months, and seven (7) days’ notice of each meeting SHALL be given to the members ….” 10 [53] We found nowhere mentioned expressly nor specifically under Rule 9 of “YKT-2” that PCCCI’s Committee is empowered to pass a resolution in any Committee Meeting for the appointment of any new auditor to audit PCCCI’s Financial Statement. As clearly 15 provided under Rule 15 of PCCCI’s Constitution (“YKT-2”), the supreme authority of the Chamber is vested in a general meeting of the members. The crucial decision as to the appointment of the new auditor contrary to the express provision of Rule 13 should have been made through an Ordinary General Meeting or 20 Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM), but not through a Committee Meeting (without prior reference to the general meeting as laid down by Rule 9(4)). Therefore, any resolution regarding that appointment of the new auditor passed through the Committee Meeting was considered as void ab initio and it would 25 have no legal effect at all though it was allegedly passed and adopted later on in the AGM. The learned judge was correct when he held that - “Submitting the 2013 Financial Statement prepared and 30 signed by the new auditor contravenes the Rules and 40 Constitution of PCCCI. I do not find anywhere in the Rules 5 and Constitution of PCCCI that gives the Committee the power to appoint a new auditor to audit the Financial Statement of PCCCI by way of a resolution passed during a Committee Meeting. I agree with the SFC that since the supreme authority of PCCCI is vested in a general meeting 10 of the members, the appointment of a new auditor has to be done during an Ordinary General Meeting, an AGM or an Extraordinary General Meeting and not through a Committee Meeting. This is clearly so provided under Rule 15(1) of the Constitution. Given that the new auditor was 15 appointed during a Committee Meeting renders the appointment unlawful. From the above, it is clear that the Applicants did not comply with the conditions of the 2nd Respondent in its letter 20 dated 20.1.2015. As such, it cannot be said that the 2nd Respondent’s decision to maintain the order for deregistration of PCCCI to be irrational.” (See: Pages 38- 39, ROA, Vol.1(A)] 25 [54] We reiterated the facts that at any material time, no prayer was ever sought to quash the First Respondent’s decision in cancelling the registration of PCCCI through the Order dated 15.08.2014 (“YKT-10”). There is no fresh decision under Section 13 of Act 335 (cancellation of registration) was ever made by the 30 41 First Respondent vide letter dated 4.04.2016 (“YKT-20”) as it was 5 already made earlier on 15.08.2014. It was the Second Respondent and not the First Respondent who on 4.04.2016 decided that the cancellation of PCCCI’s registration to be maintained/confirmed pursuant to Section 18 of Act 335. The First Respondent’s decision dated 15.08.2014 (“YKT-10”) in cancelling 10 the registration of PCCCI was not made under dictation from or at behest of the Second Respondent. By referring to the First Respondent’s Order dated 15.08.2014 (“YKT-10”), there was nothing to indicate that it was done under the dictation from or at behest of the Second Respondent and it was made by applying 15 the First Respondent’s own discretion pursuant to Section 13(1)(c)(iv) of Act 335. [55] In the circumstances of the case, in our view since there was no issue of a fresh decision or the same condition the doctrine of res 20 judicata does not apply in the present case. The doctrine is defined as an issue that has been definitely settled by judicial decision. At any material time, the Second Respondent had never acted in any judicial capacity but his action was purely administrative pursuant to his statutory powers under Section 18 25 of Act 335. [56] We found the Appellants and PCCCI in the present case did not comply with the conditions of the Second Respondent in its letter 42 dated 20.01.2015 and therefore the decision by the Second 5 Respondent is rational. [57] One of the grounds submitted by the Appellants is that the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies in the present situation. We did not agree with the Appellants. The doctrine of legitimate 10 expectation does not apply in the Appellants’ case. Firstly, PCCCI had failed to comply with the condition imposed by the Second Respondent and it failed to submit PCCCI’s Financial Statement for 2013 which should have been signed and audited by the Honorary Auditors who were appointed pursuant to the AGM 15 2012 as required by Rule 13(2) of PCCCI’s Constitution. Secondly, the appointment of the new auditor was in contravention to PCCCI’s Constitution and Section 14 of Act 335 which empowers the Registrar to order any registered society to furnish him in writing with duly audited accounts. In North East 20 Plantations Sdn. Bhd. v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Dungun & 1 Lagi [2011] 4 CLJ 729 at page 733, the Federal Court held that legitimate expectation cannot and should not override the express statutory power vested in the State Authority. 25 [58] We also agreed with the Respondents’ submission by referring to the Federal Court case of Zakiah bte Ishak v. Majlis Daerah Hulu Selangor Darul Ehsan [2005] 6 MLJ 517 where Arifin Zakaria FCJ at page 524 held that in law for legitimate expectation to arise there must be evidence of a promise or 30 43 undertaking made by the Second Respondent to that effect i.e. 5 the cancellation of PCCCI’s registration would not be maintained/confirmed. There was no such evidence before this Honorable Court. Thus, it is our view that the Appellants’ claim for breach of legitimate expectation was wholly unsustainable. 10 [59] In Dr. Amir Hussein Bin Baharuddin v. Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 3 MLJ 298, it was held at pages 300-301: ‘Reasonableness’ connotes that the expectation must be objectively justified. A subjective hope is therefore not 15 enough … However, its use has been discouraged recently by the House of Lords … The chief reason advanced being that some expectations, although they might well be entertained by reasonable persons will not necessarily have consequences to which effect will be given in public law … 20 Furthermore, the possibility that they may be some reasonable expectations which are not ‘legitimate’ has emerged with the extension of the concept of legitimate expectation into areas other than procedural fairness; for example, standing to bring an application for judicial 25 review … [60] It is our view that it was wrong and misconceived for the Appellants to state that the said decision of the 2nd Respondent was in breach of their legitimate expectation given the express 30 provision under Section 18 of Act 335 that such Second 44 Respondent’s final decision was within the statutory discretionary 5 power of the Second Respondent. We agreed with learned judge and he had correctly held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not apply in this case as the Applicants had failed to comply with the condition imposed i.e. to submit the 2013 Financial Statement with the audited and signed by the Honorary 10 Auditors appointed during the 2012 AGM. Further, the appointment of the new auditor was unconstitutional and any Financial Statement prepared by the said new auditor would be bad in law (See at pages 43-44, ROA, Vol.1(A)). 15 [61] We had read through the Records of Appeal entirely and we are satisfied that there is nothing to suggest nor to show that the Respondents’ decisions/actions were tainted with illegality or irrationality or procedural impropriety. We are satisfied that the Respondents had strictly acted within the ambit of their 20 jurisdiction/power and had followed accordingly the provisions of law in particular the Societies Act 1966 [Act 335]. CONCLUSION 25 [62] In conclusion, we found that the Respondents had: