1. ) Lok Swee Yoon v 1. ) Majlis Perbandaran Hulu Selangor (BA-25-45-07/2023)

MAJLIS PERBANDARAN HULU SELANGOR (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MAJLIS DAERAH

NCT PLATINUM SDN BHD

JADE SAN REALTY SDN BHD (IN LIQUIDATION) (COMPANY NO. 1365843-X) RESPONDENTS

The Applicants were aggrieved with the decision of the First Respondent (“MPHS”), the local authority for the area of Hulu Selangor, in granting Planning Permission in the form of Borang C(1) MDHS/TP/51/2021, bearing reference MDHS.74/24/TP/02/L/2021/003 dated 26.04.2021 (“Impugned KM”).

The Impugned KM was granted in favour of the Second Respondent over an application entitled “Permohonan Kebenaran Merancang bagi Pembangunan Bercampur (Berfasa) di atas sebahagian Lot 2527 dan Lot 2528 Mukim Batang Kali untuk Penyerahan Balik dan Pemberimilikan Semula di bawah Seksen 204B Kanun Tanah Negara” (Application for Planning Permission for Mixed Development (Phased) over part of Lot 2527 and Lot 2528, Mukim of Batang Kali for the Surrender and Re-alienation under section 204B of the National Land Code).

Together with the Impugned KM, an endorsed layout plan No. MDHS/TP/51/2021 (“Impugned Layout Plan”) was annexed. The Impugned KM and the Impugned Layout Plan (collectively the “Impugned Decision”, or “KM-IBG” where the context requires) formed the backdrop of the instant application for judicial review.

The Applicants sought that the Impugned Decision be quashed. Alternatively, the Applicants prayed that the Second Respondent and/or the Third Respondent to apply to the MPHS to amend the Impugned KM and the Impugned Layout Plan such that the Impugned KM and the Impugned Layout Plan shall acknowledge and give provision to the existing “Fasa 1 Projek Genting Valley” (Project Genting Valley Phase 1, “GVP Phase 1”) under planning permission JPBD.Sel./07/4B/98/PS bearing reference No. JPBD.Sel./07/01/00003(4) (“Existing KM”, or “KM-GV123” whenever the context requires) and for that purpose, the MPHS to notify the Applicants regarding such application for amendment and simultaneously furnish them a copy of all the relevant documents submitted by the Second and/or the Third Respondents, and accord the Applicants with S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw opportunity to make any objection on any part of the proposed amendments.

The Applicants too sought a declaration that all approvals and actions taken by the Respondents based on the Impugned KM and the Impugned Layout Plan shall, as far as they are inconsistent with the Existing KM, be null and void. The Applicants had also prayed for damages and costs to be awarded to them.

The Applicants were the purchasers of the plots under Phase 1 (“GVP Phase 1”) of a larger project named “The Genting Valley” (“Genting Valley Project”). They purchased their respective plots from one Jade San Realty Sdn Bhd (i.e. the Third Respondent) (“JSR”, in liquidation).

The Applicants entered into the sale and purchase agreements with JSR, separately on different dates. Based on the list annexed with the Statement under Order 53 Rule 3(2) of the S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw Rules of Court 2012 (“Statement under Order 53”), the transactions were all occurred between year 2000 and year 2004.

The Applicants annexed in one of the exhibits of their supporting affidavit affirmed by one Saranjeet Kaur A/P Barjan Singh (“the AOS”), the relevant sale and purchase agreement in respect of GVP Phase 1. It appeared that it was the agreement between JSR and the Applicants respectively, that the Applicants purchased their respective plots with vacant possession without any building, from JSR.

Based on the said sale and purchase agreement, JSR had covenanted to subdivide the master titles where GVP Phase 1 is located, and convert the relevant category of land use suitable for the erection of one residential house, as the Applicants had covenanted with JSR (collectively “conversion and subdivision”). JSR had also promised to build the necessary infrastructure serving the Applicants’ respective plots (see page 384 of the AOS, encl. 3), which, according to the S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw Statement under Order 53, had been completed prior to the winding up of JSR.

JSR went into liquidation in 2007. The Applicants despite being issued a notice for delivery of vacant possession of their respective plots, found themselves in a quagmire. On one hand, the Applicants had fully paid their purchase price. JSR however, had failed to complete the conversion and subdivision, resulting in the Applicants having only beneficial titles over their plots. In short, the area covered by GVP Phase 1 is still held under two master titles Nos. GRN 40535, Lot 2527 and Lot 2528 (“GRN40535”), and GRN 47606, Lot 2529 and Lot 2530 (“GRN47606”), both in Mukim of Batang Kali, District of Ulu Selangor, State of Selangor.

Now on the description of the Genting Valley Project. Genting Valley Project consisted of 5 phases. Other than GVP Phase 1, the other phases include Phase 2, Phase 3, Phase 2A and Phase 2B. The whole project was being planned over both GRN40535 and GRN47606.

For ease of reference, the rough layout (“Macro Plan”) for both the master titles are as follow (depicted as “2527” and “2528” under GRN40535, as well as “2529” and “2530” under GRN47606 respectively):

The development of GVP Phase 1, and the aforementioned Phase 2 and Phase 3 were collectively under the Existing KM. The Applicants termed the Existing KM as “KM-GV123”.

Based on the foregoing Macro Plan, KM-GV123 covers the part of the area identified as “2528” and “2530” above. The plots S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw which the Applicants had bought under GVP Phase 1 are located in part of the area identified as “2528” and “2530”. The said Phase 2 and Phase 3 on the other hand, are entirely in the area identified as “2530”.

The location of GVP Phase 1 as well as Phase 2 and Phase 3 respectively, could be found in the plan (see page 290 of encl. 6) below. It could be observed that in the area delineated in red is where GVP Phase 1 is located, whereas the remaining area that was delineated in pink is where both Phase 2 and Phase 3 are located:

The development of the said Phase 2A and Phase 2B on the other hand, was under layout plan JPBD.Sel./07/05/2003/PS with reference JPBD.Sel./07/01/00004(12). The Applicants termed this as “KM-GV2AB” (“KM-GV2AB”). The said Phase 2A and Phase 2B covers lands which are at the northern part of GVP Phase 1, specifically in the area described as “2527” in the Macro Plan. It was intended under KM-GV2AB that the development be in the following manner (the locality of the area which was covered S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw by KM-GV2AB, in relation to the area covered by GVP Phase 1, could be seen in the site plan (pelan tapak) depicted below):

Based on the foregoing, it could be observed that the development of GVP Phase 1 is located at the southern part of both GRN40535 and GRN47606. Phase 2A and Phase 2B are located above GVP Phase 1, in GRN40535. Phase 2 and Phase 3 on the other hand, are located at the eastern side of GVP Phase 1, entirely in GRN47606.

Genting Valley Project was subsequently abandoned. Based on the “Explanatory Statement to Scheme Creditors” dated

18.03.2022, JSR halted the Genting Valley Project in year 2004. JSR was subsequently wound up in year 2007. The issue remained unresolved for almost two decades.

The Applicants’ attempts to resolve the matter with the relevant authority were unfruitful. The Applicants commenced a suit in the Kuala Lumpur High Court vide case No. WA-22NCvC-908- 12/2019 against JSR on 06.12.2019 for a declaration that the Applicants are entitled to their respective plots in GVP Phase 1 and all other consequential order (“KL Suit”). The KL Suit went on a full trial resulting in the Applicants being granted some of the reliefs they sought for.

During the pendency of the KL Suit, the Applicants discovered that the KM-GV2AB had been replaced with the Impugned KM and the Impugned Layout Plan. The Applicants termed both the Impugned KM and the Impugned Layout Plan as “KM-IBG”. KM-IBG or the Impugned Decision was granted in favour of the Second Respondent. As depicted in the rough layout plan below, the area delineated in purple is where KM-IBG covers. It could be observed that KM-IBG covers not only the area S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw covered in KM-GV2AB, but it also extends to part of the area located in the eastern part of “Lot 2527” in the Macro Plan above:

From the above rough layout plan, the area marked as “Lot B4” together with “Lot C3” are where part of GVP Phase 1 currently locates, whereas the outer area delineated in green is the whole GRN40535. The extended area which was not originally found in KM-GV2AB is the area marked as “Lot A2” above. It must be noted that the area marked as “Lot A2” and “Lot B1” above were S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw originally an area reserved for “pitch and putt” in the original KM-GV2AB.

The Applicants then sought the expert opinion of one Mr. Ravi Shankar A/L Nadaraja, a registered town planner and one Mr. Yap Ping Li, a registered surveyor, on the effect of KM-IBG.

Based on the Statement under Order 53, the grievances of the Applicants in respect of the approval and granting of the Impugned Decision, or KM-IBG, are as follows:

KM-IBG may be regarded as having superseded KM-GV123. The fact that JSR is the registered owner of GRN40535 which covered both KM-GV123 and KM-IBG would give the relevant authority an impression that KM-GV123 had been abandoned, resulting in the Applicants “will not be allowed to” apply to subdivide lands covered by GVP Phase 1, in accordance with KM-GV123;

(ii) KM-IBG or the Impugned Decision will have the effect of encroaching into the land area of GVP Phase 1 as a result S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw of a road situated between the area of GVP Phase 1 and KM-IBG, to be widened from 66 feet to 100 feet (“Road Widening Exercise”), and this will lead to the rejection by MPHS for “any application for pre-computation plan based on the original layout”, that will render any sub-division based on original layout of GVP Phase 1 impossible;

(iii) there will be a change of GVP Phase 1 layout due to the new road network hierarchy policy, following the Road Widening Exercise;

(iv) the need of infrastructure and facilities for the 206 bungalow lots within GVP Phase 1 is ignored and it may be “impracticable, infeasible or impossible” for GVP Phase 1 to obtain connection to water and electricity supply. The recreational facilities of GVP Phase 1 may also be taken off;

the Applicants may be refused titles to their lots due to the failure of KM-IBG to take into account KM-GV123;

(vi) the Applicants attributed the failure in taking into consideration KM-GV123 to the Second Respondent, or an omission by the MPHS; and

(vii) the Applicants were not accorded with right to be heard in the granting of KM-IBG by the MPHS. Principles Relating to Judicial Review

Prior to considering and analysing this application, it would be prudent for this court to be reflect on the legal principles relating to judicial review. Order 53 Rules of Court 2012 provides for the procedures in an application for judicial review.

It is trite that the decision of a public authority may be reviewed by this court on the grounds of illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety or disproportionality. This review is not confined to the decision-making process but also to the merits of the decision.

In the Federal Court case, Akira Sales & Services (M) Sdn Bhd v. Nadiah Zee Abdullah & Another Appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 513; [2018] 2 MLJ 537, the liberal approach on judicial review in R Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147; [1997] 1 MLJ 145 has been re-emphasised at pp. 547 to 548 (CLJ); pp. 571 to 572 (MLJ) as follows: “[45] In the same appeal, Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ (Eusoff Chin in agreement) said that an award could be reviewed for substance as well as for process: It is often said that judicial review is concerned not with the decision but the decision making process. (See eg Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155). This proposition, at full face value, may well convey the impression that the jurisdiction of the courts in Judicial Review proceedings is confined to cases where the aggrieved party has not received fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected. Put differently, in the words of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw 374, where the impugned decision is flawed on the ground of procedural impropriety. But Lord Diplock’s other grounds for impugning a decision susceptible to Judicial Review make it abundantly clear that such a decision is also open a challenge on grounds of ‘illegality’ and ‘irrationality’ and, in practice, this permits the courts to scrutinise such decisions not only for process, but also for substance. In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock (at pp. 410- 411) defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it: By ‘illegality’ as a ground for Judicial Review, I mean that the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By ‘irrationality’, I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts’ exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe’s ingenious explanation in Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] AC 14, or irrationality as a ground for a court’s reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker. ‘Irrationality’ by now can S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by Judicial Review. I have described the third head as ‘procedural impropriety’ rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. Lord Diplock also mentioned ‘proportionality’ as a possible fourth ground of review which called for development.” See also: Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia v Persatuan Aliran

The meaning of error of law has also been explained in the case of Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v. Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 CLJ 748; [1995] 2 MLJ 317 in the following words: “Is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive definition of what amounts to an error of law, for the categories of such an error are not closed. But it may be said that an error of law would be disclosed if the decision-maker asks himself the wrong question or takes into account irrelevant considerations or omits to take into account relevant considerations (what may be conveniently termed Anisminic error) or if he misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or misapplies or misstates a principle of the general law.” Analysis 28. The Applicants put forth the reasons in praying for the reliefs they sought for in the instant application, in their Statement under Order 53 as adumbrated above. They can be summarised as follow:

that the Impugned Decision will have the effect of impeding the subdivision process of the lots under GVP Phase 1, as it will encroach into a portion of the such area covered by GVP Phase 1 by reason of the Road Widening Exercise. This would mean that the area covered by GVP Phase 1 will have to be re-drawn, not only for reason of the encroachment, but also for the Applicants be expected to comply with the road hierarchy policy. Complaints under this head are mostly over the interest or entitlement of the Applicants over the individual titles to their respective plots;

(ii) that the Impugned Decision will affect the connection for utilities such as electricity and water supplies to GVP Phase 1, especially with the wording “dikekalkan pertanian”. The Road Widening Exercise would also mean that the Applicants being the purchasers of GVP Phase 1 be deprived of certain enjoyment to certain facilities. It could also be inferred that, albeit this appeared to have only been mentioned by the Applicants in passing, S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw that the Impugned Decision or the KM-IBG would mean that the Applicants lost access to the area reserved for “pitch and putt” mentioned above, a feature inducing the Applicants to purchase their plots in GVP Phase 1 from JSR some twenty years ago. Grievance under this head are mainly over the expectation or enjoyment of the Applicants over the GVP Phase 1 and the overall Genting Valley Project.

At the outset, it may be difficult to ascertain with any certainty the exact grievance of the Applicants. The Applicants had identified the Impugned Decision they sought to challenge, however each ground relied on by the Applicants for the Impugned Decision to be quashed appeared to be perfunctory. In her concluding submissions, learned counsel for the Applicants appeared to have asked only one thing: that the wordings “dikekalkan pertanian” be removed. This appeared to fly in the face of the reliefs sought for by the Applicants, which have a wider implication such that the whole KM-IBG, which is the Impugned Decision, be set aside or amended with the Applicants being accorded with the rights to be heard. By S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw according the Applicants rights to be heard could also mean that matters other than the mere removal of “dikekalkan pertanian” will be invoked.

Now on the merits of the Applicants’ case. Based on the submissions of the learned counsel for the Applicants, the Applicants’ case appeared to be founded mainly on the expert views of Mr. Ravi Shankar, supported with any other oral testimony or written expert opinion of JSR’s expert given during the KL Suit that happened to support the Applicants’ cause or narrative.

It is apparent that Mr. Ravi Shankar is not the decision maker. He does not have any say over how the area covered by GVP Phase 1 or the whole GRN40535 is to be subdivided. Being a single natural person, Mr. Ravi Shankar is in no better position, without the benefit of the comments from a variety of technical department, to dictate how the relevant authority will treat each and every application to subdivide the lands. He could only speculate or anticipate what might have transpired or occurred.

This Court cannot act upon what is really speculative in nature. To do the same would mean that this Court be clothed with power to assume the role of what indeed was the prerogative of the relevant bodies outside the judiciary branch. It is trite that an application of judicial review concerns mainly, unless fall within certain exceptions (see Petroliam Nasional Bhd v Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2003] 4 CLJ 625), the decision making process. However, in order for this Court to invoke its supervisory jurisdiction, there must first be a decision and that such decision must be one that had affected the Applicants. Matters which are speculative in nature cannot be said to have affected the Applicants.

In this regard, reference could be made to the case of Ahli-Ahli Suruhanjaya Yang Membentuk Suruhanjaya Siasatan Mengenai Rakaman Klip Video Yang Mengandungi Imej Seorang Yang Dikatakan Peguambela Dan Peguamcara Berbual Melalui Telefon Mengenai Urusan Pelantikan Hakim-Hakim v. Tun Dato' Seri Ahmad Fairuz Dato' Sheikh Abdul Halim & Other Appeals [2012] 1 CLJ 805 where Raus Sharif FCJ (later CJ) had the occasion to state: S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw [26] It is trite law that the purpose of an order for certiorari is to quash the legal effect of a decision. In England, in the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 the House of Lords held that for a decision to be susceptible to the court's reviewing powers, there must first be a decision by a decision maker or a refusal by him to make a decision, and, that decision must affect the aggrieved party by either altering his rights or obligations or depriving him of the benefits which he has been permitted to enjoy.

That being the case, this Court proceed to analyse the merits of the Applicants’ claims.

The conversion and subdivision of land are governed by the National Land Code (NLC), and such powers rest with the State Authority, typically exercised through the land office. In this regard, sections 124A or 204B of the NLC are the relevant S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw provisions. In the present case, the relevant land authority was not a party to the judicial review application.

Although the support of the local authority (MPHS) is typically needed for applications involving land conversion and subdivision, MPHS had already acknowledged the validity of the existing planning permission, KM-GV123. This acknowledgment is consistent in its affidavit.

The Applicants were aware of this position, as confirmed by a 2017 letter from the Selangor Town and Country Planning Department stating that KM-GV123 was still valid and that GVP Phase 1 development was completed in 2005. While the Applicants’ expert raised doubts about the continued validity of the letter due to later developments, MPHS’s affirmation of KM-GV123’s validity weakens that concern. The letter also noted the lapse of the pre-computation plan under KM-GV123.

Despite the Applicants possessing the 2017 letter from PLANMalaysia, there was no real attempt to dispute its contents during the proceedings. As such, their claim that the S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw approval of KM-IBG invalidated or superseded KM-GV123 is unfounded and unsupported by any concrete evidence.

The Applicants' claim that the approval of KM-IBG nullified or replaced the existing KM-GV123 is unfounded and unsupported by any factual or documentary evidence. the allegation of the Applicants that the approval of KM-IBG or the Impugned Decision would render or give the impression that KM-GV123 or the Existing KM been superseded is merely an assumption.

Regarding the pre-computation plan under KM-GV123, which had lapsed, the Applicants never claimed that it could not be re-submitted, nor did they make any attempt to resubmit it for approval.

MPHS maintains that KM-GV123 remains valid. Therefore, if an application for conversion and subdivision were to be submitted based on KM-GV123, there is no indication that it would be rejected by MPHS or the State Authority. Since no such application has been made, it is premature for the Court to speculate on how the authorities might respond.

Lastly, even if the Applicants argue they should not be affected by Phases 2 and 3 of the Genting Valley Project, this is irrelevant to the validity of the Impugned Decision (KM-IBG), which, as confirmed by MPHS, does not impact GVP Phase 1.

The Applicants alleged that a Road Widening Exercise had encroached into GVP Phase 1. However, all three Respondents confirmed in their affidavits that such encroachment no longer exists. Moreover, the KM-IGB plan in question had already been amended, making the reference number cited by the Applicants outdated, which raises the issue of whether the judicial review is now academic.

To prove encroachment, the Applicants relied on expert surveyor Mr. Yap Ping Li. However, his opinion lacked certainty, as he himself questioned whether the visible amendment was the only change. As such, the Court found it unsafe to rely on his opinion, especially when MPHS having consulted all relevant technical departments and reviewed the original layout plan, maintains there was no encroachment.

The Applicants also claimed that road hierarchy policy under the Selangor Planning Guidelines might affect GVP Phase 1 due to the road widening. They relied on Mr. Ravi Shankar’s view. However, since KM-GV123 remains valid, and no application for conversion and subdivision has been submitted, authorities have had no opportunity to assess the impact of any such policy. Therefore, the claim is premature.

Ultimately, the Applicants failed to prove any actual infringement of their substantive rights. Their grievance regarding the alleged encroachment must therefore be rejected.

On the issue of the wording “dikekalkan pertanian” found in the KM-IGB. As far as the effect of the wording “dikekalkan pertanian” is concerned in respect of any application for conversion and subdivision, the Applicants’ expert namely Mr. Yap Ping Li in encl. 42 averred that it “will likely”, to borrow the wordings of the learned counsel for the Applicant (see page 26, encl. 48), lead to the MPHS or the relevant authority’s rejection of any pre-computation plan.

Again, as alluded to earlier, MPHS had made a positive assertion that KM-GV123 or the Existing KM remained intact and that there will be no encroachment of KM-IBG into the area covered by GVP Phase 1. Therefore, this Court is of the view that such concern highlighted by Mr. Yap Ping Li is simply unfounded. It is merely speculative in nature.

Evidence suggests that the phrase was inserted at the request of the Second Respondent, not the MPHS (First Respondent). The Court clarified that it is not functioning as an appellate body and can only review what was before MPHS at the time of its decision. The Applicants failed to prove that the inclusion of the phrase impacted their rights or rendered the decision reviewable.

Based on the Notes of Proceedings, it is the case of Ms. Fu Swee Yun, who represented the submitting authority of the application for the KM-IBG, that the wordings “dikekalkan pertanian” are to reflect the status of the express condition found in the title of GRN40535, which part of GVP Phase 1 situates. The Local Plan 2020 on the other hand, which was S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw exhibited by the MPHS and gracefully pointed out by the learned counsel for the Applicants, indicated quite clearly that the area which was covered by GVP Phase 1 is zoned as residential.

In light of the materials available before this Court, the risk or concern raised by the Applicants’ expert, cannot be the sole basis for the instant application to be allowed. At any rate, the KM-IBG which have been subsequently amended had made clear reference to KM-GV123, which is the Existing KM.

On “pitch and putt” and enjoyment of land, Applicants claimed that the KM-IBG would replace the “pitch and putt” area, but they showed no legal rights over the land, which belongs to JSR. Therefore, they lack standing (locus) to raise this claim, and it fails at the outset.

Their broader complaint about the use and enjoyment of Phase 1 also fails, as MPHS affirmed KM-GV123 remains valid and S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw untouched. This is an assertion the Applicants did not convincingly dispute.

On utilities supply concerns, the Applicants feared that KM-IBG and the phrase “dikekalkan pertanian” could mislead authorities into denying utility services (e.g., electricity, water) to Phase 1. However, they failed to identify the responsible utility parties or provide any data or report to support this claim. The concern remains speculative and does not justify overturning or modifying the KM-IBG decision. Right to be heard and any other relevant Issues

The Applicants argued that they have been deprived of their rights to be heard in the MPHS’s approval of the Impugned KM or the Impugned Layout Plan.

In this regard, it cannot be gainsaid that GVP Phase 1 was located in the area where according to the Local Plan 2020, is zoned as residential. There exists a valid local plan at the time KM-IGB was granted. In such instances, the Applicants cannot S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw be entitled automatically a right to be heard. This is in consonant with s. 21(6) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (“TCPA 1976”) which reads:

If the proposed development is located in an area in respect of which no local plan exists for the time being, then, upon receipt of an application for planning permission, or, where directions have been given under subsection (3), upon compliance with the directions, the local planning authority shall, by notice in writing served on them, inform the owners of the neighbouring lands of their right to object to the application and to state their grounds of objection within twenty-one days of the date of service of the notice.”

The Federal Court in Perbadanan Pengurusan Sunrise Garden Kondominium v Sunway City (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors and Another Appeal [2023] 2 CLJ 333 had also provided a useful guidance in relation to the right to be heard. The relevant excerpt reads: S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw [207] … Yet, it appears that the local authority recognised that the TCPA ensures two points at which owners of neighbouring lands are to be given the opportunity to object and to be heard with respect to development in their area: first, during the drafting and approval process of the structure plan; and second, during the drafting and approval process of the local plan. In the absence of a local plan this opportunity would be denied to them, not to mention other segments of the public. As such, where there is no local plan, s. 21(6) and (7) fills in this lacuna to some extent as it allows the owners of neighbouring lands that second opportunity to participate in and to be heard in respect of development in the area. By complying with s. 21(6) and (7) of the TCPA the local authority appears to have recognised, at least to some degree, that the pelan dasar was not equivalent to the local plan and as a result measures were needed to fill in this lacuna. …

The Applicants can really never complain unless there is a clear departure from the Local Plan 2020. In this regard, the Federal Court in Sunrise Garden (supra) said: S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw “[235] … In cases where there is a local plan and it has been followed, there would be no cause for complaint because the local plan which follows the structure plan would have received the requisite public participation which in turn would be taken into account in arriving at the final structure plan and local plan.”

Therefore, unless the Applicants are able to establish that they have been aggrieved, the Applicants are no exception in light of section 21(6) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (“TCPA 1976”).

In the course of her submissions, learned counsel for the Applicants cited paragraph 21B(1)(c) of the TCPA 1976 which reads: 21B Layout Plans

The layout plans under paragraph 21A(1)(f) shall show the proposed development and in particular-S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw …

where the development involves a building operation, particulars of the character and appearance of buildings located in the surrounding area.

In this regard, the layout plan stated in section 21B of the TCPA 1976 was required pursuant to section 21A of the TCPA 1976 which pertains to a Development Proposal Report, a document required to be submitted under an application for planning permission under section 21 of the TCPA 1976. Section 21 of the TCPA 1976 reads: 21 Application for planning permission

An application for planning permission in respect of a development shall be made to the local planning authority and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars and be accompanied by such documents, plans, and fees as may be prescribed. S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw

If the applicant is not the owner of the land on which the development is to be carried out, the written consent of the owner thereof to the proposed development shall be obtained and endorsed on the application.

Where the development involves the erection of a building, the local planning authority may give written directions to the applicant in respect of any of the following matters, that is to say-

the level of the site of the building;

the line of frontage with neighbouring buildings;

the elevations of the building;

the class, design, and appearance of the building;

the setting back of the building to a building line;

access to the land on which the building is to be erected; and

any other matter that the local planning authority considers necessary for purposes of planning.

The applicant to whom any written directions are given under subsection (3) shall amend the plan submitted with his application accordingly and resubmit the plan within such period or extended period as the local planning authority may specify.

If the plan is not resubmitted within the specified period or extended period, the application for planning permission shall be deemed to have been withdrawn but the applicant may submit a fresh application. S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw

If the proposed development is located in an area in respect of which no local plan exists for the time being, then, upon receipt of an application for planning permission, or, where directions have been given under subsection (3), upon compliance with the directions, the local planning authority shall, by notice in writing served on them, inform the owners of the neighbouring lands of their right to object to the application and to state their grounds of objection within twenty-one days of the date of service of the notice.

If objections are received pursuant to subsection

(6), the local planning authority shall, within thirty days after the expiry of the period within which objections may be made, hear-

the applicant for planning permission; and

any person who has lodged an objection pursuant to subsection (6) and who, in lodging the objection, has requested a hearing.

…

Based on the above provisions, one could observe that in an application for planning permission, the persons involved are really only the local authority and the applicant of that planning permission.

For the aforementioned reasons, this court is not satisfied that this application for judicial review ought to be allowed. There is no illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety or disproportionality which would enable this Court to grant this application for judicial review. This court hereby dismisses this application for judicial review. No order is made as to costs. Dated: 7th August 2025 SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, SHAH ALAM S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw Counsels: For the Applicants: Ng Siau Sun, Tee Yee Man Messrs Sun & Michele Advocates & Solicitors J-2-3, Block J, Solaris Mont Kiara No. 2, Jalan Solaris 50480 Kuala Lumpur For the First Respondent: Amylya Afriena Ayzad Zaqwan Messrs Nazri Yahya & Co. Advocates & Solicitors 177-2, Jalan Lanchang Taman Sri Bahtera, Cheras 56100 Kuala Lumpur For the Second Respondent: K.F. Ee Saranyah Boopalan Messrs K. F. Ee & Co. Advocates & Solicitors N-1-2, Pusat Perdagangan Kuchai, Jalan 1/127, Off Jalan Kuchai Lama 58200 Kuala Lumpur S/N Vtbw6apI/UKrcl9bZBJzxw For the Third Respondent: Rajvinder Sing Sera Foong Chui Yeng Messrs Dennis Nik & Wong Advocates & Solicitors 68-1, Jalan Telawi