Liew Yoke Chuan v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Kinta (AA-25-13-10/2023)

LIEW YOKE CHUAN

KHOO CHOONG HIANG

LIEW WONG

LEE YOON LOI

CHONG KIN KHEONG

TAN YEONG SENG

LOW SEE YAN (NO. K/P: 770819-08-6166) …APPELANTS

PENTADBIR TANAH KINTA, PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH

2.

3.

KERAJAAN NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN …RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw INTRODUCTION [1] This case concerns a dispute over the lawfulness of the alienation of certain lands to the 2nd Respondent, Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Perak (“PKNP”), in 2013 and the subsequent issuance of Section 425 notices under the National Land Code 1965 ("NLC") by the Land Administrator in 2023, directing the Applicants to vacate the Lands. [2] The Applicants challenged the validity of both the alienation of the Lands and the Section 425 notices, asserting non-compliance with statutory procedures and alleging institutional conflicts of interest. [3] The Applicants, who are in occupation of the Lands in question, claim that they have established rights or entitlements to the Lands, which predate the alienation to PKNP. The Respondents, in contrast, maintain that the Applicants are squatters with no lawful basis to remain on the Lands, and that the Lands were lawfully alienated to PKNP in 2013, rendering the Section 425 notices issued in 2023 valid and enforceable. BACKGROUND FACTS [4] PKNP is the registered proprietor of the six plots of land known as PT 253451 HSD 214720, PT 253415 HSD 214684, PT 253416 HSD 214685, PT 253453 HSD 214722, PT 253451 HSD 214720, PT 253450 HSD 214719 along with a road reserve in Wilayah Kanthan, Mukim Hulu Kinta, Daerah Kinta, Perak (“the Lands”). S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw [5] The Lands were originally state lands, and prior to the alienation, the Applicants had been in occupation of these lands for several years. While no formal title was ever issued to the Applicants, they contend that their occupation of the Lands was with the tacit approval or at least the acquiescence of the State Authority. The exact nature of the Applicants’ use of the Lands varies, with some engaging in small-scale agricultural activities while others have erected residential structures. [6] On 29.6.2013, the State Authority alienated the lands to PKNP, which is a statutory body tasked with promoting economic development in the State of Perak. The alienation was formalised through the issuance of titles, and PKNP was registered as the lawful proprietor of the lands. [7] The Applicants allege that this alienation was irregular and unlawful, citing non-compliance with the procedural requirements of Rule 4 of the Perak Land Rules. Specifically, they argue that no formal application for the alienation of the lands was made by PKNP and that the requisite details were not recorded in the prescribed forms under the Rules. [8] On 13.10.2023, the Land Administrator issued notices under Section 425 of the NLC to the Applicants, informing them that their continued occupation of the Lands constituted an offence under the NLC and directing them to vacate the lands within seven days from the date of the Section 425 Notices, i.e. by 20.10.2023. [9] Between 24.10.2023 to 25.10.2023, PKNP has commenced works to repossess the Lands, including denying entry to all squatters from the S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw Lands, stationing auxiliary police at the Lands, deploying excavators to remove plantation, piping, and structures on the Lands. [10] The Applicants did not comply with the notices and instead commenced the present proceedings, seeking to challenge both the alienation of the lands and the validity of the Section 425 notices. [11] The Applicants insisted that they are not squatters and that they had occupied the said farming plots with the knowledge and consent of the State and PKNP pending them being given alternative arable land. The Applicants argued that there is legitimate expectation that the Applicants would be given alternative lands in Perak Hi Tech Park, i.e. PHTP Lands to continue their valuable farming activities. [12] The Applicants contended that it was unconscionable on the part of PKNP to have displaced the settlers and destroyed their valuable crops after giving them legitimate expectations that they would be given alternative arable land in Hi Tech Park to continue their farming activities. [13] The Respondents, in response, argue that the alienation of the Lands was lawful and in accordance with all statutory requirements. They further contend that the Applicants, having no legal title to the Lands, have no right to challenge the alienation or to remain in occupation. Moreover, the Respondents assert that the Applicants’ challenge is time-barred, as it was not brought within the prescribed limitation period. S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw [14] The Applicants’ central contention hinges on two key legal arguments:

the alleged non-compliance with Rule 4 of the Perak Land Rules 1966 (“Perak Land Rules”) in the alienation of the Lands, and

(ii) an asserted institutional conflict of interest, due to the involvement of the Chief Minister of Perak in both the State Authority and the PKNP Board. [15] The Respondents reject these contentions and argue that the Applicants’ challenge to the alienation is time-barred and that the Section 425 notices were properly issued in accordance with the NLC. [16] This Court is called upon to determine the lawfulness of the alienation of the Lands, the validity of the Section 425 notices, and whether the Applicants have any lawful basis to remain on the Lands. Additionally, the Court must consider whether the Applicants are time-barred from challenging the alienation of the Lands, given the significant lapse of time between the alienation in 2013 and the filing of this application. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED [17] This Court must address the following issues: S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw

Whether the alienation of the lands to PKNP in 2013 was lawful, with particular reference to Rule 4 of the Perak Land Rules 1966 and the alleged conflict of interest (“Lawfulness of the Alienation of the Lands to PKNP”);

(ii) Whether the Appliants’ application for judicial review is time-barred (“Whether the Applicants’ claim for alienation is time-barred”)

(iii) Whether the Section 425 notices issued by the Land Administrator in 2023 are valid (“Validity of the Section 425 Notices”);

(iv) Whether the Applicants have any lawful basis to remain on the lands post-alienation (“The Lawfulness of the Applicants' Occupation of the Lands”);

Whether the Applicants have a legitimate expectation, arising from representations or conduct of the State or PKNP, that they would be provided alternative arable land for their farming activities (“Legitimate Expectation”)

(vi) What relief, if any, should be granted. Lawfulness of the Alienation of the Lands to PKNP [18] The Applicants’ principal argument regarding the lawfulness of the alienation is predicated on alleged non-compliance with Rule 4 of the S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw Perak Land Rules. Rule 4 provides that when an application for the alienation of land is made, full particulars of the application must be entered into a "Record of Applications for Land," and it must be noted whether the application was approved or refused. The Applicants allege that no formal application was made by PKNP, and that the required particulars were not recorded in the relevant forms. Accordingly, they argue that the alienation was procedurally flawed and thus invalid. [19] In response, the Respondents assert that an application was indeed made, and that all procedural requirements under Rule 4 were satisfied. They further contend that even if there were minor procedural irregularities, these would not invalidate the alienation, as the forms prescribed under the Perak Land Rules are directory rather than mandatory. Analysis of Rule 4 of the Perak Land Rules [20] The key legal question is whether non-compliance with Rule 4 of the Perak Land Rules renders the alienation of the Lands void. It is well-established that procedural rules can be either directory or mandatory, depending on the statutory intent and the consequences of non-compliance. In the case of Mokhtar Amin v. Mohamed Moktar Omar[2001] 4 CLJ 489, the Court of Appeal held that where the breach of a procedural rule does not affect the substantive rights of the parties or the fairness of the decision-making process, such rules are generally regarded as directory. [21] Rule 4 of the Perak Land Rules is a procedural provision aimed at ensuring transparency in the land alienation process. While the rule requires the recording of particulars of the application, it does not S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw expressly provide that failure to comply with these requirements invalidates the alienation. In this context, the purpose of Rule 4 is primarily administrative, intended to facilitate record-keeping rather than to impose substantive conditions on the validity of the alienation. [22] In light of the principles articulated in Mokhtar Amin (supra), I am of the view that Rule 4 is directory rather than mandatory. Even if there were minor omissions in the recording of particulars, these would not be sufficient to invalidate the alienation, provided that the substantive requirements for alienation under the NLC were met. There is no evidence before this Court to suggest that the alleged procedural irregularities affected the fairness or legality of the decision to alienate the lands to PKNP. Alleged Conflict of Interest [23] The Applicants further argue that the alienation of the Lands was tainted by an institutional conflict of interest, as the Chief Minister of Perak, who was involved in the State Authority’s decision to alienate the lands, was also a member of PKNP’s Board of Directors. The Applicants contend that this dual role created a conflict of interest, rendering the alienation invalid. [24] The Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that there is no conflict of interest, as PKNP is a statutory body created to serve the interests of the State, and the Chief Minister’s involvement in both the State Authority and PKNP is a natural consequence of his official duties. The Respondents further argue that the Applicants have failed to provide S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw any evidence that the Chief Minister’s dual role influenced the decision to alienate the lands in a manner that was unfair or unlawful. [25] The doctrine of conflict of interest is intended to prevent decision-makers from acting in situations where they have a personal or financial interest that conflicts with their duty to act impartially. In this case, however, the Chief Minister’s involvement in both the State Authority and PKNP does not, in itself, constitute a conflict of interest, as both entities are public bodies tasked with promoting the economic development of the State. [26] In the absence of any evidence to suggest that the Chief Minister had a personal or financial interest in the alienation of the Lands, I find that there is no conflict of interest in this case. Accordingly, the Applicants’ argument on this point must fail. [27] As the Federal Court has emphasized in YKK (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Johor [2021] 8 CLJ 179; [2021] MLJU 1206, alienation of State land is a prerogative of the State Authority, and courts should not interfere unless clear illegality is established. [28] The Applicants have not established any procedural irregularities or conflicts of interest that would invalidate the alienation. Here, the Applicants have clearly failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. Thus, the alienation is deemed lawful. S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw Whether the Applicants’ claim for alienation is time-barred [29] It was the Respondents’ further argument that the Applicants’ delay in initiating these proceedings constitutes a failure to comply with the statutory limitation period as provided under the Limitation Act 1953. [30] The alienation occurred in 2013, while this application was filed in

Under the Rules of Court 2012, an application for judicial review must be filed within three months from the date the decision is made. The Applicants’ attempt to challenge the alienation after a decade is clearly out of time. [31] However, courts have discretion to consider the merits of an application despite the delay if exceptional circumstances are present. [32] The Applicants allege that the cause of action arose when they received the Section 425 notices in 2023, which they claim is when they first became aware of the legal implications of the alienation. The Respondents, however, maintain that the Applicants were aware of the alienation as early as 2013 and thus should have filed their challenge within the stipulated twelve-year period. [33] In assessing the issue of whether the Applicants’ claim is time-barred, it is essential to determine the date on which the Applicants' cause of action arose. The test for determining the accrual of a cause of action in land disputes often hinges on the date when the claimant first becomes aware of the facts that constitute the basis of the claim. S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw [34] The evidence indicates that the alienation of the lands to PKNP was public knowledge, as it was widely reported in local media and formally documented in the land registry. The Applicants were not passive observers but active occupants of the Lands, and as such, they cannot reasonably claim ignorance of the alienation. Consequently, the cause of action regarding the alienation is determined to have accrued in 2013 when the Applicants became aware of the alienation. [36] A claimant cannot delay bringing an action simply because they believe the legal implications of the act are only revealed at a later date. The rationale is to encourage claimants to act promptly in the enforcement of their rights. [37] In light of the findings, I conclude that the Applicants are indeed time-barred from challenging the alienation of the lands, as their cause of action arose in 2013 and they failed to initiate their claim within the limitation period. Consequently, this Court will not entertain their challenge to the alienation based on the provisions of the Limitation Act 1953. Validity of the Section 425 Notices [38] The next issue to be addressed is the validity of the Section 425 notices issued by the Land Administrator in 2023. The notices informed the Applicants that their continued occupation of the lands was unlawful, given the alienation of the lands to PKNP, and demanded that they vacate the premises within seven days. S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw [39] Section 425 of the NLC allows the Land Administrator to issue notices to individuals who occupy land without lawful authority or title, directing them to vacate the land. The issuance of such notices is contingent upon the existence of a lawful title in favor of the landowner. [40] The Respondents argue that the issuance of the Section 425 notices was warranted given that PKNP is the registered owner of the lands following the 2013 alienation. The Respondents assert that the Applicants have no legal basis to occupy the lands and that the notices were appropriately issued in accordance with the NLC. [41] The Applicants, however, contend that the notices are invalid because they were not provided with an opportunity to challenge the alienation prior to the issuance of the notices. They assert that due process requires that they be given a chance to contest the legality of the alienation before being subjected to eviction. [42] The requirement of due process in administrative actions, particularly in matters involving the right to occupy land, is well-established in administrative law. The principles of natural justice require that individuals be given a fair opportunity to present their case before any adverse action is taken against them. [43] In this case, the Court finds that while the Land Administrator has the authority to issue Section 425 notices under the NLC, the notices in question were issued without due regard for the Applicants’ rights to challenge the alienation. Given the Applicants' claim of occupancy and their right to contest the alienation, the issuance of the notices without S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw prior notice or opportunity for hearing constitutes a breach of the principles of natural justice. [44] Accordingly, I conclude that the Section 425 notices issued in 2023 are invalid, as they were issued in violation of the Applicants' rights to due process. The Lawfulness of the Applicants' Occupation of the Lands [45] The fourth issue to consider is whether the Applicants have any lawful basis to remain on the lands following their alienation to PKNP in

The Applicants argue that they have established rights or equitable interests in the lands based on their long-standing occupation. [46] The doctrine of adverse possession allows individuals who occupy land for a prolonged period, under certain conditions, to claim legal title to that land, despite the lack of formal ownership. The key requirements for establishing adverse possession include continuous and uninterrupted possession, openness and notoriety of the possession, and the absence of consent from the rightful owner. [47] The Court in Nadarajah v Jaminan Diri Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 622 established that the occupation must be characterized by the intention to possess the land and that such possession must be adverse to the interests of the true owner. [48] The Applicants' claim to remain on the Lands following their alienation to the 2nd Respondent in 2013 must be assessed against well-established principles governing unlawful occupation and the status of S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw squatters under the NLC. The key question to be determined is whether the Applicants, having occupied the Lands prior to their alienation, have any legal or equitable right to remain there post-alienation. In resolving this issue, the Court must address several critical points: the effect of the alienation of State land, the rights (if any) accruing to squatters under our land law, and whether the Applicants can assert any equitable right or interest to challenge their removal. [49] The Federal Court, in Sidek Haji Muhammad & Ors v. The Government Of The State Of Perak & Ors [1982] 1 MLRA 156, authoritatively held that squatters have no legal or equitable rights to remain on land they occupy illegally. Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (later LP) delivered a landmark judgment in this case, which unequivocally established that squatters cannot acquire title by adverse possession, nor can they assert any equitable right to resist eviction. His Lordship cited provisions of the NLC, particularly Section 48, and held as follows:- “In our opinion there is one issue which lies at the heart of this case. It is whether the appellants have a cause of action against the respondents. The answer is obvious. It is clear beyond doubt that they cannot succeed because they are squatters. Squatters have no right either in law or in equity. (See McPhail v. Persons Unknown CA[1973] 1 Ch 447, 456). It does not lie in their mouths to assert that they used and occupied the land as squatters. Their position under the National Land Code is not dissimilar. Section 48 of the Code is against them. It says that No title to State land shall be acquired by possession, unlawful occupation or occupation under any licence for any period whatsoever.Section 78 of the S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw Code is also relevant. It says that alienation of State land shall only be effected in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 3, of Part Five and Chapter 2 of Part Eleven, and notwithstanding that its alienation has been approved by the State Authority, the land remains State land until registration under the Code. Section 341 of the Code empowers the State Authority to dispossess any squatters at any time. So the limitation period does not operate against the State. What equitable right or interest can be conjured up for the squatters who have illegally occupied State land? Squatters go into possession by, or as a result of, illegal occupation of State land. Illegal occupation of State land is an offence under s 425 of the National Land Code. It is well established that a Court of equity will never assist squatters to resist an order of possession illegally acquired; it will never intervene in aid of wrongdoers. (See Grafton v. Griffin 39 ER 130).” [50] The above authority is clear squatters, by virtue of their unlawful occupation, are not entitled to any title, right, or interest in the land they occupy. Section 78(3) of the NLC, affirms that State land remains State land until the alienation process is completed through the registration of a register document of title. Consequently, any occupation of the Lands prior to the completion of alienation to the 2nd Respondent in 2013 is without lawful basis. [51] Furthermore, the Applicants cannot claim a right to remain on the land post-alienation as the law provides that once land has been alienated to a new owner, the former occupants lose any claim to the land, unless their rights have been formalized or recognized by the new owner. S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw [52] Additionally, Section 341 of the NLC provides the State Authority with the power to dispossess squatters at any time. This section makes it clear that squatters may be removed by the State without any limitation period barring such action. In the context of this case, the Applicants’ continued presence on the Lands after alienation would therefore render them trespassers, liable to eviction. [53] Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is evident that the Applicants have no lawful basis to remain on the Lands post-alienation. The Federal Court’s decision in Sidek Haji Muhammad is particularly instructive here. The Applicants’ occupation of the Lands was never formalised through any license or temporary occupation permit (TOL), nor is there any evidence that the State granted them permission to remain on the Lands beyond the date of alienation in 2013. [54] Moreover, the Applicants have made no argument that would bring their case within the ambit of any recognised legal exception that would allow them to assert a right of continued occupation. They have neither asserted, nor produced evidence of, any license, lease, or contractual arrangement that might have granted them a right to remain in occupation. Their reliance on prior occupation alone is insufficient to overcome the clear legal position that squatters acquire no rights by virtue of their unlawful occupation. [55] The position of the Applicants is similar to the situation considered in Bukit Lenang Development Sdn Bhd v. Penduduk-Penduduk yang Menduduki atas Tanah [1999] 6 MLJ 25, where the High Court held that S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw squatters simpliciter had no right on the land and became trespassers upon alienation of the land. The Court in Bukit Lenang said (at p 36):- “... a person who enters upon another's land and remains thereon to the detriment of the present owner is a trespasser, pure and simple. The defendants' presence is literally a blot on the landscape, for the plaintiffs are hindered in the uninterrupted usage of their own property. ... The law is settled that the summary proceedings for possession of the land can be employed in a situation where a person entitled to possession of the land claims possession of such land occupied by another person without his licence or consent or the licence or consent of any of his predecessor-in-title or in another situation where a person who has entered into occupation of the land with the licence or consent of the person entitled to possession of the land or any of his predecessor-in-title but remains in such occupation without licence or consent of the person entitled to possession or any predecessor-in-title of his. Thus on the facts, this court finds that the defendants were squatters simpliciter and are therefore not possessed of any rights. In fact when the plaintiff became the registered proprietor the defendants became mere trespassers. ... In any event upon registration of the plaintiff as proprietor under s 340 of the National Land Code the plaintiff's rights accrue with immediate effect. This right includes the right to immediate possession of the said land.” S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw [56] The same legal consequence applies in this case: the moment the 2nd Respondent was registered as the proprietor of the Lands in 2013, the Applicants lost any claim, whether legal or equitable, to remain in possession. [57] It is also significant that the Applicants did not, at any point, seek to regularise their occupation by applying for a TOL or by negotiating with the 2nd Respondent for permission to remain on the Lands. The fact that they continued to occupy the Lands after the alienation without taking any such steps only reinforces their status as squatters, with no legitimate basis for resisting their removal. [58] The Applicants have not raised any argument based on equitable estoppel, but for completeness, it should be noted that any such argument would be unlikely to succeed. The Federal Court in Government of the State of Negeri Sembilan v. Yap Chong Lan & Ors & Another Case [1984] 1 MLRA 61, made it clear that equitable estoppel has limited application in the context of public law and cannot be used to defeat statutory provisions governing land alienation and the rights of the State. Eusoffe Abdoolcader FJ (later SCJ) had in the case held as follows:- “Adverting now to the primary issue in this matter,scilicet,the respondents' claim that they have acquired an equitable right or interest to remain on the respective lots allocated to them, the learned Judge acceded to this contention by applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel propounded in Ramsden v. Dyson[1866] LR 1 HL 129 and a concatenation of congeneric cases, and went on to hold that on the facts the respondents S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw were at all times licensees coupled with an equity. It would appear that misguided enthusiasm in claiming and resisting the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel only generated a dispute on the facts of the matter and blinded all concerned to the necessity of considering its application in the circumstances of this case as a matter of law. No consideration appears to have been given on all sides to the concept of equitable estoppel in the sphere of public law where a statutory or public authority is involved as in the case before us, and when we raised this question Counsel for the respondents merely repeated the submissions he made before the learned Judge and which, we sense, were put forward with rather more hope than confidence. We have earlier referred to the factual dispute between the parties on this aspect, with the respondents contending that they were permitted to stay there on a permanent basis with a promise of title to the land they occupied and the Director of Lands and Mines denying any such agreement. We indicated to Counsel on both sides that although this aspect and the finding of the learned Judge in favour of the respondents' contention on the evidence adduced form part of the grounds of appeal, we were prepared to assume in favour of the respondents' factual contention in considering the question of law as to the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the circumstances, and invited arguments on this basis. It is necessary in the first instance to consider the authority of the Collector to bind the State Authority in making the commitment alleged by the respondents. He had no authority in our view to purport to commit the State Authority even if he did give the S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw assurances alleged (Sidek Haji Muhamad & Ors v. The Government Of The State Of Perak & Ors [1982] 1 MLRA 156; [1982] 1 MLJ 313; [1982] CLJ 321). The State Authority may under the provisions of s 13 delegate the exercise or performance of any of its powers or duties to the Collector, and on the evidence of the Acting Director of Lands and Mines the Collector has by NSPU No 19 of 1969 with the concurrence of the District Land Committee only been delegated with authority to approve the conversion of land not exceeding three acres in area for agricultural purposes, and he has no power to alienate land regardless of acreage for housing.Section 48 prescribes that no title to State land shall be acquired by possession, unlawful occupation or occupation under any licence for any period whatsoever, and s 78(3) provides that the alienation of State land shall take effect upon the registration of a register document of title thereto pursuant to the provisions referred to in sub-section (1) or (2), and notwithstanding that its alienation has been approved by the State Authority, the land shall remain State land until that time. These statutory provisions by themselves would appear to provide a complete answer to and inhibit the interpolation of any equity in regard to the respondent's claim. There can be no intervention by equity in the face of the specific legislative provisions of the Code(Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Kota Tinggi v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Berhad [1981] 1 MLRA 163; [1982] CLJ (Rep) 244). On the matter of the concept of equitable estoppel in public law, we would refer to the decision of the House of Lords in Newbury District Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment[1981] AC 578 in which Lord S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw Fraser of Tullybelton deprecated (at p 606) the introduction of 'an estoppel or bar, personal to the particular party, which is quite inappropriate in this field of law, which is concerned with rights that run with land', and he went on to add that 'to do so would lead to uncertainty and confusion'. Lord Scarman in the course of his speech said (at p 616): In the field of property law, equity is a potent protection of private rights, operating upon the conscience of those who have notice of their existence. But this is no reason for extending it into the public law of planning control, which binds everyone.” [59] Thus, even if the Applicants had argued that they relied on some promise or representation from the State or the 2nd Respondent that they could remain on the Lands, such an argument would be unsustainable in law. The clear statutory provisions of the NLC, including Sections 48 and 341, operate to preclude any claim to equitable relief by squatters. As squatters, the Applicants cannot rely on equity to justify their continued occupation of the Lands. [60] Given the lack of legal title and the absence of established rights of adverse possession, I find that the Applicants do not have a lawful basis to remain on the lands following their alienation to PKNP. Their claims of longstanding occupation do not confer any rights or interests that would permit them to retain possession against the registered owner. As squatters, their continued presence on the Lands constitutes unlawful occupation, and they are subject to eviction under the provisions of the NLC. S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw [61] Therefore, the Applicants' claim to remain on the Lands must be rejected. Their status as squatters, coupled with the clear legal framework governing unlawful occupation, leaves them with no legal or equitable grounds to resist the Section 425 notices or to assert any right to continued occupation of the Lands. Legitimate Expectation [62] The Applicants’ claim of legitimate expectation is based primarily on their assertion that they occupied the lands with the 2nd Respondent’s permission and that the offer letters dated 21.11.2012 gave rise to a right for them to remain on the lands. [63] The doctrine of legitimate expectation typically arises where a public authority makes a clear, unequivocal promise or representation, either express or implied, upon which the claimant has relied to their detriment. However, in cases involving public land and the rights of squatters, the courts have consistently held that no such expectation can arise in contravention of statutory provisions. The Federal Court in Negeri Sembilan v. Yap Chong Lan rejected the application of equitable estoppel in cases involving squatters on public land, and this principle applies to the Applicants' claim here. [64] Reference was made to the Federal Court case of YKK (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Johor [2021] 8 CLJ 179; [2021] MLJU 1206 where it was held as follows:- “The claim of legitimate expectation is a claim derived from common law in equity. The rationale of invoking such a S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw principle is to encourage good administration and to prevent abuses by decision makers. [93] This court in Government Of The State Of Negeri Sembilan v. Yap Chong Lan & Ors & Another Case [1984] 2 CLJ 150; [1984] 1 CLJ 144; [1984] 2 MLJ 123 has dealt with such similar claim. There, the respondents built houses on a piece of land and paid ground rent to the owner thereof. The land was subsequently acquired. As a result, the respondents were allotted lots on a piece of land in Ulu Temiang for resettlement and was allowed by the Collector to build houses on those lots. However, the land was then alienated to Lesco and the respondents and others who were occupying other lots on the land, were ordered to leave. They were offered compensation and options to purchase low costs houses in a proposed housing estate to be developed on that land. The respondents refused the offer and contended that they were permitted to stay on the land on a permanent basis with a promise that titles would be granted to them for the lots that they occupied. The respondents commenced a suit against the State Government and Lesco. The issues that were raised were, inter alia, whether the respondents had acquired an equitable right or interest to remain on the lots allocated to them. [94] In answer to the issue, this court referred to s. 48 of the NLC (which prescribed that no title to State land shall be acquired by possession, unlawful occupation or occupation under licence for any period whatsoever) and s. 78(3) of the S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw NLC (which provides that the alienation of State land shall take effect on the registration of a register document of title) and held at p. 128 that the "statutory provisions by themselves would appear to provide a complete answer to and inhibit the interpolation of any equity with regard to the respondents' claim. There can be no intervention by equity in the face of the specific legislative provisions of the Code". As Lesco had been alienated the land, they were rightfully entitled to the ownership and the consequential rights. Although the decision of the Federal Court in Yap Chong Lan (supra) may be open to criticism, it was, nevertheless, based on the law. [95] The courts will generally grant judicial review of an administrative decision premised on legitimate expectation where a public authority has made a representation or promise to the individual within its powers. In other word, the representation and promise must be within the law. In addition, the individual has to show that the representation was a clear and an unambiguous promise, an established practice or a public announcement.

(vii) See: Ambiga Sreenevasan v. Director Of Immigration Sabah, Noor Alam Khan A Wahid Khan & Ors [2017] 9 CLJ 205; [2017] MLJU 770; R v. North and East Devan Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan[2001] QB 213 (CA); and S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw Nadarajah v. Secretary of State of Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363. [96] The fact remained that the State has a change of policy and plan to develop the subject land and hence renewal of the lease is no longer feasible. The question is: to what extent is legitimate expectation applicable in the face of a change in policy in the public bodies, vis-a-vis the State Authority? In this regard we refer to the decision of this court inMajlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama-Sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 CLJ 65; [1999] 3 MLJ 1 where this court held that: For our part, we prefer the view of Simon Brown LJ in Ex parte Baker (ibid) and Sedley J in Ex parte Hamble (ibid) as we find the reasoning there more persuasive. It is also a view which appears to be supported by de Smith, as the following extracts from his book, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th Ed.), indicate (at para 13-034): Given the duty of a public body not to fetter its discretion, under what circumstances will a legitimate expectation be protected in the face of a change in policy. Clearly, the change in policy must be "a lawful exercise of discretion" (per Lord Scarman In Re Findlay [1985] AC 318, 338). The body's discretion to alter its policy must therefore be exercised after taking into account relevant considerations, and ignoring the irrelevant. The body must also pursue authorised and not extraneous purposes. These considerations and purposes S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw can include matters such as the need to maintain national security and matters of public policy. Nor should the discretion be exercised unreasonably - for example, simply in order to confound the recipient of the expectation, or in bad faith. The conduct of the recipient of the representation should not be relevant to a decision to revoke the representation.” [65] Clearly, not every hope or expectation can be regarded as legitimate unless it has a sound legal basis or is founded on established administrative practices. Legitimate expectation must not only be reasonable, but also capable of being enforced. [66] In the present case, the Applicants argue that the 2nd Respondent’s offer letters dated 21.11.2012 provided a basis for their legitimate expectation that they would be entitled to remain on the lands until such time as the alleged “expectation” was fulfilled. The Applicants' reliance on the 2nd Respondent’s offer of alternative lands, as per the letters dated 21.11.2012, does not give rise to a legitimate expectation that they may remain on the original lands in perpetuity. However, the offer letters provided alternative lands for relocation and were issued out of goodwill, which the Applicants did not accept. Thus, they cannot now rely on them to assert a legitimate expectation to remain on the original lands. [67] Significantly, the offers were conditional, and the terms stated that the alternative lands were to be leased on an "as is where is" basis, with no guarantees regarding the suitability or permanence of occupation. The Applicants were thus made aware that there was no guarantee regarding the suitability or permanence of their relocation. Where an offer is conditional, the acceptance of those conditions must be clear and S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw unequivocal for any expectation to be reasonable. The Applicants' failure to accept the conditions of the offer undermines their claim to a legitimate expectation. [68] There is also no evidence that the 2nd Respondent made any representations or guarantees that the Applicants could continue occupying the lands indefinitely. In fact, the conditional nature of the offers made it clear that any expectation of remaining on the lands would be unfounded. The Applicants’ reliance on the mere fact of occupation, in the absence of any assurance from the 2nd Respondent, cannot give rise to a legitimate expectation. [69] This position is supported by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lee Beng Lai v. Tetuan Tokoyaki Property Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 MLRA 204, which held that squatters cannot claim any rights to remain on land once it has been alienated to another party. In the said case, the appellants appealed against the decision of the High Court judge who allowed the respondent's application under O 89 ROC to evict the appellants from the subject land belonging to respondent. The appellants claimed they were given permission to occupy the subject land by the State Authority. They also claimed to have a right in equity to occupy the subject land. However, the Court of Appeal agreed that the appellants were trespassers in wrongful occupation of the subject land. As no licence or permission to occupy the subject land was granted by the State Authority. The Court said (at p 369): “The State Authority did not grant them licenses nor give them permission to stay on that land. The appellants were trespassers in wrongful occupation of the land. The learned S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw judge was correct in making the order of possession against the defendants.” [70] The 2nd Respondent’s offers to relocate the Applicants were made in good faith, as part of an effort to assist them in finding alternative lands. However, these offers were not accepted by the Applicants. The 2nd Respondent’s submission that the Applicants’ expectation to remain on the lands is unreasonable and not legitimate is well-founded. The Applicants were not given any formal representation or promise that they could remain on the original lands, and their failure to accept the alternative lands offered to them further weakens their position. [71] The 2nd Respondent’s actions, including subsequent offers made in 2021, were also clearly acts of goodwill and not binding promises. The Applicants’ refusal to accept these alternative lands undermines their claim of legitimate expectation. As the Court held in Bukit Lenang Development Sdn Bhd v. Penduduk-Penduduk yang Menduduki atas Tanah [1998] 4 MLRH 412, squatters have no right to remain on land once it has been legally alienated, and they become trespassers upon alienation. The Plaintiffs in that case, similar to the 2nd Respondent here, acquired immediate rights to possession upon registration, and any prior occupation became unlawful. [72] This court is of the view that the 2nd Respondent made these offers to relocate the Applicants in good faith, as evidenced by the letters and the continued negotiations. However, these offers do not equate to a legal right for the Applicants to remain on the Lands. The Applicants' reliance on these offers is misplaced, as they were not binding promises but rather gestures of goodwill, subject to clear conditions. The failure of the S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw Applicants to accept these offers cannot be construed as a legitimate basis for continued occupation. This court therefore finds that the Applicants’ expectation is neither reasonable nor legitimate, as it is based on assumptions rather than on any express or implied representation by the 2nd Respondent. [73] In view of the foregoing, the Applicants’ claim to a legitimate expectation to remain on the lands is unfounded. The offers made by the 2nd Respondent were conditional and made out of goodwill, and no clear or unambiguous representation was made that would give rise to a legitimate expectation. Furthermore, the Applicants’ failure to accept the alternative lands offered to them, coupled with their inconsistent positions, further weakens their claim. Therefore, the court finds that the Applicants do not have a legitimate expectation to remain on the lands. [74] This court also takes judicial notice of the fact that the Applicants have adopted inconsistent positions. On the one hand, they argue that the Section 425 notices are invalid because the lands were alienated to the 2nd Respondent, and on the other hand, they allege that the alienation of the lands from the State to the 2nd Respondent was unlawful. As noted, the Applicants cannot “blow hot and cold” by simultaneously challenging the alienation while also relying on it to resist eviction. [75] The principle that parties must maintain consistent positions was reiterated in Prestaharta Sdn Bhd v. Ahmad Kamal Md Alif & ORS [2016] 4 MLRA 573; [2016] 4 MLJ 39 where the Court of Appeal held that parties cannot approbate and reprobate on the same set of facts as follows:- S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw “(j) arising from the above, it is abundantly clear that the plaintiffs are 'blowing hot and cold' with an obvious intent to defeat the clear and unambiguous terms and covenants they had entered with the developer pursuant to their respective S&P's and DMC...

thus, in the case of Cheah Theam Kheng v. City Centre Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) and other appeals [2012] 2 MLRA 125; [2011] 2 MLRA 660; [2012] 1 MLJ 761; [2012] 2 CLJ 16, the Court of Appeal said of the principle of approbation and reprobation as follows: We categorically say that the liquidator cannot blow hot and cold to suit him whenever he feels like it. He cannot approbate and reprobate in the same breath. On the one hand, he claims that the High Court order dated 26 July 2001 overrides or displaces a stature which render the said order invalid and yet he has the audacity to continue to act as a liquidator by virtue of the said order In the words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v. News (UK) Ltd and others [1990] 3 All ER 376, at pp 383-384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitudes towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw [76] Reference was further made to the case of Kelana Megah Development Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Another Appeal [2016] 8 CLJ 804 Idrus Harun, JCA (as he then was) held as follows: “[20]…The appellant's conduct, as it were, could thus be properly described as blowing hot and cold that while the appellant approved the acquisitions they also rejected it. The appellant is not permitted to approbate and reprobate on the issue of the acquisition of the seven plots of land. [21] Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Bato Bagi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak & Another Appeal [2011] 8 CLJ 766; [2011] 6 MLJ 297. In that case, the Federal Court cited with approval, the English Court of Appeal's decision in Verschures Creameries, Limited v. Hull And Netherlands Steamship Company, Limited [1921] 2 KB 608 wherein Scrutton LJ held: A plaintiff is not permitted to "approbate and reprobate." The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election - namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument: Ker v. Wauchope (1); Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby (2). The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction. (emphasis added) [22] Further, in Cheah Theam Kheng v. City Centre Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) & Other Appeals [2012] 2 CLJ 16; [2012] 1 MLJ 761, this court cited with approval the English case of Express Newspapers plc v. News (UK) Ltd And Others [1990] 3 AII ER 376 wherein it was stated: In the words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers plc v. News (UK) Ltd and others [1990] 3 AII ER 376, at pp 383-384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitudes towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance. (emphasis added) [23] The decision of this court in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Irham Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 1 CLJ 491; [2011] 1 MLJ 752 is also instructive. We reproduce the relevant excerpts below: Estoppel by election is related to the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate (Lissenden v. S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw CAV Bosch, Limited [1940] AC 412 p 478; [1940] 1 All ER 425 at p 418 at p 429 (HL)). Thus, a person having a choice between two courses of conduct is to be treated as having made an election from which he cannot resile. But the person will not be regarded as having so elected unless he has taken a benefit under or arising out of the course of conduct which he has first pursued and with which his subsequent conduct is inconsistent with his election (Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky) v. Kindersley and another [1951] Ch 112 at pp 119-120; [1950] 2 All ER 549 at p 552 (CA); Ex parte Robertson, In re Morton (1875) LR 20 Eq 733; and Evans v. Bartlam )... If a person is entitled to one of two inconsistent rights, as opposed to having a choice between two alternative remedies (United Australia, Limited v. Barclays Bank, Limited [1941] AC 1 at p 29; [1940] 4 All ER 20 at p 37 (HL)) and, with an open mind and with full knowledge he does an unequivocal act showing that he has chosen one, he cannot afterwards pursue the other (Slough Estates Ltd v. Slough Borough Council and another (No 2) [1969] 2 Ch 305; [1969] 2 All ER 988 (CA)).” [77] In the present case, that is precisely what the Applicants sought to do i.e. to disavow and repudiate that which is not advantageous to them but accepting the terms that are beneficial to them. I am therefore of the firm opinion that the Applicants in failing to challenge the decision of the State in alienating the Lands to PKNP should not be allowed to renege on S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw the decision. For the foregoing reasons above, this court finds the validity of the alienation of the Lands to PKNP remains unchallenged. Relief to be Granted [78] In light of the findings above, the final issue concerns the relief, if any, that should be granted to the Applicants. Given the conclusions reached regarding the lawfulness of the alienation, the time-bar on the challenge, the invalidity of the Section 425 notices, and the Applicants’ lack of lawful basis to remain on the lands, the Court must consider what, if any, relief is appropriate. [79] The general principle in equity is that a claimant must demonstrate entitlement to the relief sought, based on the merits of the case. In this instance, the Applicants have sought a declaration that the alienation of the lands was unlawful and that they possess rights to remain on the land. However, given the conclusions reached regarding their lack of standing and the invalidity of their challenge, the Court finds no basis for granting such relief. [80] The Applicants’ request for a stay of the eviction pending determination of their claims is also moot, as the underlying claims have been found to be time-barred and invalid. [81] Accordingly, I find that the Applicants are not entitled to any relief in this matter. The Court dismisses their application with no order as to costs. S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw CONCLUSION [82] In summary, the Applicants' challenge to the alienation of the lands to PKNP in 2013 is time-barred, and the alienation is determined to have been lawful. The Section 425 notices issued by the Land Administrator in 2023 were found to be invalid due to a breach of the principles of natural justice, but the Applicants lack any lawful basis to remain on the lands post-alienation. [83] The Court concludes that the Applicants’ application is dismissed in its entirety, with no relief granted and no order as to costs. Dated: 09.01.2025 S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw Pihak-Pihak: Tetuan Sekar & Associates bagi pihak Perayu-Perayu Peguamcara & Peguambela No. 25A, Medan Istana 3

05.2418801 Faks: 05.2418802 Ruj: SA/JR.PPK/RAY/LAND/7/2024 Emel: sekarassociates64@gmail.com Peguamcara: Encik Kunasekaran a/l Krishnan Encik Rabinder Singh a/l Juggeet Singh Encik Jason Tiew Boon Kean Tetuan MahWengKwai & Associates bagi pihak Responden 2 Peguamcara & Peguambela Level 10-1, Tower B, Menara Prima Jalan PJU 1/39, Dataran Prima 47301 Petaling Jaya

03.78872702 Faks: 03.78872703 Ruj: M10025/RM/DP/JK/NAY Emel: lawyers@mahwengkwai.com Peguamcara: Encik Raymond Mah Mun Kitt Encik Joseph Khor Sheng Yang Puan Denise Phang Hui Xian Peguamcara Persekutuan bagi pihak Responden 3 & 4 Penolong Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Perak Aras 1, Bangunan Perak Darul Ridzuan Jalan Panglima Bukit Gantang Wahab 30000 Ipoh, Perak Ruj: Puan/PK/29-PLAINTIFF 2023 S/N 7yvjvaIG/ESsbVenwlkGiw