1. ) LO CHANG GENG (mendakwa dalam kapasitinya sebagai ahli kepada Persatuan Hainan Selangor dan Wilayah Persekutuan) v 1. ) FOO WAH CHEK (didakwa atas kapasitinya sebagai Presiden Persatuan Hainan Selangor dan Wilayah Persekutuan) (WA-24NCvC-86-01/2024)

LO CHANG GENG [NRIC No.: 901121-01-6403] (Suing as a member of The Selangor and Federal Territory

WONG AH SENG [NRIC No.: 570406-10-5713] (Suing as a member of The Selangor and Federal Territory Hainan Association) … PLAINTIFFS

FOO WAH CHEK (NRIC No: 440613-10-5331) (Sued in his capacity as President of The Selangor and Federal

TAN KUAN FENG (NRIC No: 590418-10-6295) (sued in his capacity as Deputy Secretary General of The Selangor and Federal Territory Hainan Association) 22/07/2025 16:25:36

PERSATUAN HAINAN SELANGOR DAN WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN (Company Registration No.: PPM-007-14-27111952) … DEFENDANTS

LO CHANG GENG [NRIC No.: 901121-01-6403] (Suing as a member of The Selangor and Federal Territory

WONG AH SENG [NRIC No.: 570406-10-5713] (Suing as a member of The Selangor and Federal Territory Hainan Association) … APPLICANTS AND LEE SOK WAH (NRIC No.: 571116-06-5084) … RESPONDENTS

[1] In imploring this Court that the Respondent was indeed contemptuous of the High Court Order of 20.3.2024 and ought to be sent to 7 days imprisonment, the Plaintiffs cited 3 reasons in support of their application:

As the Deputy Speaker of the 3rd Defendant (Hainan Association) and the chairperson of the Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) held on 17.4.2024, deliberately refused to table the Plaintiff's motion for debate and voting despite the mandate of the High Court Order;

The High Court Order specifically required the Defendants to convene an EGM "for the purpose of considering and if thought fit, passing the resolutions as set out in the Notice of Requisition for EGM dated 22.12.2023";

The Respondent's conduct at the EGM was alleged to have intentionally impeded or prejudiced the administration of justice by frustrating the High Court Order. [2] The Respondent expressed surprise in her response to the show cause notice dated 22.4.2024. In her opinion, she had conducted the EGM professionally in accordance with the Hainan Association's Constitution. She argued that Clause 8.1(b) of the Constitution clearly states that the General Council shall be elected at an AGM and serve 3 years, with the coming election falling on 30 June 2024. She contended that allowing the EGM to decide the General Council without proper election procedures would set a dangerous precedent whereby people would use the EGM to replace election procedures. There is also the argument of a lack of sincerity, whereby when she asked the proposed 42 members who were to replace the 35 members of the General Council to stand up to confirm the motion, no one did. She argued that even if the motion were to be put to debate and dealt with by way of a secret ballot, the result would be the same, as the majority would be on the other faction. The Respondent had additionally relied on Clause 13.3 of the Constitution, which provided "the Speaker shall interpret the Constitution of the Association and when necessary, determine a point on which the Constitution is silent." She claimed that she conducted the EGM within the power given by the Constitution. Preliminary Objections [3] Before proceeding to the merits of the contempt application, this Court must first address the four preliminary objections raised by the Respondent in her solicitor's letter dated 25.2.2025:

Personal Service and EGM Requisition Notice.

The Respondent contended that she was not personally served with the High Court Order nor the EGM Requisition Notice as required under Order 45 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 (RoC). However, this Court finds that personal service may be dispensed with where the alleged contemnor has actual knowledge of the High Court Order. In OCM Opportunities Fund II, LP v Burhan Uray [2005] SGHC 81, the Singapore High Court held that the court has discretion to dispense with personal service under Order 45 Rule 7(7) where it is just to do so, particularly where the defendant was undoubtedly aware of the terms of the orders;

The evidence clearly establishes that the Respondent had full knowledge of the High Court Order. As Deputy Speaker, she chaired the EGM on 17.4.2024 and repeatedly referred and explained the High Court Order during the meeting. She read out the exact wording of the Order to the attendees. Her active engagement with the High Court Order's requirements demonstrates unequivocal knowledge, negating any prejudice from lack of formal service.

(ii) Penal Notice.

The Respondent argued that the High Court Order lacks a penal notice specifically naming her. While Order 45 Rule 7(4) RoC requires penal notices, this Court may dispense with this requirement under Rule 7(7) where it is just to do so. In Tang Hak Ju v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Pulau Pinang [2016] MLJU 696; [2016] MLRHU 953; [2017] 2 CLJ 345, the High Court held that non-endorsement of a penal notice was not fatal where the alleged contemnor had full knowledge of the order;

The Respondent's extensive knowledge of the High Court Order and her role in implementing it demonstrate that she was fully aware of the consequences of non-compliance. The absence of a specific penal notice naming her does not prejudice her position given her actual knowledge.

(iii) Non-Party Status.

The Respondent contends she should have been added as a party to the original proceedings. However, a proposed contemnor is not required to be a party to the original suit. In T.O Thomas v Asia Fishing Industries Pte Ltd [1977] 1 MLJ 151; [1977] 1 MLRA 84, the Federal Court held that the court has jurisdiction to commit for contempt a person not party to the action who, knowing of an order, aids and abets in its breach;

The High Court Order was directed at "Defendants herein and/or their agents and/or their nominees and/or their associates and/or parties instructed by the Defendants." As Deputy Speaker acting in the discharge of the Hainan Association's obligations under the Order, the Respondent falls within this category and is bound by the High Court Order.

(iv) No Vagueness and Ambiguity.

The Respondent argues that the High Court Order is vague and ambiguous. This Court finds no merit in this objection. The Order contains clear and unambiguous language requiring the EGM to be held "for the purpose of considering and if thought fit, passing the resolutions as set out in the Notice of Requisition for EGM dated 22.12.2023." The mandatory requirement to "consider" the resolutions is unequivocal;

The Respondent's own statements at the EGM demonstrate she understood the High Court Order's requirements but chose not to comply. Her assertion at the EGM that she understood what the High Court Order required but considered it "not right" confirms the High Court Order's clarity. [4] For the reasons above, this Court dismisses all four preliminary objections. The procedural requirements for contempt proceedings are satisfied, and this Court has jurisdiction to hear the substantive application. The Facts [5] The key legal requirements of the High Court Order are that the EGM must be held "for the purpose of considering and if thought fit, passing the resolutions as set out in the Notice of Requisition for EGM dated 22.12.2023." The Respondent assumed and discharged the role of the Deputy Speaker of the Hainan Association. She chaired the EGM that was conducted on 17.4.2024. She had full knowledge of the High Court Order as she repeatedly referred to it and also explained it a few times at the EGM. [6] The English translated transcript of the EGM shows the Respondent's actions and speech during the EGM. She had successfully tabled the first motion by the Executive Committee on whether to expel Datuk Tang Chai Yoong (K876) according to article 4.4 because he misled members of the General Council, and members at the general meetings on 27.7.2017, 24.6.2018 & 26.12.2021 by saying 99 feet tall Mazu statue received written approval from DBKL when in fact no approval to-date. The second motion to demand that the General Council disclose the minutes of the meeting on 29.11.2023 to all members because it involved disciplinary investigation results conducted on Datuk Tang Chai Yoong & Chen Fu Xiang. The Respondent had painstakingly conducted voting on the two motions. [7] Evidence shows that the Deputy Speaker read out the motion of the members' request that the 35 General Council members be replaced with 42 transitional directors until 30.6.2024. She invited the member who proposed the suggestion, the 1st Plaintiff to confirm the motion. The 1st Plaintiff did the same and sought to present a PowerPoint presentation to present the background of the motion and explained the reasons for the tabling of the motion to enable a debate and deliberation [evidence at Enclosure 82 p163]. [8] The transcript shows that right after the 1st Plaintiff's request to table it by way of PowerPoint, there was a member who took the floor to state that it was inconsistent with the Constitution and that the 1st Plaintiff's motion had no seconder. It was claimed that the 42 members must be present and confirm their attendance and proposal there at the EGM. The transcripts show that from the floor there were the words "Got, got, got" [evidence at Enclosure 82 p164]. [9] The 1st Plaintiff responded that the background events raised those issues and sought from the Respondent to be allowed to present the debate in the form of a PowerPoint. Then the Respondent questioned where the 42 members were and started to take their attendance. That action by the Respondent was questioned as to whether it was necessary. She, however, insisted on the attendance and physical confirmation of the 42 members. [evidence at Enclosure 82 p165-166]. She did not allow any other thoughts or opinions but said this: "I made this decision, and you don't need to say anything. I made the decision based on the Constitution. I do things based on the Constitution. Let's take a look at our membership meeting. Article 7 of our constitution states that the election of General Council is in the election year. We hold elections every three years. They are all conducted through normal elections, not through an EGM. If I let everyone elect a new General Council through a special meeting of members, Hainan Association will be laughed at." The Respondent's Deliberate Refusal to Comply [10] When it was pointed out that it was a court ruling that mandated the EGM consider the motion, the Respondent visited the High Court Order again and made explicit statements of refusal to comply. Evidence in Enclosure 82 p169-171 shows her saying: "This part states that the Association must hold a special general meeting within 30 days of the court order. We are all here today for this extraordinary general meeting. It has already been held. Here, I want everyone to read carefully for the purpose of considering and if thought fit. Considering means considering the motions in the motion, the motions signed by the members and if thought fit, passing the resolution. But as a Speaker, I think it is not right. Why? Because the extraordinary general meeting is not used to replace election. This extraordinary general can do other things, but it cannot hold elections. If an election is held to replace another group of members, the Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Hainan Association will be criticized. This is unreasonable and unconstitutional." [11] The 1st Plaintiff pleaded to be allowed to speak, pointing out the legal counsel's letter that clarified it was not ultra vires the Constitution. The Respondent went back to the High Court Order and refused to refer to the legal counsel's letter. She said: "This court order, if it was thought fit, OK? If it was thought fit, I would definitely allow it, let you debate and pass it. But the problem is that this is a complete violation of our Constitution. Our Constitution states that elections should be held every three years. Even if you hold a extraordinary general meeting, if you want to re-election, you have to go through a special election committee, not this extraordinary general meeting. So the whole situation is not right. As the Speaker, I think there is definitely a problem. I don't want the Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Hainan Association to become a laughing stock." [12] One member was allowed to say something about the Registry of Societies, violation of Constitution and who was to take responsibility. Another stated that the 42 members did not get the approval of the Election Committee. The Respondent did not let anyone else speak and ended the EGM with a reminder that members ought not do anything detrimental to the Hainan Association because of some personal agenda or personal feelings, and that the minority ought to obey the majority. Evidence at Enclosure 82 p172-174. This Court's Findings. [13] For ease of reference, the High Court Order is reproduced below and it contained a clear and unambiguous mandate in paragraph 1. The core legal mandate is that the EGM must be held for the specific purpose of considering all resolution in the EGM Requisition Notice, with the discretion to pass them if thought fit: "The Defendants herein and/or their agents and/or their nominees and/or their associates and/or parties instructed by the Defendants are hereby ordered to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) and take all necessary steps and action to convene the EGM within 30 days from the date of this order, for the purpose of considering and it thought fit, passing the resolutions as set out in the Notice of Requisition for EGM dated 22.12.2023." Knowledge, Professional Status and Selective Compliance [14] Based on this Court's comprehensive review of the documents provided by the parties, the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent had full knowledge of the High Court Order. As Deputy Speaker and chairperson of the EGM, she assumed and discharged the said roles. She repeatedly referred to and explained the High Court Order during the EGM. She read out the exact wording of paragraph 1 of the High Court Order to the members who were present. As an advocate and solicitor with 31 years of practice, she clearly understood her legal obligations and bore heightened professional responsibility to comply with court orders. [15] The transcript evidence demonstrates that she was fully capable of compliance when she chose to. She successfully tabled the first motion by the Executive Committee regarding the expulsion of Datuk Tang Chai Yoong and the second motion demanding the disclosure of the General Council meeting minutes. She painstakingly conducted voting on both these motions and had allowed presentations and debates for them. This selective compliance proves that there were no procedural impediments to her compliance with the High Court Order regarding the requisitioned motion. Clear Breach and Refusal to Allow Deliberation [16] There was a clear breach of the High Court Order when there was deliberate refusal to table the motion as per the High Court Order. She read out the motion to replace 35 General Council members with 42 transitional directors until the election date in two months. She had invited the 1st Plaintiff to confirm the motion. However, she had refused to allow the presentation of the 1st Plaintiff's PowerPoint presentation and debate. She ended the EGM without putting the motion to consideration or to vote. [17] Her explicit statements of refusal to comply with the High Court Order, as detailed in paragraphs 8 and 9 above, constitute clear admissions of contemptuous conduct. Rejection of Legal Authority and Professional Culpability [18] The Respondent's rejection of legal clarification demonstrates wilful disregard for judicial authority. When the 1st Plaintiff pointed to legal counsel's letter clarifying that the motion was not ultra vires the Constitution, the Respondent refused to consider it and went back to her own interpretation of the High Court Order. The critical exchange occurred immediately after the Respondent had read out the High Court Order verbatim to the EGM attendees. She declared her opinion that the motion was "not right" and stated that the EGM "cannot be used to replace an election," but refused to allow the PowerPoint presentation by the 1st Plaintiff. [19] The legal significance of the letter was not merely a legal opinion but contained official communication of the High Court's oral grounds and the judicial determination on the constitutional validity of the motions. The letter specifically found that the motions were "not ultra vires the Constitution," giving legal authority backing the Plaintiffs' right to proceed to table the motion for deliberation. The letter specifically addressed the exact constitutional concerns the Respondent was raising: power to remove General Council members, validity of the EGM requisition process, and constitutional compliance of the proposed motions. [20] The Respondent's rejection of the letter was a deliberate choice to ignore legal authority. She acknowledged the existence of the legal counsel's letter but consciously chose to disregard it, declaring "not your lawyer's letter." She substituted her own interpretation over judicial determination, failed to recognise it as communication of the High Court's reasoning, and maintained that the motions were "totally contravening our Constitution" despite the High Court's finding to the contrary. As a senior advocate and solicitor, she knew the significance of counsel's communication of the High Court's grounds and had a professional obligation to respect judicial determinations. Binding Duty of Obedience to Court Orders [21] The Respondent's rejection of the legal counsel's clarification demonstrates she was deciding for herself and or Hainan Association whether to obey the High Court's determination. That was not open to her. The Supreme Court in Wee Choo Keong v MBF Holdings Bhd & Anor [1993] 1 MLRA 260; [1993] 1 MLRA 782; [1993] 2 MLJ 217; [1993] 3 CLJ 210; [1993] 2 AMR 1205 held: "It is established law that a person against whom an order of Court has been issued is duty bound to obey that order until it is set aside. It is not open for him to decide for himself whether the order was wrongly issued and therefore does not require obedience." [22] Her professional status as an advocate and solicitor heightened her obligation to respect judicial authority. The Court of Appeal in Lee Lim Huat v Yusuf Khan Bin Ghows Khan & Anor [1997] 1 MLRA 244; [1997] 2 MLJ 472; [1997] 3 CLJ 197; [1997] 3 AMR 2401 emphasized the special duty of lawyers: "We are here not dealing with the case of a layman accused of breaching an injunction. The appellant is a member of the Bar. As such he, more than anyone else, should respect and obey an injunction issued by the Court. The dignity of the judicial arm of Government will surely be eroded if orders of a Court are honoured more in their breach than observance by members of the Bar." The Respondent's Admission [23] The Respondent's solicitor's letter dated 24.4.2024 was written in response to a formal show cause notice pursuant to Order 52, Rule 2B, Rules of Court 2012. This was not a "without prejudice" communication but rather a formal legal response to contempt proceedings. This Court holds the letter fully admissible, and it constitutes a clear admission of the breach. [24] In the letter, the Respondent explicitly admitted: "our client told the EGM that it is not proper and fit to debate and pass the motion." This constitutes an unequivocal admission that she refused to allow the said motion to be considered for debate, in direct contravention of the High Court Order. Constitutional Interpretation Cannot Override Court Orders [25] This Court rules that the Respondent's reliance on the Hainan Association's Constitution cannot justify disobedience to a direct Court Order. The Supreme Court's decision in Wee Choo Keong (supra) is binding. While procedural safeguards are important, the substantive breach here is clear and admitted. As affirmed in Tan Sri Dato' Dr Rozali Ismail & Ors v Lim Pang Cheong & Ors [2012] 2 MLRA 717; [2012] 3 MLJ 458; [2012] 2 CLJ 849; [2012] 2 AMR 429, committal proceedings are criminal in nature and require careful consideration, but where the breach is established beyond reasonable doubt, the court must act to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Conclusion [26] This Court finds that the Respondent's conduct constitutes a clear and deliberate contempt of the High Court Order dated 20.3.2024. The evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that:

The Respondent had actual knowledge of the High Court Order and its requirements;

She deliberately refused to comply with the mandatory direction to allow consideration of the requisitioned motion;

Her refusal was wilful and constituted a direct challenge to judicial authority;

As a senior member of the legal profession with over 3 decades of experience, she was expected to understand and comply with Court Orders. [27] This Court is mindful that committal proceedings are criminal in nature and must be approached with appropriate caution, as emphasized in Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v Faber Merlin (M) Berhad [1986] CLJ Rep 58; [1986] 1 MLRA 159; [1986] 2 MLJ 193. However, the Respondent's admission of non-compliance, coupled with the clear evidence of deliberate defiance, leaves no room for doubt as to her contemptuous conduct. [28] The Respondent's professional status as an advocate and solicitor is a relevant consideration in determining the appropriate sentence. Her legal training would have informed her of the consequences of non-compliance with court orders. The principle established in Lee Lim Huat (supra) emphasizes that lawyers bear a particular responsibility to respect court orders, and non-compliance by members of the Bar affects the proper administration of justice. See also Golden Star & Ors v Ling Peek Hoe & Ors [2021] 2 MLRA 150; [2021] 2 MLJ 259; [2021] 3 CLJ 443; Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 1 MLRA 494; [1999] 4 MLJ 321; [1999] 4 CLJ 65; [1999] 4 AMR 4005. Sentence for Contempt [29] With that conclusion that the Respondent is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court must now turn to the appropriate sentence. This Court invited counsel for the Respondent to submit as to the sentence for the contempt and the response to the Plaintiffs’ prayer for 7 days' imprisonment. The submission was to issue a stern warning to the Respondent. Brought to this Court’s attention were that she is a first-time offender and a recently widowed mother to a young adult. [30] This Court considered all relevant factors and is minded to temper justice with mercy. This Court is inclined to impose alternative sanctions that adequately reflect the seriousness of the contempt while taking into account mitigating circumstances. Considered were the temporal context and subsequent developments relevant to the High Court Order, the professional repercussions and first offender status of the Respondent, and the alternative sanctions that were open to this Court. [31] The issues underlying the contempt have been overtaken by events. The High Court Order dated 20.3.2024 required an EGM to consider resolutions for replacing 35 General Council members with 42 transitional directors until 30.6.2024. The Respondent's contemptuous conduct occurred at the EGM on 17.4.2024 when she refused to allow consideration of these resolutions. However, the constitutional electoral process has since taken its natural course - the AGM was duly held on 30.6.2024 and the regular election for the General Council proceeded as constitutionally mandated. [32] While these subsequent developments do not diminish or excuse the Respondent's contemptuous conduct in any way, they demonstrate that the practical consequences of her refusal to comply with the High Court Order have been rendered moot by the passage of time. The transitional arrangement that was the subject of the requisitioned motion would have expired on 30.6.2024 in any event. In these circumstances, where the substantive issues have been overtaken by events, imprisonment may not be the most appropriate form of punishment, though this does not in any way reduce the seriousness of her deliberate disobedience of the High Court Order. [33] This Court is acutely aware that the Respondent, as an advocate and solicitor with 31 years of unblemished practice, will face significant professional consequences from this contempt finding. These collateral consequences constitute substantial punishment in themselves. [34] This Court notes that this is the Respondent's first commission of contempt of court. Her over 3 decades of legal career has been unblemished by any prior findings of professional misconduct or contempt. This is a significant mitigating factor warranting judicial consideration. [35] Having considered the totality of circumstances, this Court finds that the objectives of contempt proceedings - deterrence, vindication of court authority, and protection of the administration of justice - can be adequately served through alternative sanctions. Justice requires that punishment be proportionate and premised on all relevant circumstances, including the temporal context, professional consequences, and first offender status. [36] Thus this Court orders that the Respondent shall tender a public apology in open court for her contemptuous conduct. She is to apologise to the Plaintiffs and the members of the Hainan Association. The requirement serves to vindicate judicial authority, provide deterrent effect, and reinforce that court orders must be respected regardless of personal views on their merits. [37] This Court imposes a substantial fine of RM50,000 in lieu of imprisonment. In default of the payment of the RM50,000 fine is 2 days imprisonment. This significant monetary penalty provides proportionate punishment, meaningful deterrence, and achieves the punitive objectives of contempt proceedings without the devastating consequences of incarceration on professional standing. This Court Order [38] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

The Respondent, Lee Sok Wah, is found guilty of contempt of court for wilfully disobeying the High Court Order dated 20.3.2024;

The Respondent is to tender a public apology in open court to the Plaintiffs and members of the Hainan Association;

The Respondent is to additionally pay a fine of RM50,000 and is given 14 days to settle, which is by 9.7.2025;

The Respondent is to pay costs of these proceedings in the amount of RM60,000 as prayed for by the Plaintiffs forthwith, subject to allocator. Conclusion [39] As soon as this Court’s orders were meted out, the Respondent has this day tendered her public apology in open court, acknowledging her contemptuous conduct and affirming her respect for judicial authority and court orders. Having complied with this Court's direction for a public apology, and with the fine to be paid within the prescribed timeframe, this brings these contempt proceedings to a close. This Court trusts that this matter serves as a clear reminder to all members of the legal profession and the public that court orders must be respected and obeyed, and that any deliberate disobedience will not be tolerated by this Court. DATED 25 JUNE 2025 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For the Plaintiffs: Ho Ai Ting together with Medha Ong Ann Ting T/n Lee Hishamuddin Allen & Gledhill For the Defendants: Intan Azlina Mazlan together with NK Tan T/n Kuah, Lim, Chin & Ooi