Kamaruzzaman Bin Rosli v ALMAVENTURES DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (WA-22NCvC-757-12/2024)

KAMARUZZAMAN BIN ROSLI

MOHAMAD HARIS BIN LATIF MOHAMAD

HAWA ATIQAH BINTI ABDUL WAHID

SYAMIMI BIN SAARI

NOOR AINI WAHIDA BINTI ZAKARI

NURFATIN ATIKAH BINTI MOHD SHARUDIN

ILI NUR’IZZATI BINTI ABDUL RAHMAN

MUHAMMAD AFIQ BIN ABD TALIB

NORAZIMA BINTI MAT ZAIDI

FUZIAH BINTI AHMAD (NO. K/P : 780827-14-5372) 09/04/2026 14:40:30 WA-22NCvC-757-12/2024 Kand. 64 GUAMAN SIVIL NO.:WA-22NCvC-757-12/2024 11. NORHAYATI BINTI MOHD ALWI

AIDAHARYANI BINTI MAZLAND

RABIATUL ADAWIAH BINTI ZAID

RASHIDAH BINTI MOHAMMAD SHAPIEN

WAN MARYAN NUR AIN BINTI WAN MANSOR

RAZIF DANIAL BIN MD RAMLI

NORFATIHAH BINTI OMAR

SITI NOORHASHIMAH BINTI ISMAIL (NO. K/P : 840927-14-6198) …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN ALMAVENTURES DEVELOPMENT SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat : 201501029217 (115438 – P) …DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The issues in this case are, firstly, whether the commencement date for calculation of time for delivery of vacant possession of properties sold by a developer ought to be the date of first payment (booking fees) made by the purchasers or the date stated on the Sale and Purchase Agreements, and secondly, the extensions of time which are applicable, to be deducted in the computation of Liquidated Ascertained Damages (“LAD”). [2] As there is no dispute regarding the relevant facts and chronology of events, the respective counsel for the parties agreed that this civil suit could be disposed of pursuant to Order 33 Rules of Court

They discussed and agreed on the questions to be answered by the Court. [3] Since the Federal Court in PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah and Other Appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60; [2021] 2 CLJ 441 had issued its Grounds of Judgment which dealt with the first issue thoroughly, I agree that this is indeed a suitable case to invoke Order 33 and dispose it without viva voce evidence. [4] The effect of this Court’s answers to those questions posed by the parties – by applying the authorities cited – resulted in two important rulings; first, that the respective date of first payment (booking fees) by the Plaintiffs/purchasers are to be regarded as the commencement date for calculation of time for delivery of vacant possession of properties which they purchased from the Defendant/developer, and secondly, the three extensions of time obtained by the Defendant/developer are valid and those periods are to be deducted to reduce the number of days of delay – for the purpose of calculation of LAD payable to the Plaintiffs respectively. My reasons are as set out below. Background Facts [5] As could be gleaned from the above introduction, the eighteen Plaintiffs are purchasers while the Defendant is a property developer. As is usually the case, the Plaintiffs/purchasers in this case want to claim the highest amount of LAD justifiable in law while the Defendant/developer seeks to minimise the LAD payable. [6] The 17th Plaintiff had discontinued her claim against the Defendant earlier. Therefore, the decision of this Court does not bind her. [7] The dates of payment of booking fees made by the remaining seventeen Plaintiffs range from 23rd December 2017 to 6th January

In August 2024, they all finally received vacant possession of the respective property which they purchased. It was no doubt a long wait for every one of them. [8] Even though it had taken several years to deliver vacant possession, the respective LAD payable is reduced for a total number of 510 days because the Defendant had obtained 3 extensions of time to extend the period of 36 months stated in Clause 25(1) of the respective Sale and Purchase Agreements (“the SPAs”). The Plaintiffs challenge the validity of these extensions of time. The Plaintiffs’ Position [9] The Plaintiffs’ learned counsel submits that the Defendant is unequivocally liable to pay LAD in the event of delay in the delivery of vacant possession, that this liability is not merely contractual but is rooted in statute, i.e. the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (“the said Act”), which prescribes mandatory terms and conditions. [10] Learned counsel highlighted that clause 25(2) of the SPAs expressly provides that if the Defendant/developer fails to deliver vacant possession within the stipulated 36 months period, it shall be liable to pay LAD calculated at 10% per annum of the purchase price from the date of expiry of the delivery period until the date the Plaintiff/purchaser takes vacant possession, and pursuant to Clause 25(3) thereof, LAD is payable upon the issuance of the notice of vacant possession, failing which the Purchaser is entitled to deduct the LAD from any outstanding instalments. It was further submitted that these provisions are clear and binding, and the Defendant's liability to pay LAD upon any proven delay is beyond dispute. [11] The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant’s admission of having received certain sums from each of the Plaintiffs as a “booking fee” before the signing of their respective SPAs constitutes a judicial admission that stands on a higher footing than mere evidentiary admissions and must be treated as the foundation of the rights of the parties. In support, the Plaintiffs rely on Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 6 CLJ 285, where the Federal Court affirmed that a judicial admission made in a pleading stands on a higher footing than evidentiary admission, and that any failure to rebut such an admission would entitle the opposing party to judgment on that point. [12] The Federal Court's judgment in PJD Regency (supra) was cited by learned counsel in his submissions as “the authoritative position on the computation of LAD for the calculation of LAD to begin from the date of payment of the booking fee and not from the date of the statutory agreement”. It was emphasised that the Federal Court in PJD Regency also held that Regulation 11(2) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 expressly and absolutely prohibits the collection of any payment before the signing of the SPA, howsoever such payment is called or described. [13] In reply to the Defendant’s plea that the LAD computation must give credit for three extensions of time ("EOTs") granted by the Housing and Local Government Ministry (“KPKT”), the Plaintiffs do not dispute the first extension (“EOT 1”) but challenge the validity of the second and third extensions (“EOT 2” and “EOT 3” respectively). [14] The Defendant had pleaded that EOT 2 (for the period of 1st June 2021 to 31st October 2021) was granted pursuant to Section 35 of the Temporary Measures for Reducing the Impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Act 2020 (“the Covid Act 2020”). However, the Plaintiffs submit that a plain reading s.35 of the Covid Act 2020 shows that it only authorises the Minister to grant an extension of time up to 31st December 2020 and that any EOT purportedly granted for a period running from June to October 2021 under that provision is therefore without legal basis. [15] As for EOT 3 (for the period of 20th December 2023 to 26th June 2024) which was due to delays by Air Selangor in completing the sewerage system, the Plaintiffs submit that Rule 12 of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 makes no provision whatsoever for the grant of any extension or exemption of time. They contend that it is a provision dealing exclusively with the right of appeal to the Minister against decisions of the Controller. The Defendant’s Position [16] The Defendant’s learned counsel submits that EOT 1, EOT 2 and EOT 3 must be regarded as valid extensions of time as there is no order invalidating them. It was emphasised that the Plaintiffs cannot challenge the validity of the extensions of time granted by KPKT by way of a challenge in the present civil suit. Reliance was placed on the landmark judgment of the Federal Court in Obata-Ambak Holdings Sdn Bhd v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2024] 8 CLJ 519; [2024] 5 MLJ 897 in support of his submission that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to challenge the validity of the Controller's decision in granting EOT 2 and EOT 3 by way of a writ action against the Defendant and that such a challenge can only be mounted by way of judicial review. [17] The Defendant admitted having collected payment of a “booking fee” from the Plaintiffs prior to entering into the SPAs with them. However, its learned counsel argues that this payment was always expressly conditional upon the Federal Territories Ministry (“KWP” is the abbreviation of Kementerian Wilayah Persekutuan) granting approval and the respective Plaintiff's successful application for a housing loan. It was further submitted that the Defendant had no control over either approval process, and the booking fee was refundable if the relevant approvals were not obtained. [18] Learned counsel for the Defendant argues that the dates stated on the SPAs ought to be used for the purpose of calculating the deadline for delivery of vacant possession, and that the “booking fees” collected prior to the signing of SPAs are distinguishable from those in PJD Regency (supra) because they were conditional upon KWP’s approval. He submits that the Plaintiffs' computation is incorrect for failing to account for EOT 2 and EOT 3. [19] In attempting to distinguish the legal position from that of PJD Regency (supra), the Defendant’s learned counsel submits that the booking fee was held by the Defendant under a resulting trust pending KWP's approval and the Plaintiffs' loan applications. He refers to the Offer to Purchase issued to each Plaintiff, which expressly provided that the payment was refundable if the relevant approvals could not be obtained. At this juncture, it is apt to note that no mention was made by him about forfeiture of the booking fee in the event of the Plaintiffs/purchasers opting not to purchase after KWP’s approval was granted. [20] It was further submitted for the Defendant that a binding contract could only have come into existence upon the execution of the respective SPAs, and not upon the payment of the booking fee. This is, according to learned counsel, because at the time of the first payment, the essential elements of a valid contract had not been established, and there was no certainty as to the unit number, the purchase price, or the acceptance of an offer. In support, the Defendant relies on Lai Fee & Anor v Wong Yu Vee & Ors [2023] 3 MLJ 503, which is a decision of the Federal Court that sets out the essential ingredients of a valid contract, including offer, acceptance, consideration, consent, capacity, certainty, and lawful object. [21] The Defendant also draws support from the High Court decision in Toh Ai Shi v Talent Team Sdn Bhd & Anor [2023] 7 MLJ 262, wherein PJD Regency Sdn Bhd (supra) was distinguished on the basis that the first payment in that case was paid to solicitors as a stakeholder's sum and not as a booking deposit paid directly to the developer. [22] Regarding the validity of EOT 2 and EOT 3, learned counsel submits that s.38C of the Covid Act permitted developers to apply to KPKT to exclude any period from 1st January 2021 to 31st December 2021 from the computation of the delivery period. This amendment was apparently cited in KPKT's letter to the Defendant dated 19th August 2022. [23] The Defendant further relies on Chong Yuong Wee & Ors v Menteri Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan, Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Ors [2025] 9 MLJ 193 and submits that s.38C of the Amendment Act is an extension of the temporary reliefs introduced under the principal Act, covering the period from 1st January 2021 to 31st December 2021, and was intended to provide relief to housing developers affected by the various movement control orders and phases of the National Recovery Plan in 2021. [24] In summary, the Defendant contends that the LAD calculation, to the extent that any LAD is payable, must commence from the date of the respective SPA and must deduct the extended periods under EOT 2 and EOT 3. Analysis of the Facts and Law [25] From the dates of the payment of booking fees and the respective date stated on the SPAs, it is quite obvious that the Defendant had collected a booking fee from the 12th Plaintiff as early as 23rd December 2017 and from the other Plaintiffs between 2018 and 2019 but had dated their SPAs in year 2020 – making a big difference in the commencement date for computation of the respective deadline for delivery of vacant possession to the Plaintiffs/purchasers. [26] A fact that appeared to have been overlooked by learned counsel for the Defendant was that in the event of the Plaintiffs/purchasers deciding not to proceed with their purchaser after approval was granted by KWP, the booking fee which they have paid to the Defendant would have been forfeited by the Defendant. In other words, the booking fee was not freely refundable and served to bind the Plaintiffs/purchasers to proceed to purchase or to lose their booking fee. This is a highly relevant point that renders PJD Regency (supra) applicable to this present case. [27] Further, contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for the Defendant, the unit number and purchase price were stated in the Registration cum Booking Form signed by most of the Plaintiffs/purchasers. A screenshot of the Form for the 2nd Plaintiff is pasted below and is sufficient to highlight this fact. The unit was 37- 08 and the price was RM300,000: [28] With the judgment of the Federal Court in PJD Regency (supra) making it amply clear, I need only cite a recent judgment of the Court of Appeal – which is equally binding on this Court – to emphasise the point that the law intends to strictly prohibit the collection of payment from purchasers unless the developer is ready for time for delivery of vacant possession to start running. The said judgment is that of the Court of Appeal in B U Development Sdn Bhd v Adeline Tan Kean Sim & Anor [2025] CLJU 637; [2025] MLJU 780 which quoted and followed PJD Regency (supra) and explained the applicable law as follows: “… we are, by virtue of stare decisis, bound by PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & other appeals (supra) because the respective facts are closely similar involving contracts governed by the HDA. We are mindful that Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat CJ also held as follows therein with emphasis added by us: "[85] Had the developers in the present appeals complied strictly with the terms of the Scheduled Contracts as statutorily prescribed, then the payment of the agreement would have been done simultaneously. The fact that they have nonetheless bypassed the statutory prohibition against the collection of booking fees, and the pro forma agreements being amply clear as to the fundamentals of the agreement, means that a bargain was indeed made at the time of the payment of the booking fee. In our judgment, the legislative intent was that the initial payment of monies, in the form of a deposit, is sufficient to constitute an intention to enter into a contract given that the agreement would have to be signed at the same time. [86] The other reason that attracts the application of these foundational principles of contract law is to ensure maximal protection of the purchasers having regard to the social purpose of the HDA 1966 and its subsidiary legislation. At the risk of repetition, if the 10 percent deposit is paid at the same time of the signing of the agreement, there would be no issue of there being separate dates for calculating the LAD. Having bound themselves to a bargain by collecting the booking fee and procuring a signed pro forma and top of it being responsible for drafting the final formal agreement, the developers have thereby put the purchasers in a disadvantageous position. The problem this poses is that the developers may abuse the opportunity to put whichever date they wish with a view to extend the date to deliver vacant possession. We can see, for example, that this was the case in Hoo See Sen (supra) where the formal agreement was only signed seven months after the booking fee was paid." [31] Based on our construction of the CP, the Appellant here also, in breach of the statutory prohibition, required the First Respondent to enter the CP to secure the purchase of the Property. At the same time, the Appellant is hence secured in advance against part of the prescribed first scheduled payment of 10% of the purchase price payable upon the signing of the SPA. As the result, the Appellant has put the weaker First Respondent in a disadvantaged position analogous to the purchasers in PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & other appeals (supra) by the Appellant flouting the law. Otherwise, the Appellant is prohibited to sell the Property and collect payment, not until the SPA is ready to be executed under the scheme envisaged by the HDA. [32] We are aware the Appellant has strenuously contended that the payment of the Booking Fee has not been collected or received by the Appellant because the three cheques given by the First Respondent have not been encashed at all material times. Reliance has been made on the English case of Parkside Leasing Ltd v. Smith (Inspector of Taxes)[1985] 1 WLR 310 on deem payment and Singapore case of Tan Chong Keng v. Vincent Lim Bak Keng [1986] CLJU 111; [1986] 2 MLJ 327 to justify that the initial date of computation of vacant possession should still be the date of execution of the SPA because no money has been collected by the Appellant. [33] Although it is an undisputed fact here that the First Respondent's cheques have not been not encashed by the Appellant, we are of the view by the fact of the execution of the CP, giving of cheques pursuant thereto and ultimately the execution of the SPA, they must all be read together in their proper context. It is plain to us that they are inextricably connected to one another designed to benefit the Appellant through pre-selling the Property and to obtain financial security thereto in the event the First Respondent reneges on purchasing the Property. [34] Moreover, by the First Respondent having issued the cheques, the First Respondent can no longer utilise that amount drawn in her current account for other purposes. Although the Appellant did not cash the cheques, it can be plainly seen that the Appellant has continuingly secured itself against the First Respondent reneging from executing the SPA by requiring the First Respondent to furnish a replacement cheque each time the earlier cheque lapsed. In our view, the Booking Fee is deem paid on the peculiar facts herein. We are also mindful that the SPA is a contract made pursuant to HDA which has been held to be a social legislation to protect the weaker party, to wit the purchaser … [35] Consequently, in contractual parlance, we find the SPA is in the circumstances here as good as entered on 14th February 2016 by virtue of the entry of the CP and the First Respondent giving the Booking Fee cheque to the Appellant. The eventual execution of the SPA is a mere formality. It is therefore irrelevant that the Appellant did not receive any payment due to the non-encashment of the cheques by the Appellant. [36] Thus, for purposes of determining the initial date for giving of vacant possession of the Property, we find that this has to be computed from 14th February 2016 which is the date of the execution of the CP which is also synonymous with the date the First Respondent gave the Booking Fee cheque to the Appellant.” [29] As could be seen from the quoted passages, the Court of Appeal decided in B U Development Sdn Bhd (supra) against the developer even though it did not bank in all the cheques for booking fees that it had received from the purchasers. Yet the Court of Appeal ruled that the PJD Regency (supra) was applicable and the date of computation of date for delivery of vacant possession should be from the date of payment of the booking fee. [30] In the circumstances, I must follow the decision of the Court of Appeal in B U Development Sdn Bhd (supra) and decline to follow Toh Ai Shi (supra) – which is a decision of the High Court. The finding of “stakeholders” in Toh Ai Shi (supra) as a distinguishing fact is, with respect, misplaced. Lawyers are creative in advising their clients to use such nomenclature as “stakeholders” to collect booking fees. Thus, in my humble view, this is precisely why Regulation 11 of Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 had to be amended to add the words “by whatever name called”, to read as follows: “No person, including parties acting as stakeholders, shall collect any payment by whatever name called except as prescribed by the contract of sale.” [31] As for the three extensions of time, I have no difficulty in finding that they were valid. Since learned counsel for the Plaintiffs have indicated that they are not seriously pursuing their challenge of the validity, I shall just briefly state that I am following the judgment of Ahmad Kamal J (as His Lordship then was) in Chong Yuong Wee & Ors v Menteri Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan (supra) and submits that s.38C of the Amendment Act is an extension of the temporary reliefs introduced under the principal Act and thus EOT 2 is as valid as EOT 1. I am bound by Obata-Ambak Holdings Sdn Bhd v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd (supra) to rule that EOT 3 is valid unless declared to be invalid and set aside in a judicial review application. In my view, there is no doubt that EOT 3 was granted by the Housing Minister himself – as could be seen in the screenshot of his letter below: [32] As for the question as to whether the date of delivery of vacant possession for the purpose of determining whether any LAD is payable is the date when the keys are actually handed over to the purchaser OR 30 days from the date of service of the Defendant’s letter of delivery of vacant possession, I find that this question requires an examination of Clause 27(3) of the SPA – which is in the format of Schedule H of the said Act – which reads: [33] Even though the said Act is a social legislation to protect the interests of purchasers of residential properties – which for many purchasers is the largest investment in his/her whole life – there is also a need to ensure that purchasers do not delay collection of keys when the developer is ready to deliver vacant possession. On this issue, I bear in mind that the LAD rate of 10% per annum of the purchase price is much higher than bank interest rate. Thus, in my humble view, Clause 27(3) has been included to impose a cut-off date by way of a deeming provision, to deem that the purchaser has taken possession 30 days after service of the notice on him/her even if he/she has yet to collect the keys. This is, of course, subject to proof of posting of notice by a developer to the purchaser. Since Clause 27(3) says “date of service”, it is fair to add 2 days from the date of posting of the notice. In this case, the Defendant issued and sent its notice in the form of a letter dated 15th July 2024 to the purchasers. It is thus fair to presume that it was served 2 days later on 17th July 2024. [34] Whilst the Plaintiffs have complained about the Defendant giving some of them appointment dates for the collection of keys which were after 15th August 2024, I note from the calculations of LAD by the Plaintiffs that they are agreeable to regard 17th August 2024, i.e. about 30 days from the date of service of the notice, as the date of delivery of vacant possession. Conclusion [35] Based on the above analysis of the facts and law, this Court would answer the questions posed by the parties pursuant to O.33 with the following answers: Question 1: Whether the Defendant is liable to pay LAD to the Plaintiffs in the event there is delay in the delivery of vacant possession of the units. Answer: YES. The said Act, which is primarily to protect the interests of purchasers of residential properties, is applicable even to cases where KWP’s approval or that of other authorities is required for a purchaser to purchase a residential property. Question 2: Whether the period of 36 months for the delivery of vacant possession as stipulated in the Sale and Purchase Agreements starts from the date of the Sale and Purchase Agreements or from the date when the booking fees were paid by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant. Answer: The period of 36 months for delivery of vacant possession as stipulated in the SPAs starts from the respective date of payment of booking fees by the respective Plaintiff to the Defendant. The judgments of the Federal Court in PJD Regency (supra) and B U Development (supra) are applicable and not distinguishable. Question 3: Whether the Plaintiffs can challenge the validity of the extensions and/or exemptions of time which was granted by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (KPKT) without adding KPKT as a party to the proceedings or to challenge the same by way of Judicial Review. Answer: KPKT should have been added as a party in any proceedings in which a challenge to the validity of its decision is mounted, be it by way of a judicial review or a civil suit for declaration. Judicial review would be the correct procedure to mount such a challenge, as was held in Obata-Ambak (supra). Question 4: If the issue above is answered in the affirmative, whether the extensions and/or exemptions of time which are said to have been obtained by the Defendant are valid and can be taken into account for the calculation of date for delivery of vacant possession. Answer: Those extensions of time (EOT 1, EOT 2 and EOT 3) are valid and to be taken into account for the calculation of deadline for delivery of vacant possession. Question 5: Whether the date of delivery of vacant possession for the calculation of LAD is on the date fixed by the Defendant for the Plaintiffs to collect the keys or whether it is 30 days from the date of service of the Defendant’s letter of delivery of vacant possession. Answer: The date of delivery of vacant possession for the purpose of calculation of LAD is 30 days from the date of service of the Defendant’s notice of delivery of vacant possession or when the Plaintiffs/purchasers actually collected the keys, whichever earlier. Question 6 is irrelevant in light of the above answers. [35] Since the primary question in this civil suit is whether the date of the first payment (of booking fee) by a purchaser is to be regarded as the commencement date for calculation of the deadline for delivery of vacant possession, I would sum up the answer, in layman terms, as follows: The law in Malaysia does not allow any developer of residential properties to collect any money from a purchaser unless it is ready for the time for delivery of vacant possession to start running from the day when money was paid by the purchaser. [36] Based on the above answers, counsel for the parties have graciously assisted this Court by calculating and agreeing on the respective amount to be awarded as LAD to the Plaintiffs. In all fairness, I made it clear to them, and I do repeat it here, that this cooperation by respective learned counsel was to ensure that the figures pronounced by this Court as the respective judgment sum are mathematical correct, and does not prejudice their respective client’s rights to appeal to the Court of Appeal to challenge the answers of this Court to those O.33 questions. Costs of only RM500 was ordered to be paid to each Plaintiff by the Defendant, except for the 4th and 5th Plaintiff who were awarded only RM250 each because they are co-purchasers of one property. Date of Decision: 15th January 2026 ………………………… Gan Techiong Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur (NCvC9) Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Bharathi Sinnathamby SOLICITORS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MESSRS BHARATHI & ASSOCIATES Advocates & Solicitors Unit C1-2-3, Solaris Dutamas, No. 1, Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 KUALA LUMPUR. Counsel for the Defendant: Wong Kah Hui (Emily Chua Yan Feng with him) SOLICITORS FOR THE DEFENDANT: MESSRS KH WONG & CO Advocates & Solicitors B-1-8, Gateway Kiaramas Corporate Suites, Jalan Kiara 5, Mont Kiara, 50480 KUALA LUMPUR.

PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah and Other Appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60; [2021] 2 CLJ 441.

Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 6 CLJ 285.

Obata-Ambak Holdings Sdn Bhd v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2024] 8 CLJ 519; [2024] 5 MLJ 897.

Lai Fee & Anor v Wong Yu Vee & Ors [2023] 3 MLJ 503.

Toh Ai Shi v Talent Team Sdn Bhd & Anor [2023] 7 MLJ 262.

Chong Yuong Wee & Ors v Menteri Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan, Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Ors [2025] 9 MLJ 193.

B U Development Sdn Bhd v Adeline Tan Kean Sim & Anor [2025] CLJU 637; [2025] MLJU 780

Order 33 Rules of Court 2012.

Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 3. Regulation 11, 11(2) & 12 of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 4. Section 35 of the Temporary Measures for Reducing the Impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Act 2020 5. Section 38C of the Covid-19 Amendment Act.