LIM HENG LOONG v Tamilarasi A/P Balasundram (BA-12B-79-08/2025)

Lim Heng Loong (No. K/P: 640508-05-5623)

Lim Thung Xuan (No. K/P: 970814-05-5156)

Lim Jit Haw (No. K/P: 950218-05-5055)

Sally Peh Chen Woon (No. K/P: 941022-14-6380)

Lucas Peh Zi Fong (No. K/P: 970209-14-5807)

Jonathan Lee Zhing Yong (No. K/P: 950225-07-5599) … Perayu-Perayu DAN Tamilarasi A/P Balasundram (No. K/P: 690506-10-5004) … Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam

Lim Heng Loong (No. K/P: 640508-05-5623)

Lim Thung Xuan (No. K/P: 970814-05-5156)

Lim Jit Haw (No. K/P: 950218-05-5055)

Sally Peh Chen Woon (No. K/P: 941022-14-6380)

Lucas Peh Zi Fong (No. K/P: 970209-14-5807)

Jonathan Lee Zhing Yong (No. K/P: 950225-07-5599) … Plaintif-Plaintif Dan Tamilarasi A/P Balasundram (No. K/P: 690506-10-5004) … Defendan] GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] In this judgment, the parties shall be referred to as if they were in the Sessions Court. [2] This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge (“SCJ”) on 31.7.2025 (after trial) to allow the Plaintiff’s claim. [3] The Plaintiffs’ appeal is against the SCJ’s decision not to award damages. [4] After perusal of the cause papers and after hearing submissions from the counsels, I have decided to allow the Plaintiffs’ appeal with costs based on the reasonings which I shall explain further. Background facts [5] The 1st Plaintiff is the father to the 2nd Plaintiff and 3rd Plaintiff. The 4th Plaintiff is the 3rd Plaintiff’s girlfriend. The 5th Plaintiff is the 4th Plaintiff’s brother. The 6th Plaintiff is working for the 4th Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs collectively own a number of units of condominium at Venice Hill Condominium. [6] The Defendant also owns one unit of condominium at Venice Hill Condominium. The Defendant was a committee member of the management corporation of Venice Hill Condominium (“Management Corporation”). The 3rd Plaintiff was elected as the treasurer of the Management Corporation but later resigned due to disagreements with the Defendant. [7] The 10th general meeting of the Management Corporation was fixed on 31.7.2022 (“MC 10”). The 1st Plaintiff, 3rd Plaintiff, 5th Plaintiff and 6th Plaintiff wanted to offer themselves as candidates. The Defendant did not offer herself for re-election but had campaigned for an opposing camp. [8] Following the events relating to MC 10, the Plaintiffs commenced a defamation suit against the Defendant for the impugned statement authored and published by the Defendant on 28.7.2022 in three WhatsApp groups comprising the owners of Venice Hill Condominium:

The WhatsApp group named “Tower 8 VH Residents” with 141 participants;

The WhatsApp group named “Visione 2030 (VH@1-9)” with 168 participants;

The WhatsApp group named “Venice Hill Owners” with 115 participants. [9] The impugned statement is reproduced as below: “the Lim family and Team contesting for MC 10

Lim Heng Loong or Sam (is the father of Lim jit haw) Lim Thung XUAN the daughter of Sam is nominating Lim Heng Loon or Sam a non owner/resident as MC candidate.

Lim Jit Haw MC 9 (son of Sam Lim Heng Loong)

Jonathan Lee Zhing Yong MC9 (staff of Lim Heng Loong/Lim Jit

Haw) Lucas Peh Ji Fong (brother of Sally Peh Chen Woon/brother in law of Lim Jit Haw)

Sally PEH Chen WOON (Daughter-in-law of Lim Heng Loong/fiancé of Lim Jit Haw and sister of Lucas Peh Zi Fong)

Seah Kok Boom (Steven) MC 7

Mohd Hairul Amri bin Mohd Redzuan MC 7,8,9

Lee Kooi Lan (staff of Lim Heng Loong)

Lai Chee Loong (Marcus) MC 7,9

Cheong See Fatt (Danny) MC 9 Everyone, the first 5 members are literally members of 1 family. Some owners were suggesting owners who don’t stay in VH should not become MC member. Here we have a non owner/resident nominated as MC candidate, where is the logic in this. Why is this family so desperate wanting to become MC candidate, just because they OWN almost 10 units as family or So that they can have the control on our finances and start with Projects? Or what? Everyone, One member of this family is good enough as MC candidate not 5 of them including their staff. At this moment we have RM2.5 mil in our maintenance fee Don’t come in just to do projects in the name of making VH into a better living environment. MC member being elected should have in mind the interest community at large and spend owners Money wisely. MC should not raise Our maintenance fees and spend our money saying we can turn around VH in 3 yrs time. Our property price will increase by then and so on. Most of the owners are here to stay and not planning to sell our property. Who is going to suffer in long run? It’s the Good paying owners who will suffer when maintenance fee are increased. Please choose your MC members wisely. MC should not be run by ONE family and their staffs. This is very dangerous. Our Original developer was run by ONE family, what happen to our money and property? Please think and vote wisely for our home. I am saying this because I am worried for our home and money. I have worked with all the above MC members. So when I say something like this means I have my own reasons. I was in MC 1, 2, 7, 8, 9. So I know what I am talking about. I am not contesting for mc this term. This is my humble opinion and my concern for PH, so think 100x before voting for above candidates.” (“Impugned Statement”) [10] The defences raised by the Defendant were: (a) The Impugned Statement did not specifically refer to the Plaintiffs; (b) Justification; (c) Fair Comment; (d) Qualified Privilege. [11] However, the SCJ had found the Defendant liable for defamation. There are two separate appeals arising from the decision of the SCJ:

this current appeal is the Plaintiff’s appeal against the SCJ’s decision not to award damages;

the other appeal (Appeal No. BA-12B-77-08/2025) is the Defendant’s appeal against the SCJ’s decision to find the Defendant liable. Summary of the decision by the SCJ [12] The SCJ found that the Impugned Statement implies that the Plaintiffs (as a family) will abuse their position if they are elected into the committee of the Management Corporation, similar to what the developer’s family has committed prior to this. The SCJ also found that the Defendant had not proven the defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege. [13] However, the SCJ did not award damages. Instead, the SCJ ordered the Defendant to issue an apology, with the contents of the said apology to be agreed by both parties. The following reliefs were granted by the SCJ:

a mandatory injunction for the Defendant to remove the Impugned Statement from the three WhatsApp groups;

an order compelling the publication of an apology in a form to be agreed;

a prohibitory injunction to restrain the Defendant from repeating the Impugned Statement; and

costs of RM8,000.00. Summary of the Plaintiff’s case (in supporting the appeal) [14] The Plaintiffs say that the SCJ had found the Impugned Statement to be defamatory but did not award damages. The Plaintiffs submit that damages are actionable per se without proof of actual harm. Therefore, it is wrong for the SCJ not to award damages on the basis that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove actual loss. There is no legal requirement for the Plaintiffs to prove actual loss. [15] The Plaintiffs argue that the apology statement alone is insufficient compensation. [16] The Plaintiffs also submit that the SCJ was wrong to order for the contents of the apology statement to be agreed by both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. The Plaintiffs ask for the apology to be in the form acceptable to the Plaintiffs. The contents must also be unconditional and subject to approval or winning party. Summary of the Defendant’s case (in opposing the appeal) [17] The Defendant submits that the court retains a wide discretion to determine whether damages should be awarded. Actionable per se does not mandate automatic monetary compensation. The Defendant argues that even for defamation claims, the claimant must prove that he has suffered the damage. [18] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence demonstrating actual damage to their reputation. It is merely bare assertions of reputational harm. Actionable per se [19] The SCJ did not award damages on the reasoning that: - “… Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif-Plaintif tidak menunjukkan kerugian sebenar yang telah dialaminya … tetapi lebih sesuai untuk dipampas melalui suatu permohonan maaf terbuka kerana ia melibatkan maruah Plaintif-Plaintif di kalangan penghuni-penghuni VH Condo yang mana pengataan-pengataan yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan adalah semasa di dalam proses berkempen untuk memegang jawatan MC.” [20] However, I agree that a defamation suit is actionable per se. In MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals [1995] 2 CLJ 912, Gopal Sri Ram JCA said: “Libel is a tort actionable per se, i.e., without proof of actual harm. In other words, damage is not an ingredient of the tort. The law presumes that when a man's reputation is assailed, some damage must result. Evidence about the extent of that damage is admissible. But evidence that purely speculates is not. That, in a gist, is the effect of the passage cited.” [21] Further, Gopal Sri Ram JCA, in MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals, set down the factors on which the court should consider when determining the amount of the damages: “With that, I now turn to consider the approach taken by the learned Judge in this case, who, when he came to assess damages, had this to say: In my opinion each case must be judged on its own particular facts and on its own merits. In the present case a very serious libel has been perpetrated on the plaintiff. The defendants calculated that the prospect of material advantage from publishing the said articles outweighed the prospects of material loss. Therefore, bearing in mind the principles applicable in tile assessment of damages and in considering all the various factors including the following:

the position and standing of the plaintiff,

the gravity and seriousness of the libel;

the mode and extent of the publication;

the mental distress, hurt, anxiety and mental anguish caused to the plaintiff as a result of the libel;

the uncertainty undergone in litigation;

the conduct of the defendants from the time of the libel down to the very moment of the verdict; and

the absence or refusal of any correction, retraction or apology, this Court finds that the award must also be sufficient to convince any person of the baselessness of the libel and act as a necessary and sufficient signal to the public at large of the full vindication of the plaintiff's reputation both in Malaysia and internationally. Taking the above into consideration, I am of the view that the damages to be awarded against each defendant must be treated individually.” [22] The Defendant had relied on the cases of Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abul Majid v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 6 CLJ 269 and Kho Poh Teck v. Digi Telecommunications Sdn Bhd [2006] 6 MLJ 349 to argue that the Plaintiffs would still have to prove that they have suffered damages. [23] However, I accept the Plaintiffs’ submissions that the two cases relied by the Defendant are cases relating to negligence suits and not defamation. The case of Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid v. Public Bank Bhd is a claim for professional negligence of an advocate and solicitor. Kho Poh Teck v. Digi Telecommunications Sdn Bhd is also a negligence suit but presented as though it was a defamation suit. Apology statement alone is insufficient compensation [24] Vindication of reputation may be achieved just by an apology statement. However, such vindication can only be said to be sufficient when the apology comes right after the publication of the defamatory statement, together with the immediate retraction of it. In Lim Guan Eng v. Ruslan Kassim & Another Appeal [2021] 4 CLJ 155, Harminder Singh Dhaliwal FCJ observed: “[122] Now, the award of damages is meant to be compensatory and not a scheme for untold wealth. In a case where there is damage to reputation, the compensation must include such sum as would vindicate his or her good name and take into account the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused. The primary aim of a remedy in defamation came up for discussion in Anwar Ibrahim v. NST, supra, with the following outcome: …. [84] The question that arises is therefore this. Should the primary aim of a remedy in defamation be in satisfying the plaintiff's hurt feelings etc or should it be in vindicating his or her standing in the community? In my respectful view, if we concern ourselves primarily with putting the plaintiff in the position he or she was before the defendant's wrongdoing, vindication of his or her standing in the community should be the focus of the remedy rather than any award of large sums of money for the plaintiff’s hurt feelings. Plaintiff may however also feel that only substantial damages may vindicate or restore their reputation and good name. But I think that vindication of reputation can also be achieved through non-monetary means. For example, the best vindication would be an almost immediate and prominent apology, correction or retraction by the defendant after publication of defamatory material. In that situation, there would be minimal damages. It should also follow that a court-ordered correction on a defendant after a trial would serve just as well if not better in the vindication or restoration of a damaged reputation than large money damages.” [25] Although Harminder Singh Dhaliwal FCJ had observed that vindication can be by means other than monetary compensation, it was still acknowledged that there is a need to award damages when the vindication only comes after trial, though the damages shall not exceed that for personal injury: “[124] It is, of course, lamentable that by the time the court has pronounced judgment, vindication has come late for the successful plaintiff and, in the meantime, much damage has been done. Even so, in the most serious cases of defamation in respect of integrity and honour, I cannot imagine general damages to exceed the quantum that is usually awarded in personal injury claims to a claimant who is fully disabled. These injuries are in most cases permanent and irreversible whilst a man's reputation may be restored and the damage can in some cases be transient in character.” [26] I therefore agree that an apology statement alone can only be said to be a full vindication when it was issued right after the publication of the impugned statement and the defendant already retracted the impugned statement right after the publication. [27] However, in this case, after the Impugned Statement was published, the Defendant did not apologise nor retract it. Instead, the Defendant said that the Impugned Statement did not refer to the Plaintiffs. As such, I agree that it would not be sufficient to merely order the issuance of an apology letter without awarding any damages. Judicial treatment on award of damages [28] In the Plaintiffs’ submissions, the Plaintiffs had relied on the following legal authorities in respect of the award of damages: Case Position of claimant Damages Veerasingam a/l Ratnam v. Narindar Singh a/l Avtar Singh Chhabra The 1st Plaintiff is a retiree. The 2nd Plaintiff is a lawyer. RM30,000 awarded to the 1st Plaintiff; RM20,000 awarded to the 2nd Plaintiff [2021] 1 LNS 778 (Defendant already apologised after the impugned statement were published) Abdul Rashid Harun v. Roziah Harun [2022] 1 LNS 3341 Brother and sister. Defendant’s counterclaim allowed with the global damages of RM40,000 together with an apology letter. Aida Phang Abdullah & Ors v Lee Siew Mei [2025] CLJU 2557 Retirees, company director and consultant. RM50,000 to each of the defendants and the issuance of an apology letter. [29] Relying on these legal authorities, the Plaintiffs asked for a global sum of RM150,000.00 as general damages and RM100,000.00 as aggravated damages. [30] For the award of general damages, I take into cognisance the trend for defamation damages has shifted away from “mega-awards” towards a more moderate and reasonable sum. Damages in defamation have always been intended to compensate, not to enrich. The current trend for the quantum of damages award in defamation cases be seen in Sundra Rajoo Nadarajah v. Thirilogachandran @ Jayasangar Shanmugasundaram [2025] CLJU 771, where Su Tiang Joo J had summarised the quantum of damages that have been handed down by the courts in Malaysia. [31] I have also taken into cognisance of the recent case of Dato’ Sri Lai Cha Suang @ Jessy Lai & Anor v. Lim Lip Eng [2023] 1 LNS 705, where the damages of RM2,000,000.00 awarded by the High Court was slashed to RM75,000.00 upon appeal to the Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. W-02(W)-434-03/2023. [32] As such, the global sum of RM150,000.00 seek by the Plaintiffs is too high. Taking into cognisance that there are 6 Plaintiffs, I award the global sum of RM60,000.00 as general damages. [33] I will also award aggravated damages in the sum of RM15,000.00 as there are element of malice and a refusal to apologise. Apology statement [34] I agree that the contents of an apology statement must be unconditional and subject to the approval of the winning party. This is what the law regards as a true apology. In MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals [1995] 2 CLJ 912, Gopal Sri Ram JCA had referred to Begbe CJ in Hoste v Victoria Times Publishing Co [1889] 1 BCR 365 on the requirements of an effective and adequate apology: “That [the apology] is surely not sufficient. It is not the offer nor even the publication of an apology at all, but an offer to offer an apology. And even in terms, it seems to reserve to the defendant a right of judging whether the plaintiff is reasonable in demanding any particular form e.g., it offers to make an apology as the defendant thinks fit. Such an apology as merely 'beg your pardon', or 'sorry for it', is not sufficient in a case of libel. The defendant should admit that the charge was unfounded, that it was made without proper information, under an entire misapprehension of the real facts, etc., and that he regrets that it was published in his paper.... You should not offer to make, but actually make and publish at once, and unconditionally, such an apology, expressing sorrow, withdrawing the imputation, rehabilitating the plaintiffs character as well as you can; not stipulating that the plaintiff is to accept it; not making any terms but publishing it in the interest of truth, and because you are anxious to undo whatever harm which may have accrued from a wrong which you find you have been the unconscious instrument of inflicting. Then in your statement of defence you can state what you had done.... That is the only authority I know of making any reference to an apology in the pleadings. It will be for the jury to say whether it was a reasonable and proper apology, and whether it is sufficient to absolve the defendant from any or how much of the damage the plaintiff has suffered. Obviously some libels may inflict an injury and loss that no apology or retraction by, or even remorse of, the wretched, miserable, libeller can wholly efface.” [35] Accordingly, I would agree that the apology has to be an unconditional public detraction and an admission of fault in terms acceptable to the Plaintiff. Conclusion [36] Accordingly, for the reasons above, the Plaintiffs’ appeal is allowed and I hereby make the following orders:

The Plaintiffs are awarded a global sum of RM60,000.00 as general damages;

The Plaintiffs are awarded a global sum of RM15,000.00 as aggravated damages;

The apology by the Defendant must be an unconditional public retraction and an admission of fault in terms acceptable to the Plaintiffs. The apology is to be published in the notice board bulletin and in the 3 WhatsApp group (Tower 8 VH Residents, Visione 2030 (VH@1-9) and Venice Hill Owners);

Relief (1) of the Sessions Court Order dated 31.7.2025 (in respect of the removal of the impugned statement in the WhatsApp groups) is disallowed;

Relief (3) of the Sessions Court Order dated 31.7.2025 is allowed and maintained;

Costs at RM4,000.00. Dated the 1st of July 2026. (SEOW HOCK PENG) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR Counsel: For the Appellants/Plaintiffs : Jonas Lee Fook Khong Wong Sher Yi (Messrs Low & Partners) For the Respondent/Defendant: Rasvinder Kaur Sodhi (Messrs Rasvin Sodhi & Co)

MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other

Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abul Majid v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 6

Kho Poh Teck v. Digi Telecommunications Sdn Bhd [2006]

Lim Guan Eng v. Ruslan Kassim & Another Appeal [2021] 4

Veerasingam a/l Ratnam v. Narindar Singh a/l Avtar Singh

Abdul Rashid Harun v. Roziah Harun [2022] 1 LNS 3341

Aida Phang Abdullah & Ors v Lee Siew Mei [2025] CLJU 2557

Sundra Rajoo Nadarajah v. Thirilogachandran @

Dato’ Sri Lai Cha Suang @ Jessy Lai & Anor v. Lim Lip Eng [2023] 1 LNS 705