Jess Technology (Johor) Sdn Bhd v Ng Wai Hoong (JA-22NCvC-10-01/2021)

JESS TECHNOLOGY (JOHOR) SDN BHD (Co. Registration No.: 201101035911)

JESS TECHNOLOGY SDN BHD (Co. Registration No.: 201001030665) …Plaintiffs

NG WAI HOONG (NRIC No.: 880724-56-5567)

LOO WAN CHING (NRIC No.: 900426-01-6012)

QL AUTOMATION SDN BHD (Co. Registration No.: 201901030222)

LAW DAY CHU (NRIC No.: 910308-01-5456)

TAN ZEE KARN (NRIC No.: 971210-03-6979)

LEE HENG YONG (NRIC No.: 970607-10-67070)

SUHAILAH BINTI MD SAAD (NRIC No.: 900625-07-5496)

LAI KWAI LING (NRIC No.: 670526-10-5652)

SEE SHU HUI (NRIC No.: 941213-05-5502)

TEOW MEI CHEE (NRIC No.: 960619-43-5226)

GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION SDN BHD (Co. Registration No.: 202101012469 [1412768-H]) …Defendants 02/12/2025 16:56:48 JA-22NCvC-10-01/2021 Kand. 546 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This is an application by the 1st Plaintiff via Notice of Application (Enclosure 378) for Order for a committal order against the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants.

After having read the Affidavits, written submissions by both parties and after having heard the oral submissions of the parties, I dismissed Enclosure 378 with costs of RM5000.00 subject to the costs of allocator, to be paid by the 1st Plaintiff to the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants within fourteen (14) days from the Court order.

Below are my grounds of the decision.

The background facts in this application are gathered from the cause papers and submissions filed by the parties in chronological order.

The brief facts which are relevant to the present application are as follows:

both the 1st Plaintiff and the 3rd Defendant are in the same business of repairing machines and other industrial equipment and apparatus. The 3rd Defendant now largely comprises of ex-employees of the 1st Plaintiff. The 1st and 2nd Defendants were particularly, the main persons managing the 1st Plaintiff prior to their departure from the 1st Plaintiff;

the 3rd Defendant essentially thrived on some of the 1st Plaintiff’s resources, such as by using the 1st Plaintiff’s confidential information, including the customer list and contact details to build its business and clientele;

subsequent thereto, vide an ex-parte application (Enclosure 20) filed by the 1st Plaintiff, the Court has granted an ex-parte interim injunction order on 07.02.2021 (Enclosure 37) (“Ex-Parte Order”);

the Ex-Parte Order prohibited the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants (at that time, those were the only Defendants in this suit) from holding, misusing or disclosing the 1st Plaintiff’s confidential information;

thus, to restrain the Defendants from so doing, it was essential that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants be prohibited from contacting or communicating with the 1st Plaintiff’s customers;

the Ex-Parte Order was duly served to the 1st to 3rd Defendants and the Defendants claimed that they have adhered to the Order from the Court and have not committed any breaches;

all the terms in the Ex-Parte Order was affirmed by the Court after the Inter Parte hearing on 17.06.2021 (“Inter Parte Order”) and the Inter Parte Order was subsequently amended on 10.01.2022 to annex the list of the customers of the 1st Plaintiff in 1st Schedule (the “Amended Order”);

the Inter Parte Order was served to the 1st to 3rd Defendants’ previous solicitors on 15.09.2021 and the Amended Order was served to the 1st to 3rd Defendants’ previous solicitors on 19.01.2022. The three orders (collectively referred to as the “Prohibitory Orders”) contained the same terms prohibiting 1st to 3rd Defendants from continuing communication with the 1st Plaintiff’s customers as listed in 1st Schedule;

subsequently on or around 31.07.2023, the 1st to 4th Defendants vide a Court order for discovery dated 17.07.2023 were compelled and thus furnished copies of the 3rd Defendant’s invoices, delivery orders and dispatch orders from January 2021 to around July 2023 (the “Commercial Documents”);

notwithstanding said prohibition ordered by the Court and based on the Commercial Documents disclosed, the 1st Plaintiff claimed that the 1st to 3rd Defendants had outrightly defied the Court Order by continuing communication with said 1st Schedule customers past the date of the Ex-Parte Order and

in view of the 1st to 3rd Defendants’ deliberate refusal and neglect to comply with the Prohibitory Orders, the 1st Plaintiff on 19.12.2023 filed an ex-parte application (Enclosure 365) for leave to commence committal proceedings against the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants (the “Contemnors”), that 1st and 2nd Defendants in their personal capacities and also as directors of the 3rd Defendant, and the 4th Defendant as 3rd Defendant’s Administrative Manager who has full access to all documentations in 3rd Defendant;

on 03.04.2024, the Court has allowed the 1st Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 365;

on 29.04.2024, a copy of an Amended Statement under Order 52 subrule 3(2) Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) dated

08.04.2023, Affidavit Verifying Facts, the Order (Enclosure 365) and Committal Application were served on the Contemnors’ solicitors.

In brief, the Plaintiffs submitted as follows:

the Contemnors have failed to fulfil and comply with a court order;

it is trite law that the quintessential requirement is for the Contemnors to have notice and knowledge of the Prohibitory Orders, where authorities have shown that service of an order could even be dispensed, so long as the Contemnors have knowledge of the terms of the order;

the 4th Defendant can be cited for contempt as the Prohibitory Orders include the 4th Defendant being the employee, namely Administrative Manager of 3rd Defendant; and

the omission by the 1st Plaintiff to endorse a penal notice does not invalidate the Ex-Parte Order and was not license for the Contemnors to defy the Ex-Parte Order.

On the contrary, the Contemnors contend that—

the omission by the 1st Plaintiff to endorse a penal notice on the Ex-Parte Order is fatal to the 1st Plaintiff’s case;

that leave for the application for the Committal Proceeding is dated 19.12.2023 however the Contemnors had submitted the documents sought by the 1st Plaintiff in the Discovery Application on 31.07.2023, there is a time lapse of five (5) months between the submission of the documents and the date of the application, which is an undue delay by the 1st

that the 1st Plaintiff has failed to provide any concrete evidence demonstrating non-compliance by the Contemnors;

that the 4th Defendant cannot be made a party to this committal application as the Prohibitory Orders obtained vide Enclosures 20, 37, 202 dan 252, do not involved the 4th Defendant and/or were obtained against 4th Defendant and therefore the 4th Defendant was not bound by the Prohibitory Orders and was merely the employee of the 3rd Defendant, and not a director or shareholder. Hence, the application against the 4th Defendant should be dismissed;

that the Plaintiff’s had previously filed the same committal proceeding against the Contemnors which had been subsequently dismissed by the Court on 26.08.2021 and the Plaintiffs filing another committal proceeding against the 4th Defendants again violates the principle of res judicata; and

that the second committal application is nothing but an abuse of process designed to prolong this matter when the same has been set down for trial on 22 and 23.07.2024. COURT ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

I have identified three (3) issues below for the determination of this

whether an omission by the 1st Plaintiff to endorse a penal notice on the Ex-Parte Order is fatal to the 1st Plaintiff’s case;

whether the 1st Plaintiff had successfully established that the Contemnors had committed contempt beyond reasonable doubt; and

whether the committal proceeding can be initiated against the Contemnors when same issues have been raised and adjudicated in prior proceeding.

Whether an omission by the 1st Plaintiff to indorse a penal notice on the Ex-Parte Order is fatal to the 1st Plaintiff’s case 9. The relevant provisions governing and concerning committal proceedings are the ones as set out in the ROC 2012.

Order 52 rule 2 of the ROC 2012 provides that— "Committal for contempt of Court (O. 52, r. 2)

The Court may, on the application of any party to any cause or matter or on its own motion, make an order of committal in Form 107. [Emphasis added]

However, pursuant to Order 45 rule 7(4) of the ROC 2012, there can be no enforcement or committal proceedings against a person, body or entity should the judgment or order not be served onto the said person, body or entity. Order 45 rule 7(4) states as follows: ''(4) There shall be endorsed on the copy of an order served under this rule a notice in Form 83 informing the person on whom the copy is served—

in the case of service under paragraph (2), if he neglects to obey the order within the time specified therein, or, if the order is to abstain from doing an act, that if he disobeys the order, he is liable to process of execution to compel him to obey it; and

in the case of service under paragraph (3), that if the body corporate neglects to obey the order within the time so specified or, if the order is to abstain from doing an act, that if the body corporate disobeys the order, the body corporate is liable to process of execution to compel the body to obey it.". [Emphasis added]

Therefore, based on the Court of Appeal decision in Samsudin bin Mohamad Fauzi & Anor. v Yayasan Ihsan Rakyat [2020] MLJU 2567, I am guided as follows: “[24] …the constitutional and statutory footing to punish for contempt is contained in Article 126 of the Federal Constitution empowers the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Courts to punish any contempt of itself as well as in s 13 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. [25] As a person, if found guilty of contempt, may be punished with a term of imprisonment, the Courts have seen to it that the procedural safeguards provided for in the rules for a contempt action are scrupulously followed. In Re B (JA) (An Infant) [1965] 1 Ch 1112 Cross J had this to say: "Committal is a very serious matter. The courts must proceed very carefully before they make an order to commit to prison; and rules have been laid down to secure that the alleged contemnor knows clearly what is being alleged against him and has every opportunity to meet the allegations. For example, it is provided that there must be personal service of the motion on him even though he appears by solicitors, and that the notice of motion must set out the grounds on which he is said to be in contempt; further, he must be served as well as with the motion, with the affidavits which constitute the evidence in support of it. It is clear that if safeguards such as these have not been observed in any particular case, then the process is defective even though in the particular case no harm may have been done. For example, if the notice has not been personally served the fact that the respondent knows all about it, and indeed attends the hearing of the motion, makes no difference. In the same way, as is shown by Taylor v Roe, if the notice of motion does not give the grounds of the alleged contempt or the affidavits are not served at the same time as the notice of motion, that is a fatal defect, even though the defendant gets to know everything before the motion comes on, and indeed answers the affidavits. [26] Such a strict approach was followed by Lord Denning MR in McIlraith v Grady [1968] 1 QB 468 where it was observed at p 477 as follows: “The second appeal is as to the committal order. Here we must remember the fundamental principle that no man's liberty is to be taken away unless every requirement of the law has been strictly complied with.” [27] As the proceeding for contempt is quasi-criminal in nature it was held in Re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 125, by Lord Denning MR that the proof is beyond reasonable doubt as follows at p 137: “A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt." See the cases of Chanel Ltd v FGM Cosmetics [1981] FSR 471 and Chiltern District Council v Keane [1985] 2 All ER 118, where the strictness of compliance with the procedure were reiterated. Our Federal Court in Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors (supra) had followed the same strict approach: "[29] It is settled law that committal proceeding is criminal in nature since it involves the liberty of the alleged contemnor. Premised upon that, the law has provided for procedural safeguards in committal proceeding which requires strict compliance." … Whether the order said to have been breached by the alleged contemnor must have a penal endorsement … [54] We adopt the same approach as the Court of Appeal in its decision in Loh Eng Leong & Anor v Lo Mun Sen & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [2003] 4 MLJ 284 on the mandatory rule found in O 45 r 7(4) ROC 2012 where at page 286 it was held by the Court of Appeal as follows: "It is true, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants, that a failure to indorse the order of court with a penal notice is fatal to an application for committal (see Leow Seng Huat v Low Mui Yein [1996] 5 MLJ 381; General (Rtd) Tan Sri Hashim Mohd Ali & Anor v Francis a/l MG Mirandah [2000] MLJU 436; Gribbles Pathology (M) Sdn Bhd v Adventist Hospital & Clinic Services (M) Bhd [2002] MLJU 619; [2003] 1 CLJ 321). The Rules of the High Court 1980 ('the RHC') provide for the instances where an order of court can be indorsed with a penal notice pursuant to which an order of committal can be made. Reference is first made to O 42 r 6 of the RHC ('r 6') which reads as follows:

Subject to paragraph (2), a judgment or order which requires a person to do an act must specify the time after service of the judgment or order, or some other time within which the act is to be done. [55] It was further held at pages 289-290 as follows: "It is therefore clear that where an order of court to do an act must specify the time within which an act is to be done then such time must be specified. It is only in such cases that there can be indorsement with the penal notice. As the indorsement with the penal notice is a prerequisite to the making of a committal order which involves the liberty of the subject it is particularly important that the relevant rules are duly complied with (see Nicholls v Nicholls (1977) 147 NLJ 61; Allport Alfred James v Wong Soon Lan [1989] 1 MLJ 338]". [56] Such a failure is fatal to the plaintiff's action for contempt and indeed the whole contempt action is unsustainable and the contempt order made has to be set aside.”. [Emphasis added]

In the instant case, the Ex-Parte Order dated 17.06.2021 vide Enclosure 22 did not include the list of the 1st Plaintiff’s customers (“1st Schedule”).

Further, the Ex-Parte Order dated 17.06.2021 for the prohibitory injunction against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants from contacting the 1st Plaintiff’s customers as listed in 1st Schedule contained no penal notice on the Ex-Parte Order pursuant to Order 45 subrule 7(4) of

Following the 1st Plaintiff’s failure to endorse the penal notice, and failure to include the 1st Schedule, the order is flawed and incomplete and the committal proceedings must fail.

The 1st Plaintiff subsequently amended the order and yet they still failed to attach the 1st Schedule and served the same to the Contemnors.

The contention of the 1st Plaintiff is that the list of customers in the 1st Schedule was in full knowledge of the alleged Contemnors as the list of customers had been attached variously in other cause papers served upon the Contemnors including the Statement of Claim (“SOC”) and affidavits. Therefore, the list of the customers can be easily ascertained by cross-reference to the list in Schedule A attached to the SOC or 1st Schedule of the Ex-Parte Order and Amended Order.

The 1st Plaintiff alleges that the Contemnors had outrightly defied the Prohibitory Orders by continuing communication with the customers listed in 1st Schedule past the date of the order and had deliberately refused and neglected to comply with the Prohibitory Orders.

In the landmark decision Messrs Hisham, Sobri & Kadir; Advocates & Solicitors v. Kedah Utara Development Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. [1988] 1 MLRH 471 where Edgar Joseph Jr J held that— “…In my approach to the questions for decision regarding this part of the case, I have kept in the forefront of my mind the basic proposition that in proceedings for committal a man's liberty is at stake and so every requirement of the law must be strictly complied with. I need no more than refer to two authorities in support of this proposition: In Gordon v. Gordon [1946] 1 All ER 247, Lord Greene MR said this: “Attachment and committal are very technical matters, and as orders for committal or attachment affect the liberty of the subject such rules as exist in relation to them must be strictly obeyed. However disobedient the party against whom the order is directed may be, unless the process of committal and attachment has been carried out strictly in accordance with the rules he is entitled to his freedom.” (at p 250F). … I should add that in such a situation, that is to say, where there has been an undertaking or order to do a positive act, the mere fact that the directors or officers were present when the order was made and so must have had notice of it is not sufficient to dispense with service (see Re Tuck[1906] 1 Ch 696; Century Insurance Co. v. Larkin [1910] IR 91 and Haydon v. Haydon [1911] 2 KB 191) unless there is also the clearest proof that service is being evaded. … Since it was common ground that neither the Company nor the alleged contemnors were served with the Consent Order bearing the appropriate penal endorsement, duly or at all, as required under O. 45 r. 7(4), the application for committal was fatally flawed on this ground as well. (See, for example, Arumugam v. Suppiah Chettiar [1935] MLJ 4; The Venda [1960] MLJ 283).”. [Emphasis added]

The 1st Plaintiff was aware that the Ex-Parte Order was an order obtained through an ex-parte application and subsequently served on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants on 09.02.2021 is an interim order. The Ex-Parte Order was then affirmed by the Court on 17.06.2021 after hearing the arguments of both Parties. The Ex-Parte Order was then superseded by the Inter Parte Order. However, the Inter Parte Order did not include the 1st Schedule and the penal notice. Hence, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants cannot be expected to know the list of the customers in the 1st Schedule in the Inter Parte Order when served on them.

The 1st Plaintiff had amended the Inter Parte Order to include the endorsement of the penal notice and attached the 1st Schedule. The Amended Order with penal notice endorsed, together with their list of customers have been served on the Contemnors on 19.01.2022.

If the contentions of 1st Plaintiff that the Ex-Parte Order dated

07.02.2021 is a valid order and the Contemnors were aware the contents of the Ex-Parte Order, there is no necessity for the 1st Plaintiff to go through the hassle to amend the Ex-Parte Order and served the Amended Order on the Contemnors on 19.01.2022. Hence, the contentions of the 1st Plaintiff that the Contemnors were fully aware of the list of customers in the 1st Schedule as other cause papers include the Ex-Parte Order and SOC is devoid of merits.

Further, I refer to the case of Re B (JA) (An Infant) [1965] 1 Ch 1112 where Cross J in deciding the case had quoted the examples that if the notice of motion does not give the grounds of the alleged contempt or the affidavits are not served at the same time as the notice of motion, that is a fatal defect, even though the defendant gets to know everything before the motion comes on, and indeed answers the affidavits.

Likewise, in the present case, the Inter Parte Order was served on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants without the 1st Schedule even though the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants might know about the list of customers in the 1st Schedule which was attached to the Ex-Parte Order and SOC, the Inter Parte Order is flawed and incomplete where the committal proceedings must fail.

Hence, based on Order 45 rule 7(4) of the ROC 2012 and the Court of Appeal decision in Samsudin bin Mohamad Fauzi & Anor. v Yayasan Ihsan Rakyat (supra) and Messrs Hisham, Sobri & Kadir; Advocates & Solicitors v. Kedah Utara Development Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. (supra), it is fatal when the 1st Plaintiff has failed to endorse the penal notice and failed to attach the list of their customers in 1st Schedule in the Inter Parte Order when served on the Contemnors as the Inter Parte Order is to abstain the Contemnors from communicating with said 1st Schedule customers.

I rule that once the Plaintiffs have failed to endorse the penal notice on Ex-Parte Order dated 17.06.2021 vide Enclosure 37 and failure to attach the 1st Schedule to the said order vide Enclosure 22, the order is flawed and incomplete and the committal proceedings must fail.

I appreciate that there are some High Court cases that suggest that the lack of a penal notice may not be fatal such as the case referred by the 1st Plaintiff, such as Class One Video Distributors Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v Chanan Singh a/l Sher Singh & Anor. [1997] 5 MLJ 209, nevertheless I am guided by the Court of Appeal in its decision in Loh Eng Leong & Anor. v Lo Mun Sen & Sons Sdn. Bhd, & Anor.[2003] 4 MLJ 284 and Samsudin bin Mohamad Fauzi & Anor. v Yayasan Ihsan Rakyat (supra) where the Court of Appeal has held that a failure to endorse the order of court with a penal notice is fatal to an application for committal.

As the endorsement with the penal notice is a prerequisite to the making of a committal order which involves the liberty of the subject it is particularly important that the relevant rules are duly complied with.

Such a failure is fatal to the 1st Plaintiff’s action for contempt and indeed the whole contempt action is unsustainable.

Whether the 1st Plaintiff had successfully established that the Contemnors had committed contempt beyond reasonable doubt

The 1st Plaintiff alleges that the Commercial Documents showed that there were clear communication and business transactions with sixty

customers of the 1st Plaintiff out of one hundred and eight (108) customers of the 3rd Defendant, since as early as 10.02.2021, after the Ex-Parte Order was granted.

The 1st Plaintiff claimed that the alleged Contemnors totally failed and disregarded compliance with the Prohibitory Orders, where a summary of comparative reference between information of relevant invoices issued by 3rd Defendant alone and 1st Schedule showed clear identification of said customers as summarized in paragraph 15(h) of the 1st Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply affirmed on 20.06.2024 (Enclosure 429) and also appended in Appendix A at the end of the 1st Plaintiff’ Written Submissions.

The 1st Plaintiff claimed that they have succeeded in establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged Contemnors had continuously acted in complete defiance against the Prohibitory Orders.

Nevertheless, upon thorough perusal and close examination of the 1st Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply, it contains mere allegations unsupported by concrete evidence which are insufficient grounds upon which to establish contempt. The evidence presented pertains to events that occurred between 19.02.2021 and 22.09.2021 were transactions discovered through the discovery order on 17.07.2023. Those transactions were occurred before the service of the Amended Order (Enclosure 252) on 19.01.2022.

Therefore, I rule that the 1st Plaintiff has failed to provide any concrete evidence demonstrating non-compliance by the Contemnors as the evidences submitted by the 1st Plaintiff failed to meet the rigorous standard necessary to establish contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the threshold for committal/contempt proceedings as held in the Court of Appeal and High Court cases discussed earlier.

Whether the committal proceeding can be initiated against the alleged

Contemnors when same issues have been raised and adjudicated in prior proceeding Subsection 25(2) of Court of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91] provides that— “Powers of the High Court

Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the High Court shall have the additional powers set out in the Schedule: Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or rules of court relating to the same. Res judicata

Power to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter in question is res judicata between the parties, or where by reason of multiplicity of proceedings in any court or courts the proceedings ought not to be continued.”. [Emphasis added]

I refer to the Supreme Court case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn. Bhd, [1995] 3 MLJ 189 where it was decided that— “What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation – interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action – nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy.”. [Emphasis added]

I also refer to the case of Cheah Boon Hoe v Lee Choon Hei [2022] 4 MLJ 94 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “…for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the same issue must have been raised and decided in an earlier proceeding or action in which the parties are represented. And for that reason, it is not open for the same issue to be litigated afresh between the same parties. This doctrine is based on the public policy that there must be finality and conclusiveness in judicial decisions and the right of the individual from being vexed by multiplicity of suits at the instance of an opponent.” [Emphasis added]

It is not disputed that the 1st Plaintiff had previously filed the same committal proceedings against the Contemnors.

Subsequent thereto, in an Order dated 26.08.2021, Enclosure 63 and all committal proceedings filed against the the Contemnors were dismissed.

In the aforementioned committal proceeding, issues such as the absence of a penal endorsement on the Ex-Parte Order and the alleged interactions with the 1st Plaintiff’s customers had already been addressed and clarified.

The 1st Plaintiff has proceeded to file another committal proceedings against the the Contemnors. The reasons being the the Contemnors who allegedly had knowledge of the court order and had allegedly blatantly and wilfully assisted in disobeying the said order.

It can clearly be seen that the 1st Plaintiff was blowing hot and cold, first failing to endorse penal notices onto their Prohibitory Orders, failing to attach their list of customers in 1st Schedule together with the said orders, then alleging that the Contemnors had at all times knowledge of the said Prohibitory Orders and list of customers. The 1st Plaintiff later on attempted to seek committal proceedings against the Contemnors which was subsequently dismissed and now again made another attempt to initiate committal proceedings against the Contemnors.

I am of the view that the1st Plaintiffs cannot be given a second bite at the cherry or to have the same issue being litigated again as this would be severely prejudicial towards the Contemnors and the second committal proceedings is an abuse of court process designed to prolong the matter when the same has been set down for trial on 22 and 23.07.2024.

Therefore, I rule that the 1st Plaintiff’s conduct in filing another committal proceeding against the Contemnors constitutes a violation of the principle of res judicata, wherein the same issues have been raised and adjudicated in a prior proceeding (Enclosure 63). The Plaintiffs who are seeking to punish the Contemnors via Enclosure 378 did not come with clean hands and treated the Contemnors fairly. It would be against the rule of equity should Enclosure 378 be granted.

CONCLUSION Based on the reasons above, I dismiss Enclosure 378 with costs of RM5000.00 subject to allocator costs, to be paid by the 1st Plaintiff to the Contemnors within fourteen (14) days from the Court order. Dated 17 November 2025. Signed by SGD ……………….. Wong Mee Ling Judge High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru Johor Darul Ta’zim. Counsel/Solicitor For the Plaintiffs: Mr ZJ Khong and Ms Esther Leong Messrs Tan & Khong Chambers Counsel/Solicitor For the Defendants: Mr S. Jeyakumar Messrs Alias, Kang, Ungku Mas & Associates