Lee Koon Kit (Menuntut Sebagai Pentadbir Harta Pusaka Lee Sang - K/P-541018105815) v Er Zhi Ning (WA-12BNCvC-54-06/2025)

LEE KOON KIT (NRIC No: 790110-14-5243) [Acting as Administrator of the Estate of Lee Sang (NRIC No: 541018-10-5815) (formerly 4702771) (Deceased) who brings this action on behalf of the Estate of the Deceased Under Section 8 of the Civil Law Act 1956)]

YUAN YOKE KIEW (NRIC No: 590607-10-6008) (formerly 5687645) [The Second Appellant is the lawful wife and dependent of Lee Sang (NRIC No: 541018-10-5815) (formerly 4702771) (Deceased)] ...APPELLANTS

ER ZHI NING (NRIC No: 040523-14-0632)

YONG YEE SIEN (NRIC No: 941014-10-5810) ...RESPONDENTS (In the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur In the Federal Territory, Malaysia

Lee Koon Kit (NRIC No: 790110-14-5243) [Acting as Administrator of the Estate of Lee Sang (NRIC No: 541018-10-5815) (formerly 4702771) (Deceased) who brings this action on behalf of the Estate of the Deceased Under Section 8 of the Civil Law Act 1956)]

Yuan Yoke Kiew (NRIC No: 590607-10-6008) (formerly 5687645) [The Second Plaintiff is the lawful wife and dependent of Lee Sang (NRIC No: 541018-10-5815) (formerly 4702771) (Deceased)] ...Plaintiffs

Er Zhi Ning (NRIC No: 040523-14-0632)

Yong Yee Sien (NRIC No: 941014-10-5810) ...Defendants)

This is an appeal against the judgment of the learned Sessions Court Judge dated 21 May 2025, wherein the appellants’ claim was allowed in part and dismissed in part. The appellants, being dissatisfied with both the quantum of damages awarded and the rejection of certain heads of claim, have lodged this appeal.

The appeal stems from a fatal road traffic accident that occurred on 24 July 2023 at approximately 7.10 am along Persiaran Cemara, Petaling Jaya, Selangor. The deceased, Lee Sang, aged 68 at the time of his demise, was riding his motorcycle bearing registration number VP 1799 when he was involved in a collision with a motor vehicle bearing registration number WDX 6814, driven by the second respondent. As a result of the collision, the deceased sustained grievous injuries and was pronounced dead upon arrival at hospital.

The first appellant is the duly appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased, while the second appellant claims to be the lawful wife and dependent of the deceased. The appellants initiated proceedings against the respondents claiming, inter alia, loss of dependency, funeral expenses, and other special damages.

The learned Sessions Court Judge, after considering the evidence and submissions, made the following key decisions that are now the subject of this appeal:

The dismissal of the second appellant's claim for loss of dependency;

The dismissal of the claim for the outstanding balance of a housing loan amounting to RM148,600.75;

The allowance of only RM15,000 for funeral expenses when the appellants claimed RM23,188; and

The dismissal of the claim for RM8,000 for the cost of extracting the grant of letters of administration.

The appellants therefore appeal against these decisions, while the respondents seek to uphold the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in its entirety.

The memorandum of appeal dated 2 July 2025 and the written submissions for the appellants raise the following grounds of appeal:

The learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in rejecting the second appellant's claim for loss of dependency by failing to properly consider the evidence regarding her status as the lawful wife of the deceased;

The learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law in holding that the deceased, having attained the age of 60 years at the time of his death, automatically barred the second appellant from claiming loss of dependency, despite evidence that the deceased was gainfully employed prior to his death;

The learned Sessions Court Judge erred in failing to consider the legitimate expectation of the deceased continuing to pay the monthly instalments for the housing loan, which was registered in the name of the third appellant but beneficially owned by the deceased;

The learned Sessions Court Judge erred in allowing only RM15,000 for funeral expenses when the full amount claimed was RM23,188, which was supported by invoices and receipts; and

The learned Sessions Court Judge erred in rejecting the claim for RM8,000 for the cost of extracting the grant of letters of administration, which was a necessary expense to enable the first appellant to commence the action.

The statutory framework governing this appeal is primarily provided for in the Civil Law Act 1956 ("the Act"). The relevant provisions are sections 7 and 8, which respectively establish the cause of action for fatal accidents and govern the survival of causes of action upon death.

Section 7 of the Act creates a statutory cause of action for the benefit of the dependents of a person whose death has been caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another. It is the provision under which the appellants’ claim for loss of dependency and special damages must be assessed. The section provides as follows:

Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death has been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to an offence under the Penal Code.

Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, child and any person with disabilities under the care, if any, of the person whose death has been so caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor of the person deceased.

The damages which the party who shall be liable under subsection (1) to pay to the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought shall, subject to this section, be such as will compensate the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought for any loss of support suffered together with any reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the party liable under subsection (1):

Distinct from the specific cause of action created by section 7, section 8 of the Act sets out the general common law rule that causes of action survive the death of a person, either for or against their estate. This provision is relevant to claims that the deceased might have had prior to his death. The section stipulates:

Subject to this section, on the death of any person all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of, his estate: Provided that this subsection shall not apply to causes of action for defamation or seduction or for inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the other or to any claim for damages on the ground of adultery.

Where a cause of action survives as aforesaid, the damages recoverable shall be the same, except as to the amount of damages for pain and suffering, as would have been recoverable if the person injured had not died, but shall include damages, where appropriate, for loss of expectation of life. Analysis and Decision

After carefully considering the evidence on record, the submissions of both parties, and the relevant authorities, I shall now address each ground of appeal in turn.

The pivotal issue for determination on this ground of appeal is whether the second appellant, Yuan Yoke Kiew, has discharged the evidential burden and proved, on a balance of probabilities, that she was the lawful wife of the deceased, Lee Sang.

The appellants’ case rests upon the contention that the second appellant entered into customary marriage with the deceased prior to the commencement of the mandatory registration requirements under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 which came into force in 1984. They rely on the identity cards of their children, particularly the eldest child Lee Siew Leng (SP3), whose date of birth predates 1984, as evidence of the marriage.

The respondents, in rebuttal, submit that the appellants have failed to produce any cogent evidence to substantiate the existence of a valid marriage. They correctly contend that an identity cards is not a definitive document for the purpose of determining the circumstances of a child’s birth or the marital status of their parents. A birth certificate would be the primary document for that purpose. Furthermore, the respondents highlight the stark absence of any direct evidence of a customary marriage, such as a marriage certificate, photographs of the ceremony, or testimonial evidence from witnesses present at the alleged event.

The onus of proof, in this instance, rests squarely upon the appellants to establish the second appellant’s status as a lawful wife, as this is the foundation upon which her claim for loss of dependency is built. Upon a meticulous examination of the evidence adduced, I find that the appellants have failed to discharge this legal burden.

The identity cards of the children are, at best, circumstantial and do not constitute conclusive proof of a marriage between the deceased and the second appellant. Although these documents may, in a limited capacity, suggest parentage through the shared surname, they are insufficient by themselves to validate the legal existence of a marital union. The learned Sessions Court Judge was, therefore, correct in concluding that such evidence falls short of the requisite standard of proof necessary to establish the claimed marital relationship.

More critically, the evidential record is devoid of any substantive proof of a customary marriage. In an era where marriages, even customary ones, were often significant community events, the complete lack of corroborative evidence such as witness testimonies or photographic records, is telling. The fact that the second appellant was named as a beneficiary in the grant of letters of administration is also not determinative of her marital status, as such grants are typically based on the information provided by the applicant and do not involve a conclusive judicial determination on that specific issue.

It is a well-established principle of law that a party who asserts a fact must prove it. A claim of such fundamental importance as the status of a lawful wife cannot be sustained by mere assertion or inference. It must be established by cogent and credible evidence. To found a claim for loss of dependency on the basis of speculation would be contrary to the principles of justice and equity.

This principle against awards based on speculation is neatly encapsulated in the decision of the Federal Court in Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v. Aidi Abdullah (1984) 1 CLJ Rep 294 FC;

1 MLJ 242, where it was held that: “There is also a difference between loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity although both items are under general damages. Future loss of earnings or loss of prospective earnings are awarded for real assessable loss i.e. loss that is capable of assessment at the date of the trial. It must be proved by evidence and not by mere speculation. In the absence of such evidence if the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, he will be awarded a sum as part of the general damages for his disability suffered as a result of the injuries sustained, instead of compensation for loss of future earnings.” [Emphasis is mine]

Although that case concerned the quantification of loss of future earnings, the underlying tenet that a court cannot act on mere speculation is equally applicable to the determination of a fact such as the existence of a valid marriage. In the present instance, the appellants have failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the existence of a customary marriage between the deceased and the second appellant.

In the result, I am entirely satisfied that the appellants have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the second appellant was the lawful wife of the deceased. Consequently, the learned Sessions Court Judge did not err in law or in fact in rejecting the second appellant's claim for loss of dependency. The appeal on this ground is accordingly dismissed.

The second issue for determination is whether the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law by holding that the deceased’s attainment of 60 years of age at the time of his death operated, by itself, as an automatic bar to the second appellant’s claim for loss of dependency, notwithstanding evidence that the deceased was gainfully employed prior to his demise.

The appellants contend that the learned Sessions Court Judge misinterpreted section 7(3)(iv)(a) of the Act. They argue that the proviso "in the case of any other person deceased" was intended to apply to a person over the age of 60 who was, unlike the general class of retirees, still gainfully employed. In support of this, they point to evidence that the deceased was earning a monthly income of RM3,600, of which RM2,000 was contributed regularly to the second appellant.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the provision is clear and unambiguous. They argue that section 7(3)(iv)(a) creates a distinct and absolute statutory bar for any person who has attained the age 60, and that the phrase “any other person deceased” logically refers to a person who has not yet reached that age.

The resolution of this issue hinges upon the proper construction of section 7(3)(iv)(a) of the Act. The provision provides as follows:

(iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the damages under this section the Court shall –

take into account that where the person deceased has attained the age of sixty years at the time of his death, his loss of earnings for any period after his death shall not be taken into consideration; and in the case of any other person deceased, his loss of earnings for any period after his death shall be taken into consideration if it is proved or admitted that the person deceased was receiving earnings by his own labour or other gainful activity prior to his death; [Emphasis is mine]

A plain and grammatical reading of the statute reveals a clear legislative intent. The provision is bifurcated into two distinct limbs, dealing with two separate and mutually exclusive classes of deceased persons. The first limb deals categorically with a person who “has attained the age of sixty years”. The language employed is mandatory and unequivocal: “his loss of earnings for any period after his death shall not be taken into consideration”. There is no qualifying language that would allow the court to look beyond the deceased’s age and consider his actual employment status.

The second limb, which begins with the phrase “and in the case of any other person deceased”, must, by necessity, refer to a person who falls outside the first category. In the context of this provision, “any other person deceased” can only mean a person who has not attained the age of sixty years. The condition that follows that loss of earnings can be considered if the person was gainfully employed therefore applies only to this second class of persons.

To accept the appellants’ construction would be to render the first limb of the provision redundant and nugatory. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the court should strive to give effect to every word of a statute and avoid a construction that would lead to an absurdity or render a part of the legislation meaningless, see the Federal Court decision in Palm Oil Research And Development Board Malaysia & Anor v Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn Bhd [2004] 2 CLJ 265. The legislature could not have intended to create a specific category for those over 60 only to immediately create an exception that swallows the rule.

This interpretation is supported by the Federal Court decision in Jennifer Anne Harper v Timothy Theseira (2009) 7 MLJ 711, where the court, in considering a similar statutory provision, affirmed the principle that: “[14] Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that the appellant’s claim under this heading is caught by the said provision of s. 7(3)(iv)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956. In essence, it means that the appellant is not entitled to claim for loss of support because the deceased was at the time of his demise above the age of 55 years. He was 68 years old at the time of his death… The words of the legislature are clear and the court need not go further than applying those words used in the legislation. It is only in cases where the intention of the legislature is not clear that this court will embark on the process of interpreting the law (See: Tan Kim Chuan & Anor v. Chandu Nair Krishna Nair [1991] 1 CLJ 682; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 441). The mandatory words in the proviso to s. 7(3)(iv)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956 are crystal clear and must be given effect in its plain literal meaning. The purpose of enacting such provision is to bar speculation and awards in cases involving individuals who has attained the age of 55 years. No provision is made in respect of a multiplier where the deceased is above the age of 55. To adopt the multiplier of 16 years as suggested by the appellant is definitely going against the grain of the provision.” [Emphasis is mine]

Although the case concerned the statutory age of 55 years, which has since been amended to 60, the enunciated principle remains the same. The Federal Court’s rationale was to give effect to a clear legislative policy to bar speculation regarding the future earning capacity of persons who have reached a prescribed age of retirement. The purpose of the provision is therefore to create a definitive cut-off, irrespective of the deceased’s actual circumstances.

In light of the unequivocal wording of section 7(3)(iv)(a) of the Act, the appellants' argument that the deceased was gainfully employed and contributing to the second appellant's maintenance is, with respect, irrelevant. The provision is express and admits of no exception based on the deceased’s actual employment status post-retirement age. The legislature has spoken in clear terms, and it is not for this court to introduce a qualification that the statute itself does not contain.

Accordingly, I find that the learned Sessions Court Judge did not err in rejecting the second appellant's claim for loss of dependency on the ground that the deceased had attained the age of 60 years at the time of his death.

The third issue for my determination is whether the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law in rejecting the claim for the outstanding balance of a housing loan, amounting to RM148,600.75. The basis of this claim was the appellants’ assertion of a legitimate expectation that the deceased would have continued to service the monthly instalments had he not died.

The appellants’ contention rests upon two grounds. First, that the deceased was the beneficial owner of the property, notwithstanding that the loan was registered in the names of the deceased’s daughter, Lee Siew Leng (SP3) and her husband. Second, that the deceased had, by his conduct, created a legitimate expectation that he would continue paying the monthly instalments of RM1,000. They submit that the learned Sessions Court Judge misapplied the law in rejecting this claim under section 8(2) of the Act.

The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the claim is untenable in law. They argue that the loan agreement was a contract between the financial institution and SP3 and her husband, and consequently, the deceased bore no legal obligation to repay it. They further contend that the claim is founded on a moral or familial duty, which does not create a cause of action survivable under the Act. As a secondary point, they raise a procedural objection, noting that the documents pertaining to this loan were merely marked for identification (ID) and were not formally admitted into evidence, rendering them inadmissible to prove the appellants’ case.

I find the respondents’ submissions to be persuasive. The learned Sessions Court Judge was correct in rejecting this claim, and my reasoning is as follows. The claim is predicated on section 8(2) of the Act, which provides:

Subject to this section, on the death of any person all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of, his estate: Provided that this subsection shall not apply to causes of action for defamation or seduction or for inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the other or to any claim for damages on the ground of adultery.

Where a cause of action survives as aforesaid, the damages recoverable shall be the same, except as to the amount of damages for pain and suffering, as would have been recoverable if the person injured had not died, but shall include damages, where appropriate, for loss of expectation of life. [Emphasis is mine]

The crucial phrase in this provision is “all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him”. A cause of action that survives against or vested in the deceased’s estate is one that the deceased himself could have sue or been sued upon in his lifetime. In the present case, the deceased was not a party to the loan agreement. The legal liability to repay the housing loan rested, and continues to rest, with SP3 and her husband. There was, therefore, no subsisting cause of action against the deceased for the outstanding debt which could survive for the benefit of his estate.

The appellants’ argument based on “legitimate expectation” misconstrues the nature of a survivable cause of action. While the deceased may have felt a moral or familial obligation, or may have led the appellants to expect he would continue making the payments, this does not crystallise into a legally enforceable debt owed by him. The law of tort and contract is concerned with legal liabilities, not moral expectations. To allow a claim on this basis would be to extend the scope of section 8(2) far beyond what Parliament intended.

Even assuming, without deciding, that the deceased was the beneficial owner of the property, this fact does not, by itself, impose upon him the personal contractual liability of the loan. Beneficial ownership and legal liability for a debt are distinct legal concepts. The claim for the outstanding balance is, in essence, a claim for future financial contributions the deceased might have made, not a claim for a debt that he legally owed. Such a claim is more akin to a claim for loss of dependency, which, as has been determined, is not available to the appellants.

In the result, the claim for the outstanding housing loan fails because it does not fall within the ambit of section 8(2) of the Act. There was no subsisting cause of action against the deceased, and the claim is founded on expectation rather than legal liability. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Court Judge did not err in rejecting this head of claim.

I am further fortified in this view by the evidential foundation upon which the appellants’ claim was based. It is a matter of record that the documents purportedly evidencing the housing loan were merely marked as ID and were never formally admitted into evidence through the testimony of a competent witness.

The consequence of such a procedural failing is well-established. In the case of Associated Pan Malaysia Cement Sdn Bhd v Westwood Development Sdn Bhd (2014) 7 MLJ 394, Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera J (as he then was) held with admirable clarity: "[34] In any event, the defendant's survey plan remained an ID document, being marked as 'IDD-14'. An ID document is not a document that has been properly admitted as evidence at trial. It is trite that such documents do not form part of the evidence for the court's consideration and any evidence or testimony in regards to these documents are to be disregarded (see Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors (1977) 1 MLJ 180). Therefore, the only approved survey plan before this court is the 2005 survey plan of the plaintiff.” [Emphasis is mine]

The principle articulated in that authority is directly applicable to the facts at hand. The documents in question, having remained ID documents throughout the trial, did not form part of the evidential matrix before the learned Judge. Consequently, any testimony or assertions predicated upon them were, as a matter of law, to be disregarded. Without the proper admission of these documents, the appellants failed to establish the existence, terms, or outstanding balance of the loan upon which their claim relied.

Accordingly, the claim for the outstanding housing loan fails on two independent grounds. Firstly, as a matter of substantive law, it does not fall within the ambit of a survivable cause of action under section 8(2) of the Act. Secondly, it is procedurally infirm for having been predicated on documents that there were inadmissible in evidence. For these reasons, I find that the learned Sessions Court Judge did not err in rejecting this head of claim

The fourth issue on appeal concerns the quantum of damages awarded for funeral expenses. The appellants contend that the learned Judge erred in principle by awarding only RM15,000, when the full amount claimed was RM23,188.

It is trite law that reasonable funeral and burial expenses are a recoverable head of claim under a fatal accident action. However, the onus rests squarely upon the claimant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, not only that the expenses were necessarily incurred but also the reasonableness of their amount. This proof must be adduced through evidence that is properly admissible before the court.

The appellants submit that the full sum of RM23,188 was substantiated by invoices and receipts from the Chinese Cemetery Association and Tong Sim Funeral Enterprise. However, this submission overlooks a fundamental procedural deficiency. As correctly identified by the respondents, and indeed by the learned trial judge, these documents were never formally admitted into evidence. They were merely marked for identification (ID) without being proven through testimony of a competent witness, such as the person who incurred the expenses or a representative of the service providers.

The legal consequence of this failure is fatal to the appellants’ claim for the specific amount. As articulated in the decision of Associated Pan Malaysia (supra), documents marked for identification do not form part of the evidence properly before the court for its consideration. The learned Sessions Court Judge was therefore bound to disregard the invoices and receipts in question. In the absence of this primary evidence, the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proving that the expenses of RM23,188 were actually and reasonably incurred.

That, however, is not the end of the matter. While the specific amount remained unproven, the fact of the deceased’s death and the consequent necessity of a funeral arrangements were undisputed. In such circumstances, where the precise costs are unsubstantiated, the court possesses a discretion to award a sum that it considers to be reasonable and just in the nature of conventional funeral expenses. The award of RM15,000 represents a proper exercise of this judicial discretion. The learned Judge, having found the specific claim unsubstantiated, appropriately substituted a figure which he deemed to be a fair and conventional sum for the funeral of an adult in the local context.

In the result, I find that the learned Sessions Court Judge committed no error in principle. He correctly applied the rules of evidence in rejecting the unsubstantiated claim for RM23,188 and, in the proper exercise of his judicial discretion, awarded a sum that was just and reasonable in the circumstances. This ground of appeal therefore fails.

The fifth issue confronting this Court is whether the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law in rejecting the claim for RM8,000 purportedly for the cost of extracting the grant of letters of administration.

The appellants submit that this expenditure was a necessary precondition to the commencement of the present proceedings. In support of their position, they place reliance on the decision of Natthanan Yoochomsuk & Anor v Insp Mohd Noor Husri Johari & Ors (2024) MLJU 1849, wherein a similar head of claim was upheld by the court. The relevant passage from that judgment reads: “[42] A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Senior Federal Counsel that the plaintiffs have failed to call their witnesses to prove the special damages claimed for funeral expenses of RM15,000.00 and legal charges of RM7,000.00 for obtaining the Letters of Administration. [43] I find this objection to be without merits because during the case management for directions for assessment of damages on 12 December 2023, no objections were raised by the defendants when the plaintiffs sought for the assessrnent to be conducted by way of evidence being led in the form of affidavits. And, on 12 March 2024, the learned SFC said she had no objections to the late filing of the affidavit in reply (Encl 79) by the plaintiffs. Further, the defendants could have applied to cross-examine the deponent of the two affidavits (Encl 74 and Encl 79) filed by the plaintiffs but they did not. See Order 38 rule 2 (2) of the Rules of Court 2012 which provides as follows:”

Conversely, the respondents contend that this claim was not specifically pleaded in the amended statement of claim dated 26 June 2024. They place reliance on the established principle enunciated in Lee Tai Kau & Anor v. Rajanderan A/L Manickam & Anor (1995) 4 CLJ 521, to the effect that special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved.

After careful consideration of the submissions and authorities cited, I am of the view that the learned Sessions Court Judge did not err in dismissing the claim for RM8,000. The legal principle is well settled. Special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved. In the case of Lee Tai Kau (supra), the court held: "Special damages. This must be specifically pleaded and proved and it is not enough for the plaintiff to simply write down the particulars and throw it to the Court to decide (Yeap Cheng Hock v Kajima Talsei Joint Venture (1973) 1 MLJ 230). The object of specifically pleading special damages is to crystallize the issue and to enable both parties to prepare for trial" [Emphasis is mine]

Applying this principle to the present case, two deficiencies are apparent. First, the claim for the cost of extracting the grant of letters of administration was not specifically pleaded in the amended statement of claim dated 26 June 2024. Second, no evidence was adduced at trial to prove that this amount was, in fact, incurred.

While the case of Natthanan Yoochomsuk (supra) did allow a similar claim, the factual matrix of that case is materially distinguishable. In that case, the claim for legal charges relating to obtaining the letters of administration was properly pleaded and substantiated by unchallenged affidavits. By contrast, in the present case, the claim was neither specifically pleaded nor supported by any evidence.

For these reasons, I hold that the learned Sessions Court Judge committed no error in law in rejecting the claim for RM8,000 as the cost of extracting the grant of letters of administration.

After carefully considering all the evidence and submissions, I find that the learned Sessions Court Judge did not err in the decisions that are now the subject of this appeal. The appellants have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the second appellant is the lawful wife of the deceased. Furthermore, section 7(3)(iv)(a) of the Act clearly bars a claim for loss of earnings where the deceased has attained the age of 60 years at the time of his death. The claims for the outstanding balance of the housing loan and the cost of extracting the grant of letters of administration have no legal basis, and the documents supporting the claim for funeral expenses were not properly admitted as evidence.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs of RM5,000 to the respondents, subject to allocatur. Dated the 24th day of December 2025 … SGN … ……………………………………………….. MOH KOK WAI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE HIGH COURT HIGH COURT (CIVIL DIVISION NCvC14) HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA Counsel for the Appellants : Krishnan Nair Messrs N. Krishnan Nair & Co Counsel for the Defendants : Mahen a/l Rasanayagam and Nuramirah Hafni binti Mohamad Hizam Messrs Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong