KARTINI FARAH BINTI ABD RAHIM v Majlis Daerah Besut (TA-24NCvC-233-12/2024)

KARTINI FARAH BINTI ABD RAHIM

MUKUNNAN A/L SUGUMARAN

HONG HAI SAN (NRIC NO.: 820826-14-5817) 02/04/2026 11:41:19

SHASHI KUMAR A/L SHANMUGAM

PERSATUAN PENJAGAAN ANJING DAN KUCING LIAR SELANGOR (REGISTRATION NO.: PPM-010-05-05120017) (Suing in the capacity as Chairman and Public Officer of the Organisation) … PLAINTIFFS

1.

TERENGGANU STATE GOVERNMENT … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This is an application by way of originating summons filed by the Plaintiffs seeking declaratory reliefs against the Defendants concerning the shooting of a stray dog named "Kopi" by officers of S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA the First Defendant, Besut District Council. The Plaintiffs, comprising three individuals and an animal welfare NGO, seek declarations that the killing contravened the Animal Welfare Act 2015 ("AWA 2015") and that the Undang-Undang Kecil Pelesenan Anjing (Majlis Daerah Besut) 1990 ("UUK Pelesenan Anjing") are ultra vires the parent legislation. The matter raises fundamental questions regarding locus standi in public interest litigation, the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain declaratory reliefs touching upon penal provisions, and the harmonious interpretation of local authority by-laws with federal animal welfare legislation.

The First Defendant is a local authority established under the Local Government Act 1976 with jurisdiction over the district of Besut in Terengganu. Between January and October 2024, the First Defendant received sixty-two complaints from local residents regarding stray dogs attacking livestock, causing disturbances, and behaving aggressively towards the community, particularly in the vicinity of Jerteh Town Centre. Following these complaints, the First Defendant's President instructed that a joint operation to capture and dispose of stray dogs be carried out.

On 6 October 2024, an operation was conducted jointly by enforcement officers of the First Defendant and the Besut Veterinary Department. During this operation, a stray dog later identified by netizens as "Kopi" was shot by an enforcement officer in front of shop lots near Jalan Dato' Haji Zakaria. The incident was recorded and circulated widely on social media, generating significant public attention. Following this, the Fourth Plaintiff, an NGO registered in Selangor, lodged a police report on 15 October 2024, and subsequently the present action was commenced on 10 December 2024.

The Plaintiffs seek five declarations:

that the killing of Kopi infringed section 29(1)(e) of the AWA 2015;

(ii) that the shooting infringed section 30(1) of the AWA 2015;

(iii) that shooting of animals pursuant to section 30(2) is prohibited as section 30(1) clearly provides that shooting is prohibited unless authorized by veterinary authority during emergency or for disease control;

(iv) that use of firearms is limited to conditions in section 30(1) and cannot be used for killing pursuant to section 30(2); and S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA

that section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing infringe sections 29(1)(e) and 30(1) of the AWA 2015.

Despite having filed an interlocutory injunction in Enclosure 11, the Plaintiffs elected not to pursue that application and instead proceeded with the substantive determination of the Originating Summons in Enclosure 1 on its merits.

The following issues fall for determination:

Whether the Plaintiffs satisfy the "adversely affected" test to maintain this action;

(ii) Whether civil courts may grant declaratory reliefs that effectively determine criminal liability under penal provisions;

(iii) Whether section 30(2) of AWA 2015 permits killing by shooting with firearms for purposes beyond those specified in section 30(1);

(iv) Whether section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing are ultra vires the AWA 2015; and S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA

Whether the State Government is liable for actions of the local authority. COUNSELS' CONTENTIONS

Counsel for the Plaintiffs submits that the Plaintiffs possess locus standi as parties "adversely affected" by the killing of Kopi, relying upon the Court of Appeal decision in The Government of Malaysia v Fung Fon Chen & Anor [2013] 1 CLJU 1543 (CA) and the High Court decision in Sharifah Sofia Syed Hussein & Ors v Pengarah kepada Lembaga Kebajikan Haiwan (2022) 7 CLJ 267 (HC). The Plaintiffs argue that as NGOs established for animal welfare, they have sufficient interest to represent animals who cannot represent themselves, analogizing to the fictional scenario in Animal Farm where animals cannot bring actions themselves.

The Plaintiffs further rely upon the Federal Court decisions in Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and Other Appeals [2023] 5 CLJ 167 (FC) ("Taman Rimba Kiara") and Nik Elin Zurina Nik Abdul Rashid & Anor v Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan [2024] 3 CLJ 323 (FC) (“Nik Elin”) to argue that locus standi should be relaxed for public interest litigation and that constitutional judicial review does not S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA require proof of personal adverse affectation. They contend that the existence of legislation creating legal powers provides sufficient basis to challenge such powers.

Regarding jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs submit that they do not seek criminal conviction or penal sanctions against any party, but merely declaratory relief concerning the validity of the by-laws. They argue that the High Court possesses broad jurisdiction under section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 to determine all civil proceedings, and that their action does not offend section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 as they are not seeking to enforce penal law but to clarify legal rights.

On the merits, the Plaintiffs contend that section 30(1) of the AWA 2015 absolutely prohibits killing animals by shooting with firearms except when authorized by veterinary authority during emergency or for disease control. They argue that section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing, which permits destruction of dogs without specifying the method, when read together with the First Defendant's practice of shooting, contravenes the AWA 2015. They rely upon the principle that subsidiary legislation cannot override parent legislation, citing Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor v Dr Vijaendreh A/L Subramaniam & Anor (2025) 4 CLJ 234 (FC).

Counsel for the First Defendant submits that the Plaintiffs lack locus standi, arguing that the "adversely affected" test requires demonstration of real and genuine interest in the factual and legal context. Reliance is placed upon Haris Fatillah Bin Mohd Ibrahim v Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia [2017] 3 CLJ 88 (CA), where the Court of Appeal held that Plaintiffs must particularize in pleadings how their rights are affected. The First Defendant distinguishes Sharifah Sofia Syed Hussein & Ors v Pengarah kepada Lembaga Kebajikan Haiwan (supra) as merely obiter and not following binding principles, noting that the learned judge failed to apply the correct test or determine how the factual and legal circumstances established locus standi.

The First Defendant further submits that The Government of Malaysia v Fung Fon Chen & Anor (supra) establishes two requirements for locus standi in public law actions: first, obtaining Attorney General's consent, and second, demonstrating infringement of private rights to satisfy the "adversely affected" test.f The First Defendant argues that Taman Rimba Kiara and Nik Elin are distinguishable as they concern constitutional judicial review where standing requirements are purposely relaxed, whereas the present case involves statutory interpretation and potential penal consequences.

On jurisdiction, the First Defendant submits that Prayers I and II seek declarations that the First Defendant committed criminal offences under sections 29(1)(e) and 30(1) of the AWA 2015, which carry penal sanctions of fine and imprisonment. Reliance is placed upon Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12 (SC), where the Supreme Court held that civil courts cannot enforce criminal law through declaratory relief, and Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor v Dr Vijaendreh A/L Subramaniam & Anor (supra), where the Federal Court recently reaffirmed that no private party may bring a civil suit seeking declaration that another has committed a criminal offence. The First Defendant argues this falls within the third hypothetical scenario in Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor v Dr Vijaendreh A/L Subramaniam & Anor (supra) where such declarations are impermissible.

The First Defendant further submits that the Plaintiffs' action usurps the Attorney General's prerogative power under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and the statutory functions of the Animal Welfare Board and Animal Welfare Officer under sections 4(1)(g) and 39 of the AWA 2015.

On the merits, the First Defendant submits that section 30(2) of the AWA 2015, beginning with "Notwithstanding subsection (1)," operates as an overriding exception permitting killing by firearms for all circumstances enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (g), including animal population control under section 30(2)(e). S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA Reliance is placed upon OCBC Bank (M) Bhd v Tan Eng Kwee and Another Application [2003] 6 MLJ 470 (HC) regarding the effect of "notwithstanding" clauses, and the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius from Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Majlis Daerah Segamat [2022] 2 MLJ 119 (FC). The First Defendant argues that since section 30(2) omits the phrase "by way of shooting with firearms" found in section 30(1), Parliament intended to permit such method for all exceptions in subsection (2).

The First Defendant further submits that section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing were enacted pursuant to section 73(1)(m) of the Local Government Act 1976, which empowers local authorities to "seize, destroy and dispose of" animals without prescribing specific methods. Applying the three-fold test from Palm Oil Research and Development Board Malaysia & Anor v Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2005] 3 MLJ 97 (FC), the First Defendant argues the by-laws fall within the scope of the parent Act, are not inconsistent with it, and do not infringe fundamental rights.

Counsel for the Second Defendant adopts the preliminary objections regarding locus standi and jurisdiction, adding that vicarious liability under section 6(1) of the Government S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA Proceedings Act 1956 applies only to tort proceedings for damages, not to declaratory reliefs. The Second Defendant submits that as the First Defendant is a corporate body capable of suing and being sued in its own name, no tort feasor has been named, and the action does not seek damages, the claim against the Second Defendant is unsustainable.

On the merits, the Second Defendant submits that section 9(1) and

of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing are general provisions authorizing destruction of dogs in specified circumstances without prescribing the method, whereas section 30(1) of the AWA 2015 specifically regulates the method of killing by firearms. These provisions should be read harmoniously as complementary rather than conflicting. The Second Defendant argues that the AWA 2015 was not intended to replace the Animals Act 1953 but to supplement it, citing the parliamentary statement by YB Dato' Sri Ismail Sabri during the second reading of the Animal Welfare Bill.

The Second Defendant further submits that the UUK Pelesenan Anjing, enacted in 1990, was consistent with the Animals Act 1953 then in force, and that the AWA 2015 does not impliedly repeal local authority by-laws. The method of destruction under the by-laws must be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the AWA 2015, but the by-laws themselves are not invalid. Reliance is placed upon similar by-laws in other local authorities and the Dog S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA Ordinance 1960 of Sabah to demonstrate that provisions for destruction of stray dogs are commonplace and valid. COURT'S FINDINGS AND DECISION ISSUE 1: Whether the Plaintiffs satisfy the "adversely affected" test to maintain this action.

Having considered the extensive submissions on locus standi, I find that the Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the threshold test of being "adversely affected" as established in Taman Rimba Kiara and applied in subsequent Federal Court decisions. The Plaintiffs' reliance upon Fung Fon Chen is misplaced. In that case, Rohana Yusuf JCA explicitly held that failure to obtain Attorney General's consent defeats locus standi in public interest litigation, and that the "adversely affected" test requires infringement of private rights. The Plaintiffs have neither obtained such consent nor demonstrated any infringement of their private rights.

The Plaintiffs' reliance upon Sharifah Sofia Syed Hussein & Ors v Pengarah kepada Lembaga Kebajikan Haiwan (supra) is similarly problematic. While the learned judge made favourable observations regarding NGO standing, these remarks were obiter dicta made without rigorous application of the established test. The learned judge did not examine whether the Plaintiffs in that case S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA had demonstrated real and genuine interest through specific factual involvement, but proceeded on the assumption that animals cannot represent themselves. This approach, while sympathetic, does not accord with the binding principles in Taman Rimba Kiara where Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ emphasized that standing requires demonstration of genuine grievance through specific adverse affectation, not merely emotional or moral concern.

The Plaintiffs' reliance upon Nik Elin is distinguishable. That case concerned constitutional judicial review under Articles 4(3) and 4(4) of the Federal Constitution, where the Federal Court relaxed standing requirements to permit challenges to the validity of legislation. The present case does not involve constitutional interpretation but rather the application of statutory provisions and by-laws. The Federal Court in Nik Elin was careful to limit its holding to constitutional challenges, noting that "incompetency challenges" under Article 4(3) are a specific category of "inconsistency challenge" governed by particular constitutional provisions.

The First Defendant's reliance upon Puspa Rani Thanabalasingam v Majlis Daerah Cameron Highlands [2021] MLJU 1557 (HC) is apposite. In that case, the High Court held that the applicant's position as President of an animal welfare association and her activities protecting stray animals did not S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA demonstrate that she was adversely affected by the local authority's decision, and that such activities did not establish direct effect from the decision challenged. Similarly, the present Plaintiffs, residing in Selangor and Kuala Lumpur, with no demonstrated involvement in animal welfare activities in Besut, cannot establish the requisite nexus to the First Defendant's actions.

The Fourth Plaintiff's status as an NGO registered in Selangor, with constitutional requirements limiting membership to Selangor residents, further undermines any claim to standing in respect of actions taken in Terengganu. The Australian decision in Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health and Another (1995) 128 ALR 238 (FC), cited by the First Defendant, correctly emphasizes that incorporation and emotional concern alone do not confer standing; there must be evidence of specific activities and involvement in the subject matter.

I therefore find that the Plaintiffs lack locus standi to maintain this action. However, given the importance of the legal issues raised and the public interest in clarifying the relationship between local authority powers and animal welfare legislation, I proceed to consider the substantive merits. S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA ISSUE 2: Whether civil courts may grant declaratory reliefs that effectively determine criminal liability under penal provisions.

The First Defendant's objection that civil courts lack jurisdiction to grant declaratory reliefs effectively determining criminal liability raises fundamental constitutional principles regarding the separation of powers. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 explicitly provides that "specific relief cannot be granted for the mere purpose of enforcing a penal law." The Supreme Court's decision in Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang (supra) established that criminal law cannot be enforced through civil proceedings for declarations, emphasizing the distinct jurisdictions, standards of proof, and the Attorney General's constitutional role as guardian of public interest in criminal prosecutions.

The Federal Court's recent reaffirmation in Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor v Dr Vijaendreh A/L Subramaniam & Anor (supra) provides clear guidance. Tun Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat CJ held that "no private party may attempt to sue another private person for a declaration that seeks to condemn that other party for having committed an offence," identifying sound policy reasons including the exclusive power of the Public Prosecutor under Article 145(1) and the different standards of proof between criminal and civil proceedings. The hypothetical scenarios articulated in that judgment illuminate the present case: the Plaintiffs' Prayers I and S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA II fall squarely within the third scenario where a private person, offended by another's actions, seeks a declaration that the other has committed an offence.

The Plaintiffs' attempt to characterize their action as merely challenging the validity of by-laws rather than seeking penal enforcement is unpersuasive. A holistic reading of the prayers sought reveals their true nature. Prayers I and II explicitly seek declarations that the First Defendant infringed sections 29(1)(e) and 30(1) of the AWA 2015, provisions which create criminal offences punishable by fine and imprisonment. These prayers are not alternative but cumulative to Prayers III-V, as evidenced by the conjunctive "and" connecting all prayers. The Plaintiffs' prioritization of these prayers, and their failure to seek them as alternatives, demonstrates their substantive intention to obtain judicial condemnation of the First Defendant's conduct as criminal.

The Plaintiffs' argument that they do not seek "conviction" or "penal sanctions" is technically accurate but substantively misleading. While civil courts cannot impose criminal penalties, the declaration sought i.e. that the First Defendant committed acts infringing penal provisions, would constitute a judicial determination of criminal liability. Such a declaration would have profound consequences for the First Defendant and its officers, effectively stigmatizing their conduct as criminal without the procedural safeguards of criminal S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA proceedings, including the higher standard of proof and the Attorney General's discretion regarding prosecution.

The Plaintiffs' action also usurps the statutory functions of the Animal Welfare Board and Animal Welfare Officer under the AWA

Section 4(1)(g) confers upon the Board the function to "administer, enforce and ensure the effective implementation of this Act," while section 39 empowers Animal Welfare Officers to investigate offences. The legislature has established a comprehensive regulatory framework for enforcing animal welfare standards, and private litigants cannot circumvent this framework through civil declaratory actions.

I therefore find that the civil court lacks jurisdiction to grant Prayers I and II, and that these prayers offend section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 and the constitutional separation of powers. ISSUE 3: Whether section 30(2) of AWA 2015 permits killing by shooting with firearms for purposes beyond those specified in section 30(1).

The construction of section 30 of the AWA 2015 is central to the parties' dispute. The Plaintiffs argue that section 30(1) establishes an absolute prohibition on killing animals by shooting with firearms, subject only to two exceptions: authorization by veterinary authority during emergency or for disease control. They contend S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA that section 30(2) merely specifies circumstances where killing is permitted by other methods, and that the phrase "notwithstanding subsection (1)" does not permit shooting with firearms for the broader purposes enumerated in section 30(2)(a)-(g).

This construction is erroneous. The phrase "notwithstanding subsection (1)" is a clear legislative signal that the provisions following it operate as exceptions to the general prohibition in subsection (1). As Low Hop Bing J held in OCBC Bank (M) Bhd v Tan Eng Kwee and Another Application (supra), such phrases mean that the preceding subsection "is to be disregarded in so far as it is inconsistent" with the subsequent provision, which "shall prevail and play a predominant role." The legislative intent is manifest: to carve out exceptions from the general prohibition where killing by any method, including shooting with firearms, is permitted.

The application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius supports this interpretation. Parliament used the specific phrase "kill by way of shooting with firearms" in section 30(1) but omitted this phrase in section 30(2). This deliberate omission indicates that Parliament intended to permit killing by shooting with firearms for all circumstances enumerated in section 30(2), without restricting such method to the two exceptions in section 30(1). Had Parliament intended to maintain the restriction on firearms for all S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA circumstances in section 30(2), it would have repeated the phrase or made explicit cross-reference to the method restriction.

The Plaintiffs' construction would produce absurd consequences. Section 30(2)(e) explicitly permits killing "for the purpose of animal population control by any authorized authority under any written law." Local authorities are authorized under section 73(1)(m) of the Local Government Act 1976 to "seize, destroy and dispose of" animals. If the Plaintiffs' construction were correct, local authorities could control animal populations by any method except shooting with firearms, even in circumstances where shooting might be the most humane or practical method. This would frustrate the legislative purpose of both the Local Government Act 1976 and the

The Circular issued by the Department of Veterinary Services dated 9 February 2019, permitting killing of animals by firearm for animal population control by local authorities, while not binding upon this court, provides persuasive evidence of executive interpretation consistent with the First Defendant's construction. The Circular recognizes that section 30(2)(e) of the AWA 2015 permits shooting with firearms for population control purposes.

I therefore find that section 30(2) of the AWA 2015 operates as an exception to section 30(1), permitting killing by shooting with firearms for all circumstances enumerated in paragraphs (a) S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA through (g) of subsection (2), including animal population control under paragraph (e). ISSUE 4: Whether section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing are ultra vires the AWA 2015.

The Plaintiffs contend that section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing are ultra vires the AWA 2015 because they permit destruction of dogs without requiring veterinary authorization for shooting with firearms. This contention misconceives the relationship between the by-laws and the AWA

2015.

Applying the three-fold test from Palm Oil Research and Development Board Malaysia & Anor v Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal (supra), I find that section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing satisfy all requirements for valid subsidiary legislation. First, the provisions fall within the scope of power conferred by section 73(1)(m) of the Local Government Act 1976, which expressly authorizes local authorities to "seize, destroy and dispose of" animals. The words "destroy" and "dispose of" in the by-laws correspond precisely to the empowering provision.

Second, the by-laws are not inconsistent with the parent Act. Section 73(1)(m) does not prescribe methods of destruction, and the by-laws similarly do not specify methods. The by-laws establish circumstances where destruction is permitted, i.e. dogs over three months found without metal badges, sick dogs without veterinary treatment, and dogs whose owners cannot be found, which are reasonable exercises of the local authority's power to control nuisances and protect public health.

Third, the by-laws do not infringe fundamental rights or constitutional limitations. The AWA 2015, as a later federal statute, does not impliedly repeal the by-laws but operates concurrently with them. The Second Defendant correctly observes that the AWA 2015 was not intended to replace the Animals Act 1953 but to supplement it, addressing aspects of animal welfare not covered by the earlier legislation. The parliamentary statement cited by the Second Defendant confirms this legislative intent.

The proper relationship between the by-laws and the AWA 2015 is one of harmonious interpretation. Section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing authorize destruction of dogs in specified circumstances. The method of destruction must comply with the AWA 2015. As I have found, section 30(2)(e) of the AWA 2015 permits killing by shooting with firearms for animal population control by authorized authorities under written law. Local authorities are such authorized authorities under the Local S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA Government Act 1976. Therefore, when the First Defendant destroys dogs under the by-laws using firearms, it acts within the scope of both the by-laws and the AWA 2015, provided the destruction is for proper purposes including population control.

The Plaintiffs' argument that the by-laws are invalid because they do not explicitly require veterinary authorization for shooting misapprehends the nature of the by-laws. The by-laws are general enabling provisions; the specific requirements for method of killing are governed by the AWA 2015. The by-laws are not rendered invalid because they do not incorporate all procedural requirements of other legislation. The First Defendant's officers must comply with both the by-laws and the AWA 2015 when exercising their powers.

I therefore find that section 9(1) and (2) of the UUK Pelesenan Anjing are not ultra vires the AWA 2015. The by-laws were validly enacted under the Local Government Act 1976 and remain operative, subject to compliance with the AWA 2015 regarding methods of killing. ISSUE 5: Whether the State Government is liable for actions of the local authority.

The Second Defendant's objection to vicarious liability is well-founded. Section 5 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA provides that the Government shall be liable for wrongful acts by public officers "in the same manner and to the same extent as that in which a principal, being a private person, is liable for any wrongful act done, or any neglect or default committed by his agent." This provision establishes vicarious liability for torts, not for declaratory reliefs.

The Plaintiffs' action does not seek damages for tort but declarations regarding the validity of legislation and the lawfulness of conduct. The First Defendant is a corporate body capable of suing and being sued in its own name under section 13 of the Local Government Act 1976. No individual tortfeasor has been named as defendant. The Plaintiffs have not established any basis for imposing liability upon the Second Defendant for the actions of the First Defendant, which operates with separate legal personality.

While the Second Defendant exercises supervisory powers over the First Defendant under sections 9 and 10 of the Local Government Act 1976, including power to give general directions on policy, this supervisory relationship does not render the Second Defendant liable for the First Defendant's operational decisions regarding stray dog control. The authorities cited by the Plaintiffs, including Lim Cho Hock v Government of the State of Perak & Ors [1980] 2 MLJ 148 (HC), concern the scope of state government powers over local authorities, not liability for their actions.

I therefore find that the claim against the Second Defendant is unsustainable and should be dismissed.

For the reasons given, the Plaintiffs' originating summons in Enclosure 1 is dismissed. They lack the legal standing to bring this claim, and the civil court cannot grant the declarations sought, as they would improperly determine matters of criminal liability under the AWA 2015.

Having ruled as above, this court observes that the operation of 6 October 2024, and particularly the shooting of the dog "Kopi", has generated considerable public outcry. The manner in which the operation was conducted, the decision to use firearms in a built-up area, are matters of legitimate public concern. This court expresses the hope that the First Defendant will undertake a thorough review of its standard operating procedures for stray animal control, and will consider adopting methods of capture and euthanasia that minimise suffering, including the use of tranquilizers where appropriate, and avoid the use of firearms except in the most exigent circumstances. The AWA 2015, and the circular issued by the Department of Veterinary Services, provide ample scope for the development of humane and effective population control programmes. As Mahatma Gandhi reportedly S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA noted, "The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated". It is for the First Defendant, in consultation with the Veterinary Department and with the oversight of the State Authority, to determine how best to exercise its statutory powers in a manner that respects both public safety and animal welfare.

On the issue of costs, while this legal challenge was misconceived, it was brought in good faith and has served the important public purpose of highlighting these very concerns. In these circumstances, and having regard to the observations I have made, I exercise my discretion to make no order as to costs. Dated: 29 March 2026 Yusrin Faidz Bin Yusoff Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Terengganu S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Harvinpal Kaur Messrs Raj & Sach, C-5-42, Tingkat 5, Block Camilia, 10 Boulevard, Lebuhraya SPRINT, PJU 6A, 47400 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Counsel for the First Defendant: Adam Luqman bin Amdan (Together with Mohammad Zaid bin Daud, Mohd Munzeer bin Zainul Abidin, & Melissa Ho Mun Wai) Messrs Yusfarizal Aziz & Zaid, Unit 01-26 & 01-27, Maxim Citylights Sentul, No. 25 Jalan Sentul Perdana, 51000 Kuala Lumpur Counsel for the Second Defendant: Zulfazliah Binti Mahmud Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Terengganu, Tingkat 14, Wisma Darul Iman, 20200 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA

The Government of Malaysia v Fung Fon Chen & Anor [2013]

Sharifah Sofia Syed Hussein & Ors v Pengarah kepada Lembaga Kebajikan Haiwan (2022) 7 CLJ 267 (HC).

Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and Other Appeals [2023] 5 CLJ 167 (FC).

Nik Elin Zurina Nik Abdul Rashid & Anor v Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan [2024] 3 CLJ 323 (FC).

Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor v Dr Vijaendreh A/L Subramaniam & Anor (2025) 4 CLJ 234 (FC).

Haris Fatillah Bin Mohd Ibrahim v Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia [2017] 3 CLJ 88 (CA).

Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12

OCBC Bank (M) Bhd v Tan Eng Kwee and Another Application [2003] 6 MLJ 470 (HC).

Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Majlis Daerah Segamat [2022] 2 MLJ

Palm Oil Research and Development Board Malaysia & Anor v Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2005]

Puspa Rani Thanabalasingam v Majlis Daerah Cameron Highlands [2021] MLJU 1557 (HC). S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA

Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health and Another (1995) 128 ALR

Lim Cho Hock v Government of the State of Perak & Ors [1980] 2 MLJ 148 (HC).

Sections 4(1)(g), 29(1)(e), 30(1), 30(2), & 39 of the Animal Welfare Act 2015.

Sections 13 & 73(1)(m) of the Local Government Act 1976.

Section 9(1) & 9(2) of the Undang-Undang Kecil Pelesenan Anjing (Majlis Daerah Besut) 1990.

Section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.

Articles 4(3), 4(4), 145(1), & 145(3) of the Federal Constitution.

Sections 5 & 6(1) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956.

Animals Act 1953.

Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. S/N PYzhBnfS0kqekUNgdfRrgA