(ii) Register of Member lodged by the company secretary with CCM – [Tab 16 of the CBD at pages 59 and 60]. Shareholder Number of Shares Percentage of Issued Shares (%) 1 Robert Lim Swee Chong 71,250 28.50% 2 Richard Lim Swee Joo 71,250 28.50% 3 Ho Sang Bin 6,250 2.50% 4 Puah Kot Choon 6,250 2.50% 5 Chong Kok Ming 40,375 16.15% 6 Victor Tan Tat Wei 54,625 21.85% Page 19 of 37 [57] The increase in the paid-up capital resulted in the dilution of the Plaintiffs’ shareholding from 62% to 18.23% or equivalent to 155,000 out of 850,000 shares issued and subscribed. [58] Thus, it is the strong contention of the Plaintiffs’ that dilution of the Plaintiffs’ shares is oppressive and is a total disregard of the Plaintiffs’ rights and interest as shareholders of CKM. This continues till to-date as there has been no change in the shareholding. [59] The Plaintiffs’ state that they were at all times ready, able and willing to subscribe to the increase in the paid-up capital and was prepared to pay for the additional increase. See: The Plaintiffs’ solicitors’ letter dated 1.11.2018 – [Tab 14 of the CBD at pages 54 to 56]. [60] Notwithstanding the Plaintiffs’ willingness and ability, the Defendants vide their solicitors’ letter dated 15.11.2018 rejected the Defendants’ request in toto which is a further testament of D1 and D2’s continuous oppression and unfair discrimination of the Plaintiffs. See: The Defendants’ solicitors’ letter dated 15.11.2018 – [Tab 17 of the CBD at page 61]. [61] The dilution of the Plaintiffs’ shares clearly prejudiced the Plaintiffs as shareholders of CKM. From a position of a majority, the Plaintiffs’ shares have been diluted into becoming a minority. Page 20 of 37 [62] In Toralf Mueller (supra) at [135] to [138], Wong Kian Keong JC (as he then was) found oppression on the issue of dilution of the petitioner’s shareholding. [63] Also, in Tan Tung Kwok & Ors v Lau Kah Hing & Ors [2019] MLJU 1807 at [64] and [67] – [Tab 15 of the PBOA], it was held that an increase in the paid up capital to dilute the plaintiffs’ shareholdings amounted to an oppression. This is what the Court had to say: - “[64] The Defendants plainly had the collateral purpose of diluting the Plaintiffs; shareholdings and had acted in an oppressive manner, more so when the Plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to take up proportional increases in the share capital. [67] The views expressed in Minority Shareholders (5th ed, 2015, Joffe, Drake, Richardson, Lightmand and Collingwood), page 363, are pertinent: “Even if the company is not a quasi-partnership, the improper exercise by the directors of their power to allot shares is capable of amounting to unfair prejudice, particularly where the allotment is in bad faith or for an ulterior purpose. An obvious example is where the directors have acted secretly in order to dilute the minority’s shareholding. So in Re a Company (No 005134 of 1986), ex p harries the director and majority shareholder had, without informing the petitioner, secretly allotted further shares to himself, so as to increase his holding from 60 per cent to 96 per cent, and reduce the petitioners’ holding from 40 per cent to 4 per cent. Peter Page 21 of 37 Gibson LJ observed that he could not conceive of “a more blatant case of unfairly prejudicial conduct” … [64] Further, in ISM Sendirian Berhad v Queensway Nominees (Asing) Sdn Bhd & Ors and other suits [2020] MLJU 388 at [120] – [Tab 16 of the PBOA], the case of Numix Engineering v Magic Telcom [2011] 9 MLRH 878 was referred to whereby Anantham Kasinather J ruled that a dilution of the petitioner’s shareholding from 65% to 13% amounted to oppression of the petitioner’s interests as a shareholder in the company. [65] The dilution of the Plaintiffs’ shares cannot be coincidental as the relationship between the Plaintiffs and D1 & D2 had irretrievably broken down since the beginning of January 2018. Soon after, the Plaintiffs were kept out from the management and affairs of CKM and the dilution of the Plaintiffs’ shares followed suit. See: The Defendants’ own admission in paragraph 78 of their Affidavit dated 6.3.2019 (Enclosure 8) – [Tab 18 of the CBD at pages 62 to 64]. Third Grievance: Defendants’ refusal and/or failure to distribute dividend. [66] In paragraph 72 of the Defendants’ Affidavit dated 6.3.2019 (Enclosure 8), the Defendants contended that the sum of RM212,806.70 is not sum allocated for dividend payments to the shareholders of CKM but sums paid to vendors of CKM. Page 22 of 37 [67] This runs contrary to the documentary evidence vis-à-vis the Minutes of Meeting dated 11.11.2015 which was circulated to the Plaintiffs, D1 and D2 vide Hui Wen’s email. See: The Minutes of Meeting dated 11.11.2015 – [Tab 13 of the CBD]. [68] The relevant part of the minutes of meeting is now reproduced in verbatim:- “CKKMT has issued all adjustment to the joint account (D1 and D2’s joint bank account) and total fund is RM212,806.70. Below is the table showing distribution according to shareholding. Conclusion: The distribution will on hold till next meeting. SHAREHOLDERS SHAREHOLDING Total CKMMT = 212,806.70 HO SANG BIN 17,500.00 2.50% 5,320.14 PUAH KOT CHOON 17,500.00 2.50% 5,320.14 LIM SWEE JOO 199,501.00 28.50% 60,649.87 LIM SWEE CHONG 199,501.00 28.50% 60,649.87 TAN TAT WEI VICTOR 152,951.00 21.85% 46,498.30 CHONG KOK MING 113,05051.00 16.15% 34,368.39 700,004.00 100.00% 212,806.70 [69] The parts highlighted in red are comments to the minutes of meeting made by D2. Page 23 of 37 See: D2’s email dated 17.11.2015 at 11.54 am. – [Tab 13 of the CBD at pages 50 to 53]. [70] The contemporaneous evidence speaks for itself. If this was sums to be paid to vendors of CKM as alleged by D1 and D2, the table above would not show the names of the Plaintiffs, D1 and D2 and how much dividends will be paid to each and every one of them as shareholders of CKM. [71] Further to that, D2 would not use words such as “Conclusion: The distribution will on hold till next meeting” which all points to distribution of dividends to shareholders of CKM. We further submit that if it was sums to be paid to vendors of the Company, the word ‘payment’ will be used as opposed to ‘distribution’. [72] Pursuant to a meeting held on 3.10.2017 in Yong Peng between the Plaintiffs, D1 and D2, a summary of the minutes of meeting was circulated to all the parties vide Hui Wen’s email dated 5.10.2017 at 11.54.08 am and followed by the comments made by P3 vide his email on the same day at 6.23 pm. See: The summary of the minutes of meeting vide Hui Wen’s email and the comments made by P3 vide his email – [Tab 19 of the CBD at page 65]. [73] In both the emails, it was resolved that a sum of RM300,000-00 will be declared and distributed to all the shareholders of CKM after settling the debtors and creditors. Page 24 of 37 Hui Wen’s email: “3) Distribute first dividend RM300,000.00 from CKM” P3’s email: “Item 3 – Upon settling all the debtors and creditors first than distribute the RM300,00-00, first dividend from CKM” [74] In the circumstances, we submit that the minutes of meeting dated 11.11.2015 and the proposed distribution of dividends irrefutably and conclusively confirms the Plaintiffs as shareholders of CKM. [75] The Defendants in their affidavits in reply has no explanation or defence to the above save for bear denial. D1 and D2 simply contend that the distribution of dividends of RM300,000-00 were solely for themselves. [76] If the dividends of RM300,000-00 were solely for D1 and D2, it does not explain why the same was discussed with the Plaintiffs. [77] The following email exchanges will further corroborate the Plaintiffs’ version:-