Lee Yoke Swee (WA-31NCvC-1423-05/2025)

These Grounds of Judgment relate to two interrelated applications, namely Enclosure 18 and Enclosure 27, which were heard together as both arose from the administration of the estate of the late Lee Kim San ("the Deceased").

Both applications were made pursuant to section 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 ("the PAA 1959") and sought the removal of one of the existing joint administrators and the appointment of a replacement administrator in his or her stead.

Enclosure 18 was filed by Lee Yoke Swee ("the First Administrator") together with Lee Bee Ling, seeking, inter alia, an order that Yang Cai Jiao ("the Second Administrator") be removed as co-administrator of the estate and that Lee Bee Ling be appointed in her place.

Conversely, Enclosure 27 was filed by the Second Administrator together with Chen Kah Mun, seeking the removal of the First Administrator and the appointment of Chen Kah Mun as replacement administrator.

As both applications concerned the same estate, involved substantially the same factual background and raised overlapping questions of law and fact relating to the continued suitability of the existing administrators, this Court heard and determined both applications together.

Although the parties advanced numerous factual complaints against one another, this Court considered that the applications ultimately raised a narrower legal issue.

The principal question before the Court was whether the evidence disclosed "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 34 of the PAA 1959 to justify the Court exercising its supervisory jurisdiction to remove either of the existing administrators.

In determining that question, the Court remained mindful that the jurisdiction to remove a personal representative is one to be exercised cautiously, having regard to the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of all beneficiaries.

The present applications cannot properly be understood without first appreciating the procedural history that culminated in the present joint administration of the estate.

Following the demise of the Deceased, a Grant of Probate was initially obtained in respect of the estate. Subsequently, disputes arose amongst members of the Deceased's family concerning the administration of the estate, resulting in proceedings which ultimately challenged the continuation of that earlier grant.

Those proceedings were eventually resolved by way of a Consent Judgment entered into by the relevant parties. Pursuant to that Consent Judgment, the earlier Grant of Probate was revoked and the parties agreed to proceed with a fresh application for Letters of Administration.

The Consent Judgment also contained various agreed terms intended to regulate the future administration of the estate and to facilitate the orderly management of the estate for the benefit of all beneficiaries.

Following the Consent Judgment, an application for Letters of Administration was duly made before this Court. On 7 August 2025, this Court issued fresh Letters of Administration appointing Lee Yoke Swee and Yang Cai Jiao as joint administrators of the estate.

The issuance of the Letters of Administration marked an important stage in the administration of the estate. From that date onwards, both administrators stood on equal legal footing and assumed the fiduciary obligations imposed by law upon personal representatives. Each was expected to cooperate with the other in carrying out the administration of the estate, to act in good faith, and to discharge the office in the interests of all beneficiaries.

Notwithstanding the fresh appointment, disputes soon emerged concerning the manner in which the estate was being administered. Each administrator alleged that the other had failed to discharge the responsibilities expected of a joint administrator.

Allegations were made regarding the lack of cooperation, failure to communicate effectively, failure to participate meaningfully in matters concerning the administration of the estate, and disagreements relating to estate records and historical accounts.

These competing allegations eventually resulted in the filing of the present applications.

Through Enclosure 18, the First Administrator contended that the Second Administrator's post-appointment conduct had frustrated the effective administration of the estate and therefore constituted sufficient cause for her removal under section 34 of the PAA 1959.

Through Enclosure 27, the Second Administrator advanced substantially similar allegations against the First Administrator and sought corresponding relief.

It is important to emphasise that these applications did not invite this Court to revisit either the propriety of the earlier Grant of Probate or the correctness of the Consent Judgment that subsequently resolved those proceedings.

Those matters had already been concluded. Rather, the Court's inquiry was directed to the parties' conduct following the issuance of the Letters of Administration on 7 August 2025, and whether such conduct demonstrated sufficient cause for the Court to intervene under section 34 of the PAA 1959.

Having considered the pleadings, affidavits, written submissions and the respective authorities relied upon by the parties, the Court was of the view that the present applications ultimately raised three principal issues for determination.

The first issue was whether the evidence before the Court disclosed "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 34 of the PAA 1959 to justify the removal of the Second Administrator, Yang Cai Jiao, as sought in Enclosure 18.

The second issue was whether sufficient cause had likewise been established for the removal of the First Administrator, Lee Yoke Swee, as sought by the Second Administrator in Enclosure 27.

If either of the foregoing issues were answered in the affirmative, the Court would then have to consider whether the proposed replacement administrator was a suitable person to be appointed in place of the administrator removed.

In resolving those issues, the Court considered it necessary first to identify the legal principles governing the exercise of the Court's supervisory jurisdiction under section 34 of the PAA 1959 before applying those principles to the facts of the present case.

(A) Supervisory Jurisdiction under Section 34

Section 34 of the PAA 1959 confers upon the High Court the jurisdiction to revoke or vary grants of representation and, where appropriate, to remove an executor or administrator and appoint another person in his or her place. The jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and exists to ensure that estates are administered properly, efficiently and in accordance with the interests of those beneficially entitled thereto.

The jurisdiction under section 34 is not intended to punish an administrator for every mistake, disagreement or personal shortcoming. Rather, it exists to safeguard the proper administration of the estate whenever the continued appointment of a personal representative no longer serves that objective.

Accordingly, the Court's concern is not directed towards determining whether an administrator has been morally blameworthy or whether there has been misconduct in the disciplinary sense. Instead, the Court must determine whether the circumstances are such that the continued administration of the estate is likely to be prejudiced unless the Court intervenes.

It follows that every application under section 34 must ultimately be determined by reference to the particular facts of the case before the Court. The jurisdiction is discretionary and no rigid or exhaustive category of circumstances can be prescribed.

(B) "Sufficient Cause" under Section 34

The expression "sufficient cause" appearing in section 34 is deliberately broad. Parliament has not attempted to define the phrase exhaustively, thereby leaving it to the Court to determine, on the facts of each case, whether intervention is necessary to protect the administration of the estate.

It is well established that mere hostility between beneficiaries, personal dislike between family members, or disagreement amongst co-administrators does not, without more, constitute sufficient cause for removal.

Family disputes frequently arise in the administration of estates, and the Court must be slow to remove a personal representative merely because relations between the parties have become strained.

Equally, the Court does not intervene simply because another person may be capable of administering the estate more efficiently.

The jurisdiction under section 34 is not exercised on the basis that the Court is selecting the "best" administrator. Rather, the Court is concerned with whether the existing administrator remains capable of discharging the fiduciary obligations attached to the office in a manner consistent with the proper administration of the estate.

Conversely, where the evidence demonstrates that the administration of the estate has been materially impeded by the conduct of a personal representative, whether through persistent non-cooperation, inability or unwillingness to discharge the obligations of office, or conduct inconsistent with the due administration of the estate, the Court may conclude that sufficient cause has been established to justify intervention.

(C) Fiduciary Nature of the Office

Upon accepting a grant of representation, an administrator assumes fiduciary obligations owed not to himself or herself, but to the estate and to all persons beneficially interested therein.

The office of administrator is therefore not merely one conferring authority. It imposes corresponding responsibilities. Among those responsibilities are the duties to administer the estate honestly, diligently and impartially, to cooperate where there are joint administrators, to preserve estate assets and to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to facilitate the orderly administration of the estate.

Where two persons accept appointment as joint administrators, each assumes equal responsibility for the administration of the estate. Neither administrator may simply adopt a passive role or leave the burden of administration entirely to the other. Joint administration necessarily requires cooperation, communication and constructive participation.

The Court recognises that differences of opinion may naturally arise between joint administrators. Nevertheless, disagreements must be addressed in a manner consistent with the fiduciary obligations attaching to the office. Persistent non-engagement or conduct which materially frustrates the administration of the estate may, depending upon the circumstances, amount to sufficient cause for removal.

(D) Authorities

These principles are reflected in the authorities relied upon by the parties. In Re Khoo Boo Gong decd; Khoo Teng Seong v Teoh Chooi Ghim & Ors [1981] 2 MLJ 68 , the Federal Court emphasised that the paramount consideration is the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the beneficiaries, rather than the personal disputes between those involved in the administration.

More recently, in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor v TanYing [2023] 2 MLJ 583, the Federal Court reaffirmed that the Court's jurisdiction to remove a personal representative must be exercised cautiously and only where the interests of the proper administration of the estate genuinely require such intervention.

This Court respectfully adopts those principles. They demonstrate that the Court's inquiry is necessarily prospective rather than punitive.

The question is not whether an administrator has committed an isolated error or whether disagreements have arisen between family members. Rather, the Court must determine whether, viewed objectively, the continued appointment of the administrator promotes or undermines the due and proper administration of the estate.

Guided by those principles, this Court proceeded to evaluate the evidence before it.

(A) The Proper Scope of the Court's Inquiry

Before examining the competing allegations made by the parties, this Court considers it necessary to identify the proper scope of the present inquiry.

A considerable portion of the affidavits filed by both sides revisited events which occurred before the issuance of the present Letters of Administration. Those matters included disputes surrounding the earlier Grant of Probate, the circumstances leading to the Consent Judgment, as well as allegations concerning the historical administration of the estate.

In the Court's judgment, those matters provide the factual background against which the present applications arose. However, they do not themselves determine whether either administrator should now be removed under section 34 of the

The Consent Judgment represented a negotiated resolution of the earlier probate dispute. Pursuant thereto, the earlier Grant of Probate was revoked and the parties proceeded to obtain fresh Letters of Administration. On 7 August 2025, this Court appointed Lee Yoke Swee and Yang Cai Jiao as joint administrators of the estate.

The legal significance of that appointment cannot be understated. From the date of the issuance of the Letters of Administration, both administrators stood on equal legal footing and assumed identical fiduciary obligations as personal representatives of the estate. Whatever disagreements had existed before that appointment had already been resolved, at least insofar as the composition of the administration was concerned.

Consequently, this Court does not regard the present applications as an opportunity to revisit the merits of the earlier probate proceedings or to determine whether the Consent Judgment itself was advantageous to one party or the other. Those issues have already been concluded.

The Court's inquiry is therefore directed to a different question altogether, namely whether the subsequent conduct of either administrator, after accepting the office of joint administrator, demonstrates sufficient cause within the meaning of section 34 to justify the Court's intervention.

(B) Fiduciary Obligations Following the Grant of Letters of

The appointment as a joint administrator is not merely a conferment of authority. It is an acceptance of fiduciary responsibilities owed to the estate and to every beneficiary interested therein.

A joint administrator is expected to participate actively in the administration of the estate, to cooperate with the other administrator, to communicate where necessary, and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the administration proceeds efficiently and lawfully.

These obligations arise by virtue of the office itself. They exist independently of the personal relationship between the administrators.

Accordingly, although differences of opinion and even hostility between family members may exist, those circumstances do not excuse an administrator from discharging the obligations imposed by law upon a personal representative.

In the present case, both parties voluntarily accepted the appointment as joint administrators pursuant to the Letters of Administration issued by this Court. Each therefore assumed an equal responsibility to ensure that the administration of the estate could proceed effectively notwithstanding their previous disagreements.

(C) The Respondent's Explanation

The Second Administrator contended that many of the complaints levelled against her stemmed from the fact that she did not have custody of the estate documents prior to the Consent Judgment. She further maintained that the responsibility for historical accounts and earlier administration rested primarily upon the First Administrator.

This Court accepts that the historical custody of estate documents constitutes a relevant factual consideration. Likewise, the Court accepts that obligations relating to the previous administration cannot automatically be transferred to another administrator merely because a fresh grant has subsequently been issued.

However, with respect, those explanations do not answer the central issue before the Court.

The present applications are not determined by asking who was responsible for the historical administration of the estate before the issuance of the Letters of Administration. Nor are they determined by identifying which administrator had possession of particular documents during the earlier administration.

Even if this Court accepts that aspects of the historical administration remained the responsibility of the First Administrator, that circumstance did not relieve the Second Administrator of the independent fiduciary obligations assumed upon her appointment on 7 August 2025.

The entitlement to seek information, clarification or supporting documents is entirely legitimate. However, the fiduciary obligations of a joint administrator extend beyond requesting information. They require active participation, constructive engagement and reasonable cooperation in ensuring that the administration of the estate proceeds.

(D) Whether Sufficient Cause Has Been Established

Having carefully considered the affidavits, documentary exhibits and submissions of the parties as a whole, this Court is satisfied that the evidence must be evaluated cumulatively rather than by isolating individual incidents.

Viewed individually, certain complaints relied upon by the First Administrator may not, in themselves, justify the removal of the Second Administrator.

Nevertheless, when viewed collectively, the evidence reveals a continuing pattern of non-engagement in matters requiring joint administration. The repeated absence of meaningful participation, lack of timely cooperation and inability to work constructively with the co-administrator materially impeded the efficient administration of the estate.

The Court emphasises that the present decision is not founded merely upon family hostility or personal disagreements. Family disputes unfortunately arise in many probate matters. Section 34 does not exist to resolve domestic disagreements or to determine which party is morally more deserving.

Neither is this Court making any finding of dishonesty, bad faith or misappropriation against the Second Administrator. No such finding is necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction under section 34.

Rather, the Court is concerned with the practical functioning of the administration itself. The evidence demonstrates that the joint administration established pursuant to the Consent Judgment and implemented through the subsequent Letters of Administration has not functioned in the manner contemplated when those Letters of Administration were granted.

In the judgment of this Court, the continued inability of the joint administrators to administer the estate effectively is closely connected with the Second Administrator's persistent failure to participate meaningfully in the administration after assuming office.

Viewed objectively, the cumulative conduct established before this Court constitutes sufficient cause within the meaning of section 34 of the PAA 1959 to warrant the Court's intervention.

(E) Enclosure 27

The Court now turns to the cross-application seeking the removal of the First Administrator.

The complaints advanced against the First Administrator relate principally to the earlier administration of the estate, the custody of historical documents and the preparation of estate accounts.

Those matters are undoubtedly relevant to the overall administration of the estate. However, they do not establish, on the evidence before this Court, that the First Administrator is presently incapable of discharging the duties of a personal representative.

More importantly, the evidence relied upon in support of Enclosure 27 does not demonstrate that the First Administrator's continued appointment has rendered the future administration of the estate impracticable in the manner contemplated under section 34.

The Court is therefore not satisfied that sufficient cause has been established to justify her removal. F.

For the reasons set out above, this Court finds that sufficient cause has been established under section 34 of the PAA 1959 for the removal of the Second Administrator, Yang Cai Jiao.

Accordingly, Enclosure 18 is allowed. Yang Cai Jiao is removed as joint administrator of the estate, and Lee Bee Ling is appointed in her place, subject to compliance with the requirements of the

Enclosure 27 is dismissed as this Court is not satisfied that sufficient cause has been established for the removal of the First Administrator.

For the avoidance of doubt, this decision does not affect the respective beneficial entitlements of any beneficiary under the Distribution Act 1958. The Court's intervention is confined solely to the administration of the estate and is intended to secure its due and proper administration for the benefit of all persons beneficially interested therein.

As both applications arose out of a continuing family dispute concerning the administration of the estate, and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, this Court ordered that each party bear their own costs in respect of the respective applications. Dated: 22nd July 2026 …………………………………………….. (YA PUAN MAHAZAN BINTI MAT TAIB) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Counsel for The Applicants : Mohammad Ameer Hafiy Bin Amri Messrs. Sim & Rahman (Shah Alam) Advocates & Solicitors Counsel for The Respondent :