Similarly, it was argued that the defence of qualified privilege was also not proven as the Respondent had no duty to communicate the allegations to the public and the public had no corresponding legitimate interest to receive them, the facts did not support the defence and the Respondent was motivated by improper purposes rather than legitimate duty. [13] Finally, it was argued that the Respondent was actuated by malice, which could be inferred from his failure to verify the facts or seek legal advice despite knowing committal proceeding was a complex issue, not informing that the first committal application was dismissed and his longstanding animosity with the 2nd Appellant who had previously exposed the Respondent's own wrongdoing in occupying public land. OUR DECISION [14] After readings the written submission and hearing the oral submissions of the parties, we are of the view that there are no reasons for this Court to interfere with the decision of the Learned JC. We accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs for the following reasons: [15] In this appeal, we have considered the Appellant's arguments on the Learned JC's reliance on the case of Dr. Shaari Isa (supra) as reflected in paragraph 42 of the GOJ which was heavily relied by the Appellant. In our view, the decision of the Learned JC does not amount to a misdirection which merits the intervention of this court. This is because in arriving at his decision the Learned JC had also relied on other trite case laws on defamation such as Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 CLJ 729, Lewis & Anor v Daily Telegraph Ltd; Same v Associated Newspaper Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151, JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 and Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian vs The China Press Bhd. [1999] 1 MLJ 371. [16] In the present case as can be observed from the following paragraphs of the GOJ which is reproduced below showed that the Learned JC had adopted the approach as explained in one of the trite case laws on this point i.e., Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461, where the Court of Appeal (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA, as his Lordship then was) held: [1] The first task of a court, in an action for defamation, is to determine whether the words complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. This is a question of law. Having decided the question, the next step is to ascertain whether the words complained of are in fact defamatory. This is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of the case." [17] At paragraph 40 and 41 of the judgment, the Learned JC states as follows: [40] It is observed that the Plaintiffs have omitted to include and plead several material passages or paragraphs from the news articles in their Statement of Claim. These omitted passages are pertaining to the developer exercising their right to due process by appealing against both the High Court Judgment made by the High Court, Tawau on 23.10.2009 (the 2009 Judgment) which ordered, inter alia, the demolition of the unfinished structures and the Judgment dated 10.6.2016 allowing the application to amend the 2009 Judgment to expressly include the demolition order (the 2016 Judgment). The appeals which took several years to complete were dismissed and the 2009 Judgment and the 2016 Judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court in two separate appeals. [41] Reading the news articles as a whole, in essence, the Defendant is stating the fact that the litigants had filed an application for committal against the Plaintiffs for not complying with the 2009 Judgment and the 2016 Judgment which had, inter alia, ordered the Plaintiffs to demolish the uncompleted structure. The Plaintiffs had, despite having knowledge of the said Court Judgment and Order, failed to comply with the Order of the Court to demolish the uncompleted structure. In line with his election promise, the Defendant supports the application for committal made by the litigants. In the event the Court allows the application for committal, the developer would be subject to legal sanctions. Therefore, the Defendant urged the developer of the unfinished building on an open space in Sabindo to demolish it as soon as possible or risk being hauled up for contempt of Court. The Defendant did not say that the 2nd Defendant will definitely go to prison. The Defendant said that "should the Court allow this application (for committal), the company's director, Datuk Seri Kong Hoi Ching, may likely be sent to prison". The Defendant also said that "there is a due process in serving justice and the law must take its course". From the context and circumstances of the publication, the ordinary, fair minded and reasonable reader would think or understand that in accordance with the due process of the law, the Plaintiffs would exercise their legal rights to dispute the application for committal or in the event that the application is allowed, the Plaintiffs may appeal against the decision on committal to the appellate Courts as they had done so in respect of the 2009 Judgment and the 2016 Judgment. [18] In regards to the findings in the above paragraphs (40 and 41), it is clear that the Learned JC, in our view had not only considered the impugned statements in its natural and ordinary meanings but had taken into consideration the whole article. This Court in the case of Keluarga Communication v Normala Samsudin [2006] 2 MLJ 700 reiterated that impugned statements must be viewed not in isolation, but rather in the context of the totality of the whole statement of which the impugned statement was but a part thereof. [19] Having considered the ordinary and natural meaning and taking into consideration the whole article, the Learned JC concluded that the impugned statements were not defamatory. The Learned JC then went on to consider the defences raised by the Respondent in the event his findings that the impugned statements were not defamatory was wrong. [20] The Respondent in this case have raised the defence of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege. [21] In determining whether the Respondent has succeeded in proving the defence of justification which is a complete defence, it is necessary to consider the findings of the Learned JC on this issue which can be found in paragraph 87 to 91 of the GOJ which we shall deal shortly. [22] In arguing that the Learned JC erred in finding that the defence of justification was made out, the Appellant submitted that the Learned JC's reliance on the grounds of decision given by the High Court in Tawau case was flawed as the said decision did not address the sting of the defamatory words published and also the grounds of decision given in a Court case are not evidence of the correctness or truths of facts stated in the said grounds of decision. We have considered the submission on this point, and we are unable to agree with the Appellants' arguments. In the present appeal, the Learned JC in arriving at the decision that the defence of justification has been proved stated as follows: [85] It is not in dispute that the 1st Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the 2009 Judgment and launched an appeal against the said decision. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Tawau High Court. The 1st Plaintiff applied and obtained leave from the Federal Court to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal on 21.2.2012. The following question of law, that is, whether it is lawful for the Court, by way of mandatory injunctive relief on the ground of nuisance, to direct the 1st Defendant to remove or demolish the structure erected on the state land by the Tawau Municipal Council and the 1st Defendant in the joint venture, whereby the said structure was subsequently accepted and retained by Tawau Municipal Council and/or the State Government of Sabah. The 1st Plaintiff's appeal was dismissed by the Federal Court. See Page 13 of DSBOD (Encl. 15). This clearly shows that the Plaintiffs are well aware of the demolition order in the 2009 Judgment and had appealed against the said 2009 Judgment and Order to the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. [86] With the dismissal of the said appeals, the demolition order stands and is valid. It is the duty of every person against whom a Judgment or order is made by the Court to obey it unless it is set aside. In Lee Tain Tshung v Hong Leong Finance Bhd [2000] 4 CLJ 15 the Court of Appeal elucidated that: "It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom, an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. 'A party who knows of an order, whether null and void, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it... It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null and void --- whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question: that the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null and irregular and who might be affected by it was plain. He should apply to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.' (per Lord Cottenham LC in Chuck v. Cremer [1846] Cooper temp. Cottenham 205, 338.) Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will, in general, follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court... is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise." [87] Following the dismissal of the 1st Plaintiff's appeal by the Federal Court, the Plaintiffs did not comply with the 2009 Judgment to remove or demolish the unfinished structure. This led to the filing of the 1st application for committal against the 1st Plaintiff. However, the sealed 2009 Judgment omitted to include the order for the removal or demolition of the unfinished structure even though the same was clearly mentioned in the grounds of decision of the 2009 Judgment. This was the main reason for the dismissal of the 1st application for committal. See Page 47 of PBOD (Encl. 10). The 2009 Judgment was amended by the 2016 Judgment to include the order for removal or demolition of the unfinished structure. The Plaintiffs still did not comply with the amended 2009 Judgment to remove or demolish the unfinished structure which stood on a public open space. Instead, the Plaintiffs appealed against the 2016 Judgment all the way to the Federal Court but was unsuccessful. The 2016 Judgment was also affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. [88] By a letter before action dated 12th Jan, 2018 issued by the former advocates of the Plaintiffs in the Tawau Suit (Civil Suit No. T (21)- 52 of 2005 and T (21)-53 of 2005) to the 2nd Defendant (Pages 897-88 of PBOD), it was stated as follows: "We refer to the Demolition Order of the High Court dated 10th June 2016 which was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 24th March 2017 and the Federal Court on 12th October 2017. The said Demolition Order was served on you on 2nd May 2017. We have on 14th December 2017 written to Jeramas Sdn. Bhd.'s solicitors regarding this matter who replied that they had no instructions to deal with the matter. We wish to inform that we are yet to receive the sealed copies of the Court Order from the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. Pending receipt of the sealed orders from the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court, we are instructed to enquire if you, as Managing Director of Jeramas Sdn. Bhd. are prepared to proceed to dismantle, remove and clear the existing uncompleted structure on the area of the land comprising Block D without the necessity of the enforcement of the said Demolition Order granted by Her Honourable Judge YA Datuk Yew Jen Kie on 10th June 2016. Our clients are prepared to cooperate fully with you to have the uncompleted structure removed and cleared in any manner they can. In this regard, please let us know within fourteen days of receipt of this letter when you will commence the demolition works. Please acknowledge receipt by signing and returning the duplicate of this letter to us." [89] Despite the said letter before action, the Plaintiffs did not take heed of the letter and the 2009 and 2016 Judgments to remove or demolish the uncompleted structure. This resulted in the Plaintiffs in the Tawau Suit filing a 2nd application for committal against the Plaintiffs on or about 17.7.2018 and complaining about the non-compliance of the 2009 and 2016 Judgments to the Defendant who is the State Assemblyman for Sri Tanjung, Tawau. A few days after the filing of the 2nd application for committal, the Defendant issued the press statement which was published in the news articles on 19.7.2018. The 2nd application for committal was unsuccessful due to non-service of the sealed amended 2009 Judgment. [90] The dismissal of the 2nd application for committal does not detract from the fact that an order for the removal or demolition of the unfinished structure was made by the High Court in the 2009 Judgment and the 2016 Judgment. The said Judgment and demolition order was upheld and affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court twice. The Plaintiffs did not abide by the 2009 Judgment to remove or demolish the unfinished structure despite the issuance and receipt of the letter before action. The Defendant did not say that the 2nd Plaintiff will definitely go to prison for contempt of Court. The Defendant only said the 2nd Plaintiff would be subject to legal sanctions or may likely be sent to prison should the Court allow the committal proceedings and "there is a due process in serving justice". [91] From the above evidence and facts, this Court finds on a balance of probabilities that the material statements in the news articles are true and there is substantial justification of the whole of the alleged libel. It is not necessary to prove the truth of every word of the alleged libel. [23] From the findings of facts above which were amply supported by the evidence in the trial, the fundamental facts established by the evidence are these: (i) the existence of valid and binding demolition orders against the Appellants which were affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court; (ii) the Appellants' failure to comply with those orders despite having knowledge of the same; and (iii) the resulting commencement of committal proceedings against the Appellants. These in our view are sufficient to establish the essential truth of the defamatory 'sting' that the Appellants breached the court orders. In the circumstances, we do not see any reasons to disturb the findings of facts made by the Learned JC. In the case of MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd, (2016) 4 CLJ 665 COA, Her Ladyship Nallini Pathmanathan JCA (as she then was) had succinctly lays down the principles of Appellate intervention as follows: [5] As this matter comes before this Court on appeal after a full trial, this Court is bound to have regard to the limited power of an Appellate Court to reverse findings of fact of the judge who has heard the evidence. It is a long settled principle, stated and restated both domestically and in wider common law jurisprudence, that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong. [24] On the pleadings points that was raised by the Appellant; after carefully considering the arguments put forward by the Appellants, the Respondent's response, and the Learned JC's decision on the pleading issue, we are of the view that the Appellants' claim that the defences of justification and fair comment cannot be relied upon due to insufficient particulars is without merit. [25] The Appellants argue that under Order 78 rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012, the Respondent's failure to clearly state which parts of his statement were facts and which were comments, and to provide details of the facts supporting the truth of those factual claims, is enough to dismiss the Respondent's defence of justification outright. [26] However, we respectfully disagree with the Appellants' position. It is important to note that the Appellants' own pleadings on the alleged defamatory meanings were also lacking in specificity. The Appellants did not pinpoint the exact statements said to carry those meanings and did not claim any legal innuendo. Instead, they relied on the articles in a general, broad manner. Given this, we are of the view that the Respondent makes a compelling argument that it would be unfair to expect the Respondent to dissect every single sentence of his statement and label it as fact or comment when the Appellants' own case was so vaguely presented. [27] Certainly, the Respondent could have provided more detailed particulars. But considering how the Appellants presented their case, the lack of extensive particulars, in our view was not fatal. The core of the defences, that the Respondent's statements were based on established facts about the Sabindo dispute, was reasonably clear. We are also of the view that the Appellants have not demonstrated that the way the defences were pleaded caused them any significant prejudice. As the Learned JC rightly noted, the Appellants were fully aware of the nature of the Respondent's case and had every chance to either ask for more particulars or present evidence to challenge the pleaded defences. The Appellants did the latter vigorously. [28] In view of our findings that the Learned JC was right in arriving at his decision that the defence of justification was successfully proven and the said defence is a complete defence, we are of the view that there are no merits in the appeal and there is no necessity for us to make further findings of the other defences raised by the Appellants in this appeal. [29] For the reasons enumerated above, we dismissed the Appellants' appeal and affirm the decision of the Learned JC with costs of RM20,000 to be given to the Respondent subject to the payment of allocatur. Dated:17 September 2024 - Signed - ( ISMAIL BIN BRAHIM ) High Court Judge Kota Kinabalu Solicitors For The Appellant: Mr. Chung Jiun Dau Messrs. Chung & Associates Kota Kinabalu. Solicitor For The Respondent Mr. Mark Rosaidey Mohd Amin Messrs. Amin & Co., 471. 1 $ ^{st} $ Floor, Block O Bandar Sabindo, Tawau. Sabah.