KARUNAMOORTHY A/L PALANIANDY v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak (BA-25-18-02/2026)

1.

KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Lampiran 1)

Vide Enclosure 1, the Applicants prayed for leave to file for Judicial Review for reliefs including –

an order of certiorari to quash the First Respondent’s last notice dated 31.12.2025 (Impugned Notice) directing the Applicant to vacate and demolish structures on land bearing coordinates 3.392703,101.466307, located at Batu 31, Mukim Rawang (Batu 31 Land) as it was contrary to their letter date 8.10.1993; and

(ii) an order of mandamus –

to compel the First Respondent to cancel the

to stop the First Respondent from enforcing the

to compel the 2nd Respondent to make good their promise to give the Applicants the land.

After careful consideration of the cause papers and the the Honourable Attorney General Malaysia (AG)’s objections and parties’ submissions, this Court allowed the AG’s objections and dismissed Enclosure 1. The following is the reasons for the decision. Background facts

The Applicants allege that sometime in 1992, the First and/or the 2nd Respondent asked them to temporarily move to Plot 6, Batu 29/30, on Lot 3884, Jalan Batang Berjuntai, Mukim Rawang, Selangor (Batu 29/30 Land). The Applicants moved, from where they were originally located, as they were promised compensation and land.

The Applicants were permitted to settle at the Batu 29/30 Land and carry out their cattle and goat farming. The First Respondent had issued the permit dated 8.10.1993 (Permit) (Exhibit “LMS-2” Enclosure 3) and at all material times, the Respondents had knowledge of the Applicants’ occupation on the Batu 29/30 Land.

The Respondents issued notice dated 26.6.2025 (First Notice) notifying the Applicants that they were in occupation of Government land without permission and therefore had committed an offence under section 425 National Land Code

They were given 30 days to vacate the Batu 31 Land and demolish the structures thereon.

The Applicants immediately appealed to the Respondents asking for land to be alienated to them. There was no response from the Respondents. The Applicants were then served with the Impugned Notice.

The Applicants allege that the Respondents’ enforcement actions were illegal and ultra vires as they had been promised land. The Applicants were not afforded an opportunity of being heard and this was an error of law. They had legitimate expectation that they would be given land and labelling them as trespassers was unreasonable. AG’s objections

The AG raised the following objections to Enclosure 1 -

the Applicants’ application for judicial review was filed out of time;

(ii) the 3rd and 4th Applicants did not have the locus standi to institute this application as the Permit was not issued to them;

(iii) the Impugned Notice was issued in respect of the Batu 31 Land whereas the Permit is in relation to the Batu 29/30 Land; and

(iv) the relief for an order of mandamus cannot be directed at the Respondents unless the Applicants have a legal right to the performance of that duty and the Respondents have a clear duty to perform the same.

The AG also argued that the Applicants had failed to show special circumstances that warrant a stay of the First Respondent’s enforcement action pending the hearing and disposal of their application for judicial review.

The Applicants cited Ketua Pengarah Hasil dalam Negeri v. Yayasan Buah Pinggang Kebangsaan Malaysia [2024] 6 CLJ 413 at 435 in support of their argument that their application was within time as the challenge was mounted on the Impugned Notice and not the First Notice.

The Applicants denied that they did not have the locus standi to institute this application. It was premised on the Permit which remained valid to date. Moreover, the Applicants had legitimate expectation that land would be alienated to them as they were promised land by the Respondents who had to be held accountable for that promise. Findings and analysis

O.53 Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) sets out a specific procedure for applying for reliefs under the First Schedule Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91).

In particular, O.53 r.3(6) ROC reads – “An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant”

In Wong Kin Hoong & Anor (Suing For Themselves And On Behalf All Of The Occupants Of Kampung Bukit Koman, Raub, Pahang) v. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 MLJ 161 Raus Sharif PCA (as His Lordship then was) held at 171 – “The time frame in applying for judicial review prescribed by the Rules was fundamental. It goes to jurisdiction and once the trial judge had rejected the explanation for the delay for extension of time to apply for judicial review, the court no longer has the jurisdiction to hear the application for leave for judicial review. Whether the application has merits or not, is irrelevant.”

In the most recent pronouncement of the Court of Appeal in Tan Boon Teet v. Jawatankuasa Perancangan Negeri Pahang & 2 lagi [2026] MLJU 933, Ong Chee Kwan JCA held at para [48] onwards – “O. 53 provides that an application for judicial review must be made “promptly and in any event within three months” from the date when “the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated”. There are 2 distinct requirements: the application must be made promptly, and the utmost limit requires the application to be made within 3 months from either the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision was first communicated. … … Under O 53, an applicant must act “promptly”, and the failure to act promptly is independently fatal, even if the application is technically filed within time. The rationale is stated in Hardy v Pembrokeshire County Council [2006] EWCA Civ 240, para [10] as follows: It is important that those parties, and indeed the public generally, should be able to proceed on the basis that the decision is valid and can be relied on, and that they can plan their lives and make personal and business decisions accordingly. We also draw support from the case of Finn-Kelcey v. Milton Keynes Council [2008] EWCA Civ 10676 (HL) and Re Musgrave Retail Partners (Nl) Limited; Re Department of the Environment (Planning Services) [2012] NIQB 109. … …We are of the view that the word “promptly” in O. 53 is not inserted purely for ornamental value. In fact, this Court has in Abdul Rahman bin Abdullah Munir & Ors v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2008] 6 MLJ 704 adopted the jurisprudence set out by the House of Lords in Griffiths & Anor v. Secretary of State for the Environment & Anor [1983] 2 WLR 172 (HL) as to why prompt action is needed, especially in planning cases: … … We find that the facts of this case, as enumerated, support our conclusion that the JR Application has not been filed promptly. This means that the Court did not have the necessary jurisdiction to hear the matter right from the beginning [See: Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Kemaman &

These cases enunciated by the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal are clear and bind this Court; this Court has no jurisdiction to hear any application that is filed outside this time frame without regard of the merits of the application.

The Applicants’ own narrative shows that the grounds for the Applicants’ complaint first arose when the First Respondent issued the First Notice to them. The Impugned Notice merely extends the time given for the Applicants to vacate the Land.

For this reason, the Applicants’ argument that their challenge premised on the Impugned Notice is within time must fail.

The Applicants’ reliance on Yayasan Buah Pinggang (supra) is unfounded as the factual matrix of the case is different from the present application. The Respondents did not consider the Applicants’ appeal to the First Notice and therefore could not be said to be reconsidering the decision for the Applicants to vacate the Land and demolish the structures thereon.

The Applicants are clearly out of time and this reason alone, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear their application.

A perusal of the Impugned Notice shows the First Respondent’s enforcement action was directing at land located at the Batu 31 Land. The Applicants’ contention, that proximity of this land to the Batu 29/30 Land they were permitted to settle