1. Khor Kok Chiang v 1. Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah (JA-25-34-07/2021 & JA-25-35-07/2021)

1.

TEH SIN YAW …APPELLANTS 10

1.

2.

3.

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA …RESPONDENTS 20 Page 2 of 23 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [1] This was an application for leave to commence judicial review to ask for a declaration that the orders for police supervision against the appellants were illegal and a nullity. The appellants were ordered to be 5 placed under police supervision in Mukim Sokor, Jajahan Tanah Merah, Kelantan & Bandar Tumpat, Jajahan Tumpat, Kelantan respectively. The statement under O53r3(2) ROC 2012 was in enclosure 2 & the affidavit in support was in enclosure 3 of the respective appellant’s application. After hearing parties I dismissed the application for leave based on the fact that 10 the applicants were out of time and that the matters raised were academic. The appellants being dissatisfied have filed an appeal. My reasons now follow. [2] The Malaysian Civil Procedure (White Book) 2018 edition states : 15 “An application for judicial review should not be frivolous or vexatious: Clear Water Sanctuary Golf Management Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Perhubungan Perusahaan [2007] 6 AMR 384; [2007] 6 MLJ 446; [2007] 10 CLJ 111, where it was said: 20 It is settled law that leave to apply for an order to file proceedings for judicial review should not be Page 3 of 23 refused unless the application is frivolous or vexatious. In other words, the sole questions at the leave stage is whether the application is frivolous (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA in QSR Brands Bhd v Suruhanjaya Sekuriti & Anor [2006] 3 MLJ 5 164; [2006] CLJ 532 at 537). Frivolous or vexatious action or statement is generally referred to as groundless action or statement with no prospect of success or wanting in bona fide or when it is not calculated to lead to any practical 10 result. It is often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. In 2000, the present Order 53 was introduced. The present Order 53 is comparable to the post-1977 Order 53 in England 15 (note however the English Order 53 is now replaced by Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, following a review of the Crown Office—see the English Supreme Court Practice). For a discussion on the differences between the new and old Order 53, see Sudha Pillay, “Administrative Law” [2000] 20 Survey of Malaysian Law 51 at 68. The purpose of the new Order is to prescribe the procedure by which a person may enforce the rights conferred by Part II of the Constitution: Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2002] 2 AMR 1900; [2002] 2 MLJ 413. Like 25 Page 4 of 23 any other rule of court it should not be given an interpretation that would result in unfairness or produce a manifest injustice: Bank of America v Chai Yen [1980] 1 MLJ 198; Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor(above). 5 The rule enables an applicant to seek any combination of remedies, including mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari, declaration, injunction and monetary compensation. The court may grant any relief and is not 10 confined to the relief claimed by the applicant (Sivarasa Rasiah v Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2002] 2 AMR 1900; [2002] 2 MLJ 413). See further, Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed Ginan & 108 Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur [2007] 4 AMR 388; [2007] 3 MLJ 12; 15 [2008] 1 CLJ 464, HC. Broadly, if the proceedings are directed to challenging a decision of a public law nature, and are not for the enforcement of private rights, an application for judicial review is the only permissible course; the court will not permit an action for a declaration to be used as a means of 20 circumventing the procedural restrictions on the availability of judicial review, in particular the rule that leave to apply for judicial review must be obtained and the time limit of three months (see O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237; [1982] 3 All ER 1124, HL). Hence, such proceedings if brought by way 25 Page 5 of 23 of private action without resorting to Order 53 is an abuse of process of the court: Bencon Development Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang & Ors [1999] 2 AMR 1440; [1999] 2 MLJ 385; Yahya bin Kassim v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 749, CA; O’Reilly v 5 Mackman (above); Subramaniam Vythilingam v The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Suhakam) & 5 Ors [2003] 3 AMR 213; [2003] 6 CLJ 175; Heywood v Hull Prison Board of Visitors & Anor [1980] 3 All ER 594. The Court of Appeal in Permodalan Negeri Selangor (PNSB) & Anor v Citrasama 10 Projek Sdn Bhd & Anor[2017] AMEJ 0082; [2017] MLJU 25 dismissed the appellant’s appeal on the basis that the claim for infringement concerned private law relief rather than public law relief. The Court of Appeal, following Ahmad Jefri Mohd Jahri v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors[2010] 15 5 CLJ 865, held that if the claim for infringement is based solely on substantive principles of public law then relief must be by way of an application for judicial review under Order 53. However, if the matter is within the realm of private law, though concerning a public authority, Order 53 is not suitable.” 20 [3] In the matter before me, the application for judicial review was filed on 30 July 2021. The supervision order was served on the appellants on the 27 April 2021. Ergo the application was out of time by three (3) days. Page 6 of 23 This delay cannot be cured unless there is an application for extension of time which in this case was never made. [4] The Malaysian Civil Procedure (White Book) 2018 edition states : 5 “Time limit—This has now been increased from 40 days to three months (see r 3(6)). Time now begins to run from the date the decision in question is first communicated to the aggrieved person. If an applicant is out of time he must apply for an extension of time to make the application and if that 10 application is refused the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for leave. See Wong Kin Hoong (suing for themselves and on behalf of all of the occupants of Kampung Bukit Koman, Raub, Pahang) v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 AMR 211; [2013] 4 MLJ 161. 15 In the case of Menteri Besar Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur v Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 AMR 220, the court seems to be of the view that: “The High Court in its judgment was of the view that the 40 days specified under O 53 r 3(6) was 20 not rigid. I am of the view the judge erred in ruling that the time frame prescribed by the rules is not rigid. I am in agreement with the appellant’s counsel that compliance with the time frame Page 7 of 23 prescribed by the rules is fundamental as it goes to jurisdiction.” The time limited by Order 53 is jurisdictional. The time limit requirement serves an important public purpose, that is, that challenges to the decisions of public authorities should be 5 brought to a resolution one way or the other speedily in the interests of justice and of good administration. Unless an extension is sought and obtained, the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the substantive motion (Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour & Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 10 54) and this position was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Abdul Rahman Abdullah Munir & Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2008] 5 AMR 573; [2008] 6 CLJ 805, CA, and subsequently applied in Ace College v Ketua Pendaftar, Institusi Pendidikan Tinggi Swasta, Kemeterian Pengajian 15 Tinggi Malaysia [2014] AMEJ 1358; [2014] 9 CLJ 468, HC. Grounds for relief—A court will grant the appropriate form of relief upon the applicant establishing one or more of the following grounds formulated by Lord Diplock in Council of 20 Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; [1984] 3 All ER 935, HL:

(A) Illegality. If an act or decision of a public authority is ultra vires its statutory powers, the decision may 25 Page 8 of 23 be quashed or declared invalid: Sydney Municipal Council v Campbell [1925] AC 338, PC; Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates plc [1985] AC 661, HL; Lam Eng Rubber Factory (M) Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Alam 5 Sekitar, Negeri Kedah dan Perlis & Anor [2005] 2 AMR 471 [2005] 2 CLJ 159; Menteri Sumber Manusia v Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia [1999] 2 AMR 1837; [1999] 2 MLJ 337; Syed Mubarak v Majlis Peguam 10 Negara [2000] 3 AMR 3048; [2000] 4 MLJ 167.

(B) Irrationality. This refers to what has come to be known as “Wednesbury unreasonableness”, i.e. “a 15 decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it” (per Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service 20 Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; [1984] 3 All ER 935, HL). Under this head, a “decision may be struck down, for being contrary to substantiveprinciples” (per Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ in R Rama Chandran v 25 Page 9 of 23 The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 AMR 433; [1997] 1 MLJ 145; [1997] 1 CLJ 147, FC). The Federal Court in Malaysia Airline System Bhd v Wan Sa’adi @ Syed Sa’adi bin Wan 5 Mustafa [2015] 1 AMR 629; [2015] 1 MLJ 757, FC, affirmed that a decision could be considered manifestly unreasonable if no body of persons could have reached it, and that in order to come to such conclusion there must be 10 overwhelming evidence to support it.

(C) Procedural impropriety. This head connotes the wider concept of “fairness”. In essence, the complaint is that 15 the decision-maker had failed to observe basic rules of natural justice and or procedural rules. Accordingly, failure to give reasons is a ground which can be brought under the heading of procedural impropriety (see M Sentivelu a/l R 20 Marimuthu v Public Services Commission Malaysia & Anor [2005] 5 MLJ 393). See further Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317 at 342; Kelab 25 Page 10 of 23 Lumba Kuda Perak v Menteri Sumber Manusia, Malaysia & Anor[2005] 5 AMR 361; [2005] 5 MLJ 193. It must be noted that the Federal Court in R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court [1997] 1 MLJ 145, FC, also recognised the concept of “proportionality” whereby it commented that there 5 were cases in the United Kingdom which pointed to the conclusion that even where EEC law was not applicable, such a principle has been recognised as a general principle of English law, and when applied, it enables the court to review an impugned decision for substance as well as process. See 10 also Petroliam Nasional Bhd v Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2004] 2 MLJ 288; Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid bin Haji Mohd Noh [1997] 1 AMR 1008; [1997] 2 CLJ 11; [1997] 1 MLJ 789; Amanah Butler (M) Sdn Bhd v Yike Chee Wah [1997] 2 AMR 1653; [1997] 2 CLJ 79; [1997] 1 MLJ 750; Swedish Motor 15 Assemblies Sdn Bhd v Haji Mohd Ison bin Baba [1998] 2 AMR 1929; [1998] 3 CLJ 288; [1998] 2 MLJ 372. However, the Federal Court in the case of Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid Noh [1997] 1 AMR 1008; 20 [1997] 1 MLJ 789; [1997] 2 CLJ 11, FC, after affirming the Rama Chandran decision held that there may be cases in which for reasons of public policy, national interest, public safety or national security the principle in Rama Chandran may be wholly inappropriate. 25 Page 11 of 23 [5] The 1st appellant in his affidavit in support stated that he does not know how to read but his affidavit in the affirmation or deposition section does not contain a jurat where the contents have been explained to him. 5 [6] The Malaysian Civil Procedure 2018 edition states :- Meaning of jurat— The word “jurat” is not defined in the Rules of Court 2012. It is also not defined in the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91) or the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act 10 388). Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (1977 edn) defines it as “the statement at the foot of an affidavit of the names of the parties swearing it, and of the officer before whom it is sworn, of the date, and of any other necessary particulars, as that the affidavit of an illiterate or blind person was read in the presence 15 of an officer to such person and that he seemed perfectly to understand it”. This latter part refers to the certification required where the deponent is blind and illiterate (r 3). This definition was adopted by Mohd Hishamudin J in Han Euu Tiam v Phang Kui Fatt & Ors [2000] 1 AMR 690; [1999] 4 MLJ 683 at 686; 20 [1999] 4 CLJ 395, HC). Absence of jurat— Absence of the jurat makes the affidavit defective and inadmissible (Gan Thing Phing v Ong Gek Kim Page 12 of 23 (No 2) [1998] 7 MLJ 351; and Lim Goh Huat v Saw Keng See[1998] 6 MLJ 600). The curative provision of r 4 should be borne in mind. Absence of a jurat has been held to be not a defect of form and not curable under r 4 (Charles Edward Marlissa lwn Timber Master 5

(M) Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi [1997] 3 MLJ 199). However a corrective affidavit with the necessary jurat “on all fours” with the earlier affidavit without jurat has been allowed to cure it (Chio Tan Seng & Ors v Chong Chai Huat & Ors [1997] 4 CLJ Supp 116, HC). 10 Rule 4 was applied in Mohan a/l Paramsivam v Sepang Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd [1989] 1 MLJ 247, to allow an affidavit in English by a deponent who affirmed that he did not speak or write in English, without a jurat, to be used though the court said 15 it was mindful that whatever was stated might not be the truth of the whole matter. Completion and signing of jurat— It is a mandatory requirement for the jurat to be completed by the person before 20 whom the affidavit was sworn. A jurat is not complete unless it has all the “necessary and appropriate parts” ( Utama Merchant Bank Bhd v Dato’ Mohd Nadzmi bin Mohd Salleh [2001] 2 AMR 1687; [2001] 5 MLJ 317; [2001] 2 CLJ 235, HC). That means all the blank parts in the prescribed forms must be filled up 25 Page 13 of 23 accordingly. Thus that part of the jurat in Form 74(a) which reads “Through the interpretation of …” must not be left blank even for a deponent who is conversant in Bahasa Malaysia and requires no interpretation. It should be filled up with the words “no interpretation required” instead: Utama Merchant Bank Bhd 5 v Dato’ Mohd Nadzmi bin Mohd Salleh [2001] 2 AMR 1687; [2001] 5 MLJ 317; [2001] 2 CLJ 235, HC (decided with reference to corresponding RHC 1980 Form 78(a)). However if the commissioner omits the quoted words the court will assume that the deponent is conversant in Bahasa Malaysia ( Han Euu 10 Tiam v Phang Kui Fatt & Ors [2000] 1 AMR 690; [1999] 4 MLJ 683 [1999] 4 CLJ 395, HC). An affidavit with the words “sworn before me” omitted from the jurat has, however, been allowed because the court was 15 satisfied that it was indeed sworn before the person before whom it was purported to have been sworn (Eddowes v Argentine Loan and Mercantile Agency Co (1890) 38 WR 629). The commissioner for oaths and not the interpreter must also 20 sign the jurat (Chan Kiew v Lai Sang & Anor [2001] 4 AMR 4817). He cannot cure his omission by signing it at the hearing of the application (Voon Mow Chen v Menteri Dalam Negeri & Anor [1993] 2 AMR 2199; [1993] 4 CLJ 195, HC). See also Metro Kajang Construction Sdn Bhd v Eka Bahtera Sdn 25 Page 14 of 23 Bhd [2001] AMEJ 0219; [2001] 6 MLJ 129; [2001] 3 CLJ 951, HC; and Gan Thing Phing v Ong Gek Kim (No 2) [1998] 7 MLJ 351, HC. See too on this point Re Heymann, ex p Heymann (1872) 7 Ch App 488; 26 LT 339; 29 WR 47; and Bill v Bament(1841) 8 M & M 317; 151 ER 1060 (an old English 5 case where the jurat not being signed by the commissioner for oaths rendered the affidavit irregular and all proceedings based on it were set aside). A commissioner for oaths who has affixed his seal below the 10 jurat in the affidavit and also under the words “Before me” his name, address together with his number W-217 and the word “sgd” has signed the jurat (Kala Devi Thamoderan v Eon Finance Bhd [2000] 6 CLJ 15). The omission of the title of the commissioner was held not fatal 15 in Ex p Johnson (1884) 26 ChD 338). The same requirement for the signature of the commissioner for oaths applied under Order 25 r 22(7) of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 since repealed. Non-compliance was an irregularity 20 of substance and not of form (Impuda Trading Sdn Bhd v Khoo Kiat Piau & Anor[1997] 1 CLJ Supp 158, HC). Omission of name of deponent in the jurat— Order 41 is silent about inserting the name of the deponent in the jurat, 25 Page 15 of 23 though the forms of jurat in Form 74 provide space for this. Omission of the name of the deponent in the jurat has been held not to be fatal (MBf Finance Bhd v Hasmat Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 180, HC where Abdul Malek J, as he was then, was quite prepared to invoke r 4 to save the affidavit). See 5 also the following bankruptcy cases: Re Liow Fong Mooi; ex p Malayan Banking Bhd [2000] AMEJ 0089; [2000] 6 MLJ 146(affidavit verifying bankruptcy petition without name of deponent in jurat held defect of form and 10 cured by Bankruptcy Act 1967 (Act 360), s 131; the deponent was clear to Skinner J, as he then was, reading the affidavit as a whole); and Re Koang Chong Yeow; ex p Mivan Far East Sdn Bhd [2001] 3 MLJ 98 (name of interpreter inserted 15 by the commissioner for oaths in jurat instead of deponent’s and court allowed an affidavit by the former to correct this).” [7] Basically both the appellants’ complaint is in regard to events that 20 happened prior to the issuance of the supervision order. Page 16 of 23 [8] Further in section 15B of the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 Act 297 it is unequivocally stated : “Judicial review of act of decision of Board 15B.

There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision made by the Board in the exercise of its discretionary power in accordance with 10 this Act, except in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision.” (Emphasis added)

In this Act, “judicial review” includes 15 proceedings instituted by way of-

an application for any of the prerogative orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari;

an application for a declaration or an injunction; (ba) a writ of habeas corpus; and 20

any other suit, action or other legal proceedings relating to or arising out of any act done or decision made by the Board in accordance with this Act.” 25 Page 17 of 23 [9] In the case of Punithan a/l Ganasan & Ors v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] MLJU 2323 I had occasion to observe as follows : 5 “[5] There were common issues raised by all the Applicants which are issues number ii, iii, iv, v, vi & vii for the 1st Applicant, issues i, ii, iii & iv for the 2nd Applicant, and issues i, ii, iv, v, vi, vii for the 3rd Applicant. In answer to the common issues raised I need only refer to the case of Tamilarasan a/l 10 Subramaniam v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 6 MLJ 147 where the Federal Court held that anything that happened before the detention order was made is irrelevant and academic. This is what the Federal Court said: 15 “[31] As the term implies, procedural non compliance means failure to abide by the procedural rules laid down by the governing statute, in this case the Act. The following observations by this court in Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2005] 20 3 CLJ 914 at page 930- 931, albeit made in relation to amendments made to the relevant statute, are on point … Page 18 of 23 [32] Further to that, it has been held by this court in L Rajanderan R Letchumanan v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2010] 7 CLJ 653 that any irregularity for non compliance with the procedure prescribed by section 3(2)(a),

5 and (c) of the Act is not a relevant matter for consideration when it has been superseded by the Minister’s detention order under section 6(1). The reason is because any question on the legality or propriety of the arrest or detention of a detainee at 10 the investigation stage is not a relevant consideration, nor is it a precondition for the Minister to make the detention order. This is what the court said at paragraphs [9]-[11]: ‘[9] The cases referred to above illustrate the 15 principles upon which the courts will consider in allowing for judicial review on an executive detention order. It may be stated this way. A writ of habeas corpus must be directed only against the current detention order even if the 20 earlier arrest of the detainee is irregular. The court is also not concerned with the vagueness, sufficiency or relevancy of the grounds of detention which is the sphere of the subjective exercise of the Minister’s discretion 25 Page 19 of 23 under the various executive detention legislations unless mala fide on his part is shown (see Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (Minister of Home Affairs), Malaysia [1969] 1 LNS 65 see also Minister of 5 Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 29). Any questions on the legality or propriety of the arrest or detention of a detainee at the investigation stage is not a relevant consideration nor is it a pre- 10 condition to the order of detention of the Minister. [10] Only when the statute requires an act to be a condition precedent to the making of a detention order can a valid complaint be made 15 against that detention. Under the Act there are two conditions precedent for the Minister to consider before making a detention order. These are found in s. 6(1) of the Act… [11] The scheme under the Act (similarly under 20 the POPOC) is that before a detention order is directed, the police would need to conduct an investigation which includes the power to detain any suspected persons. The manner on conducting the investigations and arrests at 25 Page 20 of 23 this stage, is neither a condition precedent nor a matter which has a direct link with the detention order and thus not a ground for judicial review. Previous cases such as Koh Yoke Koon v Minister for Home Affairs, 5 Malaysia & Anor [1987] 1 LNS 67, which held that a detention order made against a suspect who had been illegally detained by the police at the investigation stage is subject to judicial review are no longer good law since this is not 10 a procedural non-compliance of a condition precedent to nullify the detention order. (see also the Federal Court case of Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914).’ 15 [33] That is exactly what the present appeal is all about, which is a challenge by the appellant on the legality or propriety of the investigation process carried out by the Investigating Officer. This is untenable as whatever defect, if any, in the investigation process carried out by the 20 Investigating Officer has been superseded by the issuance of the detention order by the Minister on 27.4.2020 and is therefore irrelevant. As decided in L Rajanderan, any application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus must be directed at the current or pre-existing detention of the 25 Page 21 of 23 arrested person and not after the expiry or extinguishment of his detention period: See also Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 CLJ 81 which was followed recently by this court in Goh Leong Yong v ASP Khairul Firoz Rodzuan & Ors [2021] 1 LNS 994; [2021] MLJU 5 1403.” [6] In the Federal Court case of Goh Leong Yong v ASP Khairul Fairoz Bin Rodzuan & Ors [2021] MLJU 1325; [2021] 1 LNS 994 it was held: 10 “[122] Based on the aforesaid, Mohd Faizal bin Haris, L Rajanderan a/l R Letchumanan are still good law. Steve Shim CJSS’s decision in Mohamed Ezam which held that the detention under s 73(1) was unlawful premised on non compliance of s 73(1)(b) 15 was actually in line with the ratio in Mohd Faizal bin Haris, ie that a detention under any provision of the law must fulfill the condition precedent for it to be lawful. The three panel of judges which presided in Mohamed Ezam also presided in Nasharuddin Nasir 20 and their decisions, although following the principles in Karam Singh (which held that a court has no jurisdiction to hear a writ filed against the police for irregularities in a detention order under s 73(1) of the ISA when it had been superseded by one under 25 Page 22 of 23 s 8(1), contradicted their decision in Mohamed Ezam, but in line with that of Mohd Faizal bin Haris. [123] Given the aforesaid, on the academic point, the preliminary objection on the application for the writ of habeas corpus against the detention of the appellant 5 under s 4(1)(a) of the POCA by the senior federal counsel has merits. The issuance of the writ of habeas corpus would not serve any purpose for the detention under s 4(1)(a) as it has already ended when it was brought before the High Court. Such a 10 challenge has been rendered academic. An application for a writ of habeas corpus must be directed towards the current detention order. The principle as enunciated by Mohd Faizal bin Haris and L Rajanderan a/l R Letchumanan is still relevant and 15 remain as good law. The learned trial Judge did not err when His Lordship upheld the preliminary objections of the respondent on the academic point.” [7] See also the case of Mohd Hairy bin Mohammad & Ors v 20 ASP Khairul Fairoz bin Rodzuan & Ors [2020] MLJU 1818 wherein the academic issue was discussed. Ergo all the common issues fail and are dismissed.” [10] Therefore cadit quaestio. 25 Page 23 of 23 Dated : 1 MARCH 2022 5 …..SIGNED….. ASLAM B ZAINUDDIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT IN MALAYA JOHOR BAHRU 10 Counsel for the Appellants: Tetuan Ahmad Zaidi & Partners Peguambela & Peguamcara 15 J-1-10, Block J, Jalan PJU 1A/1, Taipan 2 Damansara, 47301 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Counsel for the Respondents: 20 Peguam Persekutuan Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Kementerian Dalam Negeri Aras 5, Blok D1, Parcel D, Presint 1, Putrajaya.